Abstract What do the populations of small and medium powers think about their countries' relations with China and the United States, and how might their attitudes matter for foreign policy change? In this article, we propose a theory of public opinion potential (POP), conceptualized as the extent to which public preferences create conditions for change in foreign policy. Drawing on survey data from 9,451 respondents in 30 countries across Africa, the Americas, eastern Europe, south-east Asia and the Middle East, we analyse how people perceive their country's current and desired relations with the two world powers. We measure two dimensions of POP: the preference gap (the difference between perceived and desired relations) and the preference variation (the ‘spread’ of opinions). Together, these capture the structure of public opinion, which may enable or constrain foreign policy change. We develop a typology with four ideal types of POP and illustrate their implications through the cases of Haiti, Georgia, Brazil and Venezuela. The article contributes to understanding how the structure, rather than just the direction, of public opinion can shape the foreign policy of small and medium powers in the context of the evolving US–China competition.

Abstract Multiplexity is a promising concept in International Relations (IR) to describe the emerging world order. For Amitav Acharya, a multiplex world is a world of complex interconnectedness and interdependence, with cross-cutting international orders and globalisms led by non-western actors. In a multiplex world, the West will have ‘to negotiate accommodation’ with these global South voices and influence ‘to salvage aspects of the liberal order’. This article interrogates the theoretical foundations of multiplexity by arguing that its claims of foregrounding the significance of the global South—which is, in turn, democratizing power relations—are problematic. Multiplexity as a concept ends up broadening the basis of oligarchy rather than democratizing power relations and empowering ordinary people. We show how this co-optation dynamic is implicit in the concept of multiplexity, where the deep-rooted commitment to the western neo-liberal ideology remains central. In the post-Second World War context, we use specific empirical examples such as the New International Economic Order, the BRICS and the G20, where the much-trumpeted arrival of a new multiplex world was co-opted by great powers. Ultimately, we call for critical multiplexity. The article synthesizes the insights of Gramscian hegemonic projects and Kautskyian ultra-imperialism, and focuses on the struggles of the people rather than on elite prerogatives. Critical multiplexity is a world that is attentive to the challenges against entrenched political and economic power relations and identity politics, without which multiplexity remains in closer communion with a superficially ‘diverse’ but still elitist and class-based international order.

Abstract Scholarship on multiplex orders has largely focused on the spatial dimensions of multiplexity. This article explores the notion of temporal multiplexity, arguing that global orders also operate through distinct and coexisting temporal regimes. Drawing on and expanding Amitav Acharya's multiplex framework, we theorize how different actors experience, interpret and structure time within international politics. We propose a reinterpretation of the contemporary world order through three overarching temporalities—global western, global eastern and global southern—each shaped by distinct regimes of historicity. Global western temporality is grounded in a progressive yet crisis-ridden modernity, emphasizing linear liberal progress but increasingly marked by anxieties of decline and end times. Global eastern temporality operates within an ancient framework, structured around cycles of imperial rise, decline and resurgence, where past traumas and aspirations for restoration shape geopolitical strategies. Global southern temporality, by contrast, is presentist and transformational, foregrounding decolonization and reparative justice while rejecting hierarchical temporalities that position the South as lagging behind. These divergent temporal imaginaries generate competing global visions, shaping international conflicts, governance structures and development discourses. Understanding how time functions in a multiplex order reveals the deeper sources of the tensions underpinning contemporary international relations, from geopolitical rivalries to contestations over global governance reform. Recognizing temporal multiplicity is essential for fostering a more inclusive international order that reconciles competing historical narratives and future aspirations, rather than imposing singular trajectories of progress or restoration.

Abstract This article, and the special section in International Affairs it introduces, ask: how can we best read the post-liberal era of world politics? The resurgence of hard power has led many to turn to realism, even as a liberal lens reveals key features of the world we inherited. Meanwhile, diverse state and non-state actors around the globe are (re)asserting their voices in international affairs. This introduction to the special section builds on Amitav Acharya's work to offer a vision of ‘multiplexity 2.0’ that captures the interface of hard power, soft power and global diversity. It does so by unpacking the key components of Acharya's concept—‘multiplicity’ and ‘complexity’. Doing so, we contend, captures: 1) the rapidly multiplying set of actors, ideas and structural forces shaping our system's transformation, while 2) reading the interactions between these parameters through the lens of complexity theory. A ‘multiplicity + complexity = multiplexity 2.0’ approach captures non-linear, multidirectional patterns for an ultimately more ‘realistic’ reading of world (dis)order.