The escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022 marked a new series of challenges for all key actors in international relations, including the states of the European Union. The largest EU countries France and Germany faced with a set of external and internal crisis phenomena chose different ways to build a strategy to overcome them. The German leadership attempted to use the Ukrainian crisis as a reason for launching previously postponed reforms in Germany and as a source of explanation for economic and social difficulties. Rising inflation, a reduction in industrial production from expensive energy resources, difficulties in migration policy and other problems were explained by Berlin as part of the price for the necessary support for Ukraine. At the same time, the reform of the Bundeswehr, which initially received broad public approval against the backdrop of the start of the Special military operation, faced criticism due to the half-heartedness of the proposed measures. As a result, the German government faced an unprecedentedly low approval rating for its performance, which only exacerbated Germany’s overall state of crisis. On the contrary, the French leadership, faced with a series of internal crises, the central plot of which was pension reform, chose not to tie them to the foreign policy dimension and, in particular, to the events in Ukraine. As a result, the French domestic political discussion did not become dependent on the logic of the development of the situation in Ukraine and was not radicalized at the expense of external participants. The difference in the choice of anti-crisis strategy has strengthened the contradictions within the Franco-German tandem as the economic and political core of the European Union.

In recent years and especially after February 2022, there has been a sharp intensification of Brussels’ engagement with Central Asia. The growing interest in Central Asia is due to the EU’s desire to develop an alternative version of infrastructure development and connectivity in the region as opposed to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to use the resource potential of the region to reduce dependence on China for green and digital transition strategy, and the region’s transit potential for development transport and energy infrastructure bypassing Russia. The new geopolitical situation and the trends developing in Central Asia are regarded in Brussels as providing a “window of opportunity” to increase the EU’s presence. Moreover, the EU’s policy towards Central Asia starts to be driven by geopolitical interests. Containing Russia, limiting Russia’s and China’s influence in the region, reducing dependence on China are becoming the main goals of Brussels’ policy in the region. The “benevolent indifference” to the region that once characterized the EU is being replaced by Brussels’ desire to become a major geopolitical player in the region. The article provides a retrospective analysis of the EU policy towards Central Asia throughout the entire period of official interaction between the parties. The focus of the article is to trace the evolution of the goals, priorities and interests of the EU in the region, identify the driving forces that determined Brussels’ policy towards the region at different historical stages, and determine the tools used to achieve the goals. The article also describes the largest EU initiatives for the region. The author concludes that in the current geopolitical situation, Central Asia has no independent significance for Brussels: policy towards the region is built through the prism and in accordance with the logic of confrontation with Russia and hedging risks associated with China.

The current cycle of interstate rivalry and crisis of European security raises the issues of civilizational identity of Russia and relations between the West and East of Europe. The analysis examines a broad range of political, historical and cultural problems that determine the modern place and role of Russia in Europe. The current features of interstate rivalry and its structure are revealed. An analysis of the causes and historical parallels of recent events, including those related to the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, is given. The strategic risks and opportunities of Russian foreign policy in Europe are outlined. It is underlined that the increasing aggressiveness of Western policy is dictated by the crisis of the neoliberal model of globalization. The European space of the EU and NATO increasingly finds itself in a situation where its ability to play a dominant role in the world is decreasing and it becomes necessary to adapt to the conditions of a polycentric world order. The inability of the West to keep pace with event produces the search for an external enemy, and the growing mentality of a besieged fortress. The West increasingly imports external risks by pedalling the Ukrainian crisis as well as the dogmatic course towards expanding the EU and NATO at the expense of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. In the current circumstances, while making much-needed efforts to preserve and strengthen Russian identity, it is important not to leave the concept of Europe at the mercy of those who do not understand Russia or are hostile to it.

The study aims to identify the significance of the European Union factor in shaping the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the People’s Republic of China in the early 2020’s. The research question stems from the existing contradiction between the economic interests of German states and business corporations on the one hand and the policy of the German government, which is increasingly distancing itself from China, on the other. It is hypothesized that Berlin’s shift to a confrontational strategy towards Beijing is largely due to “Europeanization” – the strengthening of centralization elements in European Union governance and the related adaptation of national models to the pan-European one. In the context of the “Europeanization” of foreign policy, supporting the existing trends rather than developing an alternative scenario contributes to preserving the leading role of Germany in the formation and implementation of the EU’s policy towards China. Thus, the study, in a certain sense, is a case study of the limits of autonomy of foreign policy of the integration associations’ member–states. Based on the bottom-up approach existing within the concept of “Europeanization,” the article provides a periodization of Germany’s policy towards China, taking into account the changes in the state of the EU ties with the latter. Four phases of German – Chinese engagements are proposed, namely 1993–2016, 2016–2019, 2019–2023 and 2023 until present. The comparison of the national and supranational levels of decision–making during these periods allowed us to demonstrate the full cycle of the “Europeanization” of Germany’s political course and once again emphasize the importance of the European Union in the formation of the policy of the state under study. Initially Germany presented its own norms of interaction with China to the EU level in order to ensure the most favorable conditions of cooperation with the latter; now it is adopting pan-European standards, adapting its national position to that of the European Union. The author’s conclusions are supported by the results of qualitative analysis of textual materials of the leading think–tanks in 2020–2024. The results of the study allow predicting further solidarization of Germany with the pan-European position and deterioration of German – Chinese relations.

This article investigates the relationship between the quality of political and economic institutions and economic growth. The study aims to empirically test the hypothesis of an interdependence between institutional quality and GDP growth rates following the global economic crisis of 2008 2009. The analysis focuses on the period of stable global economic growth from 2010 to 2018, with the upper boundary set at the onset of the COVID 19 crisis. To assess the quality of political institutions, each country’s average ’’Democracy Index’’ ranking over the nine-year period is used. Economic institutional quality is measured via the country’s average position in the ‘’Ease of Doing Business Index’’ over the same timeframe. Economic growth rates are determined by calculating the average ranking of countries over nine years according to World Bank data. Correlation analysis reveals that, in the post-crisis period, countries with lower positions in both indexes experienced the highest growth rates, while those leading in these rankings displayed comparatively lower economic growth. These observed differences may be attributable to the low-base effect in some rapidly growing countries and the effective economic policies of their elites. In contrast, the case of Russia highlights a unique pattern, where a low «Democracy Index» position correlates with a low economic growth rate, and a relatively favorable «Ease of Doing Business Index» position corresponds to lower growth – a paradox that may be explained by the severe negative impacts of the global economic crisis, anti-Russian sanctions, and ineffective economic policy. The findings underscore the need to further develop research methodologies at the intersection of political science and economics to deepen our understanding of the relationship between institutional quality across different sectors and macroeconomic performance dynamics.

The article discusses the use of development assistance as a foreign policy tool by the Benelux countries, namely Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The paper aims to answer the question whether the development assistance provided by the Benelux states corresponds to their political statements which cite this policy area as a soft power instrument, or the three approaches to development assistance rather reflect other goals, e.g. beneficial economic cooperation with developing countries. The article analyzes international statistical data, sociological surveys and official development assistance-related documents, using qualitative historical and descriptive as well as genealogical and historical methods to trace the evolution of the three countries’ approaches. The concepts of small and middle powers, to which the Benelux countries belong, and the concept of soft power constitute the theoretical and methodological framework of the research. The article concludes that the Benelux countries’ approaches to development assistance are different, complex and changeable. The pursuit of economic goals helps explain at least some of the three states’ geographic and functional priorities, which translate into defining countries where Benelux’ companies are situated as key partners or specializing in the development assistance areas where these companies can be involved. This pursuit is most clearly evident in the Dutch approach, while Luxembourg seems to value soft power function more as it enhances the country’s image as one of the most generous donors and a responsible member of the international community. Unlike Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium show a downward trend in the amount of assistance allocated (with the exception of 2015 and 2022), amid doubts about the effectiveness of development assistance and securitization of this area; however, the ongoing public debates keep relevant the use of development assistance as soft power vis-à-vis the countries of the Global South.

Book review: America against All [Amerika protiv vsekh] (2023). Geopolitics, Statehood and Global Role of the USA: History and Modernity [Geopolitika, gosudarstvennost’ i global’naya rol’ SSHA: istoriya i sovremennost’]. Moscow: LLC “Commonwealth of Cultures” [OOO “Sodruzhestvo kul’tur”], 588 p.What is America for Russia, the rest of the world and itself? This question is answered differently by historians, journalists, writers, diplomats, academic researchers, and incumbent politicians. Why has the United States – in recent years especially – pursued an exemplarily offensive foreign policy, as if directed “against everyone”? The authors of the book of the same name, “America Against All. Geopolitics, Statehood and the Global Role of the United States: History and Modernity” offer their answer to this question. The authors of the monograph analyze a significant body of literature on the U.S. geopolitical thought, reflect on the origins of American statehood, and seek to trace the formation of the so-called ‘‘American empire” and the spread of American hegemony from the late 19th century to the present day. In conclusion, the authors outline proposals for democratizing modern America. This book review is an attempt to critically analyze the assessments and recommendations of a large number of authors from the Diplomatic Academy, IMEMO RAS, MGIMO University, RUDN, and branch institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The U.S. Administration has been increasingly using secondary sanctions to make legal persons in foreign jurisdictions comply with the U.S. regimes of economic restrictive measures. The practice of secondary sanctions has been towering since the outbreak of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Hundreds of companies in third jurisdictions found themselves in Specially Designated Nationals List of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. At the same time the concept of secondary sanctions as well as empirical reflections of their use hardly enjoy satisfactory reflection in the academic literature. The purpose of the article is to fill in this gap. Key research questions concern the intensity of the use of the U.S. secondary sanction in relation to Russia, the main reasons of their use against particular persons, the distribution of sanctioned persons in terms of country of origin and other variables. Main hypothesis implies the quantitative rise of sanctions related to the violation of export control and connections to already sanctions persons in such countries as China, UAE, Turkey and others. The processing of 511 cases of secondary sanctions database is the main tool to test this assumption.

The evolution of US migration policy has run several cycles: at first, the fate of immigrants was the responsibility of the employer (companies, who brought them to the USA), then, with an increase in their influx and their gradual resettlement, the lives of newcomers began to be determined at the state level. Only at the end of the 19th century migration regulation began to acquire the features of the federal government’s established policy with a vector towards liberalization throughout the next century. Starting from the 2010s there is a reverse trend – back to restrictionism and ‘descend’ of the regulation to the level of state authorities, especially for illegal immigrants. Such shift causes a clash between states and federal government, and at the same time emphasises the inability of this government to carry out objectively aspired reform.Today immigration policy in the United States can be divided into two major areas: legal immigration regulation and government attempts to solve the problem of illegal immigration. This division, albeit conditionally, helps to understand why for 30 years now no Congress has been able to work out a comprehensive immigration reform or at least agree on key areas for the implementation of its’ certain aspects. A set of acute problems of socio-economic, moral and ethical nature forms an inseparable set of challenges. It equally includes both the areas necessary for the country’s successful economic development: highly qualified personnel attraction, aging of the nation combating, increase of the birth rate, and the challenges associated with the burden on society and the increase in crime: the influx of refugees, illegal, seasonal and permanent immigrants and their families.Due to domestic political peculiarities in the modern United States, party coalitions cannot agree on even one of these areas, let alone develop a profound working system that meets constantly changing needs of the economy, foreign policy challenges, and is in consensus with states’ authorities, who would finally assimilate newcomers.Will the current crisis on the southwestern border of the United States affect J. Biden’s reelection in November 2024? What strategy has D. Trump chosen to bypass his rival? – you will find from this article.

The article examines trade policy initiatives of the Biden administration. In a complex climate of domestic political polarization, the United States compete with China and defends its position in international markets. These challenges affect the areas of high technologies, digital economy, information and communications sector, renewable energy sources, and infrastructure. At the same time, an equally important problem in the context of increased geopolitical risks remains increasing the reliability of logistics and production chains, primarily for microelectronics. Addressing these challenges requires the creation of appropriate platforms that allow the United States to interact with partner countries. Within these frameworks, the United States intends to promote the priorities of the Biden administration: standards in the field of high technologies, ensuring the energy transition, protecting working conditions and inclusion. Another crucial area is promoting the fight against corruption, ensuring transparency of business processes in partner countries and training personnel. Completing these goals should attract American business and investment to the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and Latin America. These should also increase American leverage in its strategic competition with China. At the same time, the formats of cooperation created by the United States must be insured against their internal political situation and the risks of interruption of work when there is a change of presidential administrations. In less than four years of its work (2021–2024), the Biden administration has proposed three platforms: the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and the Partnership of the Americas for Economic Prosperity. The results of their implementation are different. This article examines the two last mentioned regional platforms and describes conditions for their creation, work prospects, probable risks, and some results.