This paper explores two different theories of Church-State relations proposed by John Locke and Jacques Maritain, focusing specifically on their account of religious autonomy within secular, pluralistic societies. Locke, writing shortly after Europe's great religious conflicts, envisions a society in which the state is charged solely with guarding "civil," or temporal, interests, with churches treated as mere voluntary associations devoid of coercive power. In this framework, one of the state's principal goals would be to secure each citizen's right to pursue their own conception of the good life, which would, in turn, grant the state authority to suppress religious viewpoints that might subvert this end. Maritain's theory, on the contrary, seeks to reconcile pluralistic democracy with the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church. He argues that the state, while retaining its secularity, should acknowledge the Church's sovereignty over spiritual and moral matters, pursuing cooperation with the Church to achieve the religious good of their citizens. As this paper argues, however, Maritain's position is untenable. His vision depends upon an impossible separation between the "temporal" and "spiritual" and overlooks their inevitable overlap. Locke, on the other hand, more accurately predicts the actual dynamics of Church-State relations in the Modern West. In examining this debate, we make progress toward answering two questions of fundamental importance to the issues of Church-State relations: what kind of status should spiritual entities enjoy in a democracy with no established religion? How should members of religious congregations, bound by specific moral dictates, participate in a political body composed of individuals of all faiths?

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time presented a rather novel view of ontology with a set of unique concepts. Conventionally, the work of Heidegger is considered as definitively Western, and yet, beneath the surface, it is well-supported that Heidegger was notably influenced by both Chinese and Japanese ideas. In this thesis, I will argue that the extent to which classical Daoist sources have appeared in Martin Heidegger’s work, especially Being and Time, has hitherto been overlooked; and furthermore I will set the stage for how classical Daoist ideas like wuwei manifest in a relationship with Dasein. Finally, I will demonstrate the similarity of the paradigms Heidegger and classical Daoist thinkers each employ regarding tooling, equipmentality, and Thrownness.

This paper explores the relationship between the Church and the state in the tradition of political liberalism. I analyze how that relationship is grounded in a philosophical anthropology common to liberal thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls. It then critiques the liberal view from a Thomistic perspective in two parts. First, it presents an alternative anthropology taken from the work of Aquinas himself. Secondly, it gives one possible alternative conception of the relationship between the Church and the state, namely Pope Leo XIII's confessional state. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the obstacles facing a wider acceptance of Thomistic anthropology within the pluralism and political liberalism of modern society.

Is the slave as free as his master? You may recognize this controversial idea from thephilosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, who once equated the freedom of ‘the master’ with the freedomof ‘the slave’ based on a radical conception of human freedom, which has drawn strong criticismand mockery since then. This paper aims to defend a revised version of Sartre’s characteristictheory of ‘radical freedom’ by tracing its philosophical evolution and confronting keysociological and scientific objections. Beginning with Sartre’s early existentialism in Being andNothingness and Existentialism is a Humanism, I explore his concept of ‘bad faith’ and hisunderstanding of ‘authenticity’ as a moral imperative. I then examine Simone de Beauvoir’scritique of Sartre’s thesis, wherein she presents a more nuanced account of how socialization andoppression do shape one’s perceived possibilities without negating ontological freedom. Drawingon Jonathan Webber’s analysis of the two authors, I argue that Sartre’s later works – especiallySaint Genet – reflect his acceptance of Beauvoir’s insights and present a more realistic, sociallygrounded existentialism. Finally, I engage with contemporary neuroscience – particularly thework of Robert Sapolsky and Neil Levy – which challenges the very foundation ofexistentialism, i.e., free will. In response, I advocate for preserving a pragmatic belief in humanfreedom – not because it is metaphysically certain, but because perceiving ourselves as freeagents opens up the possibility to transcend past and present circumstances that may otherwisehold us back. Thus, without denying the influence of biological and social factors, we can rejectthe harmful defeatism of incompatibilist determinism, which encourages us to see ourselves aslifelong victims of circumstances outside of our control; in fact, I join Sartre and Beauvoir inarguing that we have the moral imperative to do so. Given our social tendency to make excuses and flee into psychological determinism, this paper calls for a radical reaffirmation of ourfundamental capacity to transcend, even when the odds – and the science – suggest otherwise.

Aristotle famously claimed that all substances are affected by final causes, but what exactly he meant by this is contested. Some maintain that Aristotle held final causes could be wholly explained in terms of other types of causes, whether they be material, formal, or efficient. Others believe that Aristotle restricted the scope of final causality to the biological domain such that inorganic matter would not be subject to the influence of final causes. Still others hold that Aristotle believed the final cause of the cosmos was mankind. In contrast to all these interpretations, this essay argues that Aristotle sees final causes as a unique form of causation that affects all natural substances, including the natural elements in addition to biological life, by leading them to their predefined ends as opposed to any human purpose that they may serve.

The theory of evolutionary ethics suggests that the biological process of natural selection can supply a foundation for morality. This paper considers the philosophical groundings and implications of such a theory, with reference to common defenses against the counterarguments of the theory. This paper finds that—in spite of recent defenses—the theory of evolutionary ethics remains philosophically indefensible.

This paper elucidates the conception of the self by reading prominent philosophers such as Sartre and Kierkegaard against the backdrop of Nietzsche’s “will to power”. By understanding this central tenet of Nietzschien thought as a self-overcoming force - ubiquitous in all life - that wills only its own growth, we are left with the question of how the will to power manifests. I will argue that in order to self-overcome, the will to power must have individuated life, i.e., a myriad of “selves” who, under the Sartrean definition of consciousness, are able to be what they are not yet. A singularity, I will claim, would be unable to become what it is not because there is no being it is not; therefore, life individuates into selves capable of Sartrean self-consciousness. Kierkegaardian anxiety can then be conceived as a pull into selfhood away from what he terms “the race”. With this groundwork laid, I will return to Nietzsche’s philosophy to provide an answer for the self’s purpose: one that is paradoxically supplemented by De Rougemont’s analysis of love.