The concept of equivalence is present in various forms in the Solvency II framework, the EU prudential regulatory framework for insurance and reinsurance. While equivalence in Solvency II does not grant, or should not be equated to, market access for market participants that make use of the equivalence instruments within Solvency II, equivalence plays an important role in insurance, in particular in the solvency capital calculation at group level, in group supervision and for the recognition of reinsurance under Solvency II. The conclusion can be drawn that equivalence is an essential building block of the current framework. The application of equivalence in the framework and in practice is discussed in this contribution, and while the application might be complex, it is indispensable. At the same time, other mechanisms, either within the Solvency II framework or more broadly at international level, influence the current state and might affect the evolution of equivalence going forward. While, inherently, there is a political component to equivalence as well, the instruments remain firmly based in (detailed) Solvency II rules and are applied accordingly in practice.

This article examines the setting of the legal regime governing third country access to the UK financial market, in light of the political, market, and legal disruption associated with the UK withdrawal from the EU. It considers the UK reform context and the priority being given to securing UK financial market competitiveness, identifies a related and significant liberalization of the third country regime, and examines the implications for the UK, the EU, and for international financial market access.

This paper discusses the role of the third-country regime and equivalence from the Swiss perspective. It provides an analysis of the evolution of the Swiss approach. The various reactions to EU developments have ranged from the attempt to implement a reciprocity principle, to the resort to unilateral recognition. An overarching purpose of the Swiss equivalence framework has consisted of the relentless pursuit of a competitiveness objective. Yet the decline of equivalence as a market access mechanism has led to favouring other market access routes. This paper concludes that the recent reforms have initiated a roadmap towards an increasing autonomy of Swiss financial market law.

This paper will examine the sustainability of directors’ duties from two perspectives, namely that the duties are stable in their own right and that they cover enough ground for them to help achieve sustainable goals. First, we will examine how directors’ duties to act in a company’s best interest operate well when shareholder interests are aligned. These duties, when breached, can be ratified by shareholders given the traditional understanding that they are the company. This may, in turn, have been associated with the growing acceptance of shareholder primacy over the past 40 years, seen most recently in the UK Supreme Court decision in BTI v Sequana (2022). The Supreme Court, however, also discussed the limitations of shareholder ratification, and its interaction with the rules protecting creditors, particularly as regards capital maintenance. Those rules have, however, been weakened, and private law has had to step in to address the abuse those rules were aimed at. Where the substantive content of directors’ duties is concerned, the focus everywhere is on how to make directors take account of external constraints such as environmental, social and governance (ESG) concerns and corporate purposes that may contradict enhancing shareholder value (as well as existing shareholder protection) as an established paradigm of company law. We will also analyse the difficulties in accommodating the interests of other internal constituents, like creditors (some of whom may have been externalised). This paper will build on earlier suggestions that the proper purpose rule has a part to play in balancing the interests of corporate constituents both inter and intra se and even in considering the position of future shareholders. The test of what is in the best interest of the company may not provide enough balance in this regard, as seen perhaps from the recent failed derivative action sought by some shareholders of Shell against its directors, and directors should take account of the interest of the reasonable shareholder in capturing the gist of what ESG should aim at.

As part of the European Commission’s ‘Banking Package’, introducing a series of amendments to the key legal sources of EU banking regulation, a comprehensive proposal for the treatment of third country branches of credit institutions (i.e., branches of institutions licensed by non-EU jurisdictions seeking authorisation in an EU Member State) has been presented. If and when ultimately adopted, this new framework will, for the first time, harmonise the applicable authorisation procedures and substantive conditions for authorisation hitherto left exclusively to the discretion of EU Member States. Under the new regime, the equivalence of third country regulatory and supervisory approaches with EU banking regulation will play a role, albeit a limited one. While taking up, and refining, approaches that have been present in a range of Member States for some time already, the new framework will require others to fundamentally change their existing regimes. The new amendments will be of particular relevance for the future regulatory relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, since a bespoke arrangement for continuing access of UK financial intermediaries to the EU markets has not been achieved, and UK credit institutions wishing to continue to operate within the EU other than through legally separate and independently capitalised subsidiaries have to rely on authorisations as third country branches. Against this backdrop, the present paper presents a functional analysis of the incoming regime in light of experiences made with regard to the existing landscape of diverging national laws.