Abstract: Thailand’s development has been influenced by numerous factors, one of which is its interplay with China. However, the Thai government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hold different perspectives on China’s role in the Mekong subregion and Thailand. This article aims to analyze the differences in views between the Thai government and NGOs regarding China’s rise in four key areas: the environment, infrastructure development, the economy, and the political rivalry between China and the United States. I argue that Thai officials perceive China’s ascent as an opportunity. It provides Thailand, as a medium-sized country, with more opportunities to receive assistance and engage in trade. Additionally, China can help balance the power of the United States. Conversely, NGOs view China’s rise in the region as a problematic phenomenon.

Abstract: This article analyzes the activities of Southeast Asian civil society organizations (CSOs) with regard to citizens’ online freedom of expression (digital rights) against the backdrop of China’s increasing digital investments in the region through its Digital Silk Road (DSR) concept. CSO behavior relating to citizens’ digital rights contributes to the on-the-ground, agency-driven perspective among countries that are targets of Chinese digital infrastructure investments. This perspective is underrepresented in the literature surrounding China’s contemporary global rise. Focusing specifically on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines—three countries that rank as “high” recipients of Beijing’s media influence (one form of digital technology influence)—this article sheds light on two phenomena. First, the Southeast Asian CSO landscape currently focuses on pressing issues threatening freedom of expression in national and regional spaces, such as national government surveillance, misinformation campaigns, and internet shutdowns, more so than the “digital Chinese threat.” Second, although pushback against the threats to Southeast Asians’ digital rights often has connections to China’s digital technologies, the reality that digital repression techniques are organized and executed by Southeast Asian governmental regimes (and not by Chinese actors) generates contradictions that run counter to the democratic ideals espoused by these countries and align more closely with the Chinese states’ views relating to information organization and control.

Abstract: Since 2017, the concept of “sharp power” has gained traction within academic and policy circles, further reinforcing the metanarrative of China as a revisionist power. This study aims to substantiate the authoritarian form of sharp power influence that challenges liberal norms by exploring its social functions and restraining mechanisms in action, using South Korea as a case study. The findings underscore that China has projected sharp power through three distinct avenues: political attraction, economic coercion, and cultural socialization. By drawing upon the “chordal triad of agency” framework as elucidated by Emirbayer and Mische (1988), the article proceeds to illustrate three paths of responsive agency within South Korea, operating within and transcending these constraints.

Abstract: This article studies the parallel evolution of Sri Lanka’s domestic politics and China’s foreign financing in Sri Lanka’s post-independence era through four lenses, namely, political opposition, political gains, economic structure, and institutions. We focus on the bilateral relationship prior to Sri Lanka’s economic liberalization and the aftermath of the middle-income transition and add three major findings to the literature. Firstly, Chinese economic engagements continue to have substantial political opposition in Sri Lanka. But the nature of such opposition evolved from ideology-based to sovereignty-based anti-China sentiments, which heavily correlate with elections. Economic relations with China have continued to evolve as political gains, which helped maintain government popularity in the short-to-medium term and exceeded the costs inflicted by political opposition. Secondly, the nature of the bilateral economic relationship has become more complex, moving from being purely government-to-government to involving multiple actors: Chinese policy banks, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the private sector. Thirdly, despite differences, Sri Lanka’s governments have utilized economic relations with China for short-term political gains and to avoid structural reforms, especially in the run-up to Sri Lanka’s sovereign default and unprecedented economic crisis in 2022. We conclude that China’s approach to ongoing debt restructuring will affect domestic politics around China’s engagements and affect how the bilateral economic relationship evolves.

Abstract: Bhutan sits across a geopolitical fault line in South Asia. To its south lies its traditional partner—India. To its north lies China: a country whose economic power could significantly benefit Bhutan but whose regional orientation is strategically opposed to that of India. This article explores how Bhutan manages its growing relationship with China and seeks to chart where the relationship might go in the future. It shows how increasing economic and commercial ties with China are exerting growing pressure on Bhutan, a country with few developmental opportunities. These ties—in parallel to increasing political engagements—are moving Bhutan closer to diplomatic recognition of China; a decision that will impact on the regional balance of power well beyond the country’s borders. How and when this policy shift will occur is unclear, as Bhutan has been able to successfully prioritize its own interests over Chinese agendas. In doing so, Bhutan has managed to exert a higher degree of agency than other small states in the region. This outcome challenges traditional notions of small state agency in international relations. This study finds that this has been possible due to both material power considerations and the perceptional value accorded to the relationship.