In Republic V 474b3–480a13, Plato initiates a discussion that is intended to define who the philosophers are that must rule the city. In the context of this discussion, we are told that the sight-lovers are among the pretenders to the title of the philosopher. This paper addresses the following questions about the sight-lovers: “Who are the sight-lovers of Republic V?”; “Do they maintain some kind of coherent ontological position?”; and, “If they do, then what is its content, and how does Plato attempt to rebut it?”. In particular, it is argued that: (1) The sight-lovers of Republic V maintain that the objects of our everyday experience are bundles of things such as colors and shapes; (2) Plato presents his own position about the nature of concrete particulars in the Phaedo (Phd. 102a11–103a3); (3) This discussion in the Phaedo may facilitate our effort to place the sight-lovers thesis in its proper setting and also parse its finer details; and (4) Plato spells out his critique of the sight-lovers’ position in Republic VII (R. 523a5–524d4) in the context of his treatment of the summoners.

George Pachymeres’ Commentary on the second part of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides is from a codicological point of view a continuation of the lost part of Proclus’ Commentary, but it can be characterized in its essence as an autonomous exegetical effort by the polymath and Aristotelian philosopher that aims to deal with the demanding text of the Parmenidean hypotheses by codifying this argumentative system of Platonic dialectic. The purely logical identity of his interpretation, which is far from being influenced by the Neoplatonists’ metaphysical and theological approaches, is manifest through the logical system of the “24 arguments” that he borrows though from Proclus’ interpretation and tries to apply ad hoc to the Platonic system of hypotheses, following it as closely as he can. This article maps the landscape of Pachymeres’ hermeneutical effort, i.e., it tries to structure in a clear and complete scheme the skeleton of his methodological approach on the whole of Parmenides’ arguments, by seeking to establish the appropriate correspondences with Proclus’ logical system of the “24 dialectical modes” and by following step by step the course of the Byzantine commentator’s reasoning strategy, especially his ingenious adjustments between Plato’s demanding text and Proclus’ schematization-model. To what extent, then, would the skeleton of the system of hypotheses that Pachymeres reconstructs from the Proclean schemes be perfect or sufficiently robust? This problem is the starting point of the present study.

In addition to the existing source editions and translations, several new works on the so-called Presocratics (i.e., early Greek philosophers) have been published (see bibliography). While this study continues our work on the translation of the doxography and fragments of these authors, this paper presents Anaximander and Anaximenes of Miletus, who dealt with the same issues of principles, cosmogony, astronomy, and meteorology. We deal with them separately, but in a similar arrangement of sources, slightly different from previous editions, taking into account as instructive the longest of all testimonies about Anaximander and Anaximenes, namely the accounts of Hippolytus of Rome in Refutatio omnium haeresium I 6–7. As previously with Thales, we approach these Milesians in a selective and systematic arrangement of testimonies and those few fragments which, although considered inauthentic by many researchers, we find extremely interesting, rather reliable, and worth quoting. For greater clarity, we have introduced appropriate thematic headings in our translation of these texts, which is as close to the original as possible. The brief information below may serve as an introduction to a new reading of the sources on Anaximander and Anaximenes of Miletus.

According to the apophthegm reported by Plutarch and Stobaeus (SSR V B 61), Diogenes the Cynic accused Plato of ‘causing pain to no one’ during his long philosophical career. This article considers whether this critique of Plato is accurate by examining previous interpretations and proposing others. First, Plutarch understood the ‘pain’ required by Diogenes as a psychological motivator that drives the young to study hard. This interpretation, however, is implausible because Plato does not seem unfamiliar with this treatment of ‘pain’. Second, Stobaeus connected pain with parrhēsia, likely supposing that a philosopher should tell the truth even if it hurts his audience. Nevertheless, his account needs further clarification since Plato also emphasises the importance of parrhēsia. To resolve the problem, this article proposes a distinction between two kinds of parrhēsia: ‘telling the truth’ and ‘openly making abusive remarks’. Unlike Plato, the Cynics occasionally resort to the latter, which causes sufferers completely passive pain. This kind of pain is certainly alien to Plato’s philosophy, which presupposes some active participation by sufferers. Finally, the article introduces the Cynic concept of askēsis to illuminate another aspect of ‘philosophical pain’. While Plato confines his askēsis to mental labour or moderate physical exercise, the Cynics also demand that individuals undergo physical pain in the course of askēsis. In conclusion, the article argues that Diogenes’ objection to Plato is apt, at least in light of two antithetical natures of ‘pain’: passive/active and physical/mental.

In the Platonic Symposium the rhetorician Pausanias celebrates celestial love, directed to a greater degree to the soul rather than the body and which involves the lover and the beloved in the practice of a common virtue. This passage has been put in parallel with Alcibiades I, where Socrates maintains that authentic love is directed not towards the body but the soul. He says he loves Alcibiades with such a love: therefore he urges the young man to correspond to him by seeking to be “as beautiful as possible”, with an inner beauty that, unlike that of the body, will not fade. Undoubted textual analogies allow us to link the two texts: nevertheless the meaning of Socrates’ argument in Alcibiades I seems much deeper than that of Pausanias. It is based on the demonstration that man’s true self is the soul, capable of love and lovable only if is the object of constant care (epimeleia heautou). If anything, it is this philosophical thesis – as also the Phaedrus demonstrates as Platonic – that can establish the authenticity of Alcibiades I.

The purpose of my paper is to investigate some aspects of Proclus’ foundation of the theological role of mathematics. In the first section, I briefly discuss the question of the foundation project of mathematics in Plato, as I believe it is also from the dialogues that Proclus derives the crucial status of mathematical entities in the ascent of the soul. In the second part, after presenting the four ways that Proclus recognizes as theological and pointing out that mathematics is made part of theology through images, I analyze in particular the theological power of two geometrical images, that of the divided line and that of the circle. Lastly, the third section firstly emphasizes that the theological status of mathematics finds its ontological validation in the Proclean theory of mathematical entities as intermediates. Then, it focuses on the intelligible-intellectual roots of the intermediates themselves, which ensure that the soul’s ascent is surely directed toward the highest realities.

In this paper, we examine the concept of evil in Early Stoicism, which is assessed alongside the concepts of good and indifferents within the Stoic classification of things that partake in essence. Adopting the Socratic theory of virtue, which holds that virtue can be taught, the Stoics divided humanity into two categories: the wise (those who act according to reason and are virtuous) and the fools (those who lack reason and are, therefore, ignorant and bad). In this framework, they introduced the notion of the ‘human in progress,’ a state attainable by all who make continuous and diligent effort. If this model holds true, why then do evil people exist, and why does evil persist in the world? The Stoics, we believe, ultimately provide a solution to this problem, which we aim to explore and substantiate in this paper.

It is well known that Aristotle’s philosophical legacy has not survived in its entirety to our time. A large part of it has been lost, and only scattered fragments, paraphrases and testimonies cited by other ancient philosophers have survived. The analyses carried out in the article focus on what the Stagirite says about pleasure in fragments of lost writings, especially in the Symposium, On Pleasure, Protrepticus and On Justice. The aim of the analyses is to establish whether or not the statements in these fragments can be correlated with statements from Aristotle’s surviving works, and whether or not they are compatible with them. Thanks to the analyses, it is also possible to show that the hypothesis that Aristotle’s philosophy may have been subject to evolution is not tenable at least as far as the doctrine of pleasure is concerned.