At the initial stage of the construction of monarchical states in medieval Europe, the main function of the supreme secular power was the administration of justice. The Church laid the ideological foundations for strengthening monarchical power: the sacred concept of justice combined with the ideas of theologians about special royal dignity as service for the common good. The "reception" of Roman law transformed the status of the monarch, turning him into a "debtor of justice." In this context, France was positioned by the ideologists of the monarchy as the "homeland of exemplary justice," which was considered a sign of the French Kingdom's chosenness. Why has justice become the main tool for strengthening monarchical power? The reason lies in the structure of medieval society: polycentrism in the 10th –12th centuries did not leave a vacuum of power, and the king acted like any lord. In this situation, in order to expand the competence of the supreme secular power, it needed to gain moral authority and to prove their advantages over other authorities with the same powers. This moral authority could be provided only by the king as the supreme judge, independent arbitrator, and peacemaker. The construction of a strong monarchical state was the result of the actions of kings, their judicial officials, and the support of the broad strata of society. The first milestone in this process was the establishment by Philippe II Auguste of bailiffs and seneschals, to whom it was possible to appeal against the verdicts of other courts in the domain. The second step on this path were the reforms of Saint Louis: the revision of 1247 and the right to complain about negligent officials; the ordinance of 1254 on the reform of morals, which legalized the presumption of being not guilty; the abolition of judicial duel, which allowed challenging any sentence; finally, the separation of Parliament from the Royal Curia as the supreme court of appeal of the kingdom. Lawyers and judicial officers have made a crucial contribution to strengthening monarchical power by taking cases away from other courts through reliance on law, loopholes in the laws, and references to the priority of mercy. These actions found a response in society, and were supported by all classes who benefited from the strengthening of the power of the King of France.

The article is devoted to the problem of the relationship between liberalism and democracy in France during the July Monarchy (1830–1848). The study focuses on the position of the French moderate Orleanist liberals, supporters of Louis-Philippe d'Orleans, who became the king of the French as a result of the July Revolution of 1830. Analyzing the works of such Orleanist leaders as F. Guizot, P.-P. Royer-Collard, and others, the author of the article considers how representative government and popular sovereignty, qualified democracy and universal suffrage – the key principles of the political regime of the July Monarchy, were related in France at that time. The article concludes that moderate Orleanist liberals professed the ideas of natural inequality of people, supported the qualified electoral system, and had a negative attitude towards the idea of popular sovereignty and democracy as the legitimization of the power of the majority. The Orleanists were supporters of the sovereignty of reason and justice, the bearers of which they considered to be representatives of the middle class. At the same time, the Orleanists deliberately interpreted the category of "middle class" very broadly, smoothing over the social contradictions that existed in society. Democracy as the power of the people, in their opinion, could only lead society to anarchy and dictatorship, as well as to the leveling of the merits of each individual. The Orleanists were supporters of a democracy with qualifications, strictly linking property and political rights. The author of the article concludes that the concept of the liberal Orleanists turned out to be elitist, while the ideas of democratization of the political system were popular in society. The unresolved issue of suffrage became fatal in many ways for the regime of the July Monarchy. At the same time, it was the Orleanists who prepared the ground for the further democratization of French society.

In February 1808 French troops arrived in Barcelona as allies of Spain. However, the goodwill and hospitality of the locals soon gave way to suspicion and then hatred of the French, which by the summer of that year had led to mass anti-French movements throughout Catalonia. The article focuses on the formation of anti-French resistance in Catalonia in 1808, the role of the religious factor in anti-French uprisings, and the specifics of the activities of irregular armed units – somatenes and miqueletes. Based on the texts of chronicles, reports, and memoirs of French and Spanish contemporaries, the author addresses the specifics of the perception of somatenes and miqueletes, as well as the assessment of their actions from the point of view of their compatriots and representatives of the enemy army. The text of the Catalan priest Raymundo Ferrer’s chronicle, reflects the Spanish view of the Catalan militias, which connected with the glorification of the somatenes and miqueletes. However, Ferrer’s chronicle does not fully reflect the problems of recruitment into the ranks of the militias, issues of discipline and desertion among the somatenes and miqueletes. The opposite assessment of the activities of the somatenes and miqueletes is reflected in French sources, which present the Catalan volunteers as armed bandits and robbers. An appeal to the phenomenon of the somatenes and miqueletes in the conditions of the Peninsular War of 1808-1814 shows that traditional types of armed detachments were successfully at the beginning of the war, but found themselves in a state of crisis in the conditions of prolonged military actions and the French occupation of Catalonia.

In the winter of 1813–1814, the allies of the anti-French coalition besieged Hamburg, which was defended by troops under the command of Marshal N. Davout. Napoleon attached great importance to this city at the mouth of the Elbe, and Davout stubbornly defended it, capitulating only after Napoleon's abdication. The siege placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population. After the end of the war, a discussion unfolded, with the figure of Napoleon's marshal at the center. Numerous, often anonymous, publications on this issue formed a large corpus of literature devoted to assessing his actions. However, the range of narrative sources on the history of besieged Hamburg is much broader than publications about the Marshal himself. The sources reflect a wide variety of aspects of the lives of the townspeople and the military. Not only the extensive range of written sources is noteworthy, but also the presence of a fairly significant layer of “women's literature” in it, which allows us to raise the question of the gender perception of the war. The sources at the researcher's disposal also contain material on the post-war problems of settling both material claims for damages incurred and reputational issues. They cover the processes of preparing Hamburg for the siege from the military, financial, food and medical sides, details of the evacuation of suburban residents and the subsequent forced expulsion of the poorest part of the city's inhabitants, describe the system of the French military-civil administration, the policy of requisitions in the city and the reaction to it. The authors left colorful pictures of the typhus epidemic that struck the city, the provision of hospitals, machinations in supplies by various officials, descriptions of life in the besieged city, the experiences of civilians and soldiers, their fears and hopes, relationships, perception of life and death. The sources considered often have a frankly subjective, polemical nature: feelings and emotions overwhelm them. But this is precisely what allows researchers to study the human dimension of war, giving military history an anthropological bias.

The year 1793 was a difficult one for France as a whole and for many departments in particular. Corsica was no exception: that year became a turning point, when a decision about which path the island would take had to be made. However, Corsica was pushed to make this choice by Paris. It was in 1793 that the Convention declared Corsica rebellious and blamed General Pascal Paoli for it. After the Sardinian expedition, unsuccessful for the republicans, events unfolded very rapidly. The Corsican position was greatly influenced by the «party spirit», as sources call the clan system that had existed throughout virtually Corsica’s entire history. During the first half of 1793, Corsican society was divided. Some sought to prove their loyalty to the Republic, their desire to «be French», while others chose to pursue independence. Ultimately, the proximity of a British squadron cruising at sea, motives of personal vendetta, the Convention’s misunderstanding and its reluctance to delve into the conflict – all this resulted in a confrontation between the Corsicans and the Republic. Corsica’s principal leaders were declared enemies of France. From then on, the Corsicans had to find their own way out of the crisis to prevent the island from plunging into civil war. Based on published and archival sources, the author shows that the Convention itself, unwilling to consider local nuances, effectively pushed Corsica toward its much-vaunted independence, which only worsened the situation on the island.

The author of the article analyzes the latest monograph by the British historian Colin Jones, «The Fall of Robespierre: 24 Hours in Paris During the French Revolution» published in 2025 in Russian. Based on a wide range of archival documents, Jones tells by the hour and even by the minute about what was happening simultaneously in different parts of Paris with different people on 9 Thermidor, which gives his study not only a cinematic quality, but also a character of genuine drama. If most of his predecessors who wrote about 9 Thermidor were attracted, first of all, by the collision that took place at the morning session of the Convention, which ended with the arrest of the Robespierrists, then the British historian focuses his attention on the subsequent multidirectional mass movement, which contemporaries called the «revolution of 9 Thermidor». As the author of the article notes, Jones's detailed analysis of how the Paris Commune organized the uprising in defense of the Robespierrists highlights in general some characteristic features of the mechanism of this kind of urban movement – the so-called journées, which occurred repeatedly during the French Revolution.

This article addresses the history of French participation in the defence of Constantinople besieged by the Ottomans. In 1399, responding to the request of Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos for military assistance, King Charles VI of France sent a detachment of knights under the command of Marshal of France Jean II le Meingre, nicknamed Boucicaut, to the Byzantine capital. In Constantinople, the Marshal chose offensive tactics and made a series of naval raids against the Ottoman territories. However, he failed to solve the strategic task of lifting the siege of the city. He advised the Emperor to go personally to France for negotiations with Charles VI concerning additional military and financial resources. Boucicaut also contributed to ending the dynastic strife between Manuel II and his nephew John VII. The author of the article draws attention to the title “Grand Constable of the Emperor and of the Empire of Constantinople” in the epitaph on the tomb of Boucicaut and suggests that it was a French adoption of the Greek rank of grand domestic. According to the author of the article, the Byzantine Emperor elevated the Marshal to this rank when assigning him to command the joint forces of the Greeks and Latins.

In a book published in 2022, dedicated to the events of 1799 in the southern Italian region of Terra di Bari, author Giuseppe Di Matteo analyzes the region's socioeconomic, political, and cultural characteristics, reconstructs the events that unfolded there after the French invasion of Naples and the establishment of the Parthenopean Republic. He attempts to answer the question of why some cities in Terra di Bari sided with the Republic, while others opposed republican ideas, leading to counterrevolutionary uprisings. Seeking to understand the reasons for the different attitudes toward republican authority within a single, relatively small region, he examines several cities, attempting to identify their specific characteristics. As a result of his research, Di Matteo comes to the conclusion that a significant role in the population's uneven attitudes towards the Republic was played not only by the diversity of the social and cultural landscape, the characteristics of local authorities, and the level of economic development of each city, but also by random factors - family disputes, internecine strife, and centuries-old conflicts between social groups that had long been at odds with each other and which flared up again with renewed vigor during the days of the Parthenopean Republic.

The personality of M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, the victor over Napoleon in 1812, has caused and continues to cause heated debate for over 200 years. The new biography of M. I. Kutuzov, proposed by A. G. Vlasenko and based on an extensive set of documents, many of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time, is intended to sum up some of these debates. The author's focus was primarily on the history of two wars - 1805 and 1812, and the personalities of two commanders - Kutuzov and Napoleon. Consistently revealing the course of the 1805 campaign, A. G. Vlasenko questioned a number of established stereotypes regarding the Battle of Schöngraben, the position of Alexander I and the position of M. I. Kutuzov regarding the readiness of both to go to the general battle of Austerlitz, and the nature of Napoleon's planning of actions during this battle. Overall, the events of 1805 played a major role in how Alexander I and M.I. Kutuzov would act in 1812. At the same time, the events of the 1812 campaign are also presented in a debatable manner, which, in turn, give rise to the controversy of a number of the author's statements – about the reasons for Napoleon's movement to Smolensk along the southern bank of the Dnieper, the purposes of the construction of the Shevardino redoubt by the Russians, the nature of the assessments of the disposition of Russian troops at Borodino, the actions of M. I. Kutuzov during his contacts with J. A. B. Lauriston and, in particular, explaining the actions of the opponents during the battles on the Berezina. The idealization of the personality and actions of M. I. Kutuzov, initially set by the author, is striking, due to which the genius of Napoleon by definition pales in comparison with the greatness of the merits of the Russian military leader. In general, the work of A. G. Vlasenko will become a noticeable stage in understanding the key events of the era of the Napoleonic wars, the role of Russia and, above all, M. I. Kutuzov in the final outcome of the great confrontation at the turn of the 18th–19th centuries.

In their monograph "Terror. Demons of the French Revolution" Michel Biard and Marisa Linton offer a new understanding of one of the most controversial phenomena of the French Revolution - the Terror. They aim to prove that the Terror did not have a clear chronology, was not carried out according to a pre-planned plan and, ultimately, was not a "system" as many historians believe: this concept was invented by Thermidorian propaganda. The book touches on a wide range of issues directly or indirectly related to the Terror: it analyzes in detail the historiographical disputes both about the essence of the phenomenon itself and its chronology, touches on the connection between Terror and various concepts of the Enlightenment, studies the use of the word "terreur" under the Ancien Régime and in the early years of the Revolution. The authors reconstruct the logic of the creation and development of emergency institutions of power and emergency justice bodies, tell in detail about the history of the transfer of the actual governance of the country into the hands of the committees of the Convention and the activities of representatives of the people in missions, the political struggle in the National Convention.