The landslide victory won by the incumbent centre-left Labor Party in Australia's May 2025 federal election capped a remarkable turnaround for a government that just months earlier appeared vulnerable to defeat at the hands of a conservative opposition that had flirted with populist appeals. We argue that Labor's re-election was down to both good timing and favourable long-term political dynamics. Drawing on electoral data, campaign discourse, and existing scholarship, we argue that the conduct and outcome of the election confirmed the continuing symbiosis between Australia's pro-globalization elite consensus and public preferences on key issues like free trade and migration. Australia's electoral system, economic geography, and path dependencies created by past liberalizing reforms have limited the capacity for anti-globalization or nativist parties to acquire an agenda-setting position in mainstream politics. The opposition Liberal- National Coalition's perceived ideological alignment with Trumpism alienated key demographics, while Labor's cautious centrism dovetailed with voters' preference for stability as the global impacts of Trump 2.0 loomed large. Yet, we caution that chronic challenges of unaffordable housing and stagnant productivity could erode the social and economic foundations of Australia's open, liberal consensus if not addressed by the Labor government's forward reform agenda.

This article examines 150 years of trade between Japan and Russia, identifying common structural features, factors contributing to uneven dynamics, and lessons for addressing the current trade and economic crisis. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of international conflict theory, path dependence, comparative advantage, and gravity models of trade, this study analyzes Japanese foreign trade statistics to show that the structure of bilateral trade has remained remarkably stable—yet consistently vulnerable to recurring disruptions. Key historical characteristics of Japan-Russia trade include a persistent dependence on political conditions, a low share of bilateral trade in each country's overall trade volume, a consistent exchange of Japanese industrial goods for Russian raw materials, and a geographic concentration in Russia's Siberian and Far Eastern regions. The analysis identifies five major crisis periods (1904–1905, 1918–1921, 1938–1956, 1991–1992, and 2022–present), demonstrating that post-crisis recoveries have typically been driven by pragmatic economic cooperation, expanded cultural and humanitarian exchanges, and the temporary de-escalation of political and territorial disputes. The trade crisis that began in 2022 appears to be entering a phase of tentative stabilization, beyond which a prolonged recession remains the most probable scenario. The study recommends that, when the time comes for the gradual easing of sanctions and the rebuilding of international trust, recovery efforts focus on mutually beneficial sectors, the reintegration of energy infrastructure, renewed cooperation in resource protection, and the combatting of illicit trade.

Studies on civilian reactions to war, violence, and criminality offer valuable insights into how individuals and groups assess and cope with danger, but they rarely consider reactions to simultaneous challenges from control by armed groups and common crime. Moreover, they have rarely been analyzed in the context of living under a dictatorship. Drawing insights from 114 in- depth interviews from war-torn Myanmar/Burma in the wake of the 2021 military coup, we argue that civilian responses to various forms of insecurity and threats against their physical survival vary depending on whether they reside in areas controlled by the military junta or contested among different state and non-state actors. We find that in junta-controlled areas, citizen responses tend to be primarily individual, while collective efforts to mitigate violence are scarce, and if they exist, tend to focus on religious and cultural activities and socioeconomic survival. Yet, relatively lower levels of violence and higher political stability allow people to engage in long-term planning, which permits a small number of individuals to engage in limited forms of "quiet" or strategic support for resistance. By contrast, in contested areas, citizens engage in a wider range of responses, including more collective organization to mitigate violence or resist the junta. Yet, given relatively higher levels of violence, individuals are forced to react to constant short-term threats to security in ways that erode organizational and social bonds. Across both types of control, people face increasing common crime, fear, and erosion of social trust, which make taking precautionary measures for protection a prevalent response regardless of levels of armed control. This study contributes to the literature by analyzing actions that are often examined separately (daily individual responses to threats and collective efforts of resistance/adaptation), demonstrating the nuanced and sometimes contradictory ways people cope with threats to their survival.

Singapore's 2025 general elections further consolidated a three-tiered hierarchy of opposition parties. The Worker's Party emerged as the strongest opposition party with the best results, winning 10 elected seats and 2 non- constituency seats for a total of 12 seats in the 99-seat Singapore legislature, with a vote share of 50.1 percent against the ruling People's Action Party in the constituencies that it contested. The Singapore Democratic Party and the Progress Singapore Party solidified their status as best accompanying bridesmaids. Seven other opposition parties were even further behind in their vote shares. Singapore voters' obsession with valence perceptions of opposition parties continues to explain why the Workers' Party remains so successful and why the other opposition parties continue to falter.

This study examines host-site political and socioeconomic conditions under which China-funded projects in Malaysia shape local acceptance and avoid contestation. Employing a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of 35 China-funded projects and 60 in-depth interviews, this study identifies multiple interrelated causal pathways to locally accepted investment. Two conditions consistently emerge as necessary to minimize contestation: 1) strong political alignment between federal and state governments, and 2) the deep integration of the local workforce. Notably, the absence of bumiputra equity or employment also emerges as a necessary condition, challenging prevailing assumptions on the role of Malaysia's affirmative action policies. This study finds that, rather than relying on mandated inclusion, firms that engage with bumiputra communities through externally oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives are more likely to achieve sustained social acceptance. Furthermore, a combination of substantive technology spillovers and proactive community-based engagement significantly enhances local receptivity. Together, these findings offer valuable insights for policymakers, international investors, and scholars concerned with the governance of FDI in politically plural and institutionally complex settings. The study highlights the critical need for adaptive localization strategies that align commercial goals with the social and political fabric of host countries, both in Malaysia and across the broader Asia-Pacific region.

This article examines South Korea's 2024–2025 constitutional crisis, triggered by President Yoon Suk-yeol's unconstitutional declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024. The analysis focuses on three key aspects: the role of election fraud conspiracy theories in motivating anti-democratic actions, the dynamics of democratic resistance, and the challenges of maintaining cross-partisan pro-democracy coalitions. The crisis revealed both democratic vulnerabilities and resilience in South Korea's political system. While initial responses successfully prevented democratic backsliding through rapid mobilization and cross-partisan cooperation, subsequent polarization around election fraud claims complicated democratic recovery. The case offers crucial insights about democratic resilience, particularly highlighting the importance of immediate response to backsliding attempts and the challenge of maintaining broad pro-democracy coalitions against emerging partisan divisions.

Since the 2010s, China has been increasingly assertive in its sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the disputed islands in the South China Sea (hereafter SCS). Specifically, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimizes its ownership of these two places based on the glory of China's imperial past, shared Confucian traditions between the Chinese and Taiwanese people, and the humiliation of its colonial subjugation. Meanwhile, Beijing has been reticent about its northeastern territory ceded to Russia, as it aims to maintain stable bilateral relations. China's official narrative and foreign policy behaviour pose the following empirical puzzles: How does the Chinese government invoke feelings of glory and humiliation (or lack thereof) in constructing its claim over what it views as its indivisible territory? What role does Beijing's use of history play in forging its great power identity? This study advocates a long-term perspective on how political actors represent territory in ways that are indivisible, thereby providing insights into China's grand strategy, foreign policy posture, and its view on territorial integrity. The organization of this article is as follows. First, it engages the current literature on constructivism, territorial disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. It then proposes a framework of historical statecraft for understanding how the CCP institutionalizes the nation's past with an official narrative of glory and humiliation. Second, it unpacks the notion of indivisible territories in China's narrative, and it examines official statements from the country's top leadership, high-level diplomats, and government officials, showing how indivisibility is a socially constructed process. Third, this study provides a structured comparison of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island, Taiwan, and the SCS. Finally, it concludes with thoughts on the direction of future research on foreign policy analysis and offers policy implications for countries in Asia and beyond.

The "war on drugs" under former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte killed thousands of Filipinos between 2016 and 2022, yet the campaign was famously popular. Was public approval of the national anti-crime campaign real? Some scholars argue that public support for the drug war and Duterte was evidence of penal populism. Yet other studies suggest that state- sponsored violence produced fear. While state violence can constrain public opinion, its effect in hybrid regimes remains underexplored. I hypothesize that survey respondents in locales that experienced higher levels of violence are more likely to voice false support for the president and his drug war. This study compares survey responses using both conventional direct questioning as well as the list experiment, an indirect survey method intended to reduce possible dishonesty. This approach measures social desirability bias (SDB), or the distortion of survey results over sensitive questions. This study shows that presidential popularity is inflated by about 40 percentage points. However, violence intensity does not explain preference falsification in respondents' support for the president. Moreover, SDB in public approval of the anti- crime campaign (eight percentage points) was not statistically significant. Unexpectedly, respondents in areas that experienced high levels of violence were less likely to produce SDB for the drug war, although SDB is likely to be higher in urban areas. Popular support for the "war on drugs" is plausible: rather than being driven by fear, it generated widespread approval. The research findings discussed in this article provide mixed evidence for the penal populism thesis: presidential popularity is inflated, yet support for the drug war is genuine.

Since the eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in 2018, Japan has emphasized its Pacific diplomacy within the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework (FOIP) to increase its presence and counter China's growing influence. Japan's FOIP concept has not only a confrontational but also a cooperative approach toward China. However, some Pacific Island countries (PICs) suspect that the FOIP framework might involve a containment strategy against China. As PICs attempt to maintain neutrality and non-alignment, they are reluctant to endorse Japan's FOIP. By examining the challenges of Japan's FOIP-based Pacific diplomacy, this paper concludes that to enhance its presence and ultimately contain China's growing influence in this region under FOIP-based diplomacy, Japan should engage in sufficient dialogue, explaining its ideas and understanding PICs' perspectives on Japan's FOIP and thereby dispelling PIC concerns. Furthermore, this study suggests building a tailor-made framework, a Japan-PIC FOIP, wherein both parties are involved in its development.

This empirical study explores the reasons Filipino female entertainers trafficked to South Korea cannot seek justice as victims in Korea. To answer this question, the article considers the cause of trafficking to be the structural coercion embedded in unsynchronized migration policies in the Philippines and Korea. By examining the discrepant views and power asymmetry of these two countries, I show how they have led to the development of unsynchronized migration policies that result in knowledge gaps in the processes of recruiting and transporting migrants. These gaps allow the conflation of legal and illegal operations and the alignment of government officials and private agents. Consequently, women are deceived into engaging in prostitution in Korea through nonconsensual illegal exits from the Philippines coordinated by corrupt immigration officers and illegal brokers. This article also argues that unsynchronized migration policies lead to systemic coercion, in which the deception, intimidation, and forced migration of women by private entities align with state laws and regulations. This creates path-dependent journeys that affect women's after-migration situations. The cycle of deception, intimidation, exploitation, and deportation of women has deprived them of exit options from abusive scenarios and from the right to seek justice in Korea, discharging the Korean government of its responsibility to the victims of trafficking. This study pushes the debates on prostitution and trafficking into considering the coalescence of state, legal, and private entities in transnational migration, revealing how state violence against women is hidden behind the concept of victim consent and the malicious conduct of business entities.