Many photographs take persons as their primary subjects, and people often feel wronged by the creation, handling, or dissemination of their photographic image. Yet many dismiss these claims of purported wrongdoing or are quite conservative in their estimations of when photographs can wrong their subjects. In this article, I offer an account of a fundamental photographic wrong that I call nonconsensual photographic front incursion. I argue that this wrong is grounded in the status of persons as self-presenters and in the status of photographs as natural symbols and souvenirs. Photographic front incursions are one type of photographic wrong; they are important both because of their ubiquity and because they are difficult to capture within existing normative frameworks. Acknowledging the existence of photographic front incursions is, according to my argument, to acknowledge the importance of two things that analytic philosophers have tended to downplay: the relevance of persons’ bodies and personas to their moral agency and the status of photographs as natural symbols.

In this article, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, and this obligation can be defeated only when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom.

Throughout the Anglo-American legal world, the state claims an authority, termed parens patriae, to exert control over the lives of nonautonomous persons in ways it does not presume to control autonomous persons. Philosophers have given little attention to when and how that authority should be exercised, yet there is disagreement or confusion about this among courts and legal scholars. This article examines how parens patriae differs from other government roles, identifies which conceptions of the parens patriae role are coherent, and then presents a normative case for adopting a conception of the role as that of fiduciary for nonautonomous individuals, subject to a duty of undivided loyalty. The implications of adopting this conception are dramatic.

This paper refines and defends the grassroots demand of reallocating powers and responsibilities from police to other institutions: what I call the unbundling proposal. I begin by presenting the proposal and specifying what sorts of roles and responsibilities proponents argue should be allocated from police to other institutions. I then advance a series of arguments for why we should unbundle policing. The first two draw on straightforward principles of institutional design, claiming that we should reallocate responsibilities from police to other institutions because (1) institutions with violent capacities should have narrow mandates, and (2) unbundling induces a better distribution of epistemic labor between institutions and fosters higher quality expertise. I then argue that policing institutions should be unbundled because they disproportionately burden marginalized people and perpetuate racial structural injustice. There, I advance some general principles about what is required when institutions undermine social justice, suggesting that in this case and others, we ought to turn to extra-institutional, reallocative measures. I close by addressing a series of objections to unbundling, including the concerns that (i1crime would increase, (2) nonpolice institutions would replicate the problems with existing policing regimes, and (3) unbundling is unfeasible in places with high rates of gun violence (like the United States).

Guy Crain alleges three shortcomings of the trolley method of moral philosophy: (1) trolley cases fail to model real-world decision-making; (2) trolley cases tend to foreground high-stakes decisions, which makes them a poor tool for analyzing the ethical decisions most people routinely face; and (3) trolley cases tend to present their agents as anonymous blanks, which invites readers to fill in the blanks in problematic ways. In reply, we argue that Crain mischaracterizes the trolley method by neglecting a key feature of trolley cases: they have the goal of shaping specific audience beliefs in specific ways. The shortcomings Crain alleges are not shortcomings of trolley cases deployed in standard belief-shaping ways.

This paper presents two arguments against the compensation thesis—the proposition that an agent who infringes on another’s moral claim right acquires a remedial duty to compensate the latter for any costs imposed by the infringement. First, it argues that rejecting the compensation thesis is the best way to resolve a trilemma that arises in cases where an agent blamelessly infringes on another’s claim. Second, the paper argues that the thesis is incompatible with (a plausible interpretation of) luck egalitarianism. Thus, those who accept the thesis will find their position yoked to the controversial rejection of (a plausible interpretation of) an influential theory of distributive justice. Finally, the paper considers and rejects six quick arguments in favor of accepting the compensation thesis.

Alex Gregory argues that disabilities are best understood as particular kinds of inabilities. They should be determined relative to what are the statistically most common bodily features and ability levels in a reference class. The inability theory ties in with two aspects of how we commonly use the term ‘disability’ in everyday life and therefore appears attractively simple and intuitive. These are the ideas that disability is about a limitation of abilities and that it is a deviation from the typical or normal. In this article, I acknowledge that the inability theory is a good starting point for thinking about disability, but I then present two objections that should motivate us to continue our search for an adequate disability account. First, I show that the inability theory still faces a number of over- and underinclusiveness objections. These objections point us to features of the inability theory that make it significantly more difficult to arrive at clear, justified, and—in terms of our classification practice— convincing judgements about specific cases. Second, and more fundamentally, I show that key features of the theory are motivated solely by the consideration that a theory with these features is in line with our intuitive disability classifications. I argue that this kind of consideration should not play such a central role in shaping and justifying a theory of disability, even by Gregory’s own standards.

Perspectivism is the view that what an agent ought to do always needs to be determined relative to this agent’s epistemic position. Despite its many virtues, this theory appears crucially flawed in its inability to properly account for the existence of universal claim rights. This article draws out this incompatibility through a set of plausible and widely accepted conceptual claims. It then discusses options available to the perspectivist in reaction to this problem. A wholesale denial of universal rights is rejected and a different approach suggested. Perspectivists should reconceptualize the notion of obligation that is correlative to rights and should conceive of obligations as only prima facie normative, which means that obligations can fail to give any normative reasons under certain circumstances. Such a move might first appear radical. However, this article shows that a prima facie view still manages to retain some of the most important conceptual features of rights