In pragma-dialectics, a study of legal reasoning analyses judicial judgements’ dialectical and rhetorical aspects. Most analytical studies of legal reasoning focus on the role of judges and their decision-making mechanisms. In our study, we focus on the strategic manoeuvring of the opposing parties. Depending on the context, parties may have to justify their decision to litigants, a professional audience, and the public in rhetorically and dialectically different ways. What makes strategic manoeuvring special in judicial trials is that rhetorical aims (winning the debate) and dialectical aims (convincing the jury), in contrast with debates where parties dialectically aim at resolving a dispute by reaching consensus, are not in conflict. We analyse the Depp ctr. Heard trial 2022, focusing on the parties’ dialectical potential in cases when rhetorical aspects play an important role in addition to objective evidence required by the legal framework. Depp’s party started the trial with a strategic movement we shall call as a ‘topical shift’, doubling their starting position, aiming at dual dialectical goals, and hence also beginning a new debate parallel with the apparently only one by introducing a not directly relevant factor into the debate. Although other factors also played a role in Depp’s victory, setting up his position in the confrontation stage this way was decisive for the trial’s outcome: Heard’s party, following a traditional route, joined actively in one of the dual debates only, effectively giving up the extra debate started by Depp. This way, analysing the trial offers wider consequences to how to understand strategic manoeuvring in judicial trials, and in general as well.

This essay explores what it is to be a principle of charity in philosophical argumentation. In it, I explore some principles of charity found in classic and contemporary literature and textbooks on logic and philosophy. I distinguish between what I will maximal and sub-maximal principles of charity. With this distinction, I taxonomize current principles of charity on offer according to their dialectical function as rules for argument interpretation and reconstruction in philosophical argumentation. Principles of charity, I argue, are best construed as pragmatic rules for argument interpretation in philosophical argumentation, not merely moral or ratio-epistemic rules. I defend this claim against some objections.

This paper tries to reconcile the clash between argumentation theory and formal logic regarding circular arguments, which are regarded as the fallacy of begging the question by the former, and a benign and useful inference pattern by the latter. This paper provides a formal system which can represent circular arguments found in the literature. The formal system makes it possible to distinguish two ways in which arguments can be circular. The first type of circularity, which is vicious, is when an argument is based on an inference step which is (indirectly) supported by that inference step itself. The second kind of circularity, which is benign, occurs when one of the premises is the same proposition as the conclusion. The first type of circularity implies the second type of circularity, but not the other way round. This distinction is in line with other approaches to circular arguments. Analyzing selected examples from the literature shows the value of the formal system.