In an article entitled “News from Geneva on RTAs and WTO-plus, WTO-More, and WTO-Minus”, published in 2009, Gabrielle Marceau analyzed the jurisdictional conflicts between Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), introducing the now classic WTO-plus, WTO-more, and WTO-minus typology. At the time, she feared that the multiplication of RTAs, with their own rules and dispute settlement mechanisms, could undermine coherence and crowd out multilateral rulemaking, though she also noted their potential to serve as laboratories for future multilateralization. Today, however, in the context of a weakened WTO—paralyzed in its dispute settlement and sidelined in negotiations—RTAs function more as a safety net, replicating and reinforcing multilateral rules. The article revisits the three categories: WTO-plus provisions deepen liberalization and align with WTO goals, though they may duplicate or decentralize obligations; WTO-more provisions broaden trade agreements to cover social, environmental, and sustainability concerns, which have now moved from the margins to the core of trade policy; and WTO-minus provisions restrict existing WTO rights or obligations, posing risks to developing countries and representing an existential threat to multilateralism. The overall argument is that while the WTO’s centrality has eroded, RTAs can either stabilize and renew the global trade order through WTO-plus and WTO-more provisions or fragment it further if WTO-minus trends prevail.

This article pays tribute to Gabrielle Marceau’s lifelong commitment to linking international trade law with broader societal objectives such as human rights, gender, labor, and social standards. It examines the persistent tensions between trade liberalization rules and measures taken to guarantee and enforce human rights, particularly when they affect cross-border trade and are based on traditional concepts of “likeness” of goods or services, and differentiation between product-related and non-product-related productions and processing methods. It shows how World Trade Organisation (WTO) law exceptions—most notably Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services —have evolved into nuanced proportionality tests that grant states more policy space for pursuing legitimate societal objectives. The analysis is structured around several themes: the ways in which human-rights-related measures can be justified under WTO law; the shift in case law from rigid necessity tests to a more balanced weighing of relevant factors; and the question of which rights are most effectively pursued through trade measures, with economic and social rights emerging as the more promising than civil and political human rights. The analysis proceeds to address at which level, domestically, regionally or multilaterally, human rights are most effectively guaranteed or enforced. The article highlights that many WTO rules, for example in the Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade , or the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights , already integrate legitimate societal concerns, and that incentive-based tools often work better than sanctions. Finally, it argues for reform of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to allow more space for subsidies that pursue social or environmental objectives, and for approaches that reduce fragmentation and protectionist abuse, thereby aligning trade disciplines more closely with the promotion of human rights. The article concludes by highlighting the growing role of producers, traders and consumers in respecting human rights along international supply chains, when climate change mitigation and geostrategic rivalries pose challenges that overwhelm governments and multilateralism.

On April 2, 2025, President Trump announced “reciprocal tariffs” under the Fair and Reciprocal Plan , presented as a tool of trade justice to reduce deficits and restore balance. Duties were calculated on the basis of import and export volumes, later replaced by a flat 10% tariff for most partners and 25% on cars, with China facing the harshest treatment. The administration justified these measures as a way to cut trade deficits, combat drug trafficking, relocate production, finance social policies, and improve trade terms. The article argues, however, that tariffs are a blunt and ineffective instrument. Trade deficits are largely driven by United States fiscal imbalances, not foreign tariffs or other trade practices. Tariffs cannot replace border enforcement against trafficking, nor substitute for subsidies in industries. They are equally unrealistic as a tool for financing social policies. Moreover, costs are passed on to Unites States consumers and disrupt global value chains, harming United States industries themselves. Legally, the new tariffs breach US WTO commitments, violating bound duty levels and non-discrimination rules. Their effects extend beyond the Unites States: retaliation from partners like China, uncertainty in global markets, and discriminatory “deals” undermine the WTO system. Far from restoring reciprocity, these tariffs represent a unilateral assault on multilateral trade rules.

Dans l’affaire IHRDA et APDL c Cameroun, le Comité africain d’experts sur les droits et le bien-être de l’enfant a prononcé une décision d’irrecevabilité motivée par la présentation tardive de la communication et le défaut de tentative d’épuisement des voies de recours internes disponibles. Défavorable aux plaignantes, cette solution n’en est pas moins conforme aux exigences procédurales prévues par le droit international des droits de l’Homme, dans le respect du principe de subsidiarité. Cela étant, ces exigences sont-elles véritablement adaptées à la situation particulière de victimes de mariage forcé précoce ? D’une part, incapables de consentir à leur mariage, les mineurs ne sont pas davantage capables d’ester en justice avant leur majorité. À cet égard, leur représentation devant le juge interne par des parents à l’initiative de l’union n’est qu’illusoire. D’autre part, l’accès à la majorité ne suffit pas, en pratique, à l’accès effectif au juge. Souvent retirées des bancs d’école au profit des bans de mariage — en témoigne la décision du même jour Legal and Human Rights Centre and Centre for Reproductive Rights c Tanzanie — les victimes de mariage précoce peuvent trouver les bancs de la justice hors de portée. Si la capacité d’ester en justice s’acquiert à la majorité, le processus de résilience de victimes longtemps privées d’éducation et peut-être même toujours mariées contre leur gré peut durer dans le temps. Dans ce contexte singulier, la perspective d’une approche pro victima implique d’analyser les conditions de recevabilité au cas par cas afin de savoir si la passivité des plaignantes relève de l’indifférence ou de l’ignorance.

Les pays francophones comme d’autres États, ont besoin des fonds multilatéraux et bilatéraux pour leur développement. Ces financements obéissent à des règles comptables d’éligibilité à L’aide publique au développement, de conditionnalité et de concessionnalité inspirées d’un cadre conceptuel des comptes publics qui incarne une souveraineté comptable opposables aux emprunteurs. Cependant, chaque État emprunteur a un cadre normatif budgétaire et comptable qui fait face à celui du contributeur bilatéral européen et que ce dernier intègre dans les instances multilatérales par sa forte contribution à ces institutions. Par la méthode analytique, l’étude qui cible la France comme contributrice bilatérale présente également dans les institutions multilatérales par ses participations, la Côte d’Ivoire et le Congo-Brazzaville comme bénéficiaires, montre la spécificité de la relation juridique entre le cadre conceptuel des comptes publics et l’accessibilité aux fonds multilatéraux et bilatéraux pour le développement. Instrument d’expression de la souveraineté comptable, le cadre conceptuel des comptes publics durcit l’accessibilité des pays emprunteurs aux fonds multilatéraux et bilatéraux. En affirmant le statut comptable du pouvoir souverain, le cadre conceptuel des comptes publics renforce la souveraineté du contributeur bilatéral, celle des institutions multilatérales et affaiblit celle des pays financés. Ces derniers gagnent tout de même en performance budgétaire à un certain niveau de la chaîne de la dépense publique.

In 2020, the World Bank established the Dispute Resolution Service (DRS) to address complaints from people adversely affected by its projects. The DRS enables them to engage directly with borrower States responsible for project implementation, using mediation, fact-finding, and other methods. As outlined in Section I, this paper examines how the DRS strengthens affected people’s access to remedies and how the DRS should further strengthen such access. Section II presents the standards that underpin the access to a remedy provided by the DRS. Legal standards derive from the Bank’s founding treaty, customary international law, and potential immunities before national courts. Policy standards derive from the Bank’s three remedial mechanisms. First, the 1993 Inspection Panel investigates the Bank’s compliance with its policies, based on three principles: accessibility, effectiveness, and independence. Second, the 2015 Grievance Redress Service facilitates corporate-level dispute resolution. Third, the Bank created the DRS solely to enhance access to remedy through dispute resolution at the organization’s highest level. Section III proposes improvements to the DRS for each principle. Regarding accessibility, the Bank should expand participation opportunities for affected people, including by guaranteeing minimum access to project information. Regarding effectiveness, the Bank should require the “consistency” of dispute resolution agreements with its policies, the default publication of agreements, and mandatory verification of agreement implementation. Regarding independence, the Bank should ensure greater options in sequencing compliance review and dispute resolution processes and introduce concrete measures to mitigate the DRS’ institutional interest in outcomes. Section IV concludes that the DRS’ procedural shortcomings raise doubts about its ability to meaningfully enhance access to remedies, aligning instead with the contemporary trend in international law toward flexible dispute resolution. More broadly, the DRS illustrates the relevance of refining global administrative law theory through a transnational perspective that considers the distinct political, institutional, and economic forces that shape enforcement mechanisms.

La décision de la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ) sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Russie dans l’affaire l’opposant à l’Ukraine présente plusieurs aspects uniques1. La demande inédite de l’Ukraine d’une déclaration de non-violation, acceptée par la Cour malgré sa nouveauté, marque un tournant significatif fondé sur une lecture renouvelée de la clause compromissoire inscrite à l’article IX de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Convention sur le génocide)2. Toutefois tant l’argument des circonstances particulières que le découpage artificiel de l’affaire en deux volets exposent la Cour à des critiques quant au risque d’instrumentalisation auquel elle s’expose.