According to research on the big-fish-little-pond effect, students with a high rank in a low rank school have more favorable self-evaluations than students with a low rank in a high rank school. We examined whether this effect extends to a racial-ethnic context. Black and White adults in the United States completed a social perception test and were told that they had a high rank in a racial group that performed poorly or a low rank in a racial group that performed well. Black participants identified more strongly with their racial group than White participants. However, the big-fish-little-pond effect occurred and was similar in size across Black and White participants. These results suggest that the big-fish-little-pond effect generalizes to a racial-ethnic context and replicates across majority and minority group members.

Knowledge hiding in academia—the reluctance to share one’s ideas, materials or knowledge with other researchers—is detrimental to scientific collaboration and harms scientific progress. In three studies, we tested whether (a) knowledge hiding can be predicted by researchers’ latent fear of being exploited (i.e., victim sensitivity), whether (b) this effect is mediated by researchers’ suspiciousness about their peers, and whether (c) activating researchers’ social identity alleviates or rather amplifies this effect. Study 1 (N = 93) shows that victim-sensitive researchers whose social identity as a “researcher” has been made salient are particularly prone to knowledge hiding. Study 2 (N = 97) helps explaining this effect: activating a social identity increases obstructive self-stereotyping among researchers. Study 3 (N = 272) replicates the effect of victim sensitivity on knowledge hiding via suspiciousness. Here, however, the effects of the same social identity activation were less straightforward. Together, these findings suggest that knowledge hiding in science can be explained by victim sensitivity and suspiciousness, and that making researchers’ social identity salient might even increase it in certain contexts.

When a romantic relationship ends, individuals often look back and wish they had done things differently. What may seem clear in hindsight, however, is often unclear in foresight. We investigated the effects of outcome knowledge on individuals’ judgments of a dating couple. In Study 1 (181 U.S. college students, 334 U.S. community adults), participants read about a couple with an uncertain relationship trajectory; then, experimental group participants received knowledge about the couple’s status six months down the road as broken up or still together, while control group participants received no outcome knowledge. Individuals who were told the dating couple broke up perceived that outcome as more likely and obvious compared to those who were not given outcome knowledge or who were told the couple stayed together. In Study 2 (262 U.S. college students, 333 U.S. community adults), participants in the experimental conditions received knowledge about the couple’s status six months later as broken up or engaged, while control group participants received no outcome knowledge. In both samples, outcome knowledge of a breakup had a negative effect on individuals’ judgments about the couple. Among community adults, but not among college students, outcome knowledge of an engagement positively affected judgments of the couple. We offer directions for future research and discuss the mechanisms by which hindsight bias might affect evaluations of our own and others’ relationships.

Reputational concern shapes various social behaviours, since having a negative reputation often results in receiving negative social consequences such as ostracism and punishment. As such, individuals are motivated to avoid displaying socially disapproved behaviour. Previous studies have found that individuals with power (i.e., those who can asymmetrically influence others) tend to show various behaviours that would damage their reputation (e.g., aggression and exploitation). Taken together, we hypothesised that power would be associated with the extent to which individuals are concerned about their reputation. More specifically, we hypothesised that those who have a high and low sense of power would experience reduced and increased reputational concern, respectively. To test the relationship, we conducted three preregistered studies with commonly used power priming methods: episodic priming (Studies 1 and 3) and semantic power priming (Study 2). In Studies 1 and 2, the power priming methods failed to significantly influence the sense of power or reputational concern. In Study 3, we sought to overcome potential methodological issues with online episodic priming, and a modified high power episodic priming was successful. Yet, we did not find evidence for the hypothesised relationship between the experimentally induced sense of power and reputational concern. Our three studies offer valuable implications not only for further research on the relationship between reputational concern and power but also for the effectiveness of power priming methods.

Past studies indicated that environmental messages incorporating binding morals (i.e., loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, purity/degradation) were effective in reducing the negative association between political conservatism and pro-environmentalism. We conceptually replicated and extended this finding through open science practices. In a pilot study, we constructed three environmental messages incorporating each binding moral based on previous relevant studies, and confirmed their validity (96 U.S. adults, 50% women). We then investigated the independent effects of these binding moral messages on pro-environmentalism across the political spectrum (705 U.S. adults, 56.6% women). Contrasting with our expectations and previous findings, we found no evidence that these environmental messages emphasising distinct binding morals were more effective than a control environmental message in attenuating the political polarisation on conservation intentions and willingness to receive more information about environmental protection. Simply adding binding morals content in environmental messaging may not be useful in promoting conservatives’ pro-environmental engagement. We further discuss future research as well as the limitations of this research.

People cry for various reasons and in numerous situations, some involving highly moral aspects such as altruism or moral beauty. At the same time, criers have been found to be evaluated as more morally upright—they are perceived as more honest, reliable, and sincere than non-criers. The current project provides a first comprehensive investigation to test whether this perception is adequate. Across six studies sampling Dutch, Indian, and British adults (N = 2325), we explored the relationship between self-reported crying proneness and moral judgments and behavior, employing self-report measures and actual behavior assessments. Across all studies, we observed positive correlations of crying proneness with moral judgments (r = .27 [.17, .38]) and prosocial behavioral tendencies and behaviors (r = .20 [.12, .28]). These associations held in three (moral judgment) or two (prosocial tendencies and behaviors) out of five studies when controlling for other important variables. Thus, the current project provides first evidence that crying is related to moral evaluation and behavior, and we discuss its importance for the literature on human emotional crying.

Using a network approach, we addressed in two studies interrelations among potential antecedents of vaccine intentions, related to both COVID-19 risk perception and epistemic beliefs (i.e., trust in scientists and conspiracy beliefs). In Study 1 and 2, we assessed a US (N = 994) and an international sample (N = 902) during spring and summer 2020. The network analysis reveals a complex interplay of factors where trust in scientists, the closest predictor of vaccine intention, is associated with conspiracy beliefs and danger perception. Furthermore, we found evidence for unrealistic optimism, with participants perceiving the risk of getting infected with COVID-19 as lower compared to the risk they attributed to other people. However, this bias was not associated with vaccine intention. Study 2 corroborated these results. The results call for a global change in the narrative which should highlight the epistemic authority of science in order to build a stronger trust in the scientific community. However, tackling trust in scientists needs a wider field of persuasion that includes conspiracy beliefs and risk perception factors.

Introduction to a Festschrift in Honour of Bogdan Wojciszke Authors Katarzyna Myślińska-Szarek Faculty of Psychology in Sopot, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Sopot, Poland Konrad Bocian Faculty of Psychology in Sopot, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Sopot, Poland Michał Parzuchowski Faculty of Psychology in Sopot, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Sopot, Poland PDF HTML XML Article info Impact Citations How to Cite License Published at 6. September 2022 https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.9643 Issue: Vol. 17 (2022) Section: A Festschrift in Honour of Bogdan Wojciszke Share: Z Myślińska-Szarek, K., Bocian, K., & Parzuchowski, M. (2022). Introduction to a Festschrift in Honour of Bogdan Wojciszke. Social Psychological Bulletin, 17, 1-4. https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.9643 More Citation Formats ACM ACS APA ABNT Chicago Harvard IEEE MLA Turabian Vancouver Download Citation Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS) BibTeX This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 4.0 International License. PlumX Dimensions Views: Total Abstract PDF HTML XML 309 153 112 19 25 Downloads: Download data is not yet available.

To be successful in social life, perceivers need to form impressions of other people's trustworthiness. Current models of this process emphasize the role of specific descriptive content–individual verbal and visual features determining trust impressions. In contrast, we describe three lines of our research showing that trust impressions also depend on consistency–a sense of fit–between features. The first line demonstrates that consistency of brief verbal characterizations increases trust judgments. The second line shows that trust judgments and behaviors are boosted by incidental consistency between the foreground and background of visual scenes. The third line observes that consistency between facial features enhances impressions of trustworthiness. In all these studies, consistency (measured via subjective ratings, reaction times, and physiological measures) positively and uniquely predicted trust judgments. Overall, our results, and related findings, show that trust impressions are not a simple sum of the contributing parts, but reflect a “gestalt.” We theoretically locate these findings in frameworks emphasizing the role of fluency, predictive coding, and coherence in social cognition.