Serious incident investigations—often conducted by means of Root Cause Analysis methodologies—are increasingly seen as platforms to learn from multiple perspectives and experiences: professionals, patients and their families alike. Underlying this principle of inclusiveness is the idea that healthcare staff and service users hold unique and valuable knowledge that can inform learning, as well as the notion that learning is a social process that involves people actively reflecting on shared knowledge. Despite initiatives to facilitate inclusiveness, research shows that embracing and learning from diverse perspectives is difficult. Using the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’, pointing at practices of someone’s knowledge being unjustly disqualified or devalued, we analyze the way incident investigations are organized and executed with the aim to understand why it is difficult to embrace and learn from the multiple perspectives voiced in incident investigations. We draw from 73 semi-structured interviews with healthcare leaders, managers, healthcare professionals, incident investigators and inspectors, document analyses and ethnographic observations. Our analysis identified several structures in the incident investigation process, that can promote or hinder an actor’s epistemic contribution in the process of incident investigations. Rather than repeat calls to ‘involve more’ and ‘listen better’, we encourage policy makers to be mindful of and address the structures that can cause epistemic injustice. This can improve the outcome of incident investigations and can help to do justice to the lived experiences of the involved actors in the aftermath of a serious incident.

As embryonic stem cell research is commercialized, the stem cell debate may shift focus from concerns about embryo destruction to concerns about exploitation of the women who donate eggs and embryos for research. Uncomfortable with the polarization of the embryo debate, this paper proposes a more “contemplative” approach than intellectual debate to concerns about exploitation. After examining pitfalls of rigid intellectual positions on exploitation, the paper investigates the possibility of a broader understanding of donation for research where patients are seen as the intended beneficiaries of the donation. Together with other actors, research is perceived as mediating altruistic gift relationships that extend from donors to patients. The paper explores how this broader perspective on “donation for research” can open up new possibilities of understanding donation and addressing risks of exploitation.

After many policy attempts to tackle the persistent rise in the costs of health care, physicians are increasingly seen as potentially effective resource stewards. Frameworks including the quadruple aim, value-based health care and choosing wisely underline the importance of positive engagement of the health care workforce in reinventing the system–paving the way to real affordability by defining the right care. Current programmes focus on educating future doctors to provide ‘high-value, cost-conscious care’ (HVCCC), which proponents believe is the future of sustainable medical practice. Such programmes, which aim to extend population-level allocation concerns to interactions between an individual doctor and patient, have generated lively debates about the ethics of expanding doctors’ professional accountability. To empirically ground this discussion, we conducted a qualitative interview study to examine what happens when resource stewardship responsibilities are extended to the consulting room. Attempts to deliver HVCCC were found to involve inevitable trade-offs between benefits to the individual patient and (social) costs, medical uncertainty and efficiency, and between resource stewardship and trust. Physicians reconcile this by justifying good-value care in terms of what is in the best interest of individual patients–redefining the currency of value from monetary costs to a patient’s quality of life, and cost-conscious care as reflective medical practice. Micro-level resource stewardship thus becomes a matter of working reflexively and reducing wasteful forms of care, rather than of making difficult choices about resource allocation.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10728-022-00446-4.

Pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) are one of the most frequently used drug information sources for physicians in both the United States and China. During face-to-face interactions, PSRs use various promotional strategies to impact the prescribing behavior. In the United States, PSRs provide physicians small gifts, free drug samples, and “sincere friendships”, whereas in China, they played an indispensable role in medical corruption over the past three decades. To cope with the undue influence of PSRs, both these countries have taken positive but insufficient measures to eliminate the effect thus far. By comparing the strategies of American and Chinese PSRs, it was found that building a friendly personal relationship with physicians in a relatively closed private environment (such as physician’s office) is a key factor to exert an individualized influence on physicians, even in different social backgrounds and healthcare contexts. Therefore, this essay suggests that it is necessary to limit the establishment of personal relationships and maintain a more professional interaction to reduce the personalized psychological and emotional influences on physicians’ professional judgment. To achieve this goal, it is proposed to transfer the physician-PSR interaction to a professional public space as a supplement to current countermeasures and suggestions. The presence of others and the possibility of third party participation will stimulate more ethical and reputational concerns. It is hoped that the increased transparency of the interaction will promote participants to consider more professional norms and mitigate the undue influence of PSRs’ individualized strategies.

Information is clearly vital to public health, but the acquisition and use of public health data elicit serious privacy concerns. One strategy for navigating this dilemma is to build 'trust' in institutions responsible for health information, thereby reducing privacy concerns and increasing willingness to contribute personal data. This strategy, as currently presented in public health literature, has serious shortcomings. But it can be augmented by appealing to the philosophical analysis of the concept of trust. Philosophers distinguish trust and trustworthiness from cognate attitudes, such as confident reliance. Central to this is value congruence: trust is grounded in the perception of shared values. So, the way to build trust in institutions responsible for health data is for those institutions to develop and display values shared by the public. We defend this approach from objections, such as that trust is an interpersonal attitude inappropriate to the way people relate to organisations. The paper then moves on to the practical application of our strategy. Trust and trustworthiness can reduce privacy concerns and increase willingness to share health data, notably, in the context of internal and external threats to data privacy. We end by appealing for the sort of empirical work our proposal requires.

A particularly strong reason to vaccinate against transmittable diseases, based on considerations of harm, is to contribute to the realization of population-level herd immunity. We argue, however, that herd immunity alone is insufficient for deriving a strong harm-based moral obligation to vaccinate in all circumstances, since the obligation significantly weakens well above and well below the herd immunity threshold. The paper offers two additional harm-based arguments that, together with the herd immunity argument, consolidates our moral obligation. First, we argue that individuals should themselves aim not to expose others to risk of harm, and that this consideration becomes stronger the more non-vaccinated people there are, i.e., the further we are below herd immunity. Second, we elaborate on two pragmatic reasons to vaccinate beyond the realization of herd immunity, pertaining to instability of vaccination rates and population heterogeneity, and argue that vaccinating above the threshold should serve as a precautionary measure for buttressing herd immunity. We also show that considerations of harm have normative primacy in establishing this obligation over considerations of fairness. Although perfectly sound, considerations of fairness are, at worst secondary, or at best complementary to considerations of harm.

Mobile phone-based applications (apps) can promote faster targeted actions to control COVID-19. However, digital contact tracing systems raise concerns about data security, system effectiveness, and their potential to normalise privacy-invasive surveillance technologies. In the absence of mandates, public uptake depends on the acceptability and perceived legitimacy of using technologies that log interactions between individuals to build public health capacity. We report on six online deliberative workshops convened in New South Wales to consider the appropriateness of using the COVIDSafe app to enhance Australian contact tracing systems. All groups took the position (by majority) that the protections enacted in the app design and supporting legislation were appropriate. This support is contingent on several system attributes including: the voluntariness of the COVIDSafe app; that the system relies on proximity rather than location tracking; and, that data access is restricted to local public health practitioners undertaking contact tracing. Despite sustained scepticism in media coverage, there was an underlying willingness to trust Australian governing institutions such that in principle acceptance of the new contact tracing technology was easy to obtain. However, tensions between the need to prove system effectiveness through operational transparency and requirements for privacy protections could be limiting public uptake. Our study shows that informed citizens are willing to trade their privacy for common goods such as COVID-19 suppression. But low case numbers and cautionary public discourses can make trustworthiness difficult to establish because some will only do so when it can be demonstrated that the benefits justify the costs to individuals.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10728-021-00441-1.

This article provides a critical comparative analysis of the substantive and procedural values and ethical concepts articulated in guidelines for allocating scarce resources in the COVID-19 pandemic. We identified 21 local and national guidelines written in English, Spanish, German and French; applicable to specific and identifiable jurisdictions; and providing guidance to clinicians for decision making when allocating critical care resources during the COVID-19 pandemic. US guidelines were not included, as these had recently been reviewed elsewhere. Information was extracted from each guideline on: 1) the development process; 2) the presence and nature of ethical, medical and social criteria for allocating critical care resources; and 3) the membership of and decision-making procedure of any triage committees. Results of our analysis show the majority appealed primarily to consequentialist reasoning in making allocation decisions, tempered by a largely pluralistic approach to other substantive and procedural values and ethical concepts. Medical and social criteria included medical need, co-morbidities, prognosis, age, disability and other factors, with a focus on seemingly objective medical criteria. There was little or no guidance on how to reconcile competing criteria, and little attention to internal contradictions within individual guidelines. Our analysis reveals the challenges in developing sound ethical guidance for allocating scarce medical resources, highlighting problems in operationalising ethical concepts and principles, divergence between guidelines, unresolved contradictions within the same guideline, and use of naïve objectivism in employing widely used medical criteria for allocating ICU resources.

Current and past pandemics have several aspects in common. It is expected that all members of society contribute to beat it. But it is also clear that the risks associated with the pandemic are different for different groups. This makes that appeals to solidarity based on technocratic risk calculations are only partially successful. Objective ‘risks of transmission’ may, for example, be trumped by risks of letting down people in need of help or by missing out certain opportunities in life. In this paper we argue that a rapprochement of the insights of standpoint epistemology with pandemic science and pandemic policy making may be an important step toward making pandemic science more accurate and pandemic calls for solidarity more effective.

Access to abortion care has been hugely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has prompted several governments to permit the use of telemedicine for fully remote care pathways, thereby ensuring pregnant people are still able to access services. One such government is that of England, where these new care pathways have been publicly scrutinised. Those opposed to telemedical early medical abortion care have raised myriad concerns, though they largely centre on matters of patient safeguarding. It is argued that healthcare professionals cannot adequately carry out their safeguarding duties if the patient is not in the room with them. These concerns lack empirical support. Emerging evidence suggests that safeguarding processes may, in fact, be more effective within telemedical abortion care pathways. In this article, we address two specific safeguarding concerns: (1) that a remote consultation prevents a healthcare professional from identifying instances of abuse, and (2) that healthcare professionals cannot reliably confirm the absence of coercion during a remote consultation. We demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced, and that safeguarding may actually be improved in telemedical care pathways as victims of abuse may find it easier to engage with services. It is inevitable that some individuals will fall through the net, but this is unavoidable even with in-person care and thus does not constitute a strong critique of the use of telemedicine in abortion care. These safeguarding concerns set aside, then, we argue that the current approval that enables telemedical early medical abortion should be afforded permanence.