Narváez Mora (2024) proposes construing norms as functions. Her norms-as-functions essentially partition behaviours into two sets: correct and incorrect. I rigorously reconstruct her proposal in terms of set theory and critically examine it. I provide criteria for consistency, completeness, and closure, and connect her approach to others including Standard Deontic Logic. Doing so reveals that her proposal presupposes axiom D and reproduces a portion of more conventional deontic logics. Her norms-as-functions may be understood in terms of Kripke semantics, as direct statements of the sets of accessible and inaccessible possible worlds. These communalities with more standard approaches indicate that hers cannot do without a notion of truth. This undermines her non-cognitivist motivation for construing norms as functions. Her approach nevertheless remains interesting, especially if combined with approaches that construe norms as functions into solutions rather than correctness and incorrectness. I connect it to those of Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971) and Meier (2025) and also indicate potential uses for such approaches in improving the outputs of legal AI systems.

This article introduces a model of norms as functions. Drawing on the notions of direction of fit and maximal solution, a concept of normative function is elaborated. Norms thus understood would distribute correctness and incorrectness over classes of actions and their complements. The model is normative and therefore follows some principles of normative rationality. Three features of the norm-as-function model are presented: the non-need to deal with conditionals to represent norms, the non-existence of formal negations of norms, and the difference between the notions of blockade and antinomy. In the language of norms-as-functions, it is possible to speak of logical consequences without logical relations between functions.

Karl Loewenstein devised an ontological classification of constitutions based on his study of constitutional enactment and operation. His typology, which became particularly known in Europe and Latin America, offers valuable insights into the complex interplay between political power and constitutional norms. However, it falls short in establishing a comprehensive ontology of the nature and purposes of constitutions. Loewenstein’s factually-based or sociological approach inadequately defines constitutions ontologically. His typology lacks recognition of constitutions’ normative objectives. While Loewenstein acknowledged the need for refinement of his classification, there has not been a rigorous critique and reconstruction of his classification in terms of the normative presuppositions that it entails. In the current paper, I spotlight some fundamental shortcomings and propose necessary corrections to Loewenstein’s ontological classification of constitutions. I argue that Loewenstein overlooks the intrinsic relationship between constitutional normativity and factuality. A robust ontological classification must acknowledge that constitutions are both inherently factual and normative.

Two kinds of criticism are often raised against contemporary general jurisprudence – the part of legal philosophy dealing with the most abstract questions about law. The more fundamental criticism claims that questions discussed by general jurisprudence might actually not be interesting for other scholars. The other one suspects that, as currently practiced, it suffers from self-referentiality and lack of interest in other related discourses. In this article, I attempt to test the empirical assumptions present in both claims, using bibliometric tools. First, employing co-citation analysis, I identify the set of 169 central texts in general jurisprudence within the broader network of 713 core texts in (mostly Anglophone) legal philosophy. This provides ground for the analysis of citation flows, resulting in the following conclusions: General jurisprudence, when compared to other areas of legal philosophy, is distinctively self-referential, yet it still appears to spark some interest among other scholars, in legal philosophy and elsewhere.

The fundamental thesis of legal positivism is the social thesis, which claims that law is a matter of social facts. This thesis entails the separation thesis, which, in its weak version, claims that determining what the law is does not necessarily or conceptually depend on morality. The determination of legal content requires an interpretation of law. According to the prevailing view, interpretation necessarily involves moral evaluation. If this is true, then the separation thesis appears to be false. Legal positivists have four possible defences of the separation thesis. First, they may claim that positivism is solely a theory of legal validity. Second, they may claim that interpretation is rather an exception to the ordinary understanding of a legal text. Therefore, in most cases the determination of legal content does not require moral evaluation. Third, they may claim that canons of interpretation are parts of the law and constitute ‘the law of interpretation’ on the basis of which legal content is determined, without the need of moral considerations. Fourth, they may claim that the determination of the proper methodology of interpretation is a matter of social facts, and in particular the matter of the actual distribution of trust. Arguments for and against each of those accounts are discussed. The analysis demonstrates that none of those solutions is fully satisfactory, but the most promising is the first claim.

This article analyses Narváez Mora’s proposal to treat norms as functions. Narváez Mora started from two correct assumptions. The first assumption is that norms lack a truth value and can therefore not be handled adequately in classical logic. The second assumption is that norms attach evaluations to actions. Narváez Mora proposes treating norms as functions from actions to evaluations as correct or incorrect. There are several drawbacks to this proposal. First, the proposal ignores the difference between action types and act tokens, with the result being a lack of clarity regarding what the domain of norms as functions is. Second, the proposal does not distinguish between reasoning with rules and deontic reasoning. As an alternative to Narváez Mora’s proposal, I suggest marking a strict distinction between rule- and deontic logic. Regarding rule-logic, I recommend treating rules as logical individuals and adding an extra constraint on logically possible worlds to the effect that the conclusion of an applicable rule is true. This constraint makes a monotonic version of rule-logic possible. This article only touches on deontic logic, pointing out that most deontic arguments lead from a duty of a specific person to perform or refrain from some action type, to the evaluation of a token of this type performed by this person as (un)lawful, (im)moral, or (in)correct. Narváez Mora’s proposal is most plausible if it is read as dealing with this kind of deontic logic.