Abstract Both leniency programs and private antitrust enforcement are essential in combating cartels. The literature demonstrates that society benefits from both increased private actions and leniency applications. However, the present view is that private enforcement discourages cartel members from seeking leniency. Proponents of this view blame follow-on civil actions in the wake of successful public antitrust enforcement cases. This concern hinders the development of private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the literature that expresses such a concern fails to consider standalone civil actions’ impact. Building on a game theory model of leniency programs by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, this article reinvestigates the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory procedural devices of leniency programs and private enforcement. Considering a revised leniency game, this article reveals that incentivizing private antitrust enforcement does not necessarily discourage leniency applications. Accordingly, this article proposes ways for legislators to use private enforcement as a tool to promote leniency applications.

Abstract Despite broad statutory language authorizing “any person” injured by an antitrust law violation to sue for damages, the Supreme Court of the United States has construed that language to bar antitrust damages claims by indirect purchasers, such as consumers two or more steps removed from antitrust violators. The Court and some scholars have justified the indirect purchaser rule on the ground that assigning direct purchasers exclusive rights to recover antitrust damages increases the likelihood of suit. But this article presents new evidence that the rule reduced private antitrust litigation by twenty percent. It argues that the rule should be abandoned, consistent with the statutory text.

On December 19, 2018, Altria announced an offer of $12.8 billion for Juul Labs, combining the largest U.S. cigarette manufacturer with the largest U.S. e-cigarette company. This deal is currently being challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). We consider the antitrust implications. We also consider population health implications, which we argue are essential to a comprehensive analysis of the impact on consumers. Although the FTC antitrust investigation has focused on closed vaping systems, we argue that the relevant market is the broader nicotine delivery product market, which includes all vaping products along with tobacco products. With Altria having a large market share in the key nicotine delivery product submarkets and with important entry barriers, the merger potentially places Altria in a dominant position in the relevant market. In particular, competition in the vaping submarket is reduced, thereby likely to reduce the availability of less harmful alternatives to cigarettes.

Ex post evaluations have been adopted by regulatory authorities to evaluate the impact of antitrust decisions. Relevant studies commonly focus on single types of unlawful activity, and use data on specific products. Moreover, relatively little evidence has been provided in Asian jurisdictions. This study examines the impact of antitrust decisions and unfair competition fines, imposed by the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), on the profit margins and operation costs of firms in Taiwan. All of the administrative fines on cartels, violations of merger notifications, vertical restraints, and unfair competition are considered herein. The Difference-in-Difference model and the Quantile Regression technique were employed on a unique population-based dataset of 2,238,022 firms drawn from a census survey in Taiwan. The results point to a negative (positive) effect of the TFTC's administrative fines on firms’ profit margins (operating costs). The negative effect of fines on firms’ profit margins is more pronounced for the fines linked to cartel conduct. To respond to reductions in profit margins, firms are more likely to engage in research and development (R&D) activities and to use computers in business sales, on average. Moreover, small firms are more likely to increase the use of computers in business sales, whereas medium and large firms are more likely to invest in R&D to compensate for their losses stemming from their cessation of illegal activities.

Between 1998 and 2003, dozens of companies entered newly liberalized telecommunications markets in OECD countries. In Europe and North America, most of the entrants that attempted to use incumbents' “unbundled local loops,” at regulated wholesale prices, to offer narrowband services—essentially “plain old telephone service”—have failed. Even though Europe, the United States and Canada liberalized at different times and with somewhat different policies, excessive entry occurred in each region with too many players chasing an illusive pot of revenue with poorly designed business plans. On the other hand, the use of unbundled or shared local loops for entry into broadband services may be more of a winning strategy because it allows the entrant to compete for customers by offering new services. This appears to be the emerging broadband strategy in Europe of large ISPs owned by incumbent telecommunication companies in other countries (for example, France Telecom's Wanadoo) and in Japan. However, such entry has not worked in the United States, where new companies, such as Covad, have failed to develop profitable operations.