ABSTRACT Our study contributes to the representative bureaucracy theory literature by testing the significance of majority identity, masculinity, and partisanship on responsiveness to social unrest. This study analyzes the responsiveness of police chiefs within the first week of the U.S. Capitol attack in Washington, D.C., on January 6th, 2021. Data are retrieved from social media accounts of police chiefs within local jurisdictions with at least 200,000 residents. An event history analysis is used to understand why some officials responded faster than others or not at all. Findings reveal that White male police chiefs and those with a Republican mayor were less responsive, while White male police chiefs were more responsive in localities with larger White populations due to the presence of minoritized mayors. The study adds to the literature by expanding representative bureaucracy theory to include the role of whiteness and masculinity, as well as mayoral identity, in shaping bureaucratic responsiveness.

ABSTRACT As governments increasingly digitalize client encounters, there are growing concerns that standardized platforms may reduce bureaucratic responsiveness, particularly for historically underserved communities. We examine whether frontline workers help close that gap through their use of civic‐tech platforms. Analyzing 8037 service requests from Newark's Open311 system (2019–2022) using machine learning classification and spatial analysis, we find that frontline workers submitted nearly 25% of all requests on this platform. Worker submissions concentrated in low‐income areas, while resident requests clustered in more affluent neighborhoods. Interviews reveal that human‐centered design features encourage frontline worker reporting, while their community commitment and organizational priorities explain proactive engagement in underserved areas. We conceptualize this pattern of engagement as digitally afforded discretion, where frontline workers leverage platform features to address community needs before formal complaints arise. Our findings suggest that human‐centered digital platforms can complement frontline discretion, offering novel insight into how technology and human judgment interact to shape equity and responsiveness.

ABSTRACT Emerging technologies have far‐reaching effects on public governance. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one such technology. Yet, given concerns of privacy, accountability, and bias with AI use, public managers grapple with deciding if, and to what extent, AI should be included in delivering public services. Current research has made attempts to unpack the determinants of AI use in these settings, but with greater focus on the technology rather than its users. The current study shifts focus to citizens' perceptions and asks what the conditions are under which citizens would embrace high‐performing AI government service delivery. The study leverages a sample of 612 U.S. residents in two experiments that investigate public sentiments towards AI in public service contexts where it is implemented well. Findings reveal citizens' nuanced support for AI in simplifying complex programs delivering tailored services and reducing fraud. These insights can guide decision‐making on AI use in public service delivery.

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

ABSTRACT A central aim of contracting is to introduce competition into public service delivery. Public organizations are facing calls to generate more competition for their contracts, yet there is conflicting evidence about the effects of competition in practice. This research aims to explain some of those mixed findings by investigating the effects of different levels of competition on contract management. It examines two crucial elements of contract management that previous literature has shown can substantially influence performance outcomes: flexibility and monitoring. In highly contested markets, relationships are likely to be shorter and the payoffs from more restrictive styles of management are higher, thereby encouraging managers to be less flexible and monitor more. Findings, from an online survey experiment with 576 public managers, indicate that high competition does indeed lead to less flexibility and more monitoring, while low competition leads to less intense monitoring.