Purpose—The purpose of the article is to analyze the U.S.’s foreign policy framework toward North Korea in the post–Cold War era. Design, Methodology, Approach—We employ process-tracing technique and comparative sequential method across successive administrations and find that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea is one of a self-amplifying process. Findings—We argue that the U.S.’s foreign policy toward North Korea has remained remarkably consistent over the course of three decades. Furthermore, the policy has both hardened and narrowed in its focus on denuclearization. Practical Implications—As the U.S. deepens its pursuit for denuclearization as an end, the misalignment of goals between Washington and Pyongyang persists and even grows. Originality, Value—Through our analysis, we contribute to existing work that identifies North Korea’s liability for the engagement failures and add texture to the understanding of the current deadlock in negotiations.

IntroductionIn the past, because of political tensions and environmental reasons, the border region of Russia, China, and North Korea did not receive much attention, especially in terms of economic growth potential, even though specialists had designated the area economic territories in the early 1990s.1 The border however, is now increasingly reattracting attention from Northeast Asia experts because of its potential as a treasure trove of natural resources and a global logistics hub. Although, in the political point of view, conflicts of interests between North Korea/South Korea, China/Russia, Russia/Japan, and Japan/China are still unresolved, regional cooperation for the mutual benefit of all parties-especially in trade, investment, and energy supply-is being increasingly reassessed.In this Russia has planned to diversify its natural resource exports, balance regional development within the country, and expand its regional political influence. China has accelerated its efforts to develop its three northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), secure its way out to the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and improve accessibility to natural resources, such as oil and gas buried in Russian Siberia.2 North Korea spurs development of its Rason Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in order to overcome prolonged economic difficulties.3 South Korea searches for ways to secure energy resources along with its efforts to develop logistics routes connected throughout the Eurasian continent, which was highlighted in 2013 in the Eurasia Initiative of the Park Geun-hye government.4 Japan places top priority on ensuring resources near the Tumen River estuary as well. The region, frequently called as such by South Koreans since the late 1980s-and which includes the border areas between Russia, China, and North Korea, part of the Russian Far East and Siberia, and part of Northeast China-has reemerged as a crucial juncture because of the mutual interests of all parties interlinked in the economic and the political spheres.5In addition, because of climate change and the progress of global warming, the availability of a potential route to the Arctic Ocean is emerging. Moreover, this situation increases the availability of Russian Far East ports and natural resources development in the northern region. Logistics infrastructures and their operating systems to access the resources therein are still vulnerable. The closed customs system between China and Russia could be a constraining factor for building a seamless cross-border logistics system. The most critical barrier to growth, however, would be the disconnected maritime and/or inland logistics network to North Korea, under the influence of political factors. As a way to solve political tensions with isolated North Korea, economic cooperation in the northern logistics market (including the Korean Peninsula, China, and Russia) presents itself as a necessary task to accomplish. To achieve this goal, an understanding of the current status and implications of the northern logistics market and prospecting in the direction of future changes are necessary.Historical Background of the Northern Economic Bloc6RussiaImperial Russian territorial advancement toward the present Russian Far East began with the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, signed with Qing China to define the respective boundaries mainly along the Amur River.7 Subsequently, Russia advanced to Alaska in 1741.8 During the decline of the Qing in the mid-nineteenth century, Russia conquered Vladivostok in 1859 and established the present borderline of the Russian Far East.9 In 1891, Russia started constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), completed in 1903.10 With the demise of Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union established fifteen regions for economic development from 1920 to 1957, setting up nineteen basic economic regions, including Siberia afterward. The rapid growth of this region attempted by the Soviet Union was based on rich physical resource endowment, while scarcity of the labor force was supplemented with enforced migration by the state authorities. …

IntroductionThe year 2013 marked the sixty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The relations were established within a shared ideology, at a time when both countries sought allies to strengthen their independence. Mongolia's rejection of communism and adoption of a multi-party system and market economy in 1990 were to radically change its relationship with the DPRK.However, despite their many differences and North Korea's pariah status in the international arena, Ulaanbaatar has made repeated efforts to maintain active diplomatic relations and engage North Korea. It has hosted talks in Ulaanbaatar between the DPRK and Japan, expressed interest in leasing a seaport in North Korea and, to mark the 65th diplomatic anniversary, Mongolia's head of state has visited Pyong-yang. These initiatives raise a number of questions. How have Mongolia's relations with the DPRK evolved over these sixty-five years, and can Ulaanbaatar continue to engage North Korea now that Mongolia is a democracy, has embraced a market economy, and subscribes to vastly different values and principles? Can Mongolia convince the DPRK to take part in a dialogue on regional security, as Mongolia's head of state suggested at the time of his 2013 visit to Pyongyang?Sources regarding Mongolia's relations with the DPRK remain limited and difficult to access. This article draws on literature, media reports, official Mongolian press releases and statements, and, finally, a number of informal interviews and discussions with Mongolian policy makers and politicians.1 As such, this article approaches Mongolia's relations with the DPRK through Mongolia's DPRK policy, rather than analyzing Pyongyang's attitude towards Ulaanbaatar.Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: 19482The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948 served Mongolia and the DPRK well. Both Mongolia and North Korea only maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Though de facto following Soviet priorities, the DPRK relations provided an opportunity for Mongolia to reaffirm its independence, particularly towards its southern neighbor China. In the 17th and 18th century, the territory of Mongolia had been administered as the Chinese province of Outer Mongolia. In 1911, with the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongolia proclaimed its independence yet entered a decade of disarray. The country adopted its first constitution in 1924 and proclaimed, under Russian protection, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). Following Russia, Mongolia became the second country to adopt communism. Mongolia's independence, however, remained fragile, and it would take two decades-and some Soviet pressure-for China's Chiang Kai-shek to reluctantly recognize the MPR (Chiang's recognition, however, was short-lived, and Mongolia-Taiwan relations remain ambiguous to this date).On October 15, 1948, barely a month after the DPRK had been proclaimed, and on Pyongyang's initiative, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations.3 The diplomatic relations of the two states-and for that matter those with the Soviet Union-were predominantly based on shared ideology. Migeddorj Batchimeg, currently a member of parliament and former presidential advisor on national security,4 defines the initial relations between the two countries as an ideology-driven friendship.5 Indeed, during the Korean War Mongolia provided North Korea with food aid, horses (some of which were formally awarded the DPRK title heroic horse), and other material assistance. Mongolia further took in a number of young children orphaned during the war and continued to provide food aid to North Korea after the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953.6The early and rapid recognition of the two nations did not translate into frequent high-l evel visits and a thriving exchange between the two nations. …

IntroductionChina maintains a special relationship with North Korea, because of the traditional friendship that was first established by Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung during the Korean War in the 1950s. Although North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 caused uncertainty regarding bilateral relations, high-level official visits continued (see Table 1). Table 1 shows the mutual visits by top leaders between North Korea and China since 2006. Every year for the past seven years, there has been at least one ministerial-level visit from one side to the other. On the Chinese side, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, current Prime Minister Li Keqiang (vice prime minister at the time of the visit), current President Xi Jinping (vice president at the time of the visit) and current Vice President Li Yuanchao have all paid visits to North Korea. Despite fluctuating tension between North Korea and South Korea, relations between China and North Korea have entered a different stage, especially noticeable when new leaders came into power in both countries. Xi Jinping was elected president of China during the 18th Plenary Conference of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on November 15, 2012. After the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in December of 2011, Kim Jong-un became the 1st Chief of Committee of National Defense Committee on April 13, 2012.Since 2006, the United Nations has authorized four rounds of sanctions on North Korea, which mainly limit the import of nuclear- and missile-related equipment and technologies.1 As a result, trade between North Korea and the rest of the world has been affected. The trading of goods and services that were excluded from the sanctions still continue between North Korea and the outside world, including China. Tourism is also an important sector that has not been stopped by the sanctions.From the demand side, China is the neighbor of North Korea, and being a large market, China's economic environment provides a sound basis for tourism. China's per capita GDP reached about 6,000 USD at the official exchange rate and about 9,000 USD in purchasing power parity in 2012. According to empirical research, the tourism and leisure industry of a country will have strong growth when per capita GDP reaches 3,000-5,000 USD. Consequently, customers will have high expectations of service quality.2As more Chinese citizens travel abroad for sightseeing, more destinations are being approved by the Chinese government, after examination of mutual diplomatic relations and the security situation in those destinations. A destination must have unique value to offer to tourists. Several aspects of North Korea are attractive to Chinese tourists. The war in the 1950s left a deep impression on many Chinese, as well as on their relatives and friends, particularly those who served as voluntary soldiers. These individuals go to North Korea hoping to revisit former battlefields to see how they have changed.Members of the younger generation, born after the 1970s, grew up during the fast economic development and all around policy reform that has taken place across China in recent decades. The outlook of China changed, or became modernized, greatly after the 1980s. This makes it hard for members of the younger generation, especially those living in urban areas, to understand China's past, as they cannot find tangible elements or memories from China's history. North Korea's slow change and growth since the 1950s, plus its isolationist policies, make it a showpiece which resembles China's history. For younger Chinese, North Korea is an ideal place to learn about China's past, due to its centrally planned economy, egalitarianism, and strictly managed society. For these individuals, the main attraction is related to the spiritual, rather than the material, side. On the other hand, some Chinese investors are trying to find business opportunities in North Korea and they also join tours of the country.Curiosity will drive people to tour new destinations. …

IntroductionDoes economic integration between South and North Korea generate positive spillover effects on their relationship? Or, are geopolitical factors and security issues still powerful enough to dominate Korean politics, limiting the effect of economic integration? The level of economic integration between the two Koreas has deepened over time. The amount of bilateral trade was only about $1.1 million three years after they officially began their trade relationship in 1988. It increased to $400 million in 2000 and then $2 billion in 2012. Currently, South Korea is North Korea's second largest trading partner, accounting for about 38 percent of its total trade in 2007. Considerable research argues that economic integration generates positive spillover effects on economic partners socially and politically.2 Scholars of liberal peace, for instance, claim that bilateral economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict between trading partners.3 Strong economic ties and material gains generated from it may promote economic partners' incentive to maintain or strengthen their relationship and avoid threats that may disrupt their partnership. Frequent interactions can also increase common knowledge, understanding, and interest on various issues. To the extent it occurs, economic partners are likely to narrow their policy preference gaps over various foreign policy issues.4 In this regard, it is reasonable to suspect that increasing economic integration between the two Koreas may have promoted their foreign policy preference similarity, increasing political cooperation in international organizations.Meanwhile, from a realist perspective, military tension and external forces on the peninsula, such as the U.S. and China, are still powerful factors that drive Korean politics. From this perspective, inter-Korean relations and their foreign policies have been shaped and affected by geopolitical issues and regional super powers. Therefore, bilateral economic integration may have a negligible impact on inter- Korean relations.Both claims have solid theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, virtually no empirical studies have tested these claims and show whether economic integration has gen- erated any positive spillover effects on inter-Korean relations. This article examines whether deepening economic integration has promoted cooperation between the two Koreas by analyzing their voting (dis)similarity in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the time period, 1991-2011. Also, it tests whether their voting decisions are strongly influenced by the positions of the U.S. and China on the issues. Empirical results show no significant evidence that economic integration promotes cooperation between South and North Korea in the UNGA. However, the two Koreas show relatively similar voting patterns over economic issues and Palestinian issues, while they tend not to agree on nuclear, security, and human rights issues. Meanwhile, their vote coincidence is strongly influenced by the United States' and China's positions on votes. These results imply that political rather than economic factors are still significant in explaining non-cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.In the following pages, we first examine the theoretical basis of the relationship between economic integration and states' cooperation. Next, we explore states' voting behavior in the UNGA in general and that of the two Koreas in particular. Research design, the data and variables used in this article, and the empirical results are reported in the next section. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the findings and their implications.Economic Integration and Cooperation Between StatesEconomic integration, which is typically defined as the free flow of goods, capital, and labor across national borders, has deepened in many places in the world. The Korean Peninsula is not an exception from this global trend. Ever since the devastating Korean War in 1950-1953, the two Koreas lacked a formal economic relationship until 1988. …

IntroductionSatellite imagery has revealed steam coming from the renovated North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon,1 implying that Pyongyang has renewed efforts to accumulate plutonium, which can be processed from the reactor's waste products, in order to expand its stockpile of nuclear warheads. If this is true, it represents a fresh phase of nuclear escalation from North Korea, made all the more serious since this action nullifies previous disarmament progress made in 2008 when Pyongyang demolished a cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor,2 partially disabling its nuclear weapons program.Worryingly, the reactor needs to run for at least a year before spent fuel rods can be removed for plutonium harvesting, and the predicted date when the DPRK can begin reaping fresh weapons grade plutonium is fast approaching. Additionally, North Korea has a uranium enrichment program, which was first detected in 2002, and could also produce uranium-based nuclear arms. Despite the lack of concrete intelligence regarding the efficacy of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment for weapons building, it would be fair to assume that if left to its own devices, the DPRK's pool of nuclear explosives is set to grow.However, Pyongyang's behavior does not preclude an improvement in disarmament prospects leading to nuclear rollback. Turning to the South African nuclear disarmament model, hope for North Korean nuclear disarmament can be salvaged by the fact that Pretoria decommissioned its entire nuclear munitions manufacturing capability along with all operational atomic bombs. Hence, if the latter can relinquish its nuclear deterrent, so can the former.Learning from South Africa's Nuclear DisarmamentRevisiting the decommissioning of the South African nuclear weapons program from 1990 to 1991,3 permits the parsing of ideas for North Korean denuclearization despite the disparate nature of both states. South Africa's status as the only country to indigenously build and dismantle its nuclear arsenal should provide pointers as to how North Korea can be encouraged to relinquish nuclear arms.Concerning factors driving President F.W. de Klerk to order the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program in 1989, it can be substantiated that: (1) weakening Soviet support for Angola and Mozambique lessened the security threat that these two adversarial states posed against South Africa's northern borders4; (2) years of sanctions due to the imposition of apartheid had battered the South African economy, leading to a desperate need for externally driven economic rehabilitation5 (which would be jeopardized by pariah status from nuclear arms possession) and; (3) De Klerk strongly believed in the morality of nuclear disarmament.6As such, South African nuclear disarmament was brought about by a pacification of serious national security threats, the realization that sanctions induced economic autarky was intolerable, and the positive effect of international nonproliferation norms. Correspondingly, if the North Korean security paradigm improves, benefits from economic interdependence become tangible and prestige or legitimacy from rogue status cessation can be gained, Pyongyang might agree to denuclearize.North Korean Economic, Norms-Based and National Security RealitiesNorth Korea has a moribund economy. Despite the autarky promoting state ideology of Juche, North Korea seems incapable of surviving without foreign assistance. For instance, its economy suffered a dip as soon as socialist support was withdrawn in 19917 and shrunk by almost half from 1990 to 1999.8 Additionally, the North Korean economy only grew once from 2009 to 2011 with gross domestic product only increasing by 0.8 percent in 2011.9 Moreover, the DPRK has been constantly unable to feed its population in contemporary times with crop failure in 2014 brought about by drought,10 and serious food shortages from 1995 onward due to natural disasters and economic mismanagement, thereby degrading labor productivity and societal sustainability. …

IntroductionNorth Koreans suffer from human rights abuses at the hands of the Kim regime. Despite consensus regarding the serious nature of abuses, addressing (much less resolving) these issues has proven to be difficult. Complicating matters further, the problem of North Korean human rights is embedded in the context of perpetual nuclear and humanitarian crises. This has stimulated ethical debates and much soul-searching among policymakers, aid workers, and activists torn between choices of principle and pragmatism. It has also inevitability led to the politicization of North Korean human rights.The politicization of North Korean human rights in U.S. foreign policy raises an interesting puzzle: why do human rights and humanitarian aid groups with noble intentions of alleviating human suffering at times distrust one another? In an ideal world, human rights, and its close cousin, humanitarian aid, knows no politics. But among narrow policy and activist circles within the human rights and humanitarian aid communities, politics has inevitably crept into the picture as different tactics, goals, and worldviews collide.This article explores different responses to human suffering in North Korea and the evolution of the contrasting yet symbiotic relationship between engagement and advocacy approaches to human rights since the mid-1990s in the United States. More concretely, I examine how short and long term strategic goals interacted with different moral and principled beliefs. This interaction produced two different networks working to alleviate the plight of North Koreans. One response to North Korean suffering stressed continued engagement with North Korea at the strategic, but more importantly humanitarian level. As evidence of gross human rights violations mounted in the late 1990s, a second network emerged shifting their focus toward advocacy and awareness, demanding greater political rights and freedoms for North Koreans.Understanding the Political ContextTo clarify the difference between these two ideal-type camps,1 an engagement-oriented approach seeks to meet the basic needs of North Koreans and improve living conditions through humanitarian initiatives, social entrepreneurship, educational training, and market-oriented business development.2 Engagement does not necessarily mean holding negotiations with the regime. Rather, it implies various levels of interaction with North Koreans at the state or local level with the goal of building working relationships.3 At the heart of an engagement approach is the idea of building relations and partnerships at the people-to-people level.On the other end of the spectrum are the human rights universalists who advocate greater freedom, liberty, and political rights for North Koreans.4 Naming and shaming the regime by documenting violations and reporting on topics such as the location of gulags, sex trafficking, the refugee crisis, or religious persecution remain their staple. Some have engaged in activities which at times encroach on North Korean sovereignty. This includes establishing an underground system helping North Koreans escape to the safety of other countries, often in Southeast Asia or Mongolia, in hopes of seeking asylum in South Korea, or sending information about the outside world into North Korea through radio broadcasts, USB drives, DVDs, and balloons.Drawing on evidence from primary and secondary accounts, interviews with human rights activists, and participant-observation at North Korean human rights events from 2009 to 2011 (see Appendix A), I build an analytical framework which helps shed light on the politicization of North Korean human rights. I argue that variations in the interaction between short- and long-term strategic and principled beliefs resulted in a division between a humanitarian engagement and a human rights advocacy/naming-and-shaming approach to North Korean suffering. Strategic beliefs here refer to ideas held by individuals which inform decision-making on national security issues. …

IntroductionIn popular perception North Korea is one of the most closed societies in the world and linking North Korea to information technology and the Internet seems to be contradictory. However, reports on cyberattacks from North Korea, a sophisticated weapons program needing underlying information technology skills, and the surprise visit by a former high- ranking Google manager show that information technology and even the Internet play an increasing role in North Korea. Indeed, acquiring information technology skills and applying them has been a priority for a long time. Given the socialist preoccupation with technology as the ultimate tool for growth (as opposed to management and organizational skills), this predilection for information technology is not surprising. It is, however, seriously inhibited by the aforementioned desire for control, since access in particular to worldwide information and the Internet is not easy to control. Now, patterns of Internet use and restrictions can be recognized, which lead to the conclusion that the use of the Internet will slowly increase and that this will bring formidable challenges to North Korea's control system.This article discusses the emergence of the Internet and information technology and its subsequent applications in North Korea, a topic until now understudied.The History of Information Technology and Internet in North KoreaThe Early Development of Internet in North KoreaNorth Korea, like other socialist states, has always been obsessed by technological advances, which seemed to promise a way out of perennial economic difficulties. When Kim Il- sung visited Europe in 1984 he became interested in information technology and set the starting point for the development of that sector. At the time he learned more about the industry of microelectronics, leading to the establishment of a long- term plan and by the end of the 1980s, investment was underway. During that time, new colleges were founded that offered degree programs in the field of information technology. With the worldwide growth of the information sector and the boom of the Internet in the 1990s, Kim Jong- il wanted to further develop this industry and in 1999 the Electronic Industry Ministry was founded. By 2000 North Korea launched its first website in English. In the following years more colleges were founded and the use of computers and information technology spread among the country.1 During the 90s, fiber- optic cables were installed to connect major cities and after the 2000 summit meeting between South and North Korea a fiber- optic cable was set up through the DMZ to the South.North Korea tried to acquire knowledge and technology through various channels, among them a project on distant medical diagnosis and treatment for which they lobbied the World Health Organization for many years. At that time some high-level governmental officials had access to the Internet, mainly to communicate for business reasons with China, Japan, and Russia. In 2000 the North Korean Intranet known as Kwangmyong (bright) was established. It is used to connect certain research facilities with each other, and it is also used in libraries such as the Grand People's Study Hall in Pyongyang. Apart from that, it also includes a search engine, an email program, and a variety of other homepages mostly filled with scientific information. However, at the time it was founded, access was very limited for the general public and even though it has developed further, it is still infrequently found in private homes and access is limited. Nevertheless the private use of the World Wide Web was something that was allowed only to a small group of super elite North Koreans and when the Internet is used by governmental institutions, it is restricted and highly supervised.2First Steps and ProjectsEven though the development of the IT sector seemed to be advancing rapidly, the distribution rate to computers was still very low. …

IntroductionResolving the security threats between North Korea and its regional neighbors remains key to building a viable Northeast Asian security regime. Relationships with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are marked by episodes of urgency and high tensions in an otherwise predictable operating environment in which all actors seem resigned to the continuation of the status quo.1 Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) revealed its nuclear ambitions in 2002, withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the following year, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has held the resolution of the nuclear crisis as a precondition for normalizing diplomatic ties. This hardline stance, arguably, has contributed to the present diplomatic impasse and there appears to be little impetus for progress under the prevailing rigid policies.2The current stalemate warrants exploration of a second front in engaging North Korea-one not mired by the politics of denuclearization. The carrot-and-stick approach, offering incentives for good behavior and punishing bad, has contributed little toward normalizing North Korea's relations with the international community, and has failed to coerce obedience towards international norms.3 The contemporary U.S. policy of strategic patience4 hints at fatigue and lack of direction. When combined with economic sanctions, strategic patience affords North Korea more time to develop a credible nuclear delivery capability while simultaneously building resentment. This article contends that continuation of this combination will (1) harden the positions and rhetoric of relevant political actors, increasing the political cost, internationally and domestically, of reversing stances5; (2) increase the likelihood of unintentional military clashes and escalation6; and (3) increase the internal insecurity of the North Korean regime.Appreciation of the North Korean regime's insecurity dilemma7 is essential to deciphering its motivations and designing a more effective North Korea policy. Under current conditions, Pyongyang arguably faces greater existential threats from internal forces than external ones. The elimination or collapse of the current regime in North Korea in the short- to mid-term, given the resulting unpredictable fallout, is not in the interests of any of the strategically engaged regional powers. North Korea therefore likely faces external existential threats only in the event of uncontainable internal insecurity spillover, or a humanitarian crisis of such magnitude that it shocks the conscience of humankind, compelling outside actors to intervene. Internally, however, waves of domestic change, including marketization from below8 and external knowledge proliferation, have already started to undermine the state's absolute control over the economy and information. In the current internal environment, the North Korean regime lacks desirable alternative options; the regime must eventually pursue reforms to survive, but those same reforms will likely sow the seeds of its collapse. In order to change the regime's calculus of policy options vis-a-vis economic reform, the ruling elite's insecurity must first be addressed.This article introduces a new concept, Non-State-Centric International Economic Engagement (NSCIEE), to be used as a non-exclusive approach to ameliorating Pyongyang's insecurity. NSCIEE would create an environment for non-state international actors, such as private enterprises and international financial institutions, to interact with North Korea in economic engagements based on the principles of market forces rather than national interest. NSCIEE is fundamentally different from economic engagement policies of the past in that the economic benefits to the North Korean regime and its ruling elites through economic engagement would not be a negative externality of the policy or a cost of doing business with the regime, but rather one of the explicit goals of the policy. …