This paper analyses the opinions of economists and policy makers on the monetary reform undertaken in the Kingdom of SCS after the Great War. The purpose of the analysis is to show how those opinions evolved in the situation of growing monetary instability. Immediately after the war it was believed that the pre-war gold parity of the national currency could be restored but, after several years burdened with the depreciation of the dinar and inflation, it became clear that monetary stabilization needed a new realistic approach. The opinions on this approach ranged from extremely regulatory to completely liberal ones. Early commitment to administrative measures was more the consequence of an extremely delicate and changing economic and political situation in which the State was in the early 1920s than renunciation of the liberal economic policy pursued in the Kingdom of Serbia before the Great War. When it became clear that the implementation of palliative administrative measures could not prevent the value of the dinar from falling, a pragmatic liberal approach prevailed. The major proponent of this approach among economists was Velimir Bajkic, and among policy makers, Finance Minister Milan Stojadinovic and the Governor of the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS Djordje Vajfert.

The paper provides a review of efforts to make Serbian-Hellenic alliances and formal agreements since the last years of Karageorge?s life within the context of the relations between Serbia and Greece, and later between Yugoslavia and Greece. The circumstances that led to the signing of six formal alliances have been analysed including their content and scope. Out of the six alliances, four were bilateral, and two were Balkan (1934, 1953/54). All of them have been reviewed both in the bilateral and Balkan context. The following agreements have been analysed: The Treaty of Alliance and the Military Treaty from 1867/68, The Treaty of Alliance of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom and the Military Convention of June 1, 1913, The Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement between Yugoslavia and Greece of 1929, the Balkan Pact (the Balkan Entente) of 1934, The Treaty on the Balkan Union between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Kingdom of January 1942, the Balkan Pact of 1953/54. The issues related to the struggle of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria about Macedonia and the question of the Serbian Free Zone of Salonica have also been discussed, as well as mutual relations during the Great War and at the beginning of the Cold War.

Yugoslav-Greek relations from the end of WWII to the breakup of Yugoslavia and went through several phases. A short period of interlude when the diplomatic relations were re-established 1945/1946 was followed by a much longer one (1946-1950) of conflict due to the Yugoslav support to the Communists in the Greek Civil War. A pragmatic approach to the issue of both parties resulted in a prolonged period (1950-1967) of working relations that culminated in the signing of tripartite treaties with Turkey, Treaty of Ankara (1953) and Bled Agreements (1954). Even though the treaties lost most of their importance after the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow in 1955/1956, and the Cyprus crisis, they created a climate of correct relations between two neighbouring states marked by reciprocal visits on the highest level. The coup d??tat of April 1967 brought to power a dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974) and thus inaugurated a new period of tensions in bilateral relations. The last period 1974-1990 was characterized by good working relations between Belgrade and Athens mainly due to the Greece?s efforts to integrate the European Economic Community (EEC) that supposed good relations with its neighbours. The issue of relations of Athens with Socialist Republic of Macedonia, first as a part of Socialst Yugoslavia, and then, after the collapse of the Federation, as the independent country, proved to be the last problem for Yugoslavia and a lasting one for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as it used to be known after 1990.

The paper discusses the character of the translations of saints? relics in the late medieval central Balkans, as they increasingly gained prominence as an encouragement to the veneration of saints. The fact that translations grew much more frequent provides the opportunity to analyse the motivations behind this practice, the ways in which relics were acquired, the types of translation processions and their symbolic significance. The relic translations in the central Balkans in the period under study fitted the Christian translation pattern in every respect and stood halfway between history and cult and, frequently, between politics and cult.

This paper seeks to summarize the main aspects of bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia during a turbulent period characterized by fierce guerrilla warfare in Macedonia, the efforts made by the Great Powers for the implementation of the reforms provided by the M?rzsteg Program and various domestic changes in both countries.

The intra-party conflict in Yugoslavia in 1966 resulted in a fundamental shift in the attitude of the Yugoslav leadership toward the Albanian national minority, which was also reflected in the country?s foreign policy orientation. The normalization of relations with Albania was set as one of the objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia stopped responding to the anti-Yugoslav statements of Albanian officials and launched a series of cooperation initiatives with Albania. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was assigned a special role in the normalization of relations with Tirana and, with the consent of Belgrade, an exchange of publications, visits of cultural-artistic associations and contacts between the cultural institutions of Kosovo and Metohija and Albania ensued. This policy resulted in the establishment of direct cultural, economic and political ties between the governments of Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, into which the Yugoslav political leadership no longer had any insight.

Tito v?cut les purges staliniennes principalement en dehors de l?Union sovi?tique, ce qui lui permit de survivre, mais aussi d?en profiter pour devenir le principal dirigeant du parti. Les s?jours a Moscou, en 1938 et 1939 furent des rudes ?preuves pour lui, mais par un savant m?lange d?opportunisme politique et de l??goisme personnel il sut se distancier de tous ses collegues qui ont p?ri dans les purges ?cartant ainsi les soup?ons qui pesaient sur lui aussi. Le fait qu?il r?ussit a deux reprises de retourner de Moscou indemne en tant qu?au moins messager, sinon, comme il se repr?sentait lui-meme, comme mandataire de Komintern, lui permit de s??tablir d?finitivement au sommet de la hi?rarchie communiste en Yougoslavie dont il avait commenc? le renouveau des 1936.

La Revue des Deux Mondes est ouverte sur l?Europe et le monde. Au fil du temps, cette orientation ne s?est jamais d?mentie. Elle est illustr?e par la publication dans chacun des num?ros de la Chronique de la Quinzaine (r?f?rence au rythme bi-mensuel de la revue) dans laquelle un auteur, souvent le directeur de la publication, analyse les temps forts de l?actualit? internationale au cours de la quinzaine ?coul?e. Francis Charmes, directeur de la Revue depuis 1908 et auteur de la Chronique de la Quinzaine durant l?ann?e 1915 qui nous int?resse. Les id?es d?velopp?es dans la Chronique de la Quinzaine sont int?ressantes ? un autre titre, en raison des liens que la Revue entretient avec le Quai d?Orsay.

The paper looks at two sets of data provided by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus? De administranndo imperio, one concerning information about Belgrade in the context of Serbian settlement in the Byzantine Empire under Heraclius, the other Belgrade itself.

This paper examines on the basis of the British archival records the attitude of Great Britain towards the consular initiative of the Great Powers in August and September 1875. It was the first joint undertaking of the European powers in the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878). In the British view, it was the ambitions of the League of the Three Emperors in the Balkans and Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina that underpinned the initiative. Although the consuls had limited authority, Britain accepted the initiative with reluctance and mistrust - and only after the Ottoman Empire had given its consent. When the League of the Three Emperors proposed more extensive powers for the consuls in order to prevent the failure of their mission, both the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain declined this proposal. This meant that the Consular Mission could accomplish nothing.