ABSTRACT Objective To compare abortion attitudes among Whites and Latinos and identify factors shaping these views. Methods Data come from the 2020 Cooperative Election Study. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are used to assess the influence of gender, education, age, and religious affiliation. Results Gender, education, age, and religion exert similar directional effects across groups: women are more supportive of legal abortion than men, older individuals are less supportive than younger ones, and higher education predicts stronger pro‐choice attitudes. Affiliation with evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, or Catholic traditions is linked to greater opposition. Effect sizes, however, differ: the negative effects associated with age, lower education, and religious affiliation are stronger among Whites. Conclusions Findings indicate convergence in abortion attitudes among younger, more educated, and religiously unaffiliated Whites and Latinos but divergence among older, less‐educated, and more religious individuals, with Whites in these groups displaying greater opposition to legal abortion than their Latino counterparts.

ABSTRACT Objectives In this paper, we examine heterogeneity in popular perceptions of inflation in the United Kingdom and the United States. We examine heterogeneity both in terms of perceptions of the rate of inflation and, also, in perceptions of the causes of inflation. Methods We analyze opinion data from the United Kingdom (2023) and the United States (2024), which examines perceptions of the rate of inflation and its causes. Results In contrast to what might be expected given the rise in affective partisanship, we find that individual circumstances have a larger effect on driving perceptions of the rate of inflation than partisanship in both countries. Perceptions of inflation rate vary strongly and consistently by one's income: less well‐off voters in both countries see inflation as being much higher than do the better‐off. Over and above this pattern in perceptions, we also see that different voters hold different understandings of what is causing inflation. Heterogeneity in how voters understand how the economy works is distinct from that found in the literature to date. Conclusions Voters differ a great deal over what they believe to be the causes of inflation and see strong effects of ideological leanings. One implication of this finding of heterogeneity is that “one size fits all” communication strategies by parties or government, which focus on aggregate levels of inflation, are only likely to appeal to a subset of the population.

ABSTRACT Objectives The main goal of this article is to investigate individual‐level standards of evidence in the political realm. Our specific objective is to understand what evidentiary standards voters rely on when they evaluate the effectiveness of legislation passed by their in‐party versus an out‐party. Methods Our empirical investigation is based on original survey data collected in August 2023 in the United States. We presented people with a hypothetical economic policy, and we randomized policy authorship (Democrat / Republican / Bipartisan). Respondents were then asked to state what outcomes they would need to observe to evaluate whether the presented policy was effective. Results Our analysis provides two main findings. First, both Democrats and Republicans apply looser evidentiary standards for policies passed by their own party. Second, we find that policy authorship also influences the type of evidence that people rely on when they evaluate policy. Our models suggest that individuals are (1) less likely to consider long time horizons and (2) less likely to reflect on alternative causes when they evaluate the efficacy of a bipartisan economic policy compared to one authored by only one major party. Conclusion Our findings suggest that Democrats and Republicans consider their own policies as more efficacious at least in part because they have adopted less stringent standards for perceived policy success. Thus, our work highlights a novel cognitive process that contributes to partisan bias in policy evaluation.

ABSTRACT Objective Why do White supremacists mobilize in some places and not others? I answer this question within the case of the Civil Rights era South, where the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) resurged after decades of dormancy. Curiously, however, the KKK did not re‐emerge everywhere in the South, but chiefly in North Carolina. Method In order to elucidate this particular puzzle and the broader forces driving White supremacist terrorism in the United States, I analyze data on North Carolina Klan rallies from 1963 to 1967 and the number of klaverns per county in the 1960s. I implement a finite mixture model to evaluate three possible explanations of KKK activity: racial threat, school desegregation, and generational Klan legacies. Results Previous research has focused primarily on racial threat as the explanation for Klan activity, but I find that desegregation and Klan legacies outperform racial threat in explaining a majority of county‐year observations. The results encourage scholars to reassess the historical and political correlates of White supremacist activity.

ABSTRACT Objectives While studies have found that women are often more economically and politically vulnerable during economic crises and downturns, a growing body of work has found that increased female leadership can have multiple positive effects upon societies, particularly in policy areas germane to women. Bringing these contrasting dynamics to bear on financial crises, we examine the extent to which female leadership, particularly representation in the executive branch, can offset the gendered consequences of financial crises. Methods We analyze data on female membership in cabinet positions and financial crises from 1980–2019. Results Increased representation of females in cabinet‐level positions helps ameliorate some of the effects of financial crises, particularly those related to the distribution of public services and the economic opportunities provided to women. Conclusions Our findings advance knowledge on the nexus between female leadership and crises, suggesting that just as female leaders may be called up to lead countries out of crises, they may be better able to help countries navigate post‐financial crisis situations.

ABSTRACT Objective I investigate the impact of changes in the format of survey questions on reported inflation perceptions. In 2022, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand replaced a range‐based elicitation method with an open‐ended format requiring respondents to provide numerical estimates. The consequences of this shift for measured inflation perceptions remain unclear, and this paper is devoted to evaluating the impact of that design change on reported inflation perceptions. Methods Using a randomized field experiment, I compare inflation perceptions elicited through a range‐based question with those obtained from open‐ended numerical responses. I estimate regressions using ordinary least squares to assess effects on the mean and quantile regressions to examine effects on the median. Results The experiment yields three key findings. First, respondents providing open‐ended numerical estimates reported inflation perceptions that were, on average, 2.08 percentage points higher than those selecting from predefined ranges. Second, median perceptions were 2.05 percentage points higher under the open‐ended format. Third, median perceptions showed no systematic association with demographic or behavioral characteristics. Conclusions The results reveal anchoring effects in inflation recall and suggest that the previous range‐based survey design may have led analysts and policymakers to overestimate the alignment between perceived and official inflation. The findings reinforce that elicitation formats can systematically shape reported inflation perceptions.

ABSTRACT Background While Republicans have traditionally been seen as supportive of US law enforcement, after 2016, many Republicans came to view the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as politically biased due to its investigation of possible collusion with the Russian government by the Trump campaign. Aims We explore how partisanship and evaluations of Donald Trump affect evaluations of the FBI. We hypothesize that the relationship between partisanship and FBI evaluations is conditioned on individuals’ support for Donald Trump. Materials and Methods We use data from the 2020 and 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) to analyze evaluations of the FBI. For the sake of comparison, we analyze evaluations of the police as a placebo case. Results We find: (1) there is a direct negative effect of Trump support on FBI evaluations, and (2) as support for Trump increases, the relationship between Republican partisanship and FBI evaluations is significantly diminished. We contrast FBI evaluations in 2020 to evaluations of the police in 2016 and 2020, finding that both Trump support and Republican partisan identification have direct positive effects on Americans’ support for the police.

ABSTRACT Objectives Does providing arguments for or against campaign finance reform during an in‐person conversation alter attitudes toward campaign finance regulation or increase the salience of campaign finance reform? Methods We examine these questions with a pre‐registered field experiment combining canvassing conducted following the 2016 election and a three‐wave panel study to measure outcomes. We recruited a panel of registered voters in Broome County, NY, to participate in a series of online surveys. Those who responded to the baseline survey were randomly assigned to be canvassed at their homes with a gently supportive or oppositional message about campaign finance regulations or a placebo about hydraulic fracturing. Two waves of follow‐up surveys—the first 10–15 days after canvassing and the second 4–7 months later—were used to gauge the effect of canvassing on the direction of attitudes on campaign financing and the salience of the issue. Results We find anti‐reform canvassing may have produced a backlash, strengthening voters’ support for reforming campaign finance. We find clear evidence that counter‐attitudinal canvassing increased the salience of the issue both in the short and long terms. Conclusion These results about salience suggest that canvassing may evoke policy threat and boost interest in the role of money in politics.