IntroductionAlthough North Korea's KCNA news often threatens to launch nuclear strikes, in reality, the North Korean nuclear program has limited offensive capability.1 Just how limited is a matter of dispute between well-informed observers and analysts. South Korea's defense minister, Kim Kwan-j in, for example noted recently that it was possible that North Korea had miniaturized a nuclear warhead as there had been, in his opinion, enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization.2 He based his statement on how long it took other states to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, not on an assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capability. Additionally, even if North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead, the DPRK lacks an effective delivery mechanism and therefore has a limited ability to offensively use nuclear weapons.In our own assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability we found that the North is capable of operationally using nuclear weapons, but its options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained. We concluded that the only credible use of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal would be to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war. Aside from this nuclear-use scenario, conventional weapons predominate in realistic evaluations of deterrence and war-fighting in the Korean Peninsula.North Korean Declaratory Nuclear PostureThe stated purpose of the North Korean nuclear program has changed over the last decade.3 North Korean statements that once described the nuclear program as a tool to secure the state against outside aggression now describe it as a stabilizing force in the region.During and after the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, KCNA statements described the nuclear program as a substitute for a security guarantee from the United States. If North Korea's security concerns were addressed, they argued, there would be no need for the nuclear program. An October 2002 statement is particularly telling: settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible.4By 2005 this language had changed. North Korea declared itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons and began to depict its nuclear program as a regional stabilizer which prevented war by countering the U.S. nuclear threat to the region.5 KCNA statements even suggested that North Korea's nuclear program benefited South Korea by raising a nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean Peninsula!6By 2010 North Korea had not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the first time, saying that those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army,7 but also made the first real declaratory statement of its nuclear posture in response to the U.S. nuclear posture review:The mission of the nuclear forces of the DPRK is to deter and repel aggression and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the world is realized. The DPRK is invariably maintaining the pol- icy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nuclear weapons as long as they do not join the act of invading or attacking us in conspiracy with nuclear weapons states.8Although these statements should be taken very seriously, particularly by South Korea and Japan who are implicated in both via their alliance with the United States, we should not assume that North Korea has the operational military capability to back up this declaratory posture and the stated nuclear threats.North Korean Technical Nuclear CapacityWhen it comes to nuclear threats against the United States, South Korea, and Japan, North Korea vastly overstates its ability to strike. …

IntroductionThe six-party talks have been suspended since North Korea's withdrawal in April 2009 to protest the UN Security Council's condemnation of l ong-range missile launches in presidential statement. To solve North Korea's nuclear problem, the deadlock in the negotiations with the North should first be broken in the near future. Once the six-party talks resume, the primary discussion could focus on how to denuclearize the North. In order to achieve such an objective, it will be essential to disDepartmentmantle its nuclear weapons program in complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. In addition to removing the nuclear material and infrastructure, irreversible dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program would require redirection of the North's nuclear workers to other civilian occupations.While dealing with the North's nuclear problem, it will be important to assure the North of sustainable energy supply for supporting its economic growth. In the present context, nuclear energy is the single huge, economical, and reliable energy source. A constant supply of nuclear energy without proliferation risk would help to eradicate the necessity and false excuses of its indigenous nuclear development program. However, the international society will hesitate to do this because the North has previously attempted to mislead them into believing that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.Therefore, revisiting 1994's Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea could be considered. However, it has several weaknesses: First, it cannot resolve serious concern regarding the North's intention to divert the spent nuclear fuel discharged from the nuclear power plants, since they are located in the North; second, the North cannot effectively handle the central issue related to the irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, which is the diversion of its nuclear workers to other civilian occupations; third, such an approach will involve heavy financial burden on only three countries (Korea, the U.S., and Japan) that took part in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and fourth, it is not clear whether the approach would be acceptable to the North. The North Korean Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which Kang proposed as way to redirect the North's nuclear workers, could also be considered.1 However, Kang's proposal is not comprehensive approach to the North's nuclear problem, since it simply focused on the relocation of the nuclear workers.Hence, new comprehensive approach is needed that allows the North an opportunity to reap the benefits of its nuclear energy program according to Article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty but prevents the North's nuclear workers from conducting clandestine nuclear activities. To achieve such an objective, an approach similar to the approach to the nuclear fuel could be solution. The multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been proposed and widely discussed since Mohamed El-Baradei, the former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called for the creation of a new mechanism that will assure supplies of nuclear fuel and reactors to countries which want them, while strengthening nonproliferation through better controls over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper reviews the previous proposals of the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle which have been recommended since 2003 and proposes comprehensive multilateral approach to solve North Korea's nuclear problem.Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel CycleThe anticipated increase in global energy demand would result in the expansion of nuclear energy use worldwide, mainly due to the construction of nuclear power plants in countries that do not currently have established nuclear industries. This could result in the worldwide dissemination of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies because most countries would aim for local development of these sensitive technologies. …

IntroductionThe North Korean economy has been deteriorating since the 1990s because of food, energy, and raw material shortages, which were mainly driven by the disinteDepartment gration of the Soviet Union and the end of its economic assistance to North Korea.1 Although food shortages have symbolized North Korea's economic crisis, energy shortages have had a more direct impact on its economy. Energy shortages have damaged the operational capability of the country's industries, particularly its heavy industry,2 and crippled its agricultural sector by limiting the supply of chemical fertilizers (which are critical to the sector's production outcome), resulting in grain shortages.3Making matters worse, a number of natural disasters, including floods, droughts, and hailstorms, devastated the country in the mid-1990s. The economic crisis, combined with natural disasters, led to the collapse of the country's food-rationing system, which had played a key role in providing North Koreans with basic necessities, and this collapse in turn led to mass starvation. It is known that a large number of North Koreans died of starvation during this period and that many escaped to China and other countries. When the food-rationing system worked well, it was the main source of food and basic necessities for North Koreans; markets played only a minor role in the public distribution system. However, once the rationing system became dysfunctional, markets became the main distribution channel. Further, when the economic crisis continued, markets spread to all of North Korean society, and market-related rules and norms followed.The ongoing economic crisis has not only changed the North Korean economy as a whole but also had considerable influence on the development of the country's industrial enterprises. Because of the lack of energy and raw materials, the North Korean government no longer establishes economic plans. Instead, it has prioritized its limited resources for some strategic industries (e.g., the munitions industry) and distributed them mainly to enterprises of strategic importance,4 leaving enterprises in light industry and other less important sectors to survive on their own. Currently, various markets provide North Koreans with most of the items that the state-controlled public distribution system used to provide, and newly emerging private enterprises have been playing a key role in such markets. Private enterprises, despite being illegal, have become an integral part of North Korean society, and thus, the government would have considerable difficulty in prohibiting their commercial activity.Private enterprises are very different from collective enterprises, which used to be the primary actor in the socialist economy, in terms of their goals and management. Private enterprises pursue profits, hire workers, and sell products in markets that are not controlled by the state. Further, they follow market rules and norms. The purpose of this paper is to examine newly emerging private enterprises in North Korea-that is, shadowy private enterprises (SPEs)-by focusing on their activities. To analyze SPEs' roles and status in the North Korean economy, this paper takes the institutionalist perspective. In particular, the paper employs the concept of institutional entrepreneurship that some institutionalists have developed based on new institutionalism.Institutional Entrepreneurs and Shadowy Private Enterprises in North KoreaInstitutionalists examine not only institutional continuity but also the possibility of institutional change. Whereas the former is the very essence of institutionalism, the latter has relatively received little attention. Institutions, however, are not as stable as some institutional theorists claim.5 As a set of heterogeneous elements (not a single and coherent set), the institutional order tends to hold potential tension within itself because heterogeneous institutional elements established in different historical periods carry different interests and identities. …

The People's Republic of China (PRC) plays a key role in U.S. policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).The PRC is North Korea's closest ally, largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and arguably the country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang.China also is the host of the Six-Party Talks (involving the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) over North Korea's nuclear program.The close PRC-DPRK relationship is of interest to U.S. policymakers because China plays a pivotal role in the success of U.S. efforts to halt the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to enforce economic sanctions, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that cross into China receive humane treatment.Since late 2008, China has been not just the largest, but also the dominant, provider of aid and partner in trade with North Korea.This report provides a brief survey of China-North Korea relations, assesses PRC objectives and actions, and raises policy issues for the United States.While Beijing still maintains its military alliance and continues its substantial economic assistance to Pyongyang, in recent years many PRC and North Korean interests and goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible.Increasingly, many Chinese officials and scholars appear to regard North Korea as more of a burden than a benefit.However, Beijing's shared interest with Pyongyang in preserving North Korean stability generally has trumped these other considerations.

IntroductionGlobal supply chain management is exposed to a variety of risks such as demand fluctuations, exchange-rate fluctuations, price fluctuations, supply disruption, and supply delays.2 In addition, because of business activities and growth, management often has created conflicts among risks. Thus, business firms must develop mitigation strategies that effectively manage these risks in the supply chain.3 Supply chain risk management (SCRM) takes a proactive approach to the development of mitigation strategies for supply chain risks, giving important strategic alternatives and insights while overcoming challenges presented by the information and knowledge age.4The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1) to identify, assess, and prioritize supply chain risks; 2) to use the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique to support the strategic planning in supply chain management (SCM) decision-making; and 3) to provide business decision makers with a model to identify risk mitigation strategies. Using a business firm (BF) in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), the study focuses on exploring supply chain risks' characteristics in order to implement risk mitigation strategies that will improve the BF's and the KIC's decision-making planning process and managerial policy.5 The study will suggest risk mitigation strategies that will enable the BF to respond to innovation and new growth, while reinforcing overall ongoing business planning strategies to meet defined requirements in the KIC business setting.Supply Chain Risk ManagementSupply chain management (SCM) is defined as an integrated business philosophy for managing information, materials, and monetary flows among different facilities, suppliers, customers, and logistic levels. SCM includes both internal customers, such as all cross-functional decision-makers within an organization that have direct and/or indirect impact, and external customers such as suppliers, distributors, transporters, warehouses, retailers, and even end users. Because of the many qualitative and quantitative factors which must be included in SCM, planning is a complicated decision-making problem in business.6 Given the complexity of SCM, especially in cross-border supply chains, many studies have applied different business methodologies to real world situations.7Supply chain risk is defined as any risk associated with the flow of materials, information, and monetary transaction in a supply chain process. An effective supply chain risk management (SCRM) strategy embeds risk management into all supply chain functions, from inbound to outbound supply chain streams. Conventional risk management identifies and evaluates the various supply chain risk factors and their potential effects in areas such as purchasing and procurement, manufacturing and production, resources and real estate, outsourcing, logistics and warehousing, inventory, and legal matters. Risk factors can be identified in terms of sources, places, and relationships, or from a managerial function perspective, such as financial risk, operational risk, human resources risk, and information risk.8 Table 1 on page 36 presents categories and drivers of supply chain risks.A more comprehensive SCRM strategy may need proactive participants in the overall SCM planning processes.9 Although managing supply chain risk is a primary business activity, an even more important activity is the identification of proper risk mitigation strategies that will make the business more sustainable and profitable. By identifying risks and developing a pertinent strategy in a supply chain, business firms can align risks to the related strategies. In manufacturing-business firms, four major strategies are cost, quality, delivery, and flexibility.The existence of numerous risk factors makes supply chain decision-making more difficult to plan and implement. It is complicated because many tangible and intangible risk factors must be included in the decision-making process of a supply chain planning process. …

For many years, Chinese nationals threatened with torture or persecution for their role in helping North Korean escapees had little success gaining protection from removal in U.S. courts. In 2009 and 2010, however, some courts bucked this trend, showing a greater acceptance of both the dangers faced by Chinese nationals suspected of assisting North Koreans, and the political nature of their actions. However, inconsistency remains on the fundamental question of whether Chinese authorities have engaged in the persecution of individuals who have assisted North Koreans, or whether they instead have legitimately prosecuted them pursuant to Chinese law.

IntroductionIt is often assumed that in a totalitarian state, the decisive role should be the domain of the political police. In North Korea daily is often conducted through institutions which occasionally interact with the police, but are generally independent of it-like a neighborhood or inminpan (literally people's group, henceforth PG), whose role and activities constitute the topic of the present article. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-330-B00187).This North Korean has won a deservedly notorious reputation by relying heavily on the old-style methods of coercion and crude power which followers of the Foucauldian school would probably associate with the ancient regime: institutionalized torture, occasional public executions and the like.1 However, the stability of the North Korean regime seems to be based not only on its use of highly visual, even spectacular, violence but rather on the application of modern techniques of social control and daily surveillance, including what the Foucauldian school describes as the panopticon principle.David Wood explained this principle in the following words: Panopticism, the social trajectory represented by the figure of the Panopticon, the drive to selfmonitoring through the belief that one is under constant scrutiny, thus becomes both a driving force and a key symbol of the modernist project.2 In the PG even the most mundane activities of the population are supposed to be watched constantly by the agents of the bureaucratic modernizing state.However, in the course of time the actual PG began to develop features which make it less panopticon-like than most observers would think at the first glance (and definitely less efficient an instrument than the authorities hoped for). The PG heads, instead of being constant and vigilant watchers, had to look for compromises. They had no choice, being torn apart by two incompatible sets of demands-one by their bureaucrat overseers and another by their neighbors. These trends became more visible in the past two decades when the North Korean system began its gradual disintegration.This article will trace the origins of the PG, their evolution and the changes in their functions. Special attention will be paid to the changes which occurred in the PG system in the last two decades when the carefully constructed system of Kim Il Sung's surveillance state began to disintegrate under the economic pressures.The PG has attracted the attention of researchers before, although almost nothing on the PG is available in English. Among studies of the PG one should mention a well-researched MA thesis by Ch'ae Kyong-hui.3 Alexander Zhebin, a Russian scholar, journalist and diplomat wrote a Ph.D. thesis specifically dealing with the topic (in Russian).4 However, in this groundbreaking work Alexander Zhebin was forced to rely largely on press reports and on some limited and sometimes distorted information he managed to receive during his two controlled and supervised visits to Pyongyang. The present article takes a different approach, relying largely on a newly available source of information-defectors' interviews. This approach allows us to concentrate on what the PG actually does, not on what it is supposed to do.The persistent shortage of sources is one of the major problems every student of North Korea has to deal with. However, in recent years the dramatic increase in the number of defectors from the North has created new opportunities for research. The refugees, largely hailing from underprivileged social groups, are usually not privy to the secrets of high political life, but can provide us with a generally reliable picture of daily life in North Korea during the past few decades.There have been some doubts about the reliability of the defectors' testimony. …