The concept of "carno-phallogocentrism", introduced by Derrida in the late 1980s, is receiving significant attention today. However, commentators have noted that Derrida’s account of this concept is incomplete and not explicitly linked to the history of "anthropocentric subjectivity." The commonly proposed genealogy of this concept attempts to remediate these two unclarities by tracing the term’s definition back to its first appearance in 1989 in an interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, titled "‘Il faut bien manger’ ou le calcul du sujet". In this article, we suggest unfolding a new genealogy that examines the context in which this concept first appeared in the text "‘Il faut bien manger’ ou le calcul du sujet" and connects this first appearance to a set of other Derridean concepts and texts implicitly evoked on the same the occasion. This genealogy will reveal the speculative, "hetero-tautological" construction of the concept: the "hyphen" interposed between "carno" and "phallogo" indicates that the "law of the phallus" must speculatively oppose another law, which we call the "law of the flesh". The aim is to devise a deconstructive gesture capable of both revoking the presumed tautological omnipotence of the "anthropocentric subjectivity" (as dominant, virile, carnivorous and logocentric) and free the "law of the flesh" from its subjection to it.

This contribution explores Derrida's complex relationship with Althusser's work. It seeks to show how Derrida built on certain aspects of Althusser's work, particularly his internal critique of rigid forms of Marxism, while distancing himself from those more concerned with his relationship to science — specifically Althusser's attempt to promote a new science of history. This discussion, which sometimes took the form of a subtle game of 'positions', initially focused on the theme of ideology. Ultimately, however, it reveals itself to be the bearer of major political issues, such as the way in which social critique should be envisaged, or the place that the motif of exploitation might still occupy in it.

This paper reviews the complex and nuanced treatment of metaphysics in the first major works of Jacques Derrida (1967-72), and it supplements deconstruction with existential themes in order to safeguard it from the accusation of nihilistic relativism. The critique of logocentrism, often systematized through a paradoxical 'ontology of the trace', has been embraced by phenomenology and post-deconstruction, but also seen as insufficient for today's challenges. Returning to Derrida's demonstrations, I explore why metaphysics must be textual if it is to produce two operations constitutive of thinking: a certain technology of forgetting and an experience of meaning as singularized in words. This textuality is, specifically, that of writing, which reveals how, beyond truth, it is meaning-making that is sought by metaphysics and its writers. The techne of writing, then, plays a special role in individual, existential empowerment, but this interpretation of the history of ideas as a power struggle does not amount to moral relativism, because writing can help us sustain a unique and constructive passion for the margins.

This article argues that, despite their differences as thinkers, Toril Moi and Catherine Malabou offer surprisingly similar critiques of Derrida. Both doubt the political utility of Derridean thought. Both have also expressed reservations about the coherence and ongoing interest of his philosophy. By describing the unacknowledged similarities in their arguments, and by contextualizing them, this article tries to uncover what is and is not original in these "new" critiques. Ultimately, grappling with these challenges provides a useful means of rediscovering what remains unthought and exciting about Derrida.

When one "I" claims the entire "we" for itself, is there room left for other "I's"? How much "I" can a society endure? The author addresses these questions in three steps. First, she discusses the historical mediation of ideas between the "I" and the "we." Next, she addresses the process of liberating the individual from contexts of domination and provision. Finally, she explores the path from external responsibility to self-responsibility.

This paper explores Derrida's readings and commentaries on Marx's writings. The analysis focuses on direct quotations of Marx's reflections in Derrida's Specters of Marx, as well as in seminars, publications, and interviews before and after the book's publication. By examining four themes — money, the market, ideology, and revolution — we will demonstrate which texts Derrida focuses on and how he interprets them. This will enable us to understand how Derrida develops his concept of spectrality, a way of thinking that transcends ontology. The novelty of my approach lies in returning jointly to the details of Derrida's and Marx's texts with the aim to understand Derrida's interpretation of Marx (and its limits) rather than using Marx as a pretext to understand Derrida's overall project.

Gramatology as a positive science: Maurizio Ferrari's Derrida Reception Maurizio Ferraris is developing a realist ontology that severely criticizes the main theses of postmodernity for philosophical, ethical, and political reasons. Paradoxically, however, Derrida plays an important role in his thinking. By distinguishing natural objects from ideal objects and, ultimately, from social objects, the author shows that, rather than a criticism of Derrida, Ferraris’ realist ontology aims to limit Derridean thought to the field of social objects, which are above all written and inscribed objects. Through arche-writing and the theory of the trace, Ferraris demonstrates that writing carries the social, because the trace exists only insofar as it is recognized and therefore in a relation. In this way, Derrida's philosophy finds itself at the heart of a field from which we might have thought it had been excluded: contemporary realist ontology.

This paper explores the reception of Jacques Derrida’s work among system theoreticians, especially those who gravitate around Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann’s readings of Derrida suggest that he saw in deconstruction a contemporary evolution within the system of society. This evolution brought systemic foundation paradoxes to light in an unprecedented way. In Luhmann’s view, however, Systems Theory should precisely reflect on the possible deparadoxification of the problems presented by Derrida. We argue against the oversimplification that suggests a deconstructive penchant for paradoxes juxtaposed with a system-theoretical inclination to resolve them. The intricacies of this interplay become particularly apparent in the examination of the concept of justice. Through an exploration of Derrida and Luhmann’s writings on the subject, we assert that deconstruction does not neatly align with a formula for transcendence, as suggested by Gunther Teubner. Instead, it manifests as an aporetic state, embodying both the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of normative systems.