Pendidikan inklusif memiliki peran penting dalam menanamkan nilai-nilai sosial seperti empati, solidaritas, dan kepedulian terhadap sesama. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis implementasi pendidikan nilai solidaritas sosial melalui kegiatan Edukasi Inklusi dan Difabel (EKSKLUSIF) yang diselenggarakan oleh UKM F Literasi Pendidikan di SLB Negeri Pekalongan, serta dampaknya terhadap pembentukan karakter sosial peserta didik berkebutuhan khusus. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah kualitatif deskriptif dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui observasi, wawancara mendalam, dan dokumentasi. Analisis data dilakukan menggunakan model Miles dan Huberman, meliputi reduksi data, penyajian data, dan penarikan kesimpulan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kegiatan EKSKLUSIF efektif menanamkan nilai-nilai solidaritas sosial melalui interaksi kolaboratif antara mahasiswa dan siswa, mencakup empati, kepedulian sosial, gotong royong, dan kesetaraan. Implementasi nilai-nilai tersebut tercermin dalam setiap tahap kegiatan, mulai dari ice breaking, pengenalan materi, praktik menanam, hingga sesi refleksi, sehingga memberikan pengalaman belajar yang kontekstual dan aplikatif. Kegiatan ini mencerminkan prinsip solidaritas organik Émile Durkheim, di mana perbedaan peran dan kemampuan peserta saling melengkapi untuk membangun kohesi sosial. Dampak kegiatan dirasakan oleh siswa melalui peningkatan rasa percaya diri, penerimaan, dan kebersamaan, serta bagi mahasiswa melalui peningkatan kesadaran sosial, moral, dan kemampuan membangun lingkungan inklusif. Penelitian ini merekomendasikan pengembangan pendidikan nilai solidaritas sosial berbasis praktik dan interaksi langsung sebagai model pendidikan karakter inklusif yang efektif.

Abstract According to the Permissive View, it is rationally permissible for a person’s preferences to be both future-biased about pleasant experiences and temporally neutral about achievements. Some philosophers argue that, intuitive though it may be, the Permissive View can’t be right because it runs afoul of a plausible requirement for rationality: namely, that it is rationally impermissible to form one’s preferences by moving back and forth between different evaluative perspectives. Samuel Scheffler has recently attempted to show that this requirement is in fact compatible with the Permissive View. This paper casts doubt on Scheffler’s attempt. I argue that Scheffler either fails to reconcile the Permissive View with the requirement for evaluative consistency or commits himself to unacceptably counterintuitive claims.

Abstract In this article, I begin to develop an account of bodily trespass – a specification of the conditions under which one person infringes another’s right against bodily interference. I first offer a minimal account, intended to capture only the clear cases of bodily trespass. On this account, bodily trespass consists in either bodily touching or significant, non-psychologically-mediated bodily alteration. I then consider whether this account should be broadened to accommodate some plausible, though non-obvious, cases of bodily trespass. These are cases in which a bodily alteration is produced via psychological processes in the target. I argue that, in deciding whether to accommodate such cases within our account, we face a dilemma, and one of considerable practical significance.

Abstract There are well-known puzzles that arise when contrary-to-duty obligations are subjected to modus ponens. But there is another puzzling feature of these obligations that has not received any attention – they do not entail contrary-to-duty permissions. I aim to bring this puzzle under the spotlight by demonstrating its generality and depth, showing that the most natural ways of deflating it are unsatisfying, and indicating its relevance to theorizing about the semantics of the deontic terms.