Typical nomothetic, dimensional conceptualizations of personality traits have demonstrated that traits show robust patterns of change across the lifespan. Yet, questions linger about both the mechanisms underlying trait change and the extent to which we can understand any individual using only dimensional approaches. Alternatively, a person-specific conceptualization of personality that emphasizes processes specific to one person may offer more insight into changes at the expense of generalizability. We argue that taking an idiographic, person-specific dynamic network approach to understanding a person provides an opportunity to bridge the nomothetic-idiographic gap and understand processes underlying trait change that may point to how personality changes across the lifespan. In this study, we examined whether the properties of idiographic personality networks were related to between-person personality trait changes in a sample of college students (N = 418). We used dynamic exploratory graph analysis to construct N = 1 personality networks and then included network parameters in multilevel growth models over a 2-year period using self- and informant-report data. We found that network parameters were largely unrelated to between-person change for self-reports but were related to some informant-reports. Discussion revolves around continuing to bridge the two approaches together to create a holistic picture of personality change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Structural racism has become a household term used in the media and in everyday conversations around diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives. Despite increased discussion of structural racism, people often struggle to understand how structural racism is perpetuated by individuals. We integrate research on moral psychology, social cognition, and intergroup relations to investigate whether structural explanations can lead to reduced perceptions of responsibility and punishment for managers who engage in discriminatory hiring decisions. A field study of health care system employees who perceived discriminatory hiring as originating from structural factors (vs. individual factors) were less likely to hold the hiring manager accountable (Study 1). Explaining discriminatory hiring to participants as due to structural factors (vs. a no-information control condition; Studies 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3) decreased desires to hold the hiring manager accountable. We found evidence that this lessened accountability was due to participants' simultaneous perceptions that the hiring manager was less responsible for the lack of diversity and did not intend to discriminate under a structural racism explanation. However, when the relationship between individual and structural racism was explained, participants were more likely to hold perpetrators of discrimination accountable while allowing for crucial discussions around structural racism (Study 4). This work suggests that Americans may lack a deep understanding of the complexities surrounding structural racism, and that the connections between individuals and structural racism must be explained in order to motivate people to hold perpetrators of discrimination accountable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Widespread narratives about leadership often emphasize the importance of exhibiting agentic traits like assertiveness, ambition, and confidence. Counter to this perspective, the present research suggests that when evaluating leaders, followers especially value communal traits, such as honesty, open-mindedness, and compassion-even at the expense of agentic traits. Eight preregistered studies (N = 3,682) support our theorizing. In Study 1, we find that people describe their ideal leader as more communal than the typical leader, representing a divide between preferred versus prototypical leaders. We then examine the preference for communality in leaders at the trait level (Studies 2 and 3) and in evaluations of candidates for leadership positions (Studies 4a-5). Further, we find that followers' preference for communal leaders is explained, in part, by the anticipation that a communal leader will create a more psychologically safe climate than an agentic leader (Study 6). Finally, we evince one reason communal leaders may not emerge-communality does not predict self-selection into leadership pathways (Study 7). Taken together, our findings suggest that prominent narratives about leadership have tended to downplay the importance and appeal of communal traits for followers. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Coming to suspect that someone has engaged in wrongdoing based on their unexpected behavior is a common phenomenon-yet, little is known about what triggers initial suspicion. We investigated how violating expectations for high emotionality during a traumatic event can trigger suspicion that one has engaged in immoral-or even criminal-activity through moral typecasting. Five studies demonstrate this theory in a criminal context with dire real-world consequences: 911 callers reporting violent crimes generating suspicion by exhibiting unexpected behavior, which could trigger confirmation bias in investigations leading to wrongful convictions. Using both real and tightly controlled simulated 911 calls, we demonstrated that failing to express the expected level of emotion on a 911 call reporting a violent crime led laypeople and police to morally typecast the caller as more of a moral agent capable of perpetrating immoral acts and less of a moral patient capable of being the victim of immoral acts-ultimately increasing suspicion that they were involved in the crime and support for treating them as a suspect. We advance moral psychological theory by demonstrating that failing to express expected levels of emotion about a moral violation can shape moral inferences about someone's capacity to commit versus be the victim of moral wrongs, thereby generating suspicion that they might have engaged in wrongdoing. We demonstrated this theory in criminal settings to explain how one tragedy can become two: altruistic witnesses calling 911 to plead for help on behalf of another person becoming suspects of the crime they reported because they failed to exhibit the expected emotional demeanor. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

People appreciate members of their in-group, and they cooperate with them-tendencies we refer to as in-group love. Being a member of a minority (vs. majority) is a common experience that varies both between groups in a context and within a group between contexts, but how does it affect in-group love? Across six studies, we examined when and why being in the minority boosts in-group love. In Study 1, being in the minority boosted people's appreciation of various real-life in-groups but not out-groups. In Study 2, a real-life interaction between and within groups, people cooperated more with minority in-group (but not minority out-group) members. In Studies 3-6, we measured cooperation (Study 3, incentive-compatible), appreciation (Studies 4-6), and four mediators: perceived in-group distinctiveness, experienced in-group belongingness, expected in-group cooperation, and perceived in-group status. These four mediators independently and simultaneously explained why being in the minority boosted in-group love. In Studies 5 and 6, we observed two theoretical boundary conditions for the effect. The size of the effect was smaller when the minority in-group had many (vs. few) members (Study 5), and when the imbalance between the in-group and out-group was either low or high (here: 46% minority and 54% majority or 20% minority and 80% majority) rather than moderate (here: 33% minority and 67% majority). We discuss how these findings align with and build on optimal distinctiveness theory and other theoretical accounts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

A fundamental assumption about human behavior forming the backbone of trait theories is that, to some extent, individuals behave consistently across structurally comparable situations. However, especially for unethical behavior, the consistency assumption has been severely questioned, at least from the early 19th century onward. We provide a strict test of the consistency assumption for a prominent instance of unethical behavior-dishonesty-in a large (N = 1,916) and demographically diverse sample. Dishonest behavior was measured three times-up to 3 years apart-using different variants of well-established, incentivized cheating paradigms. A key advantage of these paradigms is that lying is individually profitable but not self-incriminating. Besides varying the specific task at hand, we experimentally varied the nature of incentives (i.e., money vs. avoiding tedious work) as well as their magnitude across measurement occasions. The consistency of dishonest behavior was estimated using a newly developed statistical model. Results showed strong consistency of dishonest behavior across contexts in most cases. Furthermore, theoretically relevant personality traits (i.e., Honesty-Humility and the Dark Factor) yielded meaningful relations both with dishonesty and indeed its consistency. Thus, contrary to long-standing assumptions, there is notable consistency in dishonest behavior that can be attributed to underlying dispositional factors. Overall, the current findings have important implications for the theoretical understanding of dishonest behavior by providing strong evidence for (dis)honesty as a trait as well as for practice (e.g., honesty interventions). Moreover, the newly developed statistical approach can serve future research across scientific fields. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).