The article consists of three parts. Firstly, the author considers the main concepts of the political regime in Belarus. Such an analysis includes the concepts of hybrid, authoritarian, and neo-patrimonial regimes. The second part deals with the reasons for Belarusian retreat from democratic standards, namely the Russian factor in Belarusian politics. President Vladimir Putin and Russian bureaucracy are afraid to lose Belarus in case Aliaksandr Lukashenka is removed from absolute power. The authoritarian regime in Russia has sponsored autocracies in the post-Soviet space, ensuring their dependence on Moscow. In the third part, the author analyses the transformation of the Belarusian regime, using the variables of the role of leadership, the state of pluralism, the role of ideology, the character of political mobilization, and the state of human rights. During a very short period of Lukashenka’s rule, we have witnessed a constant tightening of dictatorship rule, which has led the Belarusian regime to the point of a hybrid authoritarian-sultanistic regime (2006) and almost classical sultanism (2010). Such regimes as Belarusian can only be changed through the mobilization of public protest from below. Besides, the Belarusian semi-sultanism is not sustainable.

The three Baltic states have joined the European Union almost a decade ago, but as of yet no research has been carried out von how the membership in the EU has affected the national political systems of these countries. This article overviews the literature on how EU membership affects the relationship between legislative and executive branches of government and summarizes what expectations could be drawn as to the character and degree of Europeanization of Baltic parliaments, based on the research. It also calls for an empirical study of this matter to measure these expectations against the reality and gives recommendations how it should be carried out.

After securitisation, there comes the further intensivation of a conflict, or violisation, or de-securitization. De-securitisation has many forms, one being diplomatisation. The article discusses peace and reconciliation work by states that are third parties to a conflict, and fastens on the pioneering state in terms of institutionalization, which is Norway. Following the Cold War, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs engaged in this field broadly. Institutionalisation hit during the 2000s. Norwegian diplomacy facilitators think of de-securitisation in four steps: mapping the parties to a conflict, clearing their path to the table, assisting in their deliberations going across that table, being indirectly involved in the monitoring of agreements. The article concludes with a suggestion to the Copenhagen School. By adapting Austin and Searle’s speech act perspective, Wittgenstein’s general understanding of linguistic and other practices have been left behind. It is time to leave the cold analytics of speech act theory behind and reclaim the full thrust of Wittgenstein’s work, which was geared towards the constitutive role of practices for everything social. We need more empirical studies of violising practices, as well as of de-securitising legal and diplomatic practices.

A certain unity among the Baltic states emerged during their simultaneous fights for independence and for recognition by the great powers in Europe and the US. The recognition was given separately to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and not commonly to the Baltic states. This article tries to determine when and under what circumstances the Baltic question reached the institutions and leading persons dealing with foreign relations in the US as a separate problem independent of Russia. After the independence of the Baltic states, there followed a repelling attitude from the US and non-recognition until 1922.