This paper argues that economic voting is not limited to first-order elections and also can be observed in local elections (usually considered as second-order). Though local governments do not have the power to shape the macro-economic policy of the state, they may have some instruments to influence the well-being of their regions. Moreover, voters may perceive them as accountable for the state of the economy in the region and punish or reward them in local elections on basis of the economic trends. Lithuania appears to be a quite interesting case in which to test these theoretical arguments. Party identification and cleavages are quite weak here: therefore economic voting can be expected to provide at least some explanation of voting (it should not be shadowed by other social factors). Six local municipal council elections were held in Lithuania since the transition to democracy: the first were held in 1995 and the last in 2011. While controlling for important political-contextual factors, this paper strives to compare the impact of economic voting at Lithuania’s municipal elections across time five separate time periods. Results of the empirical analysis reveal that Lithuanians are learning the economic vote with unemployment being more significant as a factor in explaining changes in votes for dominant parties in the municipal councils in the more recent period than in the first several elections. A referendum effect is also observed: parties that belong to the national government parties are punished more during economic downturns.

Since the declarations of independence more than 20 years ago, besides others, the Baltic states are being pursued by energy dependency issues. Differently than was wishfully expected, accession to the EU and NATO for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania did not mean suddenly improved relations with Russia, overcome domestic political weaknesses as well as fast solutions in the energy security sector. They still cause a notable predicament after accession to the EU and NATO. In the recent years, an especial focus on the energy sector could be observed in the Baltic states – energy security has become one of the main concerns for politicians and attracts a lot of attention in the Baltic media and public debates. However, when looking from the academic perspective and analysis, these issues seem not to have found their place among more serious and consistent scholarly interests, creating a strange paradoxical situation when constant daily topicalities in the media and political life were left behind a deeper academic analysis. [...]

The aim of this article is to analyze the reasons for Rainis’ appreciation of the phenomenon he labels as the ‘basic class’. The Latvian writer attributes this concept to the members of society who provide the livelihood for themselves by doing mainly the manual labour. Although thus a praise for the proletariat is voiced, the reasons are more nuanced than the common Soviet interpretation allowed to see. Rainis sees the ‘Basic class’ as a crucial agent in the struggle for Latvian national emancipation. At the same time, the article seeks an answer to the question why, according to Rainis, bourgeoisie is reluctant to fight this struggle.

This article discusses the causes and potential consequences of the high legislative turnover in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the period from 1990 onwards. The main findings from the subject-related literature are being confronted with the data on the Baltic parliamentary recruitment. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the path dependence (length of the previous non-democratic regime) and the supply-side volatility are the most convincing explanations for the high turnover among Baltic legislators.

Restoring their statehood in the early 1990s, Estonia and Latvia established parliamentary republics, while Lithuania opted for semi-presidentialism. The paper is a case-oriented comparative study explaining this difference with the Lithuanian “exceptionality” in focus. Part of the answer is differences of interwar constitutional history: while Lithuania and Estonia had to cope with the legacy of three constitutions each, Latvia inherited only the parliamentary Constitution of 1922, because its dictator Karlis Ulmanis did not bother to constitutionalize his rule. Another part is differences in the balance of power during the time of extraordinary politics when constitutions were made. The alternation between the presidential and parliamentary phases of semi-presidentialism and the “perils of presidentialism” did manifest repeatedly in the Lithuanian post-communist politics, while Estonia and Latvia did know next to nothing about them, except for the “Zatlers episode” in Latvia in 2009–2011.The infamous Rolandas Paksas’ impeachment in 2003–2004 and controversial features in the performance style of the Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė are important illustrations of the shortcomings of semi-presidentialism, which could be cured by Lithuania’s switch to the Baltic pattern of parliamentary presidency. However, as time goes on, the probability of a constitutional reform decreases in all Baltic States, mainly due to increasing acquis constitutionnel and habituation.

The financial crisis in the Eurozone is combining several new interdisciplinary debates. Has the financial crisis been caused by the decisions of the political actors or rather by complicated economic dilemmas? In what way have different social stakeholders acted during the years of the crisis and which of the groups have had the biggest influence in different stages of the crisis? Why and how national political elites have lost their dominant position in the crisis management, which have been the cornerstones of this power transition process and what role have the supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the European Central Bank played during the crisis? Accordingly, the main goal of the article is to define the crucial events and stakeholders in the Eurozone crisis solution process by using empirical process tracing and narrative analysis as the research methods. It will also inquire into how and why national political elites and citizens delegated their democratic competences and powers to non-electable institutions during the Eurozone crisis.

This article explores the small new member states at the EU ‘frontline’ in their efforts to upload their geographic preferences in the EU foreign policy. It starts by reviewing the preferences of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. Next, it compares how they pursued these preferences in the EU. Third, it indicates their uploading success. Finally, it notes that these countries, despite their ‘double disadvantages’1, moved closer toward ‘small state smart strategy’2, including compromise-seeking behaviour, persuasive deliberation, lobbying, and using coalitions. While their uploading success has been mixed, their preference projection in the EU foreign policy has been visible.

This article intends to analyze how the term ‘populism’ is used in the Latvian public discourse, by examining the content of the largest daily newspaper “Diena” in three different time periods. As it emerges from the analysis, populism has gained a different meaning in the daily usage in contrast with the more established understanding conveyed by the academic literature. In the media, populism is used to a refer to wide range of politicians, different parties and policy initiatives from diverse ideological spectra. Most often, however, populism is employed to describe rhetorics or communication style whose primary goal is to attract public attention.

Since the completion of the Eastern enlargement in 2004, a major responsibility for addressing the Baltic Sea pollution lies with the European Union. It provides strong institutions to facilitate environmental decision-making and to enforce the implementation of regulations. However, the measures taken so far have not been sufficient to significantly improve the state of the Baltic Sea. In particular, the Common Agricultural Policy does not take the ecological characteristics of the region into consideration. Instead, it provides false incentives since it generally encourages farmers to increase production and to extend areas under cultivation. To enhance the EU’s role, it is crucial to raise the awareness of the Baltic Sea’s vulnerability in Brussels. Moreover, European regulations and policies should become more flexible and match the regional specific environmental requirements. At the same time, too heavy financial burdens and distortions of competition, especially for the region’s agricultural sector, should be avoided.

This study examines whether Russia is a threat to Estonia’s energy security as well as how Estonia has reacted to Russia as an energy supplier. The authors use Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory as a framework to understand the potential of Russia as a threat, as well as how Estonia has reacted. The balance of threat theory is chosen because it effectively establishes when states view others as a threat and how they react. The focus of the work is on Estonia’s dependence on Russian natural gas and the great lengths Estonia has gone to be energy self-sufficient. The article concludes that Estonia can and does see Russia as a threat to its energy security and has taken significant measures to reduce its dependency on Russia as an energy supplier.