This research note investigates the reasons for the silence, disbelief, and denial of the sexual atrocities perpetrated by Hamas during the October 7 attack. It employs as a framework Christie’s “ideal victim” conceptualization as adapted by van Wijk to explain the silence of international organizations and female-led civil society groups, about the abuse of Israeli women, including ensuing debates, despite expert reports documenting sexual abuse during conflict. We first discuss the reasons for and function of rape in war to effect political and demographic changes. We then review the respective Israeli and Palestinian narratives about the origins, history, and key events in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict leading up to the October 7 attack. The evidence for the sexual violence and efforts to question/deny it is contrasted with other international cases of wartime sexual abuse in DRC Congo, Iraq, Rwanda, and Nigeria. The endorsement of the Palestinian narrative by segments of the international community, which casts Israelis as deserving victims is then discussed. We conclude that, over time, the determination of who is a victim deemed worthy (or unworthy) of the international community’s sympathy and recognition, is a political judgment. Nils Christie’s concept of the “ideal victim,” is heuristically useful but politically contingent on the vicissitudes of the international zeitgeist of the moment, but not one based on forensic evidence or documentation of gender-based crimes.

Despite the ongoing need for practitioners to identify violent extremists online before their engagement in violence offline, little is empirically known about their digital footprints generally or differences in their posting behaviors compared to their non-violent counterparts particularly – especially on high-frequency posting days. Content analysis was used to examine postings from a unique sample of violent and non-violent right-wing extremists as well as from a sample of postings within a sub-forum of the largest white supremacy forum during peak and non-peak posting days for comparison purposes. Several noteworthy posting behaviors were identified that may assist in identifying credible threats online.

What is the role played by Garrison States – actors in which domestic and external decision-making is subjected mainly to security considerations – in global politics? A wide array of literature has attributed the notion of Garrison states to a myriad of state actors. However, a robust empirical account remains vague and ill-defined. This paper lays the foundations for measuring Garrison states, introducing an index mapping their development over time, focusing on the period between 1990–2020. Based on an empirically informed discussion, the paper explores the case of the most highly Garrison state in this index – Israel.

Starting in 2015, the terrorist organization known as the “Islamic State” (IS) experienced a gradual decline in territorial control within Syria and Iraq due to military success on the part of various armies and militias, and it was finally defeated as a political entity in February 2019. As predicted by terrorism experts and announced by the leaders of IS, the gradual fall of the IS led to an increase in terrorist attacks in Europe and the US. To combat these threats, governments and their security services are relying increasingly on big data-based mass surveillance. This paper is concerned with the structure and effectiveness of big data surveillance and strategies in countering Islamist violence. We develop a Bayesian analysis of the effectiveness and performativity of big data-based surveillance and counterterrorism methods, where performativity describes the fact that sometimes the very measures used to prevent terror can themselves contribute to the creation of Islamist violence. Furthermore, we evaluate the ethical dimensions of big data surveillance under the assumption of performativity.

There is a gap in knowledge when it comes to jihadism and how it is associated with notions of masculinity. Especially empirical studies on masculinity that are based on interviews with active or former jihadists are lacking. This study seeks to analyze the role that notions of masculinity have played in different phases of jihadiship among Swedish jihadist foreign fighters, from recruitment to traveling to the conflict zone, and then eventually returning to Sweden. With a focus on heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, which is a form of hegemonic masculinity that exaggerates male stereotypical behavior such as violence and aggression, the study identifies five themes: Recruitment strategies and masculinity; from masculine failure to protecting sisters in faith; jihad and street culture; the warrior ideal; jihad, patriarchy, and brotherhood; and returning home and preventing re-emasculation. The empirical material is based on interviews with six Swedish jihadists and a former jihadist recruiter.

Are individuals who obtain their news from online news sources or from social media more likely to fear terrorism? If so, why is this the case? Based on the 2021 Chapman Survey of American Fears, this study draws two key conclusions. First, subjects who more frequently use online and social media news sources exhibit higher levels of fear of terrorism. Second, the relationship between online and social media news reliance and fear of terrorism is mediated through conspiratorial attitudes. These findings are robust to the inclusion of a host of demographic and attitudinal control variables.

How do punitive attitudes toward politically motivated offenders in the United States vary by the offender’s ideology? To address this, we conducted a survey experiment with U.S. adults (N = 1,100) in March 2023. Participants were randomly assigned to either the January 6th or Portland 2020 condition and indicated their punitive attitudes for three politically motivated offenses. Across ideologies, punitiveness toward politically motivated offenders increased with offense severity. Although some correlates of punitiveness toward typical offenders held for politically motivated offenders, most did not. Further, relationships varied as a function of offense type and offender ideology.

This article explores the relationship between natural disasters and an enduring security issue: human trafficking. Natural disasters and human trafficking deserve attention from scholars and practitioners as both human security issues and potential threats to traditional conceptions of state and international security. We argue that “disaster business” dynamics—the financial and political incentives of reconstruction—create conditions for human trafficking by increasing demand for trafficking, increasing perceived economic opportunity for trafficked individuals, and easing the ability of traffickers to operate. Analysis of data from the EM-DAT International Disaster Database and Human Trafficking Indicators Dataset supports this argument. Natural disaster increases the likelihood of a state being a trafficking destination, especially after more damaging disasters, where the government has political incentives to rebuild, and where anti-trafficking capacity is weak. Research and practice already demonstrate that natural disasters can make individuals more vulnerable to trafficking, increasing the likelihood of a state being a source of trafficking to other locations. This article demonstrates that disasters can also serve as a magnet for trafficking and points to policy options to disrupt this relationship.

The Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 was based on a ground invasion of thousands of armed terrorists into Israeli communities and army camps, but it was also the beginning of a well-planned traumatizing psychological invasion that has lasted for many months since that terrible day of mass slaughter. Hamas, one of the most experienced terrorist organizations in the arena of propaganda and psychological warfare, sought to combine physical warfare with a psychological campaign that would harm the morale of Israelis, their cohesion, desire to fight and sacrifice, confidence in the political and military leadership, and mental resilience. Continuing our previous series of studies on the media-oriented conduct of Hamas, in this study we focused on its psychological campaign during the war. The article reveals how Hamas planned its psychological operations, from the cameras used to videotape the massacre and stream it to online social media to the use of hostages and their ceremonial, mass-mediated release. The article examines some of the countermeasures that can be used to fend off psychological attacks and attempts by Israel to minimize Hamas’s success in traumatizing the home front.

This article analyses the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST from a Disaster Management perspective. The article argues that since the Manchester Arena attack in May 2017, there has been a reorientation in CONTEST away from a primary focus on Prevent towards a greater concern with Protect and Prepare. We argue this move should be welcome, given it provides the wider benefit of embedding emergency preparedness and improving multi-agency response to all types of major incident in the UK. The article analyses the inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack to identify three important lessons for the development of CONTEST.