El artículo explora el debate filosófico entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en las Conferencias de Davos de 1929, centrándose en sus divergentes concepciones del ser humano. Cassirer, desde una perspectiva neokantiana, enfatiza la cultura y los símbolos como elementos clave para entender la experiencia humana. Heidegger, por su parte, a través de su concepto de Dasein, se enfoca en la existencia individual, la finitud y la autenticidad. El debate, que tuvo lugar en un contexto de crisis intelectual y política en la Europa de entreguerras, marcó una bifurcación en la historia del pensamiento filosófico, mostrando una divergencia clara en la idea del hombre. El análisis también establece paralelismos entre este debate y los personajes de la novela La montaña mágica de Thomas Mann, destacando la influencia de estas ideas en el pensamiento filosófico y cultural del siglo XX.

In the context of the emergence of aesthetics as an autonomous discipline in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, Moses Mendelssohn was one of the leading voices in the development of a new theory of sentiments and representation. In this context, Mendelssohn understood the need to delineate the limits of aesthetic representation and addressed the issue through an in-depth study of sentiments. In this article, I propose a study of the category of disgust in Mendelssohn's aesthetics, starting from his theory of aesthetic illusion. Disgust is, in fact, a feeling that cannot be reduced to the illusion created by the work of art but always refers to reality. To this end, I will refer mainly to the 82nd Literaturbrief, in which Mendelssohn expounds his study of disgust, and secondly to the Rhapsody as a text that reveals the need to deepen the theory of aesthetic illusion in light of the limits indicated through disgust. Finally, an aesthetic paradigm will emerge, which is also relevant to the contemporary debate on the possibilities of aesthetic representation

In this discussion of Katharina Kraus’ Cambridge Element Kant’s Ideas of Reason, I explore the interpretive upshot of her perspectivalist approach to the regulative use of ideas in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. After briefly summarizing her basic framework, I pose a series of questions about how her position could be interpreted as a form of modest noumenalism, focusing on the claim that a grounding relation to unconditioned reality is needed to maintain an objective criterion of truth. This leads to some brief reflections on the nature of objectivity in Kant’s broader philosophical system. I conclude by pointing out the advantages of her twofold approach to the regulative use of ideas, which serve both semantic and epistemic functions, and suggest this distinction is also essential to understanding the use of ideas in Kant’s practical philosophy.

This article offers a detailed analysis of Moses Mendelssohn’s novel proof of God’s existence as developed in chapter 16 of his philosophical testament, Morning Hours. The paper reconstructs the logical structure of the argument, situates it within Mendelssohn’s broader philosophical outlook, and explores its far-reaching implications. It also investigates the possible historical sources and conceptual affinities of the argument. While some scholars have read Mendelssohn’s argument as a version of Berkeleyan idealism, others highlight its cosmological or anti-idealist dimensions. The article concludes by assessing the philosophical significance and limits of Mendelssohn’s approach, arguing that it offers a compelling, if ultimately contestable, attempt to reconcile finite cognition with metaphysical realism through the postulation of an infinite intellect.

O presente ensaio visa mostrar o diálogo que as sugestões de Kant para a educação estabelecem com a sua filosofia da História. Tendo como ponto de partida a tese, presente nas Lições sobre pedagogia, segundo a qual «O homem é a única criatura que tem de ser educada», discute-se a sua justificação a partir do conceito kantiano de Bestimmung, de acordo com o qual a concretização da vocação do homem depende de um esforço permanente e de natureza intergeracional. Neste quadro de ideias, a questão da educação revela a sua importância em dois sentidos: tanto a educação que está intrinsecamente pressuposta no processo de desenvolvimento integral da razão e no progresso cultural e civilizacional, como a educação em sentido estrito, considerada enquanto mecanismo institucionalizado. Neste plano, vemos Kant reforçar a urgência de pensar um sistema educativo conforme aos propósitos do género humano e a refletir nas suas sugestões para a educação – e nas suas quatro tarefas: disciplinar, cultivar, civilizar e moralizar – o trajeto de maturação da razão nas suas várias fases.

The paper tackles the question as to whether Kant has successfully substantiated his claim that there exists a moral and juridical duty to leave the state of nature. Our thesis is that he has not. In the first step, it is demonstrated that Kant’s concept of provisional ownership is a logical impossibility. Thus, property rights themselves cannot generate the duty to submit to the state. The only way to argue for the duty to exit statelessness that the Kantian is left with is therefore to conceive of that duty as implied directly by the right to freedom. Yet, one may plausibly argue that at the conceptual level, public law runs afoul of Kant’s notion of freedom to a greater degree than private law does. Therefore, in virtue of the innate right to freedom, a prima facie duty arises to stay in the state of nature.

Kant's notion of intuition is usually associated with the a priori forms of space and time. In my paper, firstly, I want to demonstrate that intuition is very complex and has different functions for transcendental consciousness and plays an important role in each function, secondly, to substantiate the thesis that this concept is key to understanding the principle of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and thirdly, to point out some aporias or problems associated with this concept. Here are some difficulties: the relationship between pure intuition and empirical intuition is problematic, and the function of intuition and representation is difficult to distinguish unambiguously. In my article, I will consider several key points in Kant's philosophy for which the concept of intuition plays its own special function.

Este artículo llama la atención sobre el problema del sentido del conocimiento en Kant y la necesidad de una orientación del mismo. En esta perspectiva, toma en consideración la distinción kantiana entre el concepto escolar de la filosofía y el concepto cósmico de la misma. En la medida en que este concepto de filosofía defiende la orientación de los saberes hacia los fines morales o destino moral de la humanidad, se hace posible hablar de interés cosmopolita del conocimiento. La tesis del artículo es que dicho concepto de filosofía enlaza con la presencia de la noción de interés de la razón en Kant, siendo, además, consistente con la valoración, por Habermas, del interés puro práctico como un interés rector del conocimiento. Se estructura en dos puntos: 1. El interés de la razón práctica como interés movilizador e interés rector del conocimiento. 2. El concepto cósmico de la filosofía como expresión del interés cosmopolita del conocimiento y sentido de este.