Volume 62, Number 1

This article explains how developers and users of large language models (LMs) may be treated by English and Canadian libel law. LMs could be economically significant, and the liability environment they exist in will affect where they are developed, who accumulates wealth from their development, and who bears the burdens of any negative consequences of their development. Understanding the existing liability environment allows both developers and policy makers to make informed decisions—about which jurisdiction to offer services and what to prioritise, for the former, and about whether the existing law serves desired policy ends, for the latter. LMs also raise challenging legal issues because they undermine common-sense assumptions that are baked into existing legal doctrines. Although the discussion may have broader implications for tort law generally, this article focuses on the doctrine and theory of libel. Legal problems lie lurking in those doctrinal weeds and are helpfully revealed by the contrast between Canadian and English law. Minor jurisprudential differences in decisions from yesteryear may have significant consequences if they are followed when text is generated by LMs rather than by people.

Because eviction from rental housing can lead to highly negative outcomes, including homelessness, trauma, neighbourhood instability, and deepening inequities, it is important to understand the reasoning processes employed by tribunals when they wield the power of eviction. This article conducts a critical reading of decisions of the Office of Residential Tenancies, Saskatchewan’s residential tenancies tribunal, that deal specifically with urgent landlord applications for immediate eviction based on tenant behaviours that are alleged to be criminal, illegal, frightening, or dangerous. Coining the term “crim-eviction” to help describe this category of decisions, the article identifies that residential tenancies tribunals like the Office of Residential Tenancies are actively involved in the governance of perceived crime and disorder, as well as the discipline and management of marginalized tenants, through eviction processes. Whether or not criminal or illegal activity is alleged, the crim-eviction cases mobilize tropes and fears about crime, disorder, risk, and danger to rationalize the expulsion of tenants from their homes. Hearing officers draw on these familiar discourses and tropes, applying them in an administrative law context where formal rules of evidence do not apply, where appellate scrutiny is rare, where tenants almost never have legal assistance, and where tenants are already highly marginalized. Focusing on an eighteen-month period of eviction decisions, the article identifies several interrelated themes to support its arguments. First, it argues that the disciplinary lens adopted by the tribunal is characterized by a reliance on a conceptual binary that pits “good” tenants against “problem” tenants. Second, it shows how the tribunal uses ideas about “fear” and “risk” as justification for eviction. It shows that the tribunal is quick to associate evidence of police involvement with immediate eviction orders, and that it often views tenants who claim to be victims of harm with skepticism, depicting them instead as being responsible for the actions of those who have caused harm. The ideology of control taken up by the tribunal also manifests in a reliance on concepts from quality of life policing discourses, wherein damaged property is easily seen as a sign of disorder requiring eviction. Finally, the analysis identifies disciplinary attitudes towards even those tenants who are not evicted and the utilization in some cases of types of “civil probation” orders that serve to increase landlord power and further entrench tenant precarity.

CANADIAN LAW JOURNALS have never been known for going out of their way to facilitate direct conversations between legal scholars working on cognate issues. However, if there is anything to the old liberal adage that the truth is more likely to emerge from the civil yet robust debating of competing ideas, the lack of opportunities for holders of rival views to respond, in real time, to each other’s arguments is deplorable. Therefore, I wish to commend the Osgoode Hall Law Journal for convening this timely scholarly exchange on the problematic phenomenon of racial profiling in Canadian policing and, more specifically, the under-explored question of how courts should respond to it in view of Canada’s distinct legal framework. I also wish to thank Terry Skolnik, Fernando Belton, and Jeanne Mayrand-Thibert (hereinafter SBMT) for agreeing to engage in this dialogue.

Racial profiling is one of the most enduring problems in policing. Yet it remains largely under-theorized, which generates important theoretical and practical implications. Racial profiling tends to be construed as an arbitrary detention rather than a form of unconstitutional discrimination. For this reason, the section 15 Charter right to equality plays little to no role in most leading cases on racial profiling. The legal framework that governs racial profiling lacks clarity and can be applied inconsistently. And the remedial landscape associated with racial profiling claims has evolved minimally. This article advances a novel approach to racial profiling that addresses these shortfalls. It demonstrates why racial profiling is wrongful primarily because it embodies discrimination that violates the section 15 Charter right to equality, and secondarily, infringes liberty or privacy interests, and in so doing, breaches other constitutional rights. It offers a simplified legal framework for how courts can better approach racial profiling in constitutional criminal procedure. Drawing on the republican theory of freedom (or republicanism), it shows why racial profiling results in domination—meaning vulnerability to unchecked threats of interference— that courts fail to control. In doing so, it deepens our theoretical understanding of racial profiling and its connection to equality and liberty. The concluding parts of this article contend that courts can incorporate two innovative remedies that can better prevent and address racial profiling: structural injunctions and constitutional settlement agreements. Ultimately, this article offers a new path forward for how racial profiling can be approached in a manner that better safeguards individuals’ fundamental rights and interests.

This article is about the misunderstood history of a Canadian law for determining Indian status, the decades-long struggle to remedy sex discrimination in the law, and the significance of judges writing history. Since before Canada’s confederation until amendments to the Indian Act in 1985, Indian women, unlike Indian men, lost their Indian status if they married non-Indians. Even with the 1985 amendments, the law still disadvantaged people who traced their Indian status along the female line. Facing a challenge to the law based on sex discrimination, the government argued that the enduring disadvantage to women was the only way to reconcile the equality rights of Indigenous women and the self-governance rights of Indigenous communities. The government’s account of the legislation’s history has been widely accepted by scholars and confirmed in case law. Through scrutiny of newly declassified government records, this article refutes the government’s claim that the 1985 Indian Act amendments were the product of a necessary compromise between competing Indigenous rights claims. Rather, the government used controversies it had provoked about Indigenous self-governance to obscure a legislative objective shared by both Liberal and Conservative governments: to minimize the number of status Indians and thereby shrink the population entitled to federal benefits, weaken Indigenous land claims, and ultimately undermine Indigenous self-governance.

Since the turn of the millennium, Canadian appellate courts have been investing increasingly systematic efforts in demystifying and curtailing racial profiling in policing. These judicial efforts have so far been focused on the application of the legal criteria for arrest and detention as well as their regulation under section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this article, I contend that this unidimensional approach is unsound and outline a corrective path forward. First, I argue that the prevailing judicial understanding of what racial profiling is and how it affects the lawfulness of arrests and detentions has the paradoxical effect of undercutting the rule of law, the advancement of which is the very purpose of section 9. It chiefly does so by requiring an overbroad range of arrests and detentions to be declared unlawful. Second, I contend that the current approach also fails to address racial profiling for the core wrong that it constitutes—namely, wrongful discrimination on the ground of race, which section 15 of the Charter expressly prohibits. I make the case that addressing the phenomenon under this complementary paradigm would make it possible for courts to censure and remedy arrests and detentions tainted by it even when, for rule-of-law-related reasons, they should not be declared unlawful. Thus, it would offer courts the ability to thread a more careful and complementary remedial needle. Finally, I raise the possibility of a third paradigm—that of judicial stays of proceedings for abuses of process—to help address cases that the other two paradigms are ill-suited to redress.

The Canadian government has a long history of regulation, exploitation, and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, and two-spirit (LGBTQ2S+) people. One of the most painful chapters in this history is the “LGBT Purge,” a term that refers to the expulsion of LGBTQ2S+ service members and employees from the Canadian Armed Forces, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Federal Public Service between 1955 and 1992. The LGBT Purge was the subject of a class action lawsuit filed in 2017 that resulted in a settlement agreement in 2018. On a parallel track to the settlement, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued a formal apology for the government’s history of state-sponsored discrimination against LGBTQ2S+ people in 2017. In this article, I consider these events from a legal historical and queer theoretical perspective. I focus on the potential of the settlement to promote reconciliation with LGBTQ2S+ people, contextualizing the settlement in light of neoliberal and homonationalist pressures on the class members to settle the past and forgive legacies of homophobic violence that continue to be felt today. Praiseworthy as the settlement terms might be, I conclude by arguing that forgiving the government’s history of discrimination against LGBTQ2S+ people is an historical impossibility.

THIS VOLUME OF THE OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL (OHLJ) contains two articles—and two replies—that explore racial profiling and the law. This academic exchange comes at a crucial moment. In Attorney General of Québec v Luamba (“Luamba”), the Court of Appeal of Quebec affirmed that the statutory police power to conduct roving traffic stops is unconstitutional because it results in arbitrary detentions and unconstitutional discrimination, neither of which were justifiable in a free and democratic society.

In “Against Settlement,” Owen Fiss argued that settlement may not always be the optimal result of civil suits, particularly those that involve novel or ambiguous areas of law or ostensible power imbalances. That work spurred a range of scholarship around the merits and demerits of settlement. And although the settlement versus litigation debate is now almost four decades old, its currency persists in common law systems in which courts are, at times, called upon to expand or even re-envision doctrines or procedural rules. This article revisits that debate. It applies “Against Settlement” to transnational business and human rights litigation that has, over the past few decades, resulted in a number of high-profile civil claims across the common law world. In the context of that area of litigation, adjudication on the merits of a claim has benefits beyond the specific litigants involved. I focus on three transnational business and human rights case studies, all of which affirm one or more aspects of Fiss’s argument that the notion of settlement as a systemic solution ought to be challenged. First, I address how the October 2020 settlement in Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya further obscures what continues to be a murky intersection of customary international law and Canadian common law. Second, I look at United Kingdom litigation around Barrick Gold’s labour practices in East Africa. In that instance, settlement has been ineffectual to stop the mining giant from continuing to engage in harmful practices that contribute to personal and environmental harm. And third, I discuss how the settlement in Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc is an example of transnational corporate defendants side-stepping accountability when they settle out of court, even if they publicly acknowledge wrongdoing. The case studies suggest that Fiss’s argument remains relevant and, to the extent it can be operationalized, it should be taken seriously, despite the fact that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms have become a panacea for problems associated with state-based judicial dispute resolution processes.