The idea that positions in structures have no mathematically significant non-fundamental features is a constitutive trait of non-eliminative structuralism; it underpins the restricted structuralist thesis that all fundamental properties are structural. So, a seemingly straightforward strategy to uphold the eligibility of non-eliminative structuralism is to prove a formal rendition of the thesis. However, the soundness of the strategy depends on two key aspects: the thesis has to be substantial, and materially adequate. The substantiality of the thesis is predicated on the non-synonymy of fundamental and structural properties. The adequacy is predicated on the synonymy between the formal definition of fundamental properties and the intuitive content of the notion. Two remarkable abstractionists accounts claim to have proven a formal, non-trivial, consistent version of the thesis. The first one, developed Linnebo and Pettigrew, arguably fails to satisfactorily accomplish this goal. However, the more formally sophisticated second one, developed by Schiemer and Wigglesworth, succeeds. This will be focus of the paper. I am going to argue that, precisely because it proves a non-trivial formal version of the thesis, their account of fundamental properties fails to be adequate. More precisely, I will show that the formal specifications of the fundamental properties needed to ensure the substantiality and soundness of the proof undergenerate and overgenerate structural properties. In the end, it seems that there is a trade-off between substantiality and adequacy. The arguments will inform some pessimistic conclusions about the overall strategy of establishing the eligibility of non-eliminative structuralism by means of such a proof of the structuralist thesis.

For Augustine, eternity holds a special significance, because understanding this concept correctly enabled him to understand God as he truly is: eternal, stable, unchangeable. For this reason, eternity is a key point in understanding how God created all things. God is eternal, and yet he created a world that is not eternal. How is this possible? Augustine attempts to answer this question, inter alia, in his extensive commentary on Genesis, De Genesi ad Litteram. Following the first chapter of Genesis, Augustine presents God as the eternal being who speaks, acts, and knows everything, but who in no way diminishes itself in the process of creating the caelum et terram. This paper aims to present specifically the way Augustine understood divine eternity in the creation process.

This article conceptualizes denialism as a systemic phenomenon rooted in both contextual and agentive dynamics, framing it as a form of detrimental epistemic friction. Departing from reductive approaches that treat denialism primarily as misinformation or individual cognitive bias, the analysis foregrounds the structural mechanisms through which denialism is produced, sustained, and normalized. By situating denialism within weaponized epistemic environments, the analysis shows how it reinforces power asymmetries and undermines the epistemic conditions required for inclusive and cooperative reasoning. The article provides both a diagnostic framework for identifying structural epistemic vulnerabilities and a basis for restoring democratic epistemic practices in contested knowledge landscapes.

This article critically examines Paul Ricœur’s eidetic phenomenology of emotions. With reference to his early phenomenological analysis of the will, developed in his work entitled Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1950/1960), emotions will be understood as involuntary aspects involved in the essential structures of willing. My analysis will be divided into two parts. First, I will discuss Ricœur’s conception of emotions as tied to his sustained attention to the theme of embodiment as entailing activity (e.g., wanting, moving, doing) and resistance (internal and external). In particular, emotions will be considered in relation to Ricœur's first two moments of willing: decision and voluntary movement. I will show that emotions are linked to needs, motives, and values, conceived as the body’s involuntary dimensions correlated to decision, and I will explain their role as organs for effective action. In this context, I will stress the connection between emotions and imagination based on embodiment, as well as Ricœur’s rejection of the opposition between emotionality and rationality. Then, the second part will focus on Ricœur’s distinction between feelings and emotions and on his careful analysis of the difference between emotions and passions. These reflections will lead to Ricœur’s study of wonder as the most basic emotional attitude. Ricœur’s phenomenology of emotions offers rich insights for any philosophical reflection on the ubiquitous nature of emotions and emotional experiences.

This paper explores the complexity of Plato’s approach to mimesis and poetry, focusing on his critique in Republic Books II, III, and X. While Plato dismisses poetry as ethically and epistemologically flawed, his arguments reveal a deeper tension between philosophy and artistic representation. Through an analysis of Plato’s tripartite division of reality, the critique of imitation, and the ethical concerns surrounding poetry’s influence, the paper examines whether his rejection of art is absolute or if it leaves room for an alternative poetic function. Drawing on Stephen Halliwell’s interpretation, the study highlights how Plato’s stance is shaped by a broader philosophical concern with truth, knowledge, and the role of art in society. The analysis considers whether Plato’s discussion of mimesis is not merely an attack on art but part of a larger philosophical negotiation over the intersection of aesthetics, morality, and epistemology.

This paper argues that Augustine is consciously careful when associating Romans of pre–Christian times with ignorance in De civitate Dei. After proposing three types of Augustinian ignorance based on De libero arbitrio, I examine the case of exemplary pagan Romans in De civitate Dei, Book V, where their inherited deep ignorance leads to a positive assessment. Then, I examine the negative perception of Varro, representing erudite pagan Romans in the same work, linking it to Augustine’s views on the ascent of the soul to God. Lastly, a comparative analysis of Augustine’s Varro in De consensu evangelistarum, Book I and his “updated” Varro in De civitate Dei, Books VII and XIX shows that he deliberately reverted Varro to a state of ignorance after he reviewed Varro’s identification of Jupiter with the God of the Jews.

Traditional epistemology treats ignorance as a passive absence of knowledge, overlooking its active production within socio-political structures. Feminist epistemology challenges this view by conceptualizing ignorance as a politically charged phenomenon shaped by power, privilege, and epistemic injustice. Drawing on thinkers such as Lorraine Code, Miranda Fricker, José Medina, and Nancy Tuana, this paper argues that ignorance is socially constructed and ethically consequential. Integrating Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy of integral knowledge, it further expands ignorance beyond social structures to include metaphysical and ontological dimensions. The paper proposes epistemic responsibility and conscious knowing as forms of resistance that enable epistemic justice and transformative understanding.

This epistemological paper may be thought of as a joke. Still, its aim is serious enough: to show the meanings of an almost taboo topic taken in its double metaphorical sense, indicated here by capital letters: relations between the Heaven(s) and the Earth. These meanings appear as a result of a “multi-disciplinary” philosophical approach that, far from confusing us, emphasises, first of all, the different criteria of approaching the relationship between the two “types” of order mentioned in the title. These criteria are metaphysical, epistemological, logical, linguistic, and historical. However, after shedding light on the outlooks these criteria open, the meanings, according to their common metaphorical understanding, appear to be more critical.

Brouwer famously challenged the limits of mathematical knowledge by arguing that classical formalism obscures intuitive evidence. Hilbert, by contrast, considered that intuitive insights could safely be ignored as long as formal systems remained consistent and complete. Such a disagreement created a paradigmatic tension between intuitionism and formalism in how the foundations of mathematics should be regarded. This paper evaluates Hilbert’s eventual pragmatic dominance and explores, via a shared Kantian heritage, how intuitionistic insights might coexist with formal approaches. Focusing on axioms, the analysis reveals how neglecting certain epistemic values while admitting alternative forms of evidence shapes our understanding of mathematical limits.

As individuals need to define the unknown in order to tame it, by accepting or rejecting it, when it came to “the unknown neighbour”[1], from the late Antiquity to the Middle Ages, Church Fathers and theologians tried hard to build up an image of the Jew, from the perspective of what Christians considered to be their ongoing rejection of Christ. This paper follows the boundaries between knowledge and ignorance in the approach to the Jewish topic by two important figures of Christianity: Augustine and Nicholas of Lyra. Both their perspectives will be analysed according to the manner they influenced ethical and political decision-making processes, considering the fate of the Jews during the Middle Ages. [1] The topic relates to the title of Wolfram Drews’ book, The Unknown Neighbour. The Jew in the Thought of Isidore of Seville, Brill, Febr 2006.