Abstract Lottocratic theorists present the logic of randomness as inherently positive and beneficial, forming the conceptual foundation of lottocratic democracy. This paper challenges this narrow interpretation by offering an alternative perspective on the logic of randomness. Using a process-oriented approach, it examines the practical workings of the random selection process to provide a more nuanced understanding. It highlights the inherent problems of randomness in undermining empowerment, weakening consent theory, compromising substantive equality, eroding competence, and bypassing the authorization question. Based on this new understanding of the logic of randomness, this paper critically evaluates the concept of lottery democracy as a purported remedy for the crisis in Western democracies and scrutinizes its political proposals and programs. The claim that lottery democracy can rejuvenate and deepen democratic engagement is explored and found to lack strong empirical support. The critique presented here is grounded in the history of mixed systems in both ancient Athens and contemporary China, especially drawing from deliberative polling exercises conducted in China, providing a real-world context to the discussion.

Abstract What is the determinant of the scope of justice? Should rules of justice that regulate the interactions of the members of my society be extended to cover how such members interact with outsiders, entities that fall outside the boundary of my society? Two major approaches—namely, the deontological/contractarian and the utilitarian—offer their answers. Although their answers differ, they are universal in the sense that they do not draw a boundary between the members of my society and outsiders. As a result, one answer is deficient while the other is non-feasible. The only possible answer is the “Average Principle”. The Average Principle means that the boundary of my society can expand as long as the average wellbeing (GDP/capita) of my society does not decline. However, the Average Principle faces its own problem: the Average Principle is contingent on one’s group membership—i.e., amounting to a parochial answer. That is, the Average Principle cannot be a universal response as the case with the deontological/contractarian and the utilitarian approaches. In effect, this paper finds that the scope of the justice question faces a dilemma. While the deontological/contractarian and the utilitarian approaches involve universal moral principles, one is deficient and the other is non-feasible. While the Average Principle reasoning is non-deficient and feasible, it cannot amount to a universal moral principle. This paper finds that the scope of justice dilemma has no solution that is universal while, simultaneously, non-deficient and feasible.

Abstract Normative theories about the justice of policies to control international migration tend to come from either the standpoint of the migrant-destination country or the migrant-origin country. I show how three influential normative theorists of migration—Abizadeh, Carens, and Walzer—in formulating their respectively democratic, liberal, and communitarian visions of a just migration policy never incorporate the concerns of different groups within migrant-origin countries. Since empirical research shows migration can have both heterogeneous positive and negative impacts on migrant-origin and migrant-destination countries, normative theories about just migration policy would benefit from shifting away from either focusing on the impacts of migration only on migrant-destination countries or only on migrant-origin countries toward assessing their impact on both. I then formulate a theoretical framework-institution that could better incorporate the concerns of different groups with different positionalities within migrant-origin countries and migrant-destination countries toward the impact of international migration. This framework would allow mini-publics to elect representatives of groups with distinct interests within migrant-origin and migrant-destination countries. Such representatives would then engage in an intersubjective deliberative dialogue to develop a more just migration policy with a more international orientation, with each group’s level of influence moderated by the amount of international inequality between countries and the amount of harm caused by one country toward another.