Free to read on publisher website The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) has been criticised for failing adequately to live up to the promise of individualised resource packages tailored to the needs of each participant, instead applying bureaucratic standardised administrative logics. This paper analyses the legal architecture, policy assumptions and administration of the NDIS to establish the extent to which its guiding philosophy lies in professional person-centred caseplanning, an insurance logic, or principles of equity and efficiency of decision-making; and then assess the contribution of legal remedies in ensuring fidelity of purpose to policy goals. It is argued that whatever the validity of criticism of NDIS Taylorist administrative standardisation and data-driven planning, it is neither an error of law nor responsive to merits review avenues. Undue weighting of equity and efficiency goals over the preferences and needs of individual participants nevertheless remains ethically problematic in unduly elevating an ethics of justice (impartial planning based on abstract principles applied consistently to all participants) over an ethics of care that views each participant as unique, as arguably the NDIS was designed to promote.

This article analyses the Australian 'right to die' legislation in the context of the legal and medical principles which underlie the doctor-patient relationship. The main focus of the analysis is upon the differences in legal and medical interpretations of the concept of sound mind', which is the statutory requirement for a valid refusal of treatment. The article also examines the adequacy and suitability of the sound mind criterion when it is applied in the contest of patients affected by illness, and the effect of imposing concepts developed within a strictly legal framework upon clinical practice. Medico-legal and ethical ramifications of the right to die legislation upon the legal and professional rights of medical practitioners are also discussed, as are such related issues as the management of pain relief in cases of refusing patients, the meaning of current medical condition' in the refusal of treatment certificate, and the powers of agents.

The recent Federal Court decision in McBain v. Victoria, which rendered inoperative a Victorian law that restricted assisted reproductive technology to married or heterosexual de facto couples, has raised the issue of whether lesbians should have access to such technology. This article provides an overview of State laws currently regulating lesbian access to assisted reproduction in Australia. It then explores the growing body of empirical research indicating that the welfare of children raised in lesbian households does not differ in any significant respect from the welfare of children raised in comparable circumstances by heterosexual parents. This research undermines the view that children suffer social stigma or experience hardship caused by the lack of a 'father figure.' The 'welfare of child' rhetoric has in fact been used to mask marginalisation of 'alternative' family forms, and the reluctance to extend assisted reproductive technology to lesbians is underpinned by a deep-rooted fear of undermining the traditional heterosexual nuclear family.

In recent years there has been considerable debate over the legal and ethical issues associated with posthumous reproduction. This article analyses recent cases and legal regulation of reproductive technologies in Australia. The issues associated with posthumous reproduction are explored through a consideration of the nature of an individual's interest in their reproductive material. The suitability of a property-based model as a means of conceptualising interests in reproductive material is explored. The article concludes that the issues in this area need to be analysed in terms of autonomy interests that are understood relationally.

The Australian common law suffers from a lack of judicial authority on the right to die, in particular the right of patients to make anticipatory decisions to refuse treatment. Recent cases concerning the right of patients to refuse life-saving blood transfusions have highlighted the need for a substantial judicial clarification of this area. This article critically examines one of the most recent Australian cases in detail and compares its approach with those from other common countries. After taking this comparative analysis the article puts forth a common law model of anticipatory decision-making and examines how that model might work in the context of current legislative frameworks.

In the article Mr. Smith considers the need for reform in the area of defining when death occurs and the various approaches that exist to define death. He then analyses the stages of the developments in the various Australian jurisdictions and discusses the substantive content of the basic definition adopted and the practical implications of any enactment. The author suggests that the concept of death should be legislatively enacted in relevant pieces of legislation which call for a resolution of the question at the present time and a more general separate statement defining death should be avoided at the moment. Conceptually death should be defined as the permanent and irreversible loss of consciousness of the individual as determined by irreversible cessation of the brain stem function. The actual operational criteria of death should form the subject of a circular published by the relevant statutory health authority for the guidance of medical practitioners in relation to the specific problems they face.