IntroductionIt is widely accepted that ups and downs in the abuse of narcotics often follow cycles which are similar to those observed with infectious diseases: a sudden upsurge in the popularity of some addictive substance is followed by the decline. These periods of sudden upsurges in use are frequently described as epidemics.Admittedly, some scholars express their doubts as to whether the term is applicable to the rising levels of abuse,1 but the term is used widely and a majority of experts do not see it as problematic.2 Michael Agar, one of the world's most prominent anthropologists, says quite unequivocally: Illicit epidemics happen all time. They are 'epidemics' because a fairly constant and low baseline rate of dependence increases dramatically over a short period of time.3 As typical and oft-cited examples of such epidemics one might mention the methamphetamine epidemics in Japan in the period 1945-55 or the crack epidemics in the United States in the period 1984-93.While conducting research on the everyday life of North Koreans in North Korea of the early 2000s, we came across multiple instances of persuasive evidence which indicates that from around 2005 or 2006, the northern areas of the country (or perhaps the country at large) were hit by a dramatic upsurge in methamphetamine abuse which can be described as a drug epidemic. Recently, this epidemic has reached proportions which are unprecedented for North Korea.The numerous interviews with defectors paint a worrying picture of escalating abuse in what once was one of the world's most strictly supervised and controlled societies. This evidence comes from multiple unconnected sources, and in most cases the testimony of refugees is remarkably consistent.The goal of this article is to outline the ongoing methamphetamine epidemic and to trace its origins and the ways in which it has spread throughout North Korean society. This phenomenon is quite recent, and it has remained underreported and understudied (indeed, almost unknown outside a narrow circle of specialists). This article is based on a number of unstructured in-depth interviews with North Korean refugees currently residing in South Korea (most of the informants come from the borderland North Hamgyong province and leftNorth Korea in recent years). We conducted interviews with 21 recently arrived refugees, most of whom leftNorth Korea after 2007. To protect interviewees, we used numbers (B-01 to B-24). The basic biographical data of the refugees can be found in Table 1.The phenomenon of private production has been mentioned in an interesting article by Yun Minwoo and Eunyoung Kim.4 This article agrees with their conclusions, but elaborates it further while choosing an anthropological, rather than sociological, approach to the problem, with special attention being paid to the emerging culture of the abuse.The present study has some limitations which should be stated clearly. First, our interviewees overwhelmingly come from the northern part of the country. In most cases they are natives of North Hamgyong province. It is not clear to what extent our findings can be applied to other areas of North Korea. Another issue is the nearcomplete absence of statistical data. Due to political and ideological reasons, the very existence of the problem cannot be admitted by the North Korean authorities, so no official data-even in the unlikely case that such data is properly collected-has ever been released. Therefore, the research has to be of a qualitative and ethnographic nature. Nonetheless, in spite of all limitations, our findings indicate that new, potentially socially disruptive developments are taking place in North Korean society. We believe that this new phenomenon should be studied, especially because it has some important political and practical implications.The Old Drug ProblemNorth Korea is often associated with drugs-one might even say that this association is the impoverished country's second claim to international fame/notoriety (the first being its nuclear program, of course). …

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in context of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actually react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North Korea, as surrounded by four powers-China, Russia, Japan, and United States (U.S.)-perceives U.S. policy toward itself, and strengthening of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with People's Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed role of big brother to Korea's brother. Culturally, ideologically, and socially, North Korea belonged to Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two countries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore dominant party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal states-one strong and powerful and other a client.The Korean Peninsula, Hub of Balance of Power in East AsiaMuch of Korea's history is the story of its struggle, not always successful, to maintain its independence against external pressures.2 Contrary to its name, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of world's most heavily militarized areas. There is little depth between DMZ and capital cities of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of DMZ, and Seoul, which is approximately 40 km south of DMZ. Following consolidation of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, United States perceived that consequences of a South Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic interests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in Korean War would temper and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, Korean War of 1950-1953 reminded China of importance of Korea to its national security. The Korean War ended, but peninsula remained divided at Demilitarized Zone.Threat Perceptions until 1979: The North Korean PerspectiveThe U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against United States for two main reasons: division of Korea and American occupation of southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other American actions taken since 1953, mutual security agreement with South Korea, and maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As United States treated North Korea as a mere satellite of Soviet Union, relationship between United States and North Korea developed to take form of ideological confrontation; that is, capitalism versus socialism. From Pyongyang's point of view, a long and unbroken period of American nuclear hegemony in East Asia was inter- preted as a clear threat to its security. North Korea is only country in developing world that has faced a direct threat from a superpower's nuclear weapons from its very inception.3 During Korean War, President Truman (at behest of General Douglas MacArthur, who in July 1950 suggested a plan to use atomic bombs) seriously considered using nuclear weapons, but other allied nations objected.The South Korean Threat. The hostility between North Korea and South Korea is not only mutual but evenly matched. The North Korean version of history argues that Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) in north is only legitimate government representing entire Korean people, and that it was American imperialism and its creature, South Korean regime, that prevented unification. …

IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their heroic wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a tipping point for Korean unification. Tipping points are of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them moments of truth when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector populations, Haggard and Noland assert, There is evidence of increasing willingness to defy the government through everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media.5 Information flows are subtly changing perspectives and aspirations throughout North Korea. As personal desperation and the aspirations of a new generation synergize with knowledge of the outside world, more people will realize they are trapped inside a self-limiting political-economic and cultural system and may seek alternatives. With greater access to outside information, the power elite is probably acutely aware of this relative deficiency.This model provides especially strong incentives for the power elite to reassess its options. In every polity, there are internal divisions at the highest levels of power and authority. Disagreements undoubtedly exist among elite power brokers in North Korea as crosscurrent objectives of cabinet, party, and military peer institutions clash. …

IntroductionOn February 27, 2012, following lawmaker Park Sun-young's2 eleven-day hunger strike highlighting the human rights issue relating to Korean repatriation, the South Korean Parliament passed a resolution urging China to discontinue the practice of returning Korean border crossers. This action has triggered intensified international attention toward the human rights of Koreans, with the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs subsequently approving the extension of the Korean Human Rights Act, last reauthorized in 2008, until 2017. The British deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, also applied symbolic pressure on Korea and China by meeting Korean settlers during a visit to South Korea for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March. Given the climate in South Korea as it faces two major elections amidst growing uncertainty across East Asia in the wake of the emergence of the Kim Jong-un regime following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, it is perhaps not surprising that the Korea issue is being revisited in 2012. In the bitter competition between the two opposite camps (conservative versus democratic) in the run-up to the two elections in the South, the renewed attention to the Korean issue has been used to reframe existing indicators that distinguished positions within the remnants of the Cold War legacy-especially those that capitalized on fostering anti-North Korean sentiments. Aligning with domestic circumstances, the United States has added its voice by pressuring Korea and China in the language of human rights, foregrounding humanitarian imperialism, the salient feature of Western discourse in international affairs and post-Cold War policy,3 as a prominent component in the geopolitical matrix of East Asia. Consequently, contrary to the dominant tendency of previous years, 2012 sees Korean border crossers and arrivals in the South reconstructed as purely victims of human rights violations and political refugees. This paper brings this changing understanding and naming of Korean arrivals within the transient social discourse of South Korea into question, and argues that specific eras separate and interpellate Korean arrivals through different names and roles depending on the particular and interests of the time. Such interpellation instrumentalizes the figure of the migrant in the process of stabilizing South Korean society.North Korean arrivals to the South have been defined and understood in various ways over time: from heroic figures to economic migrants. Given the systematic and ideological confrontation following the 1953 separation, strong Cold War ideology governed the two Koreas and produced those people that, to either side, would be labeled as defectors. The number of Korean arrivals to the South was 607 for the period between 1953 and 1989, resulting in their rarity being highly valued and fully utilized by the South Korean government in the ideological war. However, the number has dramatically increased since the mid-1990s, coinciding with the gradual replacement of the Cold War era by a post-Cold War ideology across the Korean Peninsula. From 1990 to 1993, only 34 Koreans came to the South, but the next five years (1994-1998) saw 306 new arrivals, with the figure radically increasing over the subsequent three years, reaching 1,043. From 2001 onward, more than 1,000 Koreans arrived each year, with the total number peaking at 23,000 in 2011.4 This circumstantial change has led to their redefinition from the North's soldier to a variety of different names such as defected ethnic Korean, North Korean refugee, defected Korean resident, and more recently North Korean migrant.5Following the trajectory of this name giving, this article identifies three different historical stages in the processes of situating the Korean arrivals' position in South Korean social discourse. …

Research Question and StructureThis article was written mostly before Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011. However, not only do our main points remain valid; the need for a long-term, systematic understanding of the political system of North Korea (formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) and leadership succession has even grown amidst the current uncertainty. We thus discuss the background of the transfer of political power in North Korea and the related options in general, with a first outlook on Kim Jong-un and his leadership.Any leader needs first to gain and then to maintain a certain degree of power and legitimacy.1 We therefore first look at the issue of legitimacy itself and then explore the tradition of leadership, legitimacy, and power transfer in Korea in order to combine the general suggestions derived from the political scientist's perspective with the society-specific characteristics of the North Korean system. We look particularly closely at the sources of the personal legitimacy of Kim Jong-il, including the process of his own accession to power. Against this background, the current situation in North Korea and the ongoing power transfer to Kim Jong-un are analyzed.Leadership and LegitimacyAn important category for the classification of political systems is their mechanism for the legitimization of power. Max Weber suggested using the base for the claim to legitimacy as the sole criterion for classifying various types of rule.2 According to Merkel, the scope for achieving legitimacy ranges from what he calls sovereignty in a democracy to mentality (such as nationalism) in authoritarian and a in totalitarian systems.3 Note that even totalitarian systems cannot rely only on repression but also need some kind of legitimization.In which category does North Korea belong? Authoritarian systems can be understood as severely limiting democratic principles, while the latter are completely abolished in totalitarian systems.4 Well-documented features such as restricted access to power, leadership by a single person, the power monopoly of one party, the regime's paternalistic claim to control its people's lives, the repression of opposition, and the existence of chuch'e as a closed worldview suggest that North Korea can indeed be classified as totalitarian. Merkel associates North Korea with the communist-totalitarian sub-type, although he also acknowledges parallels with sultanistic-totalitarian systems.5Other authors point at the changing nature of the North Korean system. Scobell classifies North Korea as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.6 In a similar vein, Silberstein argues that totalitarianism in North Korea exists but is fading, mainly because of the vanishing of the central planning system.7 Accordingly, if we want to explore the question of succession in North Korea, we are looking at the puzzle of power transfer in a totalitarian system -not in a monarchy.Bursens and Sinardet show that there are two interrelated sides to legitimacy. In addition to the expected outcomes, an important source of legitimacy seems to be that the decision-making process, including the selection of the leadership, follows approved rules.8 Democratic systems have developed a generally accepted procedure that constantly renews legitimacy through a continuous cycle of elections; Schumpeter argued that competition for votes was the defining characteristic of a democracy.9Such a procedure, however, is lacking in totalitarian systems, including the DPRK. But Steinberg argues that elections are by far not the only means to acquire political legitimacy. Importantly, he points at the fact that in addition to internal legitimacy, there is an external form such as recognition (de facto or de jure) of a political leader.10 The acquisition of power usually takes place only once in the lifetime of a leader. The perpetuation of legitimacy must therefore be based on the actual or perceived results of the leader's rule to a much higher degree than in a democratic system. …

IntroductionThe Six-Party Talks were initiated as an ad hoc multilateral framework for dealing with the second round of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003. Since then, the talks have functionally expanded and been institutionally reinforced, with occasional fluctuations of ups and downs. Over the past years, there has been a dominant speculation that the talks would be a significant litmus test for determining future circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. The underlying assumption of this speculation is that the successful completion of the talks would lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a formal ending of the Korean War with a peace treaty, and building a Northeast Asian security mechanism. Even though the talks have stalled since November 2008, it still holds valid that the six-party process would serve as an intermediary toward achieving peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.After a two-year-long stall of the Six-Party Talks, a new momentum for the resumption of the talks seemed to have returned recently. The inter-Korean denuclearization dialogues were held in Bali in July and in Beijing in September 2011, and the U.S.-DPRK high-level talks were held in New York in July and in Geneva in October 2011. Most recently, the third round of the U.S.-DPRK talks was held on February 23-24, 2012, in Beijing, which was the first since the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011. It was reported that North Korea agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests and uranium enrichment activity, and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment. Can this be interpreted as a signal that North Korea is ready to agree to steps demanded by Washington and Pyongyang's neighbors to restart the Six-Party Talks?Since the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il last year, it has been speculated that the resumption of the Six-Party Talks appears unlikely for the time being. However, on the contrary, the sudden political change in North Korea seems to give an impetus to the talks. Given the recent diplomatic developments, it is sensible to speculate that the Six-Party Talks are likely to be resumed in the foreseeable future. In the same vein, the Six-Party Talks are still reasonably expected to have the potential to serve as an emergent toward a Northeast Asian security mechanism in the future.The objective of this article is to examine the viability of the Six-Party Talks and the possibility of its transformation into a Northeast Asian security mechanism in the post-Kim Jong-il era. This article draws on the terms path and path as a theoretical apparatus to guide the evolutionary from institutional self-reinforcement to transformation. Path emergence is conceptualized as a complement to the concept of dependence. The concept of dependence has been used to refer to a historical sequence in which contingent events set institutional patterns with deterministic properties into motion. Traditionally, dependence theory tends to focus on mechanisms that anchor and stabilize institutional trajectories. This theory explains why the six-party process has been reinforced until now. However, it does not adequately explain institutional changes and ensuing emergent properties exhibited due to complex interactions between entities. In order to modify this theoretical lapse, the term path has been coined to explain the causes underlying institutional changes and ensuing emergent properties as unintended consequences.This article consists of four main sections. The first section presents the concepts of path and path as a theoretical framework. The second section examines the dependence of the Six-Party Talks. The third section explores the road map of emergence of the Six-Party Talks. Lastly, the concluding section summarizes the research outcomes. …

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

IntroductionThe provision of humanitarian aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a challenge to many aid providers, due in large part to the ways in which the country has chosen to interact with the outside world. Despite chronic problems of child malnutrition and mortality,1 aid providers are provided with virtually humanitarian space to access vulnerable populations and monitor for effective operations.2 While large aid providers such as the World Food Programme (WFP) sticking to a no access (to monitoring), policy,3 most other organizations have not been able to enjoy the same level of access.This study shows how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were able to overcome political sensitivity and channel aid to specific targeted groups within the DPRK. NGOs in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) were selected as cases in this study, not only because the international aid community knew rather little about them, but also due to their difficult position as a by-product of unstable inter-Korean relations. Despite signs of easing tension during the early 2000s, the fact that the two Koreas were still theoretically at war also meant that South Korean aid providers had faced substantially more scrutiny than their non-Korean counter-parts.4The ROK presented both advantages and disadvantages as an aid provider to North Korea. It enjoyed minimal cultural and linguistic barriers with the North, as well as a relatively low cost of transportation of food and other supplies. Despite these advantages, this study concludes that it was by harnessing their links with partners outside the Korean Peninsula that South Korean NGOs managed to sideline some of the tough restrictions and made DPRK a more workable environment.South Korean NGOs and Their Operating Environment in the NorthThe DPRK government first appealed to the international community for humanitarian assistance in 1995 to alleviate its food crisis. This crisis resulted from decades of misguided development under the juche ideology,5 which required the country to be self-sufficient in food despite environmental limitations such as a mountainous terrain and a short growing season. A decline in food production first resulted from heavily mechanized agriculture, which caused land and water degradation.6 Short of foreign exchange, the loss of partners in barter trade after the collapse of the Soviet Union7 made it difficult to import food into the country. Eventually, floods in 1995 led to a reported damage of 2 million tons of grain and 330,000 hectares of cropland.8 The Public Distribution System (PDS), which used to guarantee access to food by individuals, also broke down as a result of the food shortage.9 According to Lee (2008), North Koreans bought about 70 percent of their food from the market after the food rationing.10South Korean NGOs started supplying the North with relief goods in 1998, when the ROK established an Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Fund as part of the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung. About 59 percent of the $720.6 million in aid delivered by the ROK between 1995 and 2001 was routed through NGOs, including the ROK Red Cross.11 After the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, the ROK government took up the responsibility of directly sending food aid to the North, while the focus of NGO efforts in food security shifted to the recovery of the agricultural sector.12 As of 2009, at least fifty-six organizations from the ROK had provided assistance of various amounts to the DPRK, in areas including but not limited to food security.South Korean NGOs had a reputation for putting more emphasis on trust building rather than hewing closely to humanitarian principles,13 so they were subject to questions of effectiveness and transparency. The ways in which they tried to remain accountable might thus present useful learning for members in the international community operating in such difficult environments as the DPRK. …

IntroductionHow should North Korea's structural economic problems, which have been evolving for decades, be addressed? North Korea's socialist economy, which had begun its downward spiral in the mid-1980s, plummeted dramatically to a near-collapse condition coincidently with, and in the wake of, global disintegration of the Cold War structure in the early 1990s.1 Economic data supplied by a number of organizations, including the United Nations, estimate that North Korea's total imports in 2008 were US$2.7 billion, while recording exports of US$1.2 billion in the same year. Since 2000 onward, North Korea has suffered severe hard-currency pressures, stemming from huge trade deficits averaging US$1.0 to $1.5 billion annually. For its economy to survive, North Korea has to earn foreign currency. The core problem here is that the North Koreans have, at least at present, no ability to foster the nation's industries that sufficiently demonstrates their export competitiveness, especially in the short term.In a general pattern, countries at the incipient stage of their economic development tend to have interests in exporting goods such as fishery products that can not only be easily produced by relatively low-skilled or manual labor, but that can also be easily converted into hard currency. This has been the case for South Korea. By the mid-1960s, its fishery products accounted for 20 percent of its total exports. Even by the early 1970s, fishery products remained as South Korea's main export staple, accounting for about 10 percent of its total exports.North Korea shows the same story at present. Fishery production in North Korea still occupies a heavy position in respect to its export performance and potential. For about a decade since 2000, North Korea's fishery products have accounted for about 20 percent of its total exports; 75 percent of the exports have gone to South Korea in the form of inter-Korean trade (Minchok Naebu Korae). South Korea's fishery imports from North Korea have increased by an annual growth rate of 20 percent- 25,000 tons in 2000, 50,000 tons in 2005, and 60,000 tons in 2008 (equivalent to US$40 million in 2000, US$60 million in 2005, and US$120 million in 2008, respectively). Although North Korea had exported significant amounts of fishery products to Japan, Japanese economic sanctions toward North Korea, including a trade ban in the aftermath of North Korea's underground nuclear test in October 2006, dramatically severed North Korea-Japanese economic ties, halting Japan's trade with North Korea almost completely. On the other hand, recent fishery trade between North Korea and China has been tending to decrease.2Considering the current trend in inter-Korean trade-and if cooperation is implemented successfully-South Korea's fishery imports from North Korea are projected to rise by 150,000 to 200,000 tons within five years. Because there is a huge gap in the fishery product market prices between the North and South, the imported products would gain tangible benefits from higher selling prices.3From the North Korean perspective, a prediction such as this suggests that the country may gain another source of foreign currency that would contribute to the improvement of its trade balance by utilizing renewable natural resources. It also has the effect that about 20 percent of South Korea's total fishery imports would be replaced by cheaper North Korean products.The potential benefits from this exchange will be significant to South Korea as well as to North Korea. The South can cover 10 percent of its total domestic demand by means of fish and shellfish imported from its geographically closest neighbor. This means that South Korea may secure a stable import source at a cheaper price, while, at the same time, the North may secure an export market. A dream of mutual prosperity will come true by means of this cooperation, making the confidence-building tasks between the two Koreas more promising. …

IntroductionNorth Korea is at a crossroads. Its ailing leader, seemingly rapid political transition, and unstable domestic political and economic situation all lead to a greater possibility of regime collapse. Although the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) still has a strong grip on its political power and maintains tight control of every layer of the society, a possible DPRK collapse or contingency continues to be one of the main issues for North Korea watchers, including pundits, scholars, policymakers, and even laymen who are interested in the changing North Korean affairs and their implications in the domestic and/or international arenas.1If North Korea collapses, then it would be a failed state in the sense that its government could not sustain its citizenry. Some commentators even say that the collapse of the DPRK has already begun. Thus, it is critical that regional powers discuss the possible outcomes of the North Korean stalemate and its impact on Northeast Asian regional security. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government, especially, should prepare for the possible outcomes of a North Korean catastrophe based on discussions, dialogues, and consultations with influential regional actors, such as the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Of the various possible future scenarios concerning the future of the DPRK regime, this article will focus on its deteriorating situations, analyze surrounding states' policy positions, and provide some meaningful policy considerations that the ROK government might consider in terms of the political, security, and legal aspects of the North Korean contingency. Regional powers surrounding the peninsula would play a critical role in a North Korean catastrophe for the following reasons: first, China has vital interests in North Korea; second, the U.S., the strategic ally of South Korea, is supposed to protect South Korea from any effect of the turbulence in North Korea; third, Russia and Japan also have strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula, so they may try to step in any contingency situation; and fourth, the U.S. and China would be highly concerned about the situation especially in the context of Sino-U.S. competition over East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, the South Korean government will be a key player in dealing with this matter, given that changes in North Korea could have a direct influence on the government in terms of security, economics, geography, and even national status. It is, therefore, timely and of the utmost importance to think about the possibility of the North Korean contingency from the perspective of the ROK.This article attempts to explain the general issue of North Korean contingency and then explores the various political and security considerations among concerned states, especially China. Next, it focuses on the legal perspectives that the South Korean government can and should employ in case of a catastrophic situation in North Korea and ends with conclusions and a summary of the main argument.The North Korean Contingency: Legal Aspects, Security Problems, and Regional ImplicationsAlthough regional stakeholders surrounding the Korean Peninsula have an acute interest in preventing any kind of catastrophic outcomes within North Korea, given the current stalemate in the North Korean situation, it is time to take more seriously any possibility of North Korean contingency in relation to its regime failure and collapse.2 North Korean contingency, if it happens, could be characterized as complex, uncertain, and unstable.First, legally speaking, the North Korean contingency has both domestic and international characteristics. In principle, resolution of the state of anarchy or the state of civil war in North Korea is a matter within North Korean domestic jurisdiction; it is a domestic matter. The principle of nonintervention in domestic matters is expressly stipulated in Article 2. …