Abstract This article seeks to unpack China’s green industrial policy and explore its implications for world trade law. It argues that, first, central to China’s achievements in renewable energy is the role of state-level centralized green industrial policy. Second, China’s approach to renewable energy features a pragmatic attitude of subordinating climate commitment to economic development prerogatives. China’s pro-growth mentality has also shaped the international posture of China on climate change. Third, China’s domination in green technology has raised important policy questions for world trade law. In response to China’s green industrial policy, other countries are likely to enforce trade defense measures more aggressively against China and launch their own green industrial policy as a critical part of the re-balancing effort.

In 2016, Japan and South Korea signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)—the first military agreement between the two countries. The agreement called for the sharing of military intelligence concerning North Korea and its missile and nuclear programs. Despite numerous similarities between Japan and South Korea and their shared concerns, the process of signing the GSOMIA was strewn with controversies and setbacks that continue to haunt it long after the signing. This paper aims to understand the interplay between the pragmatic considerations and the symbolic meanings that affected the dynamics surrounding the GSOMIA. The analysis relies on a theoretical framework we offer by linking constructivism with collective memory theory. This approach, we argue, best explains why historical disputes have become extremely influential in Japan-South Korea relations, particularly during the GSOMIA process. It is also argued that, in such a context, the main advantage of the GSOMIA is its limited scope. The agreement is potentially a trust-building mechanism. By partially setting historical differences aside, both countries can build a stronger foundation for regional stability. This, in turn, can serve as a trust-building exercise within a larger process that could help them find an acceptable solution to their difficult shared past.

Abstract Regulators in the US, EU and China embarked on several episodes of reforms to improve the accountability of credit rating agencies after the Financial Crisis 2007–2008. The US reform implemented a new civil liability provision, although the new regime remains weak, largely caused by the regulator’s inability in taking a tough liability approach on powerful credit rating agencies but giving in to the economic demands of the country. In contrast, the EU’s provision is much more balanced; however, it left too much leeway to the national laws’ interpretation. The parameters of civil liability under the Chinese law largely coincide with the Western laws, although with a unique robustness by reversing the burden of proof. The recent reforms improved the accountability of credit rating agencies to some extent, nonetheless, more work is needed to give effect to these regulatory reforms with further collaboration. This paper critically analyses the robustness of the Chinese civil liability regime with the reversed burden of proof, which arguably sits uncomfortably with the Western laws. It calls for an improvement of the current civil liability regime in the US and China by adopting the EU model, which is more feasible to balance the responsibilities of key players in the financial market.