The article examines the strategies of the Prussian king Frederick II during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), which enabled Prussia to prevail in a prolonged military confrontation. It explores how a small German state managed to win one of the largest military conflicts of the 18th century. Frederick the Great did not rely on a single strategy in his fight against Austria, France, and Russia, but employed several. These strategies were primarily related to the course of the Seven Years’ War on the main theater of operations – the European continent. The article aims to analyze Frederick the Great’s military strategies during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) in-depth. The research methods employed are determined by the peculiarity of the problem. Among them are the chronological method, which facilitated the identification of changes in the tactics and strategy of the Prussian army over the three phases of the Seven Years’ War; the analytical method, which enabled the examination of the distinct features of Frederick II’s army in its engagements against enemy forces; and the statistical method, which allowed for an assessment of the number of participants and casualties throughout the conflict. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the analysis of the Seven Years’ War from the Prussian perspective in three stages: the first from 1756–1757, the second from 1758–1760, and the third from 1761–1763. During each stage, Frederick II’s state employed different strategies against its adversaries. The article provides a detailed examination of the first offensive stage for the Prussian troops, aimed at achieving the greatest possible advantages to continue the conflict on terms favorable to Berlin. The second stage, which at times tested the concept of strategic defense, involved the use of maneuvers and engaging in battles when necessary. This phase allowed Frederick to exhaust his enemies’ financial and human resources. In the third stage, the war became more maneuver-based, and the scale of battles diminished significantly as all sides’ resources for waging war were depleted. Only after the accession of Peter III to the Russian throne and Russia’s withdrawal from the conflict did the balance of power in the war shift dramatically. The article examines the course of hostilities between Frederick the Great’s forces and his adversaries, which evolved throughout the Seven Years’ War. Conclusions. Accumulating its last forces, Prussia inflicted several defeats on its enemies, which allowed Frederick II to win the final victory in a long military conflict that decided the fate of the country for centuries to come. During all stages of the Seven Years’ War of 1756–1763, the role of the Prussian king was significant. This underlines the strategic thinking of Frederick II, which, among other factors, enabled Prussia to win the war despite the seemingly insurmountable odds. This topic remains relevant for the Ukrainian state, which is currently fighting for its survival. Although the topic has been explored by numerous scholars from various national schools, with a rich source base, it still requires further rethinking and study.

The purpose of the article is to analyze UNESCO’s activities in the field of ancient heritage preservation. The methodological basis of this article includes the principles of historicism, systematicity, and scientific approach. The author used historical-comparative, statistical, and chronological methods. The scientific novelty is an attempt to comprehensively analyze the preservation of ancient monuments in the activities of UNESCO. Conclusions. Protection of ancient monuments is an important part of preserving the world’s heritage. The sites of ancient Greece and Rome illustrate an epochal period of ups and downs, achievements and defeats. Amphitheaters, aqueducts, columns, Acropolis ruins, remains of fortifications and other archaeological finds testify to a significant cultural development of the ancient period. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) helps in preserving the cultural heritage of mankind. Special attention was given to countries where ancient monuments are located. The author highlights the measures taken to protect the sites and the Organization’s policy of providing assistance to protect the monuments. Greece has many ancient monuments on the UNESCO World Heritage List. The country protects and preserves its cultural heritage. The author outlines problems of protection the world’s cultural heritage, in particular, war, armed conflict, natural disasters, fires, pollution, uncontrolled urbanization, unchecked tourist development and others. This article also focuses on the sites included in the List of World Heritage in Danger that require special protection from the international community. The author outlines the difficult situation with the protection of ancient sites in the Middle East, in particular, Syria. The article notes that some sites are located on the territory of several states, which increases assistance in their protection. The author outlines the perspectives for the preservation of ancient sites in UNESCO’s activities, given the presence of such sites in different countries of the world, even on different continents, the significant interest in the ancient period, and the desire to preserve the ancient heritage for future generations.

This article analyzes the preconditions and causes of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The author examines the policies of the administrations of G. H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and W. Clinton (1993–2001) towards Iraq, as well as those of G. W. Bush up to the beginning of the invasion (2001 – March 2003). The political causes behind George W. Bush’s decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government are addressed, and significant attention is given to the preconditions of the invasion, which had been developing over the decade following the Gulf War (1990–1991). The article aims to examine the preconditions and causes of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by analyzing the policies of the administrations of George H. W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush regarding Iraq. The methodology of this study is determined by the specific characteristics of the research. The author employs general scientific methods of analysis and induction to evaluate and compare the policies of three U.S. administrations regarding Iraq. The study utilizes the following historical research methods: the chronological method, the historical-genetic method, the comparative method, and the method of source criticism. The chronological method is applied to describe U.S. policy toward Iraq in chronological order. The historical-genetic method is used to examine the evolution of U.S. policy on Iraq within its historical context. The comparative method is implemented to compare the policies of the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush toward Iraq. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the assessment of the U.S. intervention in Iraq within the broader historical context and specific political circumstances, as well as the examination of the impact George W. Bush’s administration’s views had on its policy change towards Iraq. It is concluded that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was driven by a number of political and ideological factors. Iraq had repeatedly launched attacks on neighboring countries and had used weapons of mass destruction both against them and its population. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq, which were to be lifted upon the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. However, Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with UN inspectors, creating the illusion that such weapons existed or could be produced within the country. At the same time, by the late 1990s, Iraq had adapted to the sanctions. Despite this, the United States did not intend to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government, as it did not view Iraq as an immediate threat. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government viewed as the main national security threat the states that harbored terrorists or could potentially provide them with weapons of mass destruction. The George W. Bush administration sought to preemptively eliminate these threats through military action. This, along with inaccurate intelligence conclusions regarding the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, were a decisive factor leading to the military intervention.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of the U.S.–British cooperation on the formation of the U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1946–1949, particularly through the examination of the conceptual foundations and key manifestations of military-political and economic collaboration. Methodology. This empirical study is based on the critical analysis of U.S. and U.K. diplomatic documents from 1946–1949, speeches by political leaders (H. Truman, W. Churchill, E. Bevin, G. Marshall), official reports, and memoirs. The subject of the study is explored within the context of major events in postwar international politics — the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Blockade, and the creation of NATO. Scientific novelty. The research offers a comprehensive re-evaluation of the U.S.–British cooperation as a decisive factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1946–1949. By tracing the dynamics of political decision-making and the interdependence of American and British initiatives, the article emphasizes Britain’s role as a catalyst that prompted the United States to move toward leadership within the emerging system of collective security. Conclusions. U.S.–British cooperation between 1946 and 1949 was a crucial factor in the development of the U.S. strategy of containment toward the Soviet Union. The starting point of this process was W. Churchill’s Fulton speech, which – despite the Truman administration’s formal distance from it – fostered a recognition of shared interests. Britain’s withdrawal from providing aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 served as an impetus for the Truman Doctrine, while the U.K.’s participation in implementing the Marshall Plan lent political legitimacy to American assistance amid U.S. expectations that initiative should come from European states themselves. The joint airlift operation during the Berlin Blockade demonstrated the effectiveness of transatlantic security cooperation, culminating in the establishment of NATO on April 4, 1949. The experience of this period shows that the synergy of political leadership, economic resources, and shared values constitutes the cornerstone of effective foreign policy strategies.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the revision of the U.S. national security strategy by Eisenhower administration in 1953, the factors that influenced this process, the continuity and changes in the strategic approaches, compared to Truman administration. Among other things, the authors sought to understand how this process was affected by the changes in the Soviet leadership following Stalin’s death. Methodology. This is a qualitative empirical research, based on a critical analysis of primary historical sources: U.S. strategic documents of 1948–1953, President Eisenhower’s speeches, and policy papers, reports and correspondence related to the activities of the National Security Council in 1953. The research topic is studied against the background of key developments in U.S.-Soviet relations in 1953. The scientific novelty of this research includes a rethinking of the factors that influenced the revision of the U.S. national security strategy during the first year of Eisenhower administration based on primary sources, some of which were never used to study this issue before. Conclusions. During Eisenhower first administration, containment strategy in the version of NSC 68/2 (1950) was replaced by the «New Look» strategy described in the NSC 162/2 (October 30, 1953). The need to revise the strategy was driven by calculations that the financial and fiscal policies associated with the significant increase in U.S. military spending during the Korean War would eventually cause serious economic problems. The new strategy had to address two major threats: Soviet communist expansion, and economic weakening of the United States. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration consistently maintained the internationalist approach of the free world nations, so federal spending cuts were not to be made at their expense. The statements of the new Soviet leadership about the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the two systems did not have a significant impact on the revision of U.S. national security strategy. The Eisenhower administration did not believe that the Soviet threat diminished, and was waiting for evidence from the USSR that it was able to abandon its expansionist policies. The first such step was supposed to be the end of the Korean War. Though an armistice agreement in Korea was signed on July 27, the Soviet thermonuclear test on August 12 was a more convincing indication of the USSR’s intentions than the conciliatory statements of its new leaders. As a result, a key component of the «New Look» strategy was the nuclear deterrence of the USSR. This approach allowed the United States to regain strategic initiative while reducing defense spending. This strategy was developed amidst the effective organization of the National Security Council and the implementation of the secret Solarium project. This experience can be useful in the development of strategic and political documents nowadays.

The operations in the Kharkiv region in 1942 and 2022, specifically examining their strategic objectives, planning, technical support, factors contributing to success or failure, and the balance of forces. The methodology of the scientific research is based on an interdisciplinary approach and the principles of scientific validity, historical analysis, systematicity, and objectivity. The article examines and analyses two large-scale offensive operations that took place in the Kharkiv region – the Soviet offensive of May 1942 and the Ukrainian counteroffensive of September 2022 – using both general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as several specialized methods, including the historical, historical-comparative, and statistical approaches. The scientific novelty. For the first time in Ukrainian military-historical scholarship, a comparative analysis has been conducted of two Kharkiv offensive operations that took place eighty years apart on the same strategic sector of the Eastern Front. An interdisciplinary approach is proposed, combining the tools of military history, strategic analysis, operational art, and information warfare to examine the course and outcomes of both campaigns. The continuity of strategic and tactical mistakes is substantiated, particularly in terms of underestimating the enemy, command and control issues, and the misjudgment of the operational situation, both in 1942 and in 2022. Conclusions. A comparative analysis of the two Kharkiv offensive operations demonstrates the transformation of military strategy in the 21st century – from «mass» to «quality and maneuver». Cooperation with the population, international support, and high-precision weapons are becoming decisive factors in modern warfare.. Both campaigns were decisive for the course of their respective military conflicts – World War II and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war.

One of the events in the diplomatic history of the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1814), namely the Frankfurt proposals of 1813 (also called the Frankfurt memorandum), remains little known not only to the general public but also to scholars of the Napoleonic Wars (здається, тут стилістична помилка. Читається так, неначе тема Франкфуртських переговорів залишається маловідомою для її ж дослідників). This article analyzes the concepts of the main representatives of the official-patriotic historiography of the Napoleonic Wars regarding the actions of Napoleon Bonaparte’s diplomacy and his allies during the negotiations, which took place at the end of the Sixth Anti-French Coalition (1813–1814). The purpose of the article is to critically rethink the works of Russian researchers on the diplomatic history of the Napoleonic Wars and to deconstruct established concepts. Research methods involve a systematic adherence to the principles of historicism and impartiality. A problem-chronological and comparative-historical approach has been applied, incorporating historiographical analysis and a critical-analytical perspective. The scientific novelty. For the first time in modern domestic historiography, an attempt has been made to trace the emergence and dissemination of myths in Russian official historiography concerning the actions of Napoleonic and Coalition diplomacy during the Frankfurt proposals of 1813, drawing on a wide range of sources. In particular, the study refutes a widely held claim in imperial Russian historiography, as well as among the majority of Soviet and contemporary Russian historians of the Napoleonic Wars, which asserts that the French emperor deliberately delayed accepting the Allies’ proposals during the Frankfurt memorandum and agreed to their terms only after they appealed to the French people. Conclusions. The author studied the origins and dissemination of Russian myths and falsifications regarding the diplomatic confrontation between Napoleonic and Coalition diplomacy during the Frankfurt proposals of 1813. Based on a critical analysis of the scholarly contributions of representatives of Russian official historiography, it has been established that the distortion of historical realities was largely driven by political directives from the authorities.

The purpose of the research is to study the nature and features of general military-technical assistance to Ukraine from the Republic of Poland during the full-scale phase of Russian aggression. The noted problems were only fragmentarily the subject of scientific reflections and require a comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, historicism, systematicity, multifactoriality, objectivity, as well as the use of a comparative approach. In the course of scientific research, the analysis of the problem was carried out with the help of general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as special methods-historical, historical-comparative, statistical. The scientific novelty lies in the renewed focus on the issues and an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of Polish military-technical assistance to Ukraine during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. Conclusions. The Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict in 2014–2025 has been going on for more than eleven years. It is one of the bloodiest in the last 200 years, and in terms of casualties, it is ahead of the typical modern war. From February 24, 2022, the Russian hybrid aggression turned into a full-scale war phase. Ukraine’s active and successful resistance to the unprovoked Russian attack caused a complex anti-Kremlin reaction all over the world. More than 140 UN member states voted for the General Assembly resolution, which condemned Russia’s aggression and demanded the immediate withdrawal of troops and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within the internationally recognized borders of 1991. Poland provided powerful political, humanitarian, economic, financial and military-technical assistance to Ukraine. The level of military aid during the full-scale war covered significant areas of the supply of weapons, ammunition, and equipment for more than four billion euros. Ukraine received almost 400 tanks, several dozen combat planes and helicopters, hundreds of artillery and anti-aircraft installations, as well as machine guns, shells, and medical supplies. Poland plays a major role in supplying Western weapons and military equipment to Ukraine through its territory, repairing damaged equipment at Polish military and defense enterprises. On July 8, 2024, Poland signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Security Sector with Ukraine, which provides for significant military support and assistance to Ukraine. Military aid to Ukraine from Poland and other partner states made it possible to stop Russian aggression and continue the struggle for the restoration of Ukraine’s full sovereignty. The current and unfinished nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the need to take into account the critical importance of military aid for Ukraine, as well as the analysis of its military-technical and military-political influence on the course of the war determine the prospects for further research in the context of the problem.

The aim of the article is to examine how the European migration crisis affected cooperation within the European Union. In addition, the author analyzed the strategy Italy adopted as a key country in the migration crisis and changes brought about by the events of 2015 – 2016. Equally important was the examination of how different strategies influenced cooperation within the shared European area of freedom, security, and justice. The research methodology is based on the principle of historicism. The author applies analytical, chronological, comparative, historical-legal, and comparative-legal methods. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that this study fills a gap in the academic literature and attempts to analyze the cooperative processes within the European Union during the European migration crisis. Conclusions. The 2015 – 2016 migration crisis presented significant challenges to the European Union, particularly regarding migration policy, cooperation and principles of solidarity among member states. After analyzing the legislation, the author concludes that the Dublin Regulation, which assumed that the first-entry countries are responsible for processing asylum applications, created an excessive burden on border states. The principle of solidarity, which the EU tried to implement through the relocation scheme, was ineffective, as some countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, refused to participate in its implementation. This highlighted the solidarity crisis and revealed internal differences in the EU regarding migration policy. Italy, despite limited support from the EU, took measures to address the crisis, including initiating the Mare Nostrum operation aimed at rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. The author emphasizes that, although the EU has taken certain steps in the direction of helping Italy, such programs as Operation Triton had a much smaller scale and funding compared to the Italian initiative. Based on the analysis, the article concludes the need to reform the European migration policy, strengthen the principle of solidarity, and introduce more effective financial and technical tools to support countries that are at the epicenter of crisis situations.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the ideas and projects of integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the context of the situation in the international arena in 1944–1947. The methodological basis of the research is the principles of historicism and consistency. The author has widely used problem-chronological, comparative and biographical methods. The scientific novelty of the article is determined by the absence of research devoted to this scientific problem in Ukrainian historiography. Conclusions. The author has found out that integration plans were a significant part of the negotiations between the governments-in-exile and groups representing different countries of the region. London became the center of their interaction. The British authorities and Prime Minister W. Churchill personally welcomed these integration efforts. It seemed to be a way to resolve interethnic conflicts in CEE and consolidate the region for the fight against communist expansion. In the spring of 1944, the «Central European Committee» was founded in London. One document from the US Central Intelligence Agency, which was prepared in December 1946, contained information about the activities of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, led by Ukrainians, and the Central European Federal Club (CFC) with the Poles as the most significant players. The Rome centre of the CFC suggested the Intermarium integration project. Its goal was to create a confederation of 16 nations between the Baltic, Black, and Aegean Seas. The London center of the CFC consisted of representatives of 10 nations and anticipated a federal union for countries «between Germany and Russia». The idea of supranational associations in CEE was very attractive to Slovak politicians. Adherents of different foreign policy orientations (Czechophile, Polonophile, Ugricophile) could find a common platform in it, as well as supporters of complete independence for Slovakia. After all, Slovak national-state rights would be better guaranteed in a system of regional federation or confederation than in a dual state union with any of Slovakia’s neighbors. Therefore, integration ideas were fully supported by leading Slovak political emigrants of various groups — M. Hodzha, S. Osusky, P. Pridavek, F. Durčansky, K. Sidor.