IntroductionAfter succeeding Kim Jong-il upon his death on December 17, 2011, Kim Jongun, the new leader of North Korea, oversaw testing of nuclear weapons on February 12, 2013, marking North Korea's third nuclear weapon test.1 The objectives of the nuclear tests were those of regime consolidation of domestic political and military power over North Korea after increasing tension among neighborhood countries. North Korea's nuclear program, begun by Kim Il-sung, the country's founder, has been used strategically under the leadership of his son Kim Jong-il and his grandson Kim Jong-un.2 In this context, the first nuclear test in 2006 is still meaningful to the analysis of the dynamic reactions of the neighboring countries to North Korea's nuclear program.News of North Korea's first nuclear weapon test on October 9, 2006, made headlines around the globe. However, perhaps no five countries took such a keen interest in the issue as the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia- the nations involved in the six-party talks with North Korea, aimed at the negotiation of a peaceful solution. The underground explosion of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility in the North Hamgyong Province of North Korea was a sensational global news media issue. This article examines how native-l anguage print media from the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia presented the news of North Korea's nuclear weapon testing to their primarily domestic audiences; the news frames employed by each; and the differences in the cross-national media coverage of this single news event. Within the frame analysis, this study used war journalism and peace journalism as two competing frames in the news coverage of the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea.Media coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis has received little attention from media scholars. In a peripheral study of media involvement in the issue, Jiang examined cross-cultural differences in U.S. and Chinese press conferences on the test.3 However, published academic research about the news coverage of the crisis is sparse. Academic inquiry into how the U.S., Chinese, South Korean, Japanese, and Russian media relayed information about an event of great national and tional to their respective audiences as well as identifying and analyzing analyzing differences in that coverage would benefit not only mass communication scholars and framing theorists, but also those engaged in diplomatic, political, or sociological endeavors in those countries. This study will begin to fill the gap in the available analysis of news coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, add to the body of media framing literature, and examine how each country's native news media content may have influenced how its respective audiences understood North Korea's nuclear test.News Coverage of International IssuesStudies about international news coverage have focused on the differences in the domestic coverage of international news events such as the news media coverage on the two cases of planes being shot down, the Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Air Force and the Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S. Navy,4 the 1991 Persian Gulf War,5 the 1994 South African elections,6 U.N. conferences,7 and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.8 Other studies, though to a lesser degree, have examined cross-national and cross-cultural news coverage of various international events and issues, including the 1971 Sri Lankan uprising,9 diplomatic relations between the United States and Europe,10 the 1991 Persian Gulf War,11 the post-Cold War environment in the United States and China,12 and the Kwangju and Tiananmen pro- democracy movements.13Such cross-national and cross-cultural news analysis has only recently been thrust into the forefront of domestic mass communication research. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil demonstrated the danger of international ignorance and cross-cultural misconceptions and led to a surge in U. …

IntroductionIn popular perception North Korea is one of the most closed societies in the world and linking North Korea to information technology and the Internet seems to be contradictory. However, reports on cyberattacks from North Korea, a sophisticated weapons program needing underlying information technology skills, and the surprise visit by a former high- ranking Google manager show that information technology and even the Internet play an increasing role in North Korea. Indeed, acquiring information technology skills and applying them has been a priority for a long time. Given the socialist preoccupation with technology as the ultimate tool for growth (as opposed to management and organizational skills), this predilection for information technology is not surprising. It is, however, seriously inhibited by the aforementioned desire for control, since access in particular to worldwide information and the Internet is not easy to control. Now, patterns of Internet use and restrictions can be recognized, which lead to the conclusion that the use of the Internet will slowly increase and that this will bring formidable challenges to North Korea's control system.This article discusses the emergence of the Internet and information technology and its subsequent applications in North Korea, a topic until now understudied.The History of Information Technology and Internet in North KoreaThe Early Development of Internet in North KoreaNorth Korea, like other socialist states, has always been obsessed by technological advances, which seemed to promise a way out of perennial economic difficulties. When Kim Il- sung visited Europe in 1984 he became interested in information technology and set the starting point for the development of that sector. At the time he learned more about the industry of microelectronics, leading to the establishment of a long- term plan and by the end of the 1980s, investment was underway. During that time, new colleges were founded that offered degree programs in the field of information technology. With the worldwide growth of the information sector and the boom of the Internet in the 1990s, Kim Jong- il wanted to further develop this industry and in 1999 the Electronic Industry Ministry was founded. By 2000 North Korea launched its first website in English. In the following years more colleges were founded and the use of computers and information technology spread among the country.1 During the 90s, fiber- optic cables were installed to connect major cities and after the 2000 summit meeting between South and North Korea a fiber- optic cable was set up through the DMZ to the South.North Korea tried to acquire knowledge and technology through various channels, among them a project on distant medical diagnosis and treatment for which they lobbied the World Health Organization for many years. At that time some high-level governmental officials had access to the Internet, mainly to communicate for business reasons with China, Japan, and Russia. In 2000 the North Korean Intranet known as Kwangmyong (bright) was established. It is used to connect certain research facilities with each other, and it is also used in libraries such as the Grand People's Study Hall in Pyongyang. Apart from that, it also includes a search engine, an email program, and a variety of other homepages mostly filled with scientific information. However, at the time it was founded, access was very limited for the general public and even though it has developed further, it is still infrequently found in private homes and access is limited. Nevertheless the private use of the World Wide Web was something that was allowed only to a small group of super elite North Koreans and when the Internet is used by governmental institutions, it is restricted and highly supervised.2First Steps and ProjectsEven though the development of the IT sector seemed to be advancing rapidly, the distribution rate to computers was still very low. …

IntroductionResolving the security threats between North Korea and its regional neighbors remains key to building a viable Northeast Asian security regime. Relationships with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are marked by episodes of urgency and high tensions in an otherwise predictable operating environment in which all actors seem resigned to the continuation of the status quo.1 Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) revealed its nuclear ambitions in 2002, withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the following year, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has held the resolution of the nuclear crisis as a precondition for normalizing diplomatic ties. This hardline stance, arguably, has contributed to the present diplomatic impasse and there appears to be little impetus for progress under the prevailing rigid policies.2The current stalemate warrants exploration of a second front in engaging North Korea-one not mired by the politics of denuclearization. The carrot-and-stick approach, offering incentives for good behavior and punishing bad, has contributed little toward normalizing North Korea's relations with the international community, and has failed to coerce obedience towards international norms.3 The contemporary U.S. policy of strategic patience4 hints at fatigue and lack of direction. When combined with economic sanctions, strategic patience affords North Korea more time to develop a credible nuclear delivery capability while simultaneously building resentment. This article contends that continuation of this combination will (1) harden the positions and rhetoric of relevant political actors, increasing the political cost, internationally and domestically, of reversing stances5; (2) increase the likelihood of unintentional military clashes and escalation6; and (3) increase the internal insecurity of the North Korean regime.Appreciation of the North Korean regime's insecurity dilemma7 is essential to deciphering its motivations and designing a more effective North Korea policy. Under current conditions, Pyongyang arguably faces greater existential threats from internal forces than external ones. The elimination or collapse of the current regime in North Korea in the short- to mid-term, given the resulting unpredictable fallout, is not in the interests of any of the strategically engaged regional powers. North Korea therefore likely faces external existential threats only in the event of uncontainable internal insecurity spillover, or a humanitarian crisis of such magnitude that it shocks the conscience of humankind, compelling outside actors to intervene. Internally, however, waves of domestic change, including marketization from below8 and external knowledge proliferation, have already started to undermine the state's absolute control over the economy and information. In the current internal environment, the North Korean regime lacks desirable alternative options; the regime must eventually pursue reforms to survive, but those same reforms will likely sow the seeds of its collapse. In order to change the regime's calculus of policy options vis-a-vis economic reform, the ruling elite's insecurity must first be addressed.This article introduces a new concept, Non-State-Centric International Economic Engagement (NSCIEE), to be used as a non-exclusive approach to ameliorating Pyongyang's insecurity. NSCIEE would create an environment for non-state international actors, such as private enterprises and international financial institutions, to interact with North Korea in economic engagements based on the principles of market forces rather than national interest. NSCIEE is fundamentally different from economic engagement policies of the past in that the economic benefits to the North Korean regime and its ruling elites through economic engagement would not be a negative externality of the policy or a cost of doing business with the regime, but rather one of the explicit goals of the policy. …

IntroductionOne of the striking aspects of the March-April 2013 security crisis on the Korean peninsula was the relatively sanguine response of commentators to a series of events that had the potential to escalate to war. While there was no direct evidence that North Korea had mobilized its military forces at any point during the two months in which the major U.S.-ROK military exercise Key Resolve took place, the rhetorical threats emanating from Pyongyang involved an unprecedented number of explicit references to nuclear use. Furthermore, the U.S. flew several nuclearcapable platforms close to North Korean airspace in the robust demonstration of immediate extended deterrence on the peninsula since U.S. nuclear-armed submarines surfaced in South Korea's harbours in the 1970s.1 By any reckoning, there was potential for serious consequences flowing from miscalculation.2 However, analysts tended to be dismissive of the idea that war was on the horizon. As one seasoned observer of North Korea claimed in the midst of the crisis, most people in Seoul don't care about the North's belligerent statements: the farther one is from the Korean Peninsula, the more one will find people worried about the recent developments here.3An important underlying assumption about North Korea's nuclear weapons program has acquired currency among observers over the past few years. This assumption aligns closely with the view held by proliferation optimists that the risks posed by new nuclear powers are exaggerated and that these states are likely to exercise significant caution after crossing the nuclear threshold.4 Optimists maintain that the leaders of new nuclear powers will be chastened by their awesome responsibility and act with appropriate restraint. Contrary to proliferation pessimists, who argue that the risks of nuclear conflict multiply with each new entrant into the nuclear club, optimists claim that the inherently compelling deterrence attributes of the world's powerful weapon will have the effect of stabilizing regional security complexes. According to proliferation optimists, all leaders operate within a rational actor mindset; no rational individual will countenance nuclear war; and nuclear weapons inevitably induce a high degree of caution. If the established nuclear weapons states have managed to co-exist for several decades, why should we assume there is a greater risk that new nuclear powers will act any less responsibly?In this article, I challenge optimistic interpretations of North Korea's behavior as a nuclear weapons state by using the neglected prism of crisis instability. Employed as a framework of analysis to assess the dynamics of the Cold War superpower nuclear relationship, notions of crisis instability focus on the extent to which stability is achievable between nuclear-armed states during crisis situations. It is one thing to say that Pyongyang will never under any circumstances launch a bolt-fromthe-blue nuclear attack, but quite another to argue that under no circumstances will North Korea ever authorize the use of nuclear weapons during a confrontation with the U.S. and South Korea. An important test for proliferation optimism concerns the incentives and disincentives new nuclear powers confront in crisis situations. Very few would contest the claim that Pyongyang is unlikely to initiate nuclear use in non-crisis conditions, but it becomes harder to sustain this argument when we examine the various challenges that will confront North Korean decision makers in periods of acute tension.The central argument of this article is that the prospects for North Korea using nuclear weapons during crises are probably greater than generally acknowledged. This is not based on any assumption about the irrationality of the leadership in Pyongyang. To the contrary, nuclear first use might be seen as a rational option by North Korean elites if they regard a U.S.-ROK conventional first-strike as inevitable. …

IntroductionTo let all people eat rice with meat soup, as a common propaganda slogan has it, has been an objective of the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea.1 Yet contrary to official proclamation, nutritional stress has lingered in North Korea ever since its foundation in 1948, which was brought about by the emerging Cold War (1945-1991). As a manifestation of food calamities, mean final height of North Korean men, taken as a proxy for nutritional and epidemiological stress in early life,2 merely stagnated for all decades of the Cold War.3,4 In stark contrast, contemporary South Korean men are by now the tallest in all of East Asia because of healthy and wealthy living conditions in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.5Worst of all, by the 1990s, North Korea experienced a great famine.6,7 Massive starvation of North Koreans occurred with the downfall of socialism and the geopolitical disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. Food, fertilizers, and energy could no longer be afforded on the basis of world market prices. Lacking these necessary inputs, North Korea's economy collapsed in the 1990s.8 More important, in the previous Cold War era, the socialist government inefficiently focused on heavy industrialization and symbolic mammoth projects of marginal economic use in addition to overspending up to one-third of its budget on the military.9 This leftNorth Korea without comparative advantages in exports in the post-Cold War era to raise the levels of living and revive its economy.Though macroeconomic shocks and long-term strategic malinvestments are the underlying causes for North Korea's decline after the Cold War, the food crisis of the 1990s itself was triggered by two consecutive floods in 1995 and 1996 that devastated large parts of the country and evolved into a major famine.10 The floods in turn were a result of the El Nino weather anomaly at that time, although deforestation accelerated the crisis. However, by the early 2000s, North Korean living standards improved thanks to international assistance. In the early 1990s, North Korea joined the United Nations, and after the first floods in 1995, it officially appealed for aid. Ever since then, international food aid has been pouring into the DPRK, with peaks from 1997 to 2005 (Figure 1). Another important factor for North Korea's revitalization in the post-Cold War era was liberalization reforms. These were officially introduced in 2002 (July First Reforms) and led to a paradigmatic shift, including marketization and decentralization.11,12,13 Table 1 demonstrates that probably 78 percent of North Koreans were participating in the informal economy by the time they were interviewed from 2004 to 2005.This article investigates the trends in underweight of children in North Korea from 1987 to 2012 to explore how the nutritional status of the North Korean people developed in the critical decade of the 1990s and beyond. First and foremost, the starting point of this study is the year 1987, which is a prefamine period when North Korea was still integrated into the Eastern Bloc. The last year of observation is the post-famine year 2012, which is over a decade after the great famine of the 1990s. Hence, this study offers very rare evidence on the long-term development of North Korean biosocial living standards. Previous statistical analysis on North Korean child malnutrition focused on cross-sectional evidence during the peak of famine14,15 or after the famine16,17 as well as on the regional effects of the food crisis.18,19 What is more, this paper compares underweight rates of children in North Korea to that of their peers in South Korea by drawing on recently released statistics based on a nationally representative anthropometric survey carried out from 2003 to 2004. This is another intriguing comparison because both Koreas share the same genetic and cultural ancestry and were also not affected much by migration over the last centuries. …

IntroductionWith its geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and ideological affinity, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has occupied an important place in the conduct of China's foreign policy. Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), which saved the DPRK from its demise, China signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with North Korea in 1961, which is still in effect today. As North Korea's economy deteriorated as a result of the so-called military first policy of the Kim Jong-Il regime from the latter part of the 1990s, China provided increasingly larger amounts of economic aid to its impoverished ally, while shielding it diplomatically and politically from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council for Pyongyang's violations of international agreements on the denuclearization of North Korea. China is estimated to provide over 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 45 percent of its food.1Under the Hu Jintao government (2002-2012), China's Korea policy revolved around three basic concerns: prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime, preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime, as North Korea provided a valuable buffer zone between China and South Korea where over 28,000 U.S. troops remain stationed. If the North Korean regime collapsed, or were absorbed by South Korea, China would have to face a unified Korea controlled by the capitalist South and allied with the United States. Such a contingency would mean not only the loss of a valuable buffer zone but also a considerable burden on China's national defense, for as many as one-fifth (or 400,000) of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) may need to be deployed along the Sino-Korean border to ensure China's national security.2 Second, China desired to prevent the outbreak of another war in Korea, for that could embroil China in an unwanted war because of its alliance with North Korea. In order for China to continue its economic development and rise, it needed a peaceful international environment in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Third, China also became concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by North Korea would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would likely be compelled to counter the North's move by developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Such a development would not be conducive to the maintenance of China's special status as the sole legitimate nuclear power in the region. As a result, China became involved in the politics of denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks in and after 2003.Throughout the Kim Jong-Il's rule in North Korea (1994-2011), China's priority was the survival of the North Korean regime (or preventing its collapse). Such a priority did not change immediately after Jong-Il's death, for China's overriding concern was the preservation of North Korea through the successful consolidation of power by Kim Jong-Un. As a result, the Hu Jintao leadership decided to help Jong- Un's consolidation of power by endorsing the legitimacy of the new regime from the very beginning. At the same time, China also wanted a more cooperative new North Korean regime which would help stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea under Kim Jong-Il had been a political liability and economic burden to China, as that regime defied the international community by perpetrating numerous provocations and crises. Pyongyang carried out missile and nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009 in violation of international agreements. Furthermore, Pyongyang sank a South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 and shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island, killing over 50 soldiers and civilians, in November of the same year. …

IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new will work. In other words, will the compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term sanctions means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powers, imposed only twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977) in the 45 years of its existence prior to the August 1990 embargo of Iraq.1 Since 1990, however, the UN Security Council has increasingly imposed economic to prevent, manage, or resolve violent conflict. When a UN sanction is imposed, all UN member nations are required to comply with the order and to enforce the sanction against the outlaw country.2The active utilization of as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy dates back to the aftermath of World War I, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson suggested that the adoption of was a method that could keep the world free of war. However, empirical studies on the effectiveness of economic by Pape3 and others found that historically, have a poor track record. The rare success of cases such as South Africa is associated with unique factors that are unlikely to be found elsewhere. …

The rumours of Unhasu Orchestra’s demise soaked up a good deal of the bandwidth in the English-language press that focused on the DPRK in autumn 2013. Yet there remains a real dearth of academic work on this significant state institution, which was clearly intended to pursue Kim Jong-il’s ideology and spread Kim Jong-un’s glories, particularly in charismatic commemorative vein. Thus this article’s scope and interest in establishing the orchestra’s function in North Korea’s efforts to craft external views of itself is both useful and timely. The Associated Press bureau in Pyongyang, similarly, has been the focus of a great deal of ire and interest on the internet, but far less scholarly investigation. This article puts the AP-KCNA collaboration into a “soft power” framework whereby North Korea’s gains from the project are juxtaposed against the propaganda uses to which it is put. Even as the AP’s presence in Pyongyang (and, briefly, Manhattan) has manifested the glimmering if hardly full appearance of a new internationalism for North Korean viewers, the article holds out the possibility of the DPRK using the AP as a channel to Washington. In other words, its greatest use in the possible unfreezing of US-DPRK relations may be yet to come, inevitable criticisms of restricted reporting notwithstanding. Both the AP-KCNA joint exhibition and the Unhasu Orchestra’s sojourn to France coincided with the first months of Kim Jong-un’s reign. Thus they can provide an alternate perspective both on North Korean foreign policy and the wider debate about how to best engage the DPRK. The paper therefore adds to the literature on North Korean foreign relations under Kim Jong-un, and can enrich the ongoing debates over journalistic and musical engagement with North Korea.

IntroductionSince the mid-1990s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) economic collapse and subsequent food crisis have caused numerous North Koreans to starve to death. Moreover, such events have prompted thousands to seek refuge in the Republic of China (PRC) and beyond. An estimated 600,000 to over 2 million North Koreans were killed by the famine.2 It is also estimated that approximately 100,000-300,000 North Koreans moved to China.3 Many North Korean escapees in northeast China have lived in hiding from crackdowns and forced repatriations by the PRC and neighboring countries, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The food crisis has resulted in an explosive increase in the migration of North Koreans to northeast China, other neighboring Asian countries, and, thereafter, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As of December 2012, North Koreans who arrived in South Korea numbered 24,614.4 Furthermore, one in three North Korean escapees is heading to countries other than South Korea, and many escapees want to defect to Western countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.5 While North Koreans in South Korea have been granted ROK citizenship, many North Korean asylum seekers staying in other countries have not been under legal or humanitarian protection. Due to political, diplomatic and legal problems in the international and domestic contexts, the North Korean diaspora has maintained an illegal or unstable status as border-crossing people or trespassers.Until now, existing studies have researched the migration and human rights violations of North Koreans in terms of status under international law. Are North Korean escapees political refugees, economic migrants or simply border-crossing people? This has been one of the critical questions regarding the North Korean diaspora. While North Korean escapees are often referred to as refugees in mass media, in many cases, especially in Asian transit countries, they have not received protection under international law as well as from the concerned countries' domestic law. Today, most of the related Northeast and Southeast Asian countries rarely guarantee status to North Koreans, and the U.S. and European countries also enforce a very selective policy of admitting North Koreans. In this regard, Western and South Korean civic organizations of North Korean human rights argue that those defecting due to human rights violations should undeniably be granted status.The number of refugees of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stood at 10.5 million at the beginning of 2011. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) in 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol) in 1967 provide a framework for the legal protection of a large number of displaced people. The Refugee Convention defines refugee as someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 6 According to UNHCR, as of January 2013, the total population of concern in the case of North Koreans is 1542, and among this, the number of refugees is 1052 and that of asylum seekers is 490.7 Here, the dilemma is whether to use the term refugee at all in referring to North Koreans who depart their country of origin illegally. This is because a majority of North Koreans leave the DPRK primarily in search of food, not for fear of persecution. However, North Koreans' defections due to food shortages and forced repatriations in many cases lead to human rights violations, such as a total denial of political, civil and religious rights as well as severe physical abuse in DPRK prison camps.8 Therefore, UNHCR claims that North Koreans, especially those living in China and other Asian transit countries, should be considered as refugees sur place because they face the threat of persecution upon returning to North Korea even though they leave their country in search of food. …

IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with actors such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker willing to stomach the risks (perhaps in return for receiving premium rates), but a hardpressed entity may have to resort to more costly measures such as bartering, laundering money through front companies, or using bulk cash. When such an affected entity is a vital node in a country's economy, such as a major bank, the disruptive effects can spread far, complicating commercial activities and creating inflationary pressures. Both legitimate and illicit commerce may therefore be affected by financial sanctions, creating an incentive for legitimate businesses to step into the financial netherworld, and for illicit ones to delve further underground.3From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, financial sanctions are a significant addition to the more traditional sanctions toolbox of trade embargos, interdictions, and targeted smart sanctions. These measures fit well within the context of the overlapping objectives of why states implement sanctions: to coerce a target regime to change its behavior; to undermine its leadership; to deter it from future actions; to degrade its capabilities; to warn international audiences against undertaking similar behavior; and to satisfy domestic audiences demanding that something be done. …