Water diplomacy in the Jordan River Basin is a representative and emblematic example of global water diplomacy dilemmas. The outbreak of the latest Israeli-Palestinian conflict has significantly reshaped the context, agenda, and developmental trajectory of water diplomacy in the basin. Currently, the asymmetric power structure in water diplomacy has shaped divergent objectives and behavioural preferences among actors, thereby forming three distinct practice paradigms: offensive water diplomacy, defensive water diplomacy, and mediatory water diplomacy. Within this specific configuration of water power dynamics and diplomatic practices, internal and external actors in the Jordan River Basin have further engendered four differentiated policy and decision-making models. Collectively, these factors exert considerable influence over the existing pattern and future direction of water diplomacy in the Jordan River Basin.

The pragmatic orientation adopted by Tunisia’s governing party Ennahda from 2011 to 2016 as key political actor has been particularly singled out as an essential factor to have favoured the country’s transition. The party was able to compromise in critical moments to open paths for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in contrast to a more sectarian and exclusivist approach many expected of a party with Islamist roots. In this context, this work explores the following research question: what was behind Ennahda’s accommodationist strategy? The argument advanced to address this puzzle is based on the literature on party change. From this framework, the article shows that strategic adaptation is an accurate rationale to make sense of Ennahda’s governing strategy.

The study analyzes one of the most important elements of Russia’s foreign policy at the present stage. The stated topic is explored on the basis of three components: a study of the Russian Federation’s policy on promoting BRICS and the SCO among the Gulf countries, an analysis of the positions and degree of practical participation of the countries in the region in these organisations, and an assessment of the reaction of Western states to this rapprochement and the countermeasures they are taking. The study was conducted based on the theoretical framework of strategic narratives, which made it possible to analyse how Russia creates and disseminates narratives to shape perceptions and exert indirect influence on the policies of the Gulf countries. In conclusion, Russia’s policy of promoting ‘Global majority’ organisations in the Gulf is highly pragmatic and faces significant limitations. The countries of the region are ready to use these platforms to derive practical benefits in the economic, investment and logistics spheres, but are not yet ready (with the exception of Iran) to engage in open political opposition to traditional international institutions. The strategic ties between the countries of the region and the West, primarily the United States, play a significant role in this. At present, Western capitals are not only closely monitoring the depth of the region’s integration into the ‘Global majority’ organisations, but are also already attempting to implement at least two counter-strategies: a ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy and the promotion of new alternative international platforms (I2U2 or the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor project).

This paper examines the process of diversification of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as a response to the changed domestic and international situation propelling them to reinvent their relationships with countries and regional blocs in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. The paper refers to the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region and the power competition therein. The paper aims to reflect on the position of Gulf countries with a focus on GCC countries and examine their efforts towards active regional diplomacy as they define their bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the midst of the interest and rivalry of the Great Powers while maintaining regional balance through self-initiatives, strengthening ties with countries in Asia-Pacific with ‘shared interests’ like India, China, Japan, and South Korea as they rebalance their exchanges. The paper will also explore the dimension of Gulf’s maritime connections to facilitate coordination with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Defence industry and technology capabilities vary widely among the states in the Persian Gulf: Arab states typically rely on the United States for arms, defence technologies and know-how; Iran has built up its resistance economy including an increasingly indigenous defence industry, and Iraqi capabilities, still in the consequence of the 2003 war, have been eliminated by the international community. The US ‘pivot to Asia’ opened the Middle East and the Persian Gulf for Asian states, primarily but not exclusively China and India. The region’s carbohydrates can finally be rewarded by the most modern technology and know-how, including defence. While ‘interoperability’ with US forces provides a limiting factor, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are building up an indigenous defence industry. In the emerging new regional order, the diversification of relations to include Asian powers will be increasingly manifest, especially in the fields of defence including maritime/naval presence, missiles and nuclear issues.

The importance of chokepoints for countries largely depends on the share of their imports and exports that transit through them. For such countries, an alternative supply route becomes equally important, particularly in times of conflict when chokepoints could be weaponised for geopolitical and geo-economic ends. Of the seven most important maritime chokepoints that are crucial for international trade, four are situated in the Asia Pacific region– Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el Mandeb Strait, Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and the Suez Canal. In the recent past, crises like the COVID pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian war and the Israel-Palestine conflict have laid bare the fragility of the supply chains highlighted the impact on prices of essential commodities like food and energy. Countries across the world are affected by these events, but some more than others. The GCC countries import approximately 85 percent of their food needs and are one of the major fossil fuel exporters in the world. The lack of arable land, scarce water supply, a growing population and climate change threats have all contributed to food insecurity in the GCC countries. The impact of food inflation on the GCC countries has been a significant one, and, unlike elsewhere in the world, accessibility more than affordability poses a challenge to these countries. Diversification of food import sources has been a priority for the GCC and there has been an uptick in food imports from India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, amongst other countries in the larger context of the Asia-Pacific region.

The United Nations is the core collective security mechanism of the international community. The Middle East has been a battlefront for great power competition and has been plagued by ongoing violence. This paper analyzes the experiences and lessons learned from the UN’s governance of Middle East conflicts since its founding through the evolution of the international security mechanisms. Using the case study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it argues that the UN has emphasised direct intervention and active peacekeeping in response to the insecurity felt by nations in the post-World War II era. However, with the shifting dynamics of the international order, the United States and its allies have emerged as significant obstacles to UN collective action, resulting in questions about the UN’s credibility. As regional conflicts have become increasingly complex, the UN’s security governance has expanded into more comprehensive assistance and reconstruction strategies. Moving forward, the UN will likely rely more on collaboration with major powers and regional organisations to address and resolve conflicts.

Holding companies in the Gulf region serve as pivotal players in advancing the economic and political interests of Gulf countries. With the Asia-Pacific evolving as a global economic centre, the role of holding companies has grown increasingly crucial. The intensifying great power competition in the Asia-Pacific, presents both opportunities and challenges for Gulf holding companies. This study explores the tactics these businesses use to manage intricate regional dynamics and build business relationships when negotiating new trade routes and online marketplaces. Holding companies play an important role in linking national development goals to international investment flows. Their actions are indicative of Gulf governments’ larger attempts to establish a powerful and sustainable presence in the world economy. As an example of the enormous economic strength of these companies, the study contains a comprehensive financial analysis of EMAAR, one of Dubai holding’s several subsidiaries, to demonstrate their size and domination.

This study examines the evolving trade interdependence between China and Middle Eastern countries through the lens of Global Value Chains (GVCs). The findings show distinct patterns of bilateral GVC dependence. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China’s GVC reliance on the Middle East has declined across most industries, with capital-intensive and medium-technology manufacturing remaining key areas of linkage. In contrast, the Middle East has seen a rise in its GVC dependence on China, especially in capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive sectors. After the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, these shifts accelerated: the region’s reliance on Chinese value-added exports expanded, while the decline in China’s dependence began to stabilise. These trends reflect the differentiated roles of the two sides within global production networks—China as a comprehensive manufacturing hub and the Middle East as an energy supplier and growing importer of Chinese industrial and technological goods.

As great power competition is escalating, institutional rivalries have emerged as a new lens for understanding interstate competition. Institutional rivalries are important components of the strategic rivalries between the US and China in West Asia due to the US zero-sum mentality. There are two types of institutional rivalries between the two powers: regional and global. In the context of multipolarity, the international institutional rivalries embedded in the US-China rivalry is a concrete manifestation of the power transition and the transformation of the international order, reflecting the US ambition for dominance over rules, norms, and agenda-setting in West Asia. In the face of Sino-US institutional rivalries, West Asian countries adhere to divergent policy orientations, featuring institutional bandwagoning, balancing, hedging, and distancing. Three factors contribute to the West Asian countries’ mixed responses: their international engagement with world affairs, political friendliness with the US and China, and their economic dependence on the two powers.