This essay is based on the Gaos lectures given at UNAM in March 2025. The general topic is the metaphysical underpinnings of moral responsibility, both in its basic and non-basic forms. It motivates causalism as a general framework from which to understand both forms of responsibility. It consists of two parts. The focus of the first part is basic responsibility—in particular, the metaphysical condition for that form of responsibility: free action. It motivates a causalist, compatibilist view of free action as an extension of the mainstream causalist conception of action. The focus of the second part is non-basic responsibility—responsibility for outcomes in the world. It motivates a view of the conditions under which responsibility for outcomes results from responsibility for actions, one that works as an extension of the causalist view of free action. Some highlights of the paper are the following. It provides a comprehensive, unified account of the phenomena. It highlights the role played by key metaphysical concepts (like causation, grounding, and powers) in a theory of moral responsibility. Finally, it discusses subtle methodological issues that arise when dealing with a mix of moral and metaphysical judgments.

Presentamos una revisión de 82 textos sobre injusticia epistémica escritos en español publicados entre 2016 y 2025. Hemos clasificado dichos trabajos en dos vertientes de discusión: aportaciones conceptuales al planteamiento de Miranda Fricker y estudios de caso sobre injusticia epistémica. Mostramos que las adecuaciones conceptuales precisan, amplían o critican el planteamiento original, al tiempo que los estudios de este tipo de agravios se centran en ámbitos como los procesos sociopolíticos, el derecho, la educación, el feminismo y la salud. Concluimos que, pese al valor de las aportaciones identificadas, los trabajos no tienen, paradójicamente, la misma resonancia al interior de la propia discusión sobre injusticia epistémica escrita en español.

This is a rejoinder of sorts to Marco Ruffino’s critique in his book Contingent A Priori Truths (Springer, Switzerland, 2022) of my own criticism of Saul Kripke’s case for the contingent a priori. A distinction is drawn between knowledge concerning the meter stick S that its length is such-and-such and knowledge concerning S’s length that it is such-and-such.

Resumen

In this paper, I analyze Ruffino’s proposal that we should evaluate contingent a priori truths resulting from initial baptisms (i.e., propositions that are uttered to introduce of a new word to a community’s vocabulary) as illocutionary acts. I argue that, even if we concede such an interpretation as the correct way to understand the phenomenon, it is not sufficient to support the claim that there are cases of contingent a priori truths that provide the speaker with de re knowledge about objects that are not themselves conventional in some way.

Abstract

In his book Contingent A Priori Truths, Marco Ruffino proposes to understand Kripke’s examples of the contingent a priori in terms of utterances with a declarative illocutionary force. I think that Marco’s approach is very original and insightful, and he provides us with many detailed and thoughtful considerations in its support. Although I agree with the general picture, there are some aspects that remain a bit obscure to me, which will be the focus of this commentary, namely, the nature of the truth-makers of the allegedly (contingently) a priori true original declarations, and the transmission of a priori knowledge from baptizers to later uses.

Alejandro Rossi, Diario, tres volúmenes, edición de Malva Flores, Milenka Flores y David Medina Portillo, prólogo de Malva Flores, Ariel, Ciudad de México, 2024. ISBN 978–607–569–682–9

I articulate and defend an analysis of true content ascriptions proposed by Devitt, according to which they predicate worldly semantic properties instead of involving relations to abstract propositions. I develop the metaphysical case against treating contents as abstract propositions, addressing possible replies to Devitt’s argument based on the causal-explanatory roles of contents and offering further considerations. I explain how the Devittian analysis of content ascriptions can account for the validity of certain inferences often thought to require a propositional analysis. Finally, I argue that it also circumvents linguistic problems faced by the standard propositional analysis of ascriptions and offers a plausible alternative for capturing their logical form and meaning.

La superafirmabilidad (SA) pretende ser una noción antirrealista de verdad en discursos como lo cómico, lo moral y lo social, donde la verdad depende de los juicios de los sujetos. Su éxito radica en que una justificación incrementada puede ser estable: una afirmación seguiría estando justificada pese a la aparición de nueva información. No obstante, SA enfrenta dificultades para alcanzar esa estabilidad debido a una concepción antirrealista restringida del acceso a la evidencia. Propongo reinterpretar la estabilidad mediante una confianza epistémica: un compromiso normativo y práctico que subyace a cualquier acto de afirmación. Cuando alguien afirma p, no solo reconoce la evidencia, sino que asume también racionalmente que la justificación perdurará salvo contraevidencia legítima.