Abstract This paper compares how Austrian and neoclassical economics construct demand curves and examines the fundamental differences in their approaches to utility theory and price determination. It aims to clarify both standpoints by highlighting how distinct foundational assumptions – such as the treatment of money, the homogeneity of goods, and the role of indifference – give rise to different forms of demand curves. The analysis further shows that the Austrian construction can potentially account for Giffen behavior without resorting to an upward-sloping demand curve. Finally, the paper revisits (Hudík, Marek. 2011. “Rothbardian Demand: A Critique.” The Review of Austrian Economics 24: 311–8) critique of Rothbardian demand, demonstrating that it rests on a set of assumptions different from those underlying standard Austrian theory.

Abstract Austrian price theory is riddled with inconsistencies surrounding the neoclassical income effect and Giffen behavior. It has sometimes been argued that neither the income effect nor Giffen behavior exist. This paper first argues that Giffen behavior is possible and can perfectly well be explained within the framework of Austrian price theory in the tradition of Mises. Moreover, it shows that income effects are real. They are merely an outgrowth of the law of diminishing marginal utility applied to money. The paper also outlines the expenditure approach to income and substitution effects as an alternative conceptualization that does not require any reference to quantifiable and measurable notions of utility, or an unambiguous and objective notion of real income.

Abstract Undoubtedly, all main terms of the theory of public goods are well-grounded in the actions of humans. Therefore, in this paper, an attempt is made to conceptualize public goods from the philosophical theory of action, which can be seen as an advancement of Mises’ theory of action. We found that not a single building block of the standard theory of public goods is entirely grounded in the logic of human action. As a consequence, public goods, as defined in the standard theory, cannot exist at all due to reasons of action theory. This does not mean the end of collective consumption. Instead, our results can be used to develop the theory of public goods further, which rests firmly on the analytical basis of human action.

Abstract This study critically revises narratives in the literature concerning the relationship between Friedrich August von Hayek’s philosophy and utilitarianism, aiming to organize and clarify the discourse in this field. At the heart of Hayek’s philosophical system lies the value of individual liberty, defined as the absence of coercion by others. Hayek presents it as a foundational and autonomous value – one that is essential to moral agency and the very essence of morality. He argues that the denial of individual liberty degrades the individual to a mere instrument for others’ ends, a stance he deems morally indefensible. Despite this, Hayek explores the consequences (across various dimensions) of adopting or rejecting freedom as a cornerstone of social order to engage those who might undervalue freedom. Such explorations have contributed to the common interpretation of his work as utilitarian – one important, though not exclusive, factor behind this attribution. However, examining his works reveals that this classification does not hold, as his approach does not fulfill the necessary conditions to count as utilitarianism (consequentialist reasoning featured in his philosophy is neither central nor aligns with utilitarian frameworks). Demonstrating that Hayek’s philosophy diverges from utilitarianism is essential for its accurate interpretation. Misattributing utilitarianism, and therefore collectivist thinking, to Hayek leads to inaccurate interpretations that undermine the individualistic and libertarian nature of his philosophy.

Abstract The purpose of the present paper is to ground the alleged universal law of (positive) time preference. Thus, we take the said positivity of individual time preference rates for granted. However, we also take pains to show that some other time preference rates (even negative ones) are conceivable only providing that ceteris paribus clause is not satisfied. All in all, we cannot but admit that the intuition standing behind the apparently necessary positivity of time-preference rates is quite robust. However, little effort has been made to justify it. For example, in Austrian economics, it is said that positive rate of time preference is somehow implied in the concept of human action. Yet, no demonstration to that effect is forthcoming. In this essay, we are trying to approximate what could serve as a best reason to believe that individual time preference rates are indeed positive. We first consider whether a phenomenon of social interest rates is able to ground the positivity of time preference. Having rejected this apparent solution as circular, we analyse whether a case can be made against non-positive rates of time preference as unjustified under any set of relevant beliefs. This attempt is also rejected, as there seems to exist a relevant belief under which a rate of time preference can rationally be zero. Finally, we appeal to the Parfitian reductionist view on personal identity as allegedly capturing necessarily positive rates of time preference. Here we note the crucial fact that psychological connectedness (something at least partially constitutive of personal identity) between person P at some time and the same person at some other time diminishes as the interval between these two times increases. Finally, this very fact appears to neatly explain the positivity of time preference.

Abstract Is the setting of speed limits compatible with the principles of a free society? At present, speed limits are conceived and enforced by public authorities. This would lead to their systematic rejection without further analysis and without questioning the framework in which they are defined. This paper argues that a free society with private roads would establish rules of conduct for their operation. These rules would include speed limits, the purpose of which would be mainly to coordinate individual plans and produce value. This paper explains the foundations of a speed limit in a free society, its characteristics and how it works.

Abstract jonathan Rauch claims that the aim of liberalism is not to provide for the moral needs of persons but instead provide the space for their pursuit of meaning. His claim could, however, be construed as rejecting the possibility of an objective standard for human good and indeed moral knowledge. Such a construal would make liberalism vulnerable to the postliberal charge that it is, as Alasdair MacIntyre has warned, the harbinger of nihilism. This essay counters this postliberal charge by providing an account of human good that is objective and yet compatible with liberty being the paramount political value.