The present conceptual paper addresses selected issues concerning the emergent pluridisciplinary research topic on survivals—an essential part of the phenomenon of nomostasis—with particular emphasis on its theoretical underpinnings and methodological implications. It argues that the concept of a “legal survival” should be understood as a legal form (a legal institution, i.e. a set of functionally interconnected legal norms, a legal concept, a legal principle, or a legal rule) which had emerged in an earlier socio-economic, political or ideological-cultural context, and had had a specific function within that context but did not disappear despite a profound change of that context. A systemic transformation, such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, from capitalism to state socialism, or back to capitalism, is a paradigmatic example of such a profound change of context, though not the only possible one. The paper addresses the ontology of legal survivals, drawing attention to the distinction between written law and legal practice, and formulates three tentative propositions concerning the theory of legal survivals: (1) the law of juristic inertia, which emphasises that lawyers tend to use old forms to express new content; (2) the law of functional adaptation of legal forms, which emphasises that old legal forms may be used to fulfil entirely new social functions; and (3) the law of decontextualisation of legal form, which emphasises that law oftentimes becomes entirely detached from its changing social context, even to the extent of becoming an irritant. Finally, the paper addresses the question of the methodology of studying legal survivals, arguing that it calls for a broadly inclusive pluridisciplinary approach, uniting the methods typical of legal history, comparative law, sociology of law and legal anthropology, with an overarching role for legal theory and the philosophy of law.

A common claim in tort scholarship has been to argue that, generally, there is no place for distributive justice or charity considerations in tort law. This article discusses this claim. It is first shown that the thesis according to which there is no place for distributive justice considerations in tort law is doubtful. It is then argued that tort adjudication is a form of distributive justice, utilizing the framework of tort adjudication as a means of distributing justice between the parties. And finally, the example of the reduction of damages rule (art. 10:401 PETL) will be analyzed as an illustration of the thesis about tort adjudication.

This article explores the ontological foundations of legal personhood in light of contemporary philosophical challenges to the human–nonhuman divide. Drawing on Bruno Latour’s theory of quasi-objects and Guido Sprenger’s animist notion of fluid personhood, it examines how shifting metaphysical assumptions may reshape legal personhood. The article argues that legal theory should move beyond fixed, anthropocentric categories and engage in a deeper negotiation of who – or what – counts in law.

The paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of neurorights, morphological freedom based on the concept of body ownership and boundless freedom for selfdetermination, including cyborgs. The origins of modern transhumanism (Huxley, Bostrom, More) can be found in Renaissance humanism with an explicit reference to the concept of dignity and freedom in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. By analyzing Pico’s work De dignitate hominis we find a misinterpretation. Posthumanism warns against the loss of human dignity and points to its widespread instrumentalization, which could be a subsequent risk of bodily improvements (Ferrando, Braidotti). Even the Renaissance addressed the question of man’s position in relation to nature and animals, the so-called scala naturae. The concept of divine nature is a manifestation of Pantheism in Neoplatonism and is not materialist (Böhme, Comenius, Ficino). Can ego-centrality be a reason for the limitation of morphological freedom, i.e. for the limits of the right to bodily integrity? So far, transhumanist enhancements take place within the framework of the right to bodily integrity and freedom to deal with one’s body, i.e. the autonomous space of the individual, closely related to the right to direct one’s life towards personal happiness. If human rights and their basis are more moral in nature, this can accept the use of proportionality to measure rights, principles, values and interests in law also taking into account environmental protection and the rights of marginalized entities, including non-human rights (Balzer, Rippe, Schaber).

In his book Hegel in a Wired Brain, Slavoj Žižek uses the approach of G.W.F. Hegel because he considers that this approach can be used to describe the reality of people immersed in technology, but above all to analyze the situation of connecting people and computers into one network. Simultaneously, the interpretations of Hegel’s concepts presented by Žižek must be considered plausible. For instance, the Slovenian philosopher correctly understood Hegel’s concept of abolition: Aufhebung. Žižek asks a fundamental question, namely how the phenomenon of the “wired brain” can affect the human experience and the status of human beings as free individuals. Žižek also considers the socio-political implications of connecting brains, which is written about by transhumanists such as Ray Kurzweil and Elon Musk. He ponders how this new situation may affect power relations and forms of freedom. Žižek uses Hegel’s critique of J.G. Fichte’s concept of the “police state” to undermine Kurzweil’s and Musk’s positions. The problem analyzed in the article is whether Žižek’s Hegelian analyses contribute something fresh to the understanding of freedom and human dignity on the ground of contemporary philosophy of law. The author emphasizes that Žižek’s analyses human exceptionality are particularly interesting from the point of view of the philosophy of law.

During the (post-)COVID period, states rendered several restrictions of fundamental rights justified by the overarching interest in the protection of human life and public health. Among others, mandatory vaccination may be ordered by the employer, which imposes a clear limitation on employees’ rights to free conscience, self-determination, free occupation, and the right to work. Moreover, in several countries, the decision was vested in the employer for termination or suspension. In a public health emergency, strong arguments support the implementation and extension of mandatory vaccination requirements as well as further extraordinary steps, such as unprecedented allocation of competences, may be reasonable. Some countries opted for mandatory vaccination in healthcare institutions as either a condition of employment or a precondition for entering the institutions. In these cases, however, mainly states had to balance the colliding fundamental rights in order to determine an exact conclusion. On the contrary, involving private stakeholders (employers) in determining the scope of the mandatory vaccination requirement may overstep the lawfully increased margin of manoeuvre of state authorities during a public health emergency. Several states allowed mandatory vaccination in the private workplace on very differentiated grounds. Based on the comparison of three models constituted by Canada, Hungary, and Poland, our research outcome provides a proposed system of criteria for states to determine under which circumstances and under which limitations private employers may be authorized with the power of balancing fundamental rights, especially regarding mandatory vaccination.

Promoted as an attractive country for digital nomads (ranked on the 3rd place in the Digital Nomad Index1), Romania adopted the Law no. 69 of 29 March 2023, which brought changes to the tax regime for digital nomads. According to the new provisions, the so-called “digital nomads” are exempt from income tax and compulsory social contributions (health and pension contributions) for a limited timeframe. This article examines, exclusively from the income tax perspective, the features of digital nomads to which the tax provisions apply and the conditions under which the income tax exemption applies.

The concept of ‘dignity’ at the base of Human Rights has been criticized, paradoxically, for a humiliating treatment of the ‘Other’ that disregards, for example, the embeddedness of individuals within communities. In response, I argue for considering dignity as a plural and relational concept, introducing contemporary peace and conflict research into legal philosophy. Besides the established approaches linked usually to values like ‘justice’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’, this article addresses a ‘concordial’ perspective that needs to be recovered and put in relation to prevailing discourses on ‘dignity’. This ‘concordial’ dignity, as I show, is oriented by different guiding principles like community, non-duality, processuality, systemic embeddedness, dynamic balance, harmony and fertility. While these principles have been often connected to so-called indigenous or ‘Eastern’ philosophies, these are central (and neglected) elements also at the core of ‘Western’ philosophy. Exemplarily, I inquire a key historical source for the concept of dignity in contemporary human rights philosophy: Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio on the Dignity of Man.

This article examines the evolving relationship between the human body and digital data, particularly in light of technological advancements that blur the distinction between physical and digital identities. The research explores the implications of this transformation for legal frameworks, questioning whether current data protection laws sufficiently safeguard personal integrity and identity in the digital age. This study emphasises the limitations of existing regulations, which primarily focus on personal data rather than the broader concept of individual identity. A central argument is that the right to informational self-determination discussed in the scientific literature and recognized in German legal practice should play a critical role in ensuring autonomy and personal identity protection. The discussion also highlights the necessity of developing more effective legal mechanisms to safeguard digital identities against technological vulnerabilities, unauthorised profiling, and market-driven commodification of personal data. This study ultimately calls for a reconsideration of legal concepts such as bodily integrity, informational self-determination, and digital sovereignty, advocating for a more comprehensive legal approach to the protection of individuals in the digital sphere. This document argues that the existing legal framework inadequately protects new forms of identity in the digital environment, especially with regard to information self-determination and digital embodiment. By exploring the changing boundaries of the human body in technological and digital contexts, this article aims to promote clearer recognition of digital identity rights within legal systems.