Failed replications can jeopardize public trust in psychological science and recent findings cast doubt on the idea that self-corrections and reforms can rebuild this trust. These findings are in contrast to trust repair research that proposes changes in transparency, norms, and policies as trust repair mechanisms. This raises the question of whether the used experimental material is one reason behind these unexpected findings. Previous studies used short texts that may give too little information on the replication crisis and initiated reforms in the field. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 390), we, therefore, tested whether comprehensive information about the replication crisis and reforms increases public trust in psychology, compared to a control condition that only informs about the replication crisis. To give comprehensive information, we created an animated video for each experimental condition. After watching the video, participants indicated their trust in researchers, trust in past research findings, and trust in current research findings. As expected and in line with trust repair research, information about reforms increased trust in researchers and in current (vs. past) research, compared with information about the replication crisis and its causes only. We discuss the generalizability of our results and implications for communicating the replication crisis to the public.

While Open Science has arguably initiated positive changes at some stages of the research process (e.g., increasing transparency through preregistration), problematic behaviors during data collection are still almost impossible to detect and pose a great risk to the validity and integrity of psychological research—especially, when researchers use data collected by others (e.g., students). Exploring students’ and supervisors’ perspectives, the present registered report enlightens this “black box” of student data collection, focusing on questionable research practices and research misconduct (QRP/M). The majority of students did not report having engaged in any problematic behaviors during data collection, but some QRP/M—ranging from somewhat questionable to highly fraudulent—seem quite common (e.g., telling participants the hypothesis beforehand, participating in one’s own survey). We provide an overview of students’ reported and supervisors’ suspected data collection QRP/M, explore potential drivers for these behaviors based on the fraud triangle model (including pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations), and report how students and supervisors perceive the eligibility of student data for further uses (e.g., scientific publications). Moreover, we explore the role of the student-supervisor relationship (e.g., communication and expectations) and Open Science practices in student projects. In summary, our findings suggest the potential scientific value of data from student projects. Fostering transparent communication regarding expectations, experiences, and intentions between supervisors and students might further contribute to strengthening this prospect.

The headline findings from the Open Science Collaboration (2015)―namely, that 36% of original experiments replicated at p < .05, with the overall replication effect sizes being half as large as the original effects―cannot be meaningfully interpreted without a formal model. A simple model-based approach might ask: what would the state of original science be and what would replication results show if original experiments tested true effects half the time (prior odds = 1), true effects had a medium effect size (Cohen’s δ = 0.50), and power to detect true effects was 50%? Assuming no questionable research practices, 91% of p < .05 findings in the original literature would be true positives. However, only 58% of original p < .05 findings would be expected to replicate using the Open Science Collaboration approach, and the replication effects overall would be only ~60% as large as the original effects. A minor variant of this model yields an expected replication rate of only 45%, with overall replication effect sizes dropping by half. If the state of original science is as grim as a non-model-based (i.e., intuitive) interpretation of the Open Science Collaboration data suggests, should it be this easy to largely account for those findings using a model in which 91% of statistically significant findings in the original science literature are true positives? Claims that the findings reported by the Open Science Collaboration indicate a replication crisis should not be based solely on intuition but should instead be accompanied by a specific model that supports that interpretation.

Yesterday, at a social event, one of us was chatting with another psychologist who remarked, "It is pretty incredible to be living in a period in which we get to observe the field undergo a historical transformation. " Their comment reflects a sentiment that many share-much has changed in how psychology is done and communicated during the last decade, perhaps more than in any other. The motivation for change, and the largely grassroots activism that has advanced change, was accelerated around 2011 with events that highlighted potential weaknesses in the credibility of published evidence and claims, as well as the processes, practices, and reward systems that shape the production of evidence and claims. New approaches emerged to improve the credibility of research. Have the changes been for the better? Do the new approaches and behaviors address the right problems? What problems are being missed? What new problems are being created? In 2021, ten years after the start of the "replication crisis" in psychology, we set out to collect a set of articles reflecting on the crisis and the ensuing "credibility revolution" or reform movement. The nine articles in this special topic provide a broad and varied perspective on this tumultuous decade.

‘First impressions’ are a popular topic in social psychology. They are researched because the initial judgments of others are consequential in everyday life (such as job interviews, first dates, justice outcomes). In the context of broader concerns about the credibility of psychological science, first impressions research has developed commendable initiatives for improving reliability (open stimulus databases, international collaborations, replication studies and reanalyses). However, these initiatives can impact the validity of studying how people form first impressions. There is a long history of critiquing the usefulness of passive-observer judgments of controlled, reduced, presentations of people—and these concerns are still relevant today. Here, we highlight the praiseworthy practices improving reliability in first impressions research, before moving on to identify persistent methodological concerns in the field. This includes inadequate stimulus sampling and diversity, constrained participant response options, limited consideration of study context, and limitations of atomised presentations of target people. We identify how these methodological limitations impact theory development, how we might be over/underestimating everyday experience, and even misunderstanding social differences in autism and mental health. Finally, we identify opportunities for methodological reform, focusing on codifying instead of controlling interactions, promoting inductive, participant-led, methodologies, and asking for stronger theory development and clarity on ‘can’ vs. ‘do’ research questions. Overall, we praise reforms for improving the reliability of first impressions research, but improvements to making scientific predictions about first impressions require renewed consideration of validity.

Science is supposed to be a self-correcting endeavor, but who is “the scientific expert” that corrects faulty science? We grouped traditional conceptualizations of expertise in psychology under three classes (substantialist, implicitist, and social conventionalist), and then examined how these approaches affect scientific self-correction in reference to various components of the credibility crisis such as fraud/QRPs, the inadequate number of replication studies, challenges facing big team science, and perverse incentives. Our investigation pointed out several problems with the traditional views. First, traditional views conceptualize expertise as something possessed, not performed, ignoring the epistemic responsibility of experts. Second, expertise is conceived as an exclusively individual quality, which contradicts the socially distributed nature of scientific inquiry. Third, some aspects of expertise are taken to be implicit or relative to the established research practices in a field, which leads to disputes over replicability and makes it difficult to criticize mindless scientific rituals. Lastly, a conflation of expertise with eminence in practice creates an incentive structure that undermines the goal of self-correction in science. We suggest, instead, that we conceive an expert as a reliable informant. Following the extended virtue account of expertise, we propose a non-individualist and a performance-based model, and discuss why it does not suffer from the same problems as traditional approaches, and why it is more compatible with the reform movement's goal of creating a credible psychological science through self-correction.

A decade ago, replications were typically not conducted and appreciated in social psychology, although replications play a central role in ensuring trust in scientific fields. Without systematic replication efforts, it is not clear whether findings are trustworthy. As journals can function as gatekeepers for publications, they can influence whether researchers conduct (and publish) replications. Yet, the scholarly culture in social psychology might have changed over the last decade because numerous highly visible studies did not replicate past findings. In light of these insights and the resulting learning opportunities for the field, we predicted an increase in the expressed support for replications in the policies of social psychology journals from 2015 (i.e., the year the replication problem became widely known) to 2022. We coded whether and how replications were mentioned in the author guidelines on the websites of social psychology journals (N = 51). As expected, replications were welcomed more often in 2022 (25%) than they were in 2015 (12%), but they were not mentioned on the websites of most journals (71% in 2022 vs. 82% in 2015). An exploratory analysis suggested that journals that expressed support for replications on their websites were also more likely to publish articles about replication. Further, exploratory analyses of the journals’ TOP factors indicated similar rates of support for replications as for other rigor and transparency promoting policies. In sum, our findings suggest that appreciation for replication has increased, but is not yet part of mainstream culture in social psychology.

The authors use infrared thermography measurements of skin temperature to non-invasively assess the heat production of Brown Adipose Tissue (BAT). In species other than humans, BAT has been linked to maternal care, and may thus be crucial for understanding differences in attachment security. Whereas early BAT research measured its relative presence in the human body through radioactive tracers, researchers have recently used infrared thermography measurement of skin temperature in cold conditions to study BAT thermogenesis outside of medical facilities. Infrared thermography relies on comparing skin temperature in the supraclavicular region (where a BAT depot is located) with skin temperature in the sternal region (which contains no BAT depots) in cold conditions, when the supraclavicular BAT depot produces heat. We replicated an infrared thermography protocol, which previously reported an increase of 0.2 °C in supraclavicular (vs. sternal) skin temperature in cold (vs. control) conditions in only 7 adults, which probably led to overestimation of the effect. With a much larger sample size (N = 94 young adults) and a similar protocol, we did not find any significant variation in relative, Cohen’s d = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.50], or absolute supraclavicular skin temperature, Cohen’s d = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.52]. Using conditional random forests, we also excluded a variety of alternative explanations for why the method failed to achieve an effect. This protocol of infrared thermography cannot measure BAT thermogenesis and is thus not recommended for future studies to study individual differences in attachment.

Even when perception of risks such as earthquakes is high, preparation is generally low. Previous research shows relatively minor changes in the framing of target issues can impact decisions. In the area of risk, the terms “natural hazards” and “natural disasters” are used inconsistently. Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour as a framework, we conducted an online experiment with a large community sample from Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand (N = 604) to examine possible framing effects. Half of the participants were asked about their attitudes and intentions regarding preparing for natural hazards and half about natural disasters. We found few significant differences in mean factor scores between the two groups, suggesting that people have attitudes and perceptions of similar strength for both natural hazards and natural disasters. However, half of the factors in structural equation modelling differed in significance or valence between the two conditions and intentions to prepare were positively associated with information-seeking behaviour only for the natural hazards frame, not the natural disaster frame. These findings suggest that the way in which these issues are framed meaningfully impacts how intentions form and translate to actual behaviour. It is possible that participants understood disaster as manifested, devastating impacts of a natural event rather than the potential for impact implied by the term hazard. Such interpretations could influence perceptions of preventability, and therefore preparation. These findings have critical implications for public information campaigns and interventions aimed at increasing preparedness for the risk posed by natural hazards.

According to the “great replacement” conspiracy theory, mass immigration to Europe and the U.S. is part of a secret plot to replace the autochthonous White and Christian population with non-White and Muslim immigrants. With the aim of exploring psychological factors that play a role in believing in the “great replacement” theory, the present research focused on individual differences in reflective thinking. Using data from a cross-sectional study (N = 906), we found that cognitive reflection was negatively associated with belief in the “great replacement” conspiracy theory, even when political ideology and sociodemographic characteristics were controlled in the analysis. The findings highlight the key role of reflective thinking in countering conspiracy theories.