IntroductionThe Arab Spring suggests a transition to a new social order, a new phase of modern capitalism. The Arab states sit at a critical moment in which old institutions are frail, and what they do over the next few years will lay the groundwork for the next generation's institutionalized of capitalism.1 It is clear that Arab regimes were deeply unpopular and faced serious demographic, economic, and political problems.The young Egyptian university graduate who burned himself to death yearning for democratization triggered democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic wind has been blown by the Arab youth who attempted to topple dictators. The democratic movement in Tunisia has bestowed a momentum to the Egyptian democratic uprising. The winds have swept through to Iran, Libya, and Bahrain in the wake of the Tunisian democratic movement. In spite of the brutal crackdown by the authoritarian regimes, the independent democratic movement of the Arab states has gained support from democratic society. People all over the Arab world feel a sense of pride in shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no deference to popular wishes.2 The kind of collective actions most likely to change the existing social structure are likely to be triggered by members of disadvantaged groups.3 The state's failure to meet the needs of the people and to represent their will may cause class struggle where rival class forces fight to control the vital political organs that wield immense power.4 North Korea as a failed state has considerable potential to be overthrown by mass collective action. Robert I. Rotberg has classified political goods in five categories-safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Failed states are those states that fall below a threshold of political goods and fail to satisfy the safety and security minimums.5 Given the scarcity of food supplies in North Korea, given its lack of human capital and other human capacities, and given the long poverty of internal discourse within the state, the removal of state security will plunge the otherwise failed state straight into true failure and, likely collapse.6 A nation-state fails when citizens finally perceive that its rulers are running the state as a criminal enterprise to their own advantage and the state no longer cares about most of its inhabitants.Against this backdrop, the feasibility of a democratic movement in North Korea is on the rise. Conditions for a democratic uprising in North Korea are growing gradually. There are many cautious predictions that a democratic movement can happen in North Korea eventually. The democratic movement in North Korea might be somewhat different from the Arab democratic movement.This article briefly reviews the feasibility of the democratization of North Korea. Drawing on this understanding, the article focuses on the implications of the Arab democratic uprising for North Korea. To better appreciate the context of the implications, the article analyzes the characteristics of the Arab democratic uprising, reviews the current situation of the democratic movement in North Korea, and examines the ripple effect of the Arab Spring on the North Korean elite. Emphasizing the negative impact of the Arab Spring on the North Korean regime succession, this article concludes that North Korea's democratization can become possible by empowering the grassroots population in order to make the North Korean regime negotiate with them.The Feasibility of the Democratization of North KoreaThe Arab democratic uprising presents a frightening prospect to the North Korean regime. The collapsed Mubarak regime was a so-called brother state of North Korea. North Korea introduced the Egyptian mobile company Orascom for its telecommunications. Now, approximately more than one million North Koreans have mobile phones run on Orascom's 3G platform. …

How Did North Korea Develop the Bomb?The promise and peril of nuclear energy share a common technological foundation. Pursuit of a civilian fuel cycle-making fuel, building reactors to burn the fuel, and maintaining the back-end to deal with nuclear waste, including the option of extracting some of the valuable by-products from burning reactor fuel-enables nations to develop the capability to make bomb fuel, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. North Korea mastered the plutonium fuel cycle ostensibly for nuclear power and then used it to build the bomb.This brief review of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear capabilities will only touch on the important political milestones that helped to shape it; a more complete discussion will be presented in the next section. Kim Il-sung, the country's founding father, laid the foundation for nuclear technology development in the early 1950s. The Soviet "Atoms for Peace" initiative, modeled after President Eisenhower's initiative of the same name, enabled several hundred North Korean students and researchers to be educated and trained in Soviet universities and nuclear research centers. The Soviets built a research re-actor, the ITR-2000, and associated nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in the 1960s. North Korean specialists trained at these facilities and by the 1970s were prepared to launch a nuclear program without external assistance.North Korea's decision to build gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors was a logical choice at the time for an indigenous North Korean energy program because gas-graphite reactors can operate with natural uranium fuel and, hence, do not require enrichment of uranium.3 Although North Korea may have experimented with enrichment technologies, commercial enrichment capabilities were beyond its reach and difficult to acquire.4 North Korea's ambitious program began with an experimental 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor, which became operational in 1986. Construction of that reactor was followed by a scaled-up 50 MWe reactor and a 200 MWe power reactor, although neither was ever completed.North Korea quickly mastered all aspects of the gas-graphite reactor fuel cycle. It built fuel fabrication facilities and a large-scale reprocessing facility, which enabled extraction of plutonium from spent fuel.5 Unlike the Soviet built research facilities, the new facilities were built and operated without being declared to or inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang had no legal obligation to declare these facilities because it was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). American reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of the reactor construction in the early 1980s and the reprocessing facility in the late 1980s. It was not until 1989, when South Korea leaked American satellite data of the reprocessing facility that the international community first became aware of and concerned about North Korea's indigenous nuclear program. The concern stems from the fact that gas-graphite reactors are capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium while generating electrical power and heat. So, whereas Pyongyang's choice of gas-graphite reactors for its energy program was logical, it was also the best choice to develop a nuclear weapons option.In parallel, North Korea asked the Soviets to build light water reactors (LWRs) to help meet North Korea's energy demands. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 because the Soviets made consideration of LWRs contingent upon joining the Treaty. These reactors, though, never materialized because of the demise of the Soviet Union. Pyongyang kept inspectors out of its new facilities until 1992, by which time it had all of the pieces in place for the plutonium fuel cycle. This move coincided with several diplomatic initiatives and President George H.W. Bush's decision to withdraw all American nuclear weapons from South Korea. By this time, the 5 MWe experimental reactor produced electricity and heat for the local town, as well as approximately 6 kilograms (roughly one bomb's worth) of weapons-grade plutonium per year. …

IntroductionAfter the Cold War, globalization, regionalization, and informatization made a rapid advancement across the world. This brought great change in Northeast Asia but, unlike elsewhere in the world, the remnants of the Cold War still linger in the region. Although a discussion about a regional cooperative community is steadily surfacing, it is still at a level of dialogue and not yet fully institutionalized. Also, the previous paradigms of the Cold War are muddled and are competing with the new alternative paradigms of globalization and regionalization of the post-Cold War era.Not only government but businesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other involved actors were preoccupied with policies that were self-serving and seeking to transition from the regional cooperation of the Cold War period to a more modern and global post-Cold War era. This can be interpreted as characteristic of a transitional period of the early post-Cold War era, and initial conditions at this stage placed structural limitations on various actors. The initial conditions can be identified as historical issues in the region, a battle of hegemony between China and Japan, and the bilateral regional hegemonic strategies of the United States.Specific geopolitical and economic changes in Northeast Asian regional cooperation can be described as follows. First, in the military sector, although the national paradigm is the dominant framework, the discussion of an international paradigm has been newly emerging in recent years. In the realm of economic cooperation, increasing economic cooperation is focusing attention on the need for multilateral regional cooperation; nonetheless, bilateral cooperation is still prevalent. In the sociocultural realm, there is a growing consensus which points to the management of various North Korea issues via civil society; however, with varying civil-societal maturity amongst nations, most still take the state-centered approach when dealing with North Korea. Human rights discussions are often divided between debates on universality and cultural relativism, making human rights cooperation ever more difficult to pursue in the region. Similarly, the unique regional characteristics of Northeast Asia, along with international universalism, affect and further complicate inter-Korean relations.2Roughly put, the preexisting national paradigm and other related erative, and political elements have worked to keep the North Korean regime intact. In contrast, the alternative international paradigm and cooperative approach requires North Korea to adopt major changes, including changes to its regime.In the same context, discussions about extending and institutionalizing multilateral cooperation in dealing with all problems related to North Korea, including nuclear provocations, are gaining popularity.3 When the current Northeast Asian order is considered, there are different national interests at play. However, when it comes to the issue of North Korea, most countries agree that the problems should be resolved step by step, in a predictable and regulated manner, by inviting North Korea into the Northeast Asian community. In other words, resolving the North Korea problem through Northeast Asian regional cooperation means interaction with North Korea, which will eventually lead to stable and gradual regime change. Without North Korea's consent and active involvement, the North Korea problem will never be solved. Therefore, instead of generalizing North Korea's behavior as unique and episodic, more thorough analysis is required to understand its regime and policies. This will allow for a better analysis of its behaviors and response.This paper will adopt the comprehensive security framework from the Helsinki Process, a mechanism used during the Cold War to end the conflict and enhance and cooperation in the European region. Through this framework, North Korea's perceptions and policies on a Northeast Asian order and on regional cooperation will be analyzed through five domains: political and military, economic, humanitarian, sociocultural, and inter-Korean relations. …

During the past twenty years, Washington has oscillated between tentative engagement with Pyongyang under the Clinton administration and isolation and multilateralism under the Bush administration. With the Obama administration almost nearing its four-year tenure, the Six-Party Talks have stalled and North Korea's multiple attacks on the South in 2010 have created new instabilities. Why so little results despite promises of a radical departure away from the Axis of Evil rhetoric and hard-line politics? This paper suggests that the Obama administration has utilized approaches that no longer fit current circumstances and hence failed to create an original, coherent and effective foreign policy.

IntroductionNorth Korean (son'gun chongch'i) is known to privilege the Korean People's Army (KPA) as important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.2 As the role of the KPA in the national economy and national defense has increased, there has been speculation that the military will ascend to power in North Korea under military-first politics. The difficulty of collecting internal information on the political situation in North Korea has made Kim Jongil's reported public appearances a useful source of information for researchers. Many researchers have thus analyzed the public appearances of the North Korean leader to understand military-first politics. The conclusion has been drawn that the KPA has taken priority over all North Korean state affairs, since the number of Kim's public appearances at military installations and the number of military officers among his entourage have increased.3 Still, the question of which factor causes Kim to appear where and when in public, under military-first politics, remains unanswered. Predictors of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance are thus necessary in an effort to address the question. The application of a predictive model furnishes a meaningful estimate of the frequency of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector and other sectors, with the corresponding implications.Avoiding Circular ReasoningKim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance is conducted in order to inspect implementation of national policies and to discuss state affairs with his entourage, who have allegedly gained an upper hand in the decision-making process.4 Military-first politics brought about a significant change to Kim's on-the-spot guidance, as his visits to the military sector have increased, as well as the number of military officers among his entourage.5 This change has been interpreted as evidence that military-first prioritizes the KPA over all affairs of state.6 If this interpretation is correct, the number of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector should remain at a relatively high level under military-first politics.Demonstrable statistics, however, are not in favor of that proposition. Figure 1 on page 95 shows that the number of Kim's visits to the military sector has not been constant, but has fluctuated over time. This might indicate that the priority of the KPA rises and falls according to certain variables. If one accepts that Kim's increased visits to the military sector are prioritizing the KPA, it is relevant to ask, What makes Kim Jong-il visit the military sector?Assuming that Kim visits the military because the KPA is a top priority, one needs to inquire as to why prioritization has occurred. Yet if one suggests that the increasing number of visits to the military are in themselves proof of the priority of the KPA, the result is the fallacy of circular reasoning. A cause is simultaneously considered an effect. Avoiding circular reasoning, one must attempt to identify predictors that might correspond to the frequency of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance to the military sector and other sectors under military-first politics. The first step must begin with an analysis of the origins of military-first in North Korea.Origins of Military-First PoliticsThe origin of military-first can be explained as a response to external and internal factors. On one hand, the priority given to the North Korean military can be seen as a self-defense tactic, reacting to the breakdown and collapse of the Soviet bloc in the period 1989-1991.7 On the other hand, military-first has been interpreted as a way for Kim to consolidate his political power since the sudden death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994.8 Some scholars following these lines of reasoning perceive the role of the military as one of preventing large-scale social disruption derived from the post-Soviet economic crisis of the 1990s. …

IntroductionRecently, an opinion has been in circulation that North Korea has something to do with the aggressive, imperialistic, and ultranationalist political doctrine and movement that grew out of the dislocations of the First World War and the Great Depression, manifesting in Italy in the 1920s, assuming the super-racist form of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and being implemented from above in Imperial Japan. Considering that fascism is imperialistic and that its extreme right-wing politics is violently anticommunist and antisocialist, the association of national state-socialist North Korea with fascism is frankly strange.The basic reasoning behind the association is that Korea was a colony from 1910 to 1945 and that thought in the 1930s and 1940s carried over into Soviet Army-liberated northern Korea from 1945 onwards. The argument continues that many Korean intellectuals had been co-opted in the colonial-fascist era and that these individuals were incorporated into the North Korean cultural apparatus (North Korea became an independent state in 1948), leading to a fascist-rooted state ideology that celebrates race.1 The claim is superficial and impressionistic.Other than the fact that its empirical ground is insufficient, the real problem with the opinion of fascism is that it fixates abstractly on ideology (a servant of politics) and neglects the political perspective and economic structure of postcolonial North Korea. In this regard, it is necessary to briefly consider some North Korean political history; revisit the writings of the late leader Kim Il Sung, whose authority is preeminent in North Korea; and consider how fascism in action has been described in fascism studies and studies. What the evidence reveals is that the North Korean system is incompatible with fascism.Struggle against Imperial JapanAnti-Japanism and anti-fascism are two policy lines that go hand in hand in North Korea. Both constitute the locus classicus of the political regime, the legitimacy of which derives from the armed of Kim Il Sung and the anti-Japanese guerrillas, who fought the Imperial military and police in Manchuria, with some forays into Korea, from about 1931 to 1941. As Kim Han Gil's official Modern History of Korea states, the anti-Japanese struggle was poised against the Japanese imperialists, the Asian ' shock-troop' of international fascism, and their imperialist colonial system.2North Korea identifies late Imperial Japan, along with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, as a state and holds a view of fascism that recalls the Stalininst Comintern in the 1930s. This is not surprising. Before northern Korea was liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945, Kim Il Sung, who became the leader of choice during the three-year Soviet occupation, had been a member of the Mao-led Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it was a Comintern affiliate, a division commander in the CCP Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, and received military training in the Soviet Union, where he retreated and became a Soviet Army captain after his guerrillas were defeated in 1941.The North Korean definition of fascism is summarizable as a form of that pursues aggressive as a of delivering itself from economic crisis. The term reactionary extremely conservative or right-wing in politics, while the term imperialism refers to a type of capitalism based on the domination of monopoly capital (or finance capital) and the international system of creditor states and debtor states (that is, colonies and semi-colonies). In the specific case of the fascist tyranny and colonial plunder of imperialism, fascism manifested the following characteristics:* anticommunism* aggressive war* intensified tyranny* police information system* militarization of the economy3Kim Han Gil repeats Kim Il Sung's words from the February 27, 1936, Nanhutou Meeting that fascism was an anti-proletarian political movement that appeared in many and that the fascists employed the means of sanguinary dictatorship and aggressive war to enslave not only the peoples of their own countries but also of all humanity and to fascistize the whole world. …

IntroductionThe denuclearization of North Korea (officially, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea relations since end of Cold War. But U.S. foreign policy in North Korea proved unsuccessful when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Both William J. Clinton administration (1993-2000) and George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) sought to prevent a nuclear North Korea by adopting a ety of toward country, ranging from a possible use of military force to a negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts failed.President Obama has been seeking denuclearization of North Korea since his inauguration in 2009. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and counterterrorism are top priorities in his foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Obama also believes that nuclear nonproliferation is critical not only security of United States, but also peace of international community. On April 5, 2009, he revealed his vision a world without nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic.1 Approximately one year later, Obama administration also announced a radical shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in that United States will not use its nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks involving biological or chemical weapons or large- scale conventional forces.2 On April 8, 2010, he also signed a historic nuclear arms control treaty with Russian president Dmitri A. Medvedev.3 He was even awarded 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.4However, Obama has not been so successful with North Korean nuclear issue. Since Obama administration adopted a policy, no progress has been made: neither denuclearization process nor Six-Party Talks have resumed. Pyongyang even conducted a second nuclear test during Obama's term, and has not rejoined Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).The central goal of this paper is to explain why Obama administration has not had any noticeable accomplishment in its policy on North Korean nuclear issue. By closely examining policy goals and strategies of Obama administration over past two and a half years, this paper seeks to uncover what is missing from U.S. policy toward North Korea. The starting point is to make sense of what Pyongyang really wants from Washington. Giving due consideration to Pyongyang's objectives, President Obama faces a choice of three different strategies: coercive diplomacy, strategic patience (the status quo), and engagement.This paper argues that success of Obama administration in achieving denuclearization of North Korea is dependent on an appropriate understanding of Pyongyang's security concerns and a careful analysis of North Korean nuclear policy. It suggests that President Obama should radically change his North Korea policy. More specifically, he should abandon strategic patience policy and instead adopt a constructive engagement policy in order to achieve denuclearization of North Korea and security of East Asian region.The North Korea Policy of Obama AdministrationPresident Barack Obama was expected to bring about dramatic change in not only U.S. domestic policy but also foreign policy. These expectations were incredibly high, both because Obama symbolized change as first African American president in American history and because he retained political power to do so with Democratic Party's control of both chambers of Congress. The inauguration of President Obama also generated expectations in Pyongyang that the strained relationship between North Korea and U.S. would improve under new U.S. administration, Obama had indicated during 2008 presidential campaign his willingness to meet even with leaders of rogue nations, such as Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, if that was what it would take to resolve North Korean nuclear issue. …

IntroductionInternational efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program are still looking for a way out. Nearly two decades have passed since the North first alarmed the world with its nuclear reprocessing facilities in 1992, but the multiple international negoDepartment tiations ever since have yet to find an effective deterrent. More perplexing than the unfruitful negotiations per se is the indeterminacy that the international community has shown throughout the process. An obvious example is the drifting policies of the U.S., the leader of the world anti-proliferation community. Throughout the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the U.S. policies wildly swung between containment and engagement. The ambiguity continues even today as we see the Obama government switching policy positions off and on.1Why isn't there a consistent solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis? Why are the international (the U.S. in particular) responses to the North's nuclear challenge drifting?Keeping in mind a normative origin of the policy inconsistency, this research delves into the contextual backgrounds of the uneven nuclear non-proliferation policies. Due to the controversial nature of the issues involving the nuclear crisis like sovereignty and national security, the nonproliferation efforts are supposed to call for a choice of only relatively better policy each time without any absolute solution. Borrowing Reinhold Niebuhr's insights, the North Korean nuclear crisis is a typical case of where a definitive behavioral principle is hard to utilize.2 Consequently an objective analysis of policy conditions is rarely available, which in turn makes a rational or institutional choice by political elites out of the question. Instead, the public perception of the issues at the bottom of the society takes its place as the matter of consequence.Ironically a social normative cause of the U.S. policy inconsistency looms large from the solid international norm for nuclear nonproliferation. Despite the solid consensus on the principle of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons at all costs, a few technical differences that rose in the middle of negotiating how to implement the norm have directed the course of negotiation. It is an irony that the methods employed to apply a principle ruled over the principle. As a response, this research asserts that some of the suggested policy means, even if they are efficient in practice, raise several fundamental social concerns that are not compatible with the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. The North Korean crisis involves two or more ideas that stand at odds with each other. The normative conflicts generate the policy indeterminacy.This research reflects on Reinhold Niebuhr's thoughts about international politics-relative justice, in essence-as the reference of normative ambiguity arising from the process of negotiation with North Korea. His ideas are helpful to identify the social context where a durable policy is hard to obtain. The North Korean nuclear challenge, seen from Niebuhr's perspective, is a typical case of lacking an absolute justice to apply. The North's nuclear adventure, though not as acceptable as the U.S. behavior to discourage it, is still excusable from its claim of national defense. To buy how much of the North's defensive concerns, this research suggests, is the determinant of the direction and level of the U.S. reaction to the nuclear challenge, while a consensus has yet to be made in American society. In addition, the U.S. policies are supposed to fluctuate given the fact that several conflicts exist within the U.S. government that involve ideational debates deep in the American society.In this paper, Niebuhr's relative justice is employed to critically review the U.S. nuclear policies toward North Korea angles in the following order. First, the literature review introduces relevant studies and points out that a normative consideration is still necessary. …