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Artistic Creation is Artistic Research: Substantiation through a Bimodal Framework

by

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Abstract

The primary objective of this dissertation is to disentangle and arrange a number of issues particular to the sphere of activity designated as artistic research. A bimodal conception of artistic research is proposed as a framework by which confusions in the discourse and in applications of artistic research may be avoided or resolved.

Mode one indicates that artistic creation is in most instances *ipso facto* artistic research. A philosophical substantiation is offered for the claim. In brief, a work of art is considered to be a state of affairs, to use Wittgenstein's terminology, of the artistic kind. The creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs are claimed to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for artistic research to occur. A state of affairs of the artistic kind provides the artistic component of artistic research; however, the state of affairs in and of itself does not normally convey propositional belief, and therefore does not satisfy the condition of research in artistic research. For artistic research to take place, propositional belief about the state of affairs of the artistic kind must be formulated. The site of the initiation of the research component of artistic research is thus located. In normal artistic practices, the class of activities commonly seen as art and the class of activities commonly seen as research exhibit significant class overlap and are inseparably intertwined in the vast majority of artistic creations.

Mode two indicates delimited forms of artistic research. Mode two artistic research does not accept that the conditions of mode one are sufficient for artistic research and subsequently

requires further epistemic justification or criteria. The further justification or criteria delimits the form of artistic research, usually within particular contexts for particular purposes.

Clarity in the discourse of artistic research is promoted when the modes are clearly differentiated, when their purposes are stated, and when the underlying presuppositions held by their proponents are revealed.

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Laurel Smith made it all happen.

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Definitions of Terms Used in this Dissertation

Art: Anything that a person designates as art (per a designation definition).

Artistic Creation: The creation of a work of art. Considered to include the designation of a thing as art.

Bimodal: Having two forms.

Designation Definition of Art: Anything that is designated to be art is art, if only for the person designating the thing as art.

Domain: A sphere of knowledge or activity based upon a conceptualization, in which relationships are found among the concepts, objects, and other entities.

Formulate: To express in a concise form.

Knowledge: True belief.

Methods: "Techniques for gathering evidence" (Harding, 1987, p. 2).

Methodology: A "discipline concerned with studying the methods employed in carrying out some form of enquiry" (Hammersley, 2011, p. 32).

Mode: A type or form of something.

Mode One Artistic Research: Artistic creation is artistic research.

Mode Two Artistic Research: Delimited forms of artistic research.

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions: "A necessary condition *N* is something that must occur if *E* is to occur. A sufficient condition *S* is something such that if it occurs, then so will *E"* (Fox, 2004, p. 1). "A sufficient condition for something occurring will be regimented as the

antecedent in a conditional. A necessary condition of something occurring will be regimented at a consequent in a conditional" (Fox, 2004, p. 3).

Practice: "A term that legitimately describes modern working methods, referring to the system of testing theory through practical activity. If that is too problematic, then its use as a verb, simply describing activity, is equally justified" (Quaintance, 2012, p. 12).

Presupposition: Background assumption, often not the result of a conscious choice.

Propositional Belief: The believing something about the thing (Audi, 2011). The belief *that*, as opposed to belief *of* a thing. Propositional belief often takes the form of a proposition but it may take other forms, such as questions, that arguably rely upon propositional belief.

Quality: Superiority or with respect to excellence.

Research: "*The intentionally controlled examination of issues [within and related to the domain]…through a process of inquiry that leads to the production of (provisional) knowledge both about the objects of the inquiry and the means of carrying out that inquiry*" [italics in original] (Hatch & Shiu, 1998, p. 313).

Scientific Method: The reliance upon and use of criteria as well as the criteria themselves that claim "the view provided by science is one achieved by reliance upon non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for developing, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make up the view" (Longino, 1990, p. 62). A hypothetico-deductive model.

Scientism: "The belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning—much the most valuable part because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial. Other beliefs related to this one may also be regarded as scientistic, e.g., the belief that science is the only valuable part of human learning, or the view that it is always

good for subjects that do not belong to science to be placed on a scientific footing" (Sorell, 1994, p. 1).

Sorites Paradox: "Little-by-little arguments, which arise as a result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the predicates involved. For example, the concept of a heap appears to lack sharp boundaries and, as a consequence of the subsequent indeterminacy surrounding the extension of the predicate 'is a heap', no one grain of wheat can be identified as making the difference between being a heap and not being a heap" (Hyde, 2014, para. 1).

Validity: The state of being well-founded and justifiable.

Quotations

"Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing how things are" (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1953/2009, §79, p. 42).

“Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement” (Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 1969/1998, 378, p. 49).

“Thinking philosophically, whatever else it means, means constantly revising one’s starting point in the light of one’s conclusions and never allowing oneself to be controlled by any cast-iron rule whatever” (Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, 1933, p. 53).

“Research is not the privilege of people who know—on the contrary, it is the domain of people who do not know. Every time we are turning our attention to something we don’t know we are doing research” (Filliou, *Filliou: From Political to Poetical Economy*, 1996, p. 82).

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Artistic creation is in most instances *ipso facto* artistic research. In this dissertation, I will attempt to substantiate that claim, and thereby provide an original contribution to the discourse regarding artist research. In doing so, I will disentangle and arrange a number of issues particular to the relationship among the concepts, objects, and other entities within the sphere of activity designated as artistic research. A bimodal conception of artistic research is proposed as a framework by which confusions in both the discourse and the applications of artistic research may be avoided or resolved.

Mode one indicates that artistic creation is artistic research. A philosophical substantiation is offered for the claim. My thesis in brief is that the creation of a state of affairs, to use Wittgenstein's terminology, of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs are claimed to be necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for artistic research to occur. A state of affairs of the artistic kind provides the artistic component of artistic research; however, the state of affairs in and of itself does not normally convey knowledge, and therefore does not satisfy the condition of research in artistic research. For artistic research to take place, propositional belief about the state of affairs of the artistic kind must be formulated. The site of the initiation of the research component of artistic research is thus located. In normal artistic practices, the class of activities commonly seen as art and the class of activities commonly seen as research exhibit significant class overlap and are in the vast majority of artistic practices inseparably intertwined.

Mode two indicates delimited forms of artistic research. Mode two artistic research does not accept that the conditions of mode one are sufficient for artistic research and therefore requires further epistemic justification or criteria. The further justification or criteria delimits the form of artistic research, usually within particular contexts for particular purposes.

The substantiation of my claim that artistic creation is in most instances *ipso facto* artistic research progresses by way of the following premises:

a) The domain "artistic research" is a useful designation of a compound concept in which the individual concepts art and research are meaningfully conjoined. In using the word "domain," I mean a sphere of knowledge and activities based upon a conceptualization, in which relationships are found among the concepts, objects, and other entities.

b) As a compound concept, artistic research is reliant upon a definition of art. A designation definition is accepted in which a thing may be art if it is designated as art; consequently, no further necessary and sufficient conditions are needed for a thing to be art.

c) Art is a combination of facts that may be called a state of affairs of the artistic kind.

d) Propositional belief may be formulated about art.

e) The creation of art and the formulation of propositional belief about art may be separated.

f) The formulation of propositional belief about art is the initiation of artistic research.

g) Knowledge is generated through the formulation of propositional belief. Knowledge for the purposes of this thesis is defined as true belief.

h) The designation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs together require no further epistemic justification

for artistic research to occur. Further epistemic justification may be considered appropriate in relation to specific contexts and purposes. This further epistemic justification most often delimits artistic research.

h) Consequently, artistic research exhibits bimodality. The modes are:

1) artistic creation as identical to artistic research;

2) artistic research as delimited.

I was motivated to undertake this research primarily by a reflection upon my lived experience as an artist, in which there was no question that my creative practice was artistic research. I found, surprisingly, that the literature surrounding artistic research exhibited a good deal of confusion and disagreement on the viewpoint that artistic creation was by its own nature artistic research. I tasked myself with a search for clarity on this issue, and quickly recognized, given the many viewpoints of authors, that providing clarity would require the two steps of disentangling and arranging, to borrow the phrase of philosopher Robin Collingwood in his book *An Essay on Metaphysics*. As I researched, I discovered no in-depth substantiation for the claim that artistic creation is artistic research. Providing the substantiation became my first goal, which eventually led to the conception of artistic research as bimodal.

In developing my argument, I have cited numerous authors who have written specifically about artistic research; they are are identified by their last name only. Their writing is intended to augment my views and the literature review of their works is interwoven throughout the dissertation. A few preeminent philosophers have written works that proved particularly instrumental to my research. As a group, these works have provided me with both a language for and a buttressing of my claims.

Philosopher and historian, Robin Collingwood held a deep interest in art and aesthetics, but it was his philosophical writings that I found most useful. In *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, Collingwood considered philosophy as a domain in which differing classes might overlap and yet continue to remain of interest separately. He provided the example of a song, as a single entity, but which was simultaneously two separate entities, those of poetry and music. This idea was important to me as I conceptualized artistic research as a class of entities and activities not adequately contained singly within the class of either art or research. Collingwood's *An Essay on Metaphysics* provided me with a language and model by which the presuppositions held by authors that shaped their conceptualizations of artistic research might be investigated.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussions of visual art, and in particular his explication of propositions and states of affairs, primarily in his *Philosophical Investigations* (the paragraphs of which will be indicated by their section symbol numbers "§") and his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (the paragraphs of which will be indicated by their decimal numbers), contributed to the development of my own views. I considered that works of art could be states of affairs, and that propositional belief could be formulated in relation to those states of affairs. In turn, I concluded that these two activities could be decoupled. This allowed me to locate the site of artistic research.

I have relied upon the epistemological work of two authors as support for my views regarding knowledge in artistic research. Lorenzo Peña, Research Professor at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas in Madrid, propounded the argument that knowledge is simply true belief, as opposed to justified true belief, as Plato has Socrates earlier investigate in the *Theaetetus* (Plato, trans. 2013). For a more detailed investigation into perception, belief, and

types of justification of knowledge, the book *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* by Robert Audi, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, was particularly useful.

When artistic creation is not accepted as artistic research, further justification or criteria is said to be required to allow artistic creation to be artistic research. One of the most common additional justifications is that artistic research utilize scientific method. Therefore, I found it pertinent to incorporate the arguments against the universal applicability of methods by philosopher Paul Feyerabend in his book titled *Against Method.*

No author in the literature surrounding artistic research stands out as requiring a singular rebuttal, mainly because authors who write about artistic research are generally supportive of artistic research and their criticisms are for the most part circumstantial and idiosyncratic. However, particular themes of criticism are recurrent and it is these to which I take opposing positions. Two main themes deserving counterarguments include the view that there exist necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee a thing is art, which in turn affects conceptualizations of artistic research, and the presupposition of scientism, which in turn results in proposals that the methods and approaches of science are appropriate for artistic research. Both views are mistaken. Necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee a thing is a work of art will not be found. In a similar manner, the methods and approaches of science will not adequately contain or reveal all that is knowable or important in artistic research.

Two of the most trenchant critiques of artistic research as a domain are offered by D.C. Phillips, Professor Emeritus at Stanford University and by Griselda Pollock, Professor of the Social and Critical Histories of Art at the University of Leeds. Phillips and I hold differing

definitions of both research and knowledge and so our views of artistic research are at odds. Both Phillips and Pollock appear to presuppose scientism as the authority to which arguments about art and artistic research may be appealed. In chapter 2.3 *Artistic Research as a Domain*, I analyze their critiques with specificity.

Finally, due to the complex nature of my undertaking, and for the fact that much of my claim involves specificity in definitions, a significant amount of preliminary background and definitions will first be necessary to provide a foundation for my main claim and for the substantiation of my claim. It should also be noted that this dissertation has educational importance for learners and facilitators of learning at every level of engagement, both inside and outside of formal learning environments, for the fact that as individuals undertake artistic creation they also undertake artistic research.

1.2 Methodology

This is a qualitative study essentially in the form of an extended philosophical argument, based on the literature surrounding artistic research. I chose to undertake a qualitative study because it was suited to the process by which I analyzed the literature and past research, considered broad questions, and identified and evaluated themes. Artistic research is a complex of interrelationships among art, practice, research, artifact, knowledge, and knowledge transmission that exists in relation to established networks of art and research. Thus, in undertaking this research, I did not know at the outset which variables would prove to be most significant in reaching a focused research question.

My initial goal was to gain an expert perspective on nearly 30 years of literature that introduced and investigated artistic research. I compared and contrasted findings, a research method for inductive knowledge acquisition commonly utilized by the humanities for their resultant analytical dissertations in which data is considered to be source literature (Creswell, 2009), and which simultaneously undertook "thematic exploration" (O'Leary, 2004, p. 99). These methods allowed me to identify the primary themes in the literature. In order to make better sense of the themes, I set up two systems of organization. I identified and correlated themes, and then winnowed the themes to those which I considered to be most important. Simultaneously, I reviewed the literature chronologically as the means to identify general thematic changes over time as more became written about the domain. As a highly visual learner, I also found it useful to create numerous visual diagrams and concept maps as a means to examine both the content of my research and the direction of my analyses.

I also drew upon a reflexive methodology, which according to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) involves the formation of concept categories that is often a step in a larger process in which a core category or central concept is identified, around which other categories revolve. They viewed a core category as central, it appeared frequently in the data, it related to other categories, and it had clear implications for theory development. In reviewing the literature, I looked for a single core thematic category that might provide me with a concise research question. Instead, I discovered that two concepts, that I positioned as questions, around which most discussions revolved. These were: a) whether and how art or artistic creation could generate valid knowledge, and b) whether further epistemic justification was needed for a artistic creation to be considered artistic research.

My artistic practice encompasses both visual art and creative writing. As a member of artistic, research, and educational communities, I engage in and with artistic research on a daily basis. My familiarity with the topic has allowed me to read *through* and to contextualize various arguments found in the literature. Early on in my considerations of the subject, I decided to exclude an autoethnographic approach from this dissertation. The questions I posed and wanted to answer and the examination of presuppositions about art and research held by authors in the literature would not particularly benefit from examples of my art practice.

The seeking of answers to questions raised by my research demonstrated the need to involve both the domains of art and philosophy. It was as though my research had proven out Wittgenstein's later thought in *Culture and Value* (1977): "There is a queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation...and an aesthetic one" (p. 25). Superficially, it might seem that I would have looked to art theorists rather than philosophers to support my views. However, in discussing the various functions of works of art, art theorists generally propound rather than interrogate their individually held presuppositions. On the other hand, philosophers normally question presuppositions and I therefore found their considerations of topics that I was researching to be the most useful.

I should also note that while I have chosen to illustrate my ideas with examples from visual art, the claims that I make in this dissertation are not discipline specific. It would have been equally effective to do so with examples from another artistic discipline.

1.3 Rationale and Significance

My research began with the recognition that artistic research was a complex of interrelated issues that required a disentanglement and arrangement. Artistic practices were often transdisciplinary and linked to art theory, scientific discoveries, and literary and philosophical texts that Schenker (2003) described as sources of inspiration and antagonism. While this transdisciplinarity may be seen as beneficial to art, a less encouraging aspect emerged in relation to artistic research. Confusions existed as authors advocated for various forms of artistic research based upon their individually held presuppositions regarding art and research. As a result, authors frequently appeared to debate differences arising from their presuppositions as they engaged with issues of artistic research. So long as authors' presuppositions were not made explicit, attempts to apply the term "artistic research" or to identify entities and activities of the domain artistic research resulted in confusion and discussions at cross-purposes. It seemed the warning of Paul Feyerabend in *Against Method* regarding theory in science was being proven out in artistic research—that the "increase in importance is not accompanied by better understanding" (p. 23). Throughout the 2000s, artistic research was given more importance as indicated by the expanding number of articles, books, and conferences devoted to the subject. Given this, however, the confusions and discussions surrounding artistic research remained much the same as they were a decade before. Today little has changed. Debate persistently centers upon the question whether artistic practice alone generates valid knowledge and whether artistic creation alone is artistic research. A trend toward scientism has emerged regarding proposed conceptualizations, methods, and approaches of artistic research, arguably sustained by academic norms and standards put forth by quality assurance and assessment bodies and funding bodies. Without widespread acceptance that artistic creation is in most cases artistic research, a real

possibility exists that scientistic agendas will subsume conceptualizations of artistic research, to its detriment. As a response, I concluded that it would be of value to substantiate the claim that in most instances artistic creation is *ipso facto* artistic research. An example will help to position my view for this claim.

Pablo Picasso may be characterized as an exemplar of the modernist artist for whom the result of his artistic practice was most often a work of visual art, and for whom theory did not play a particularly important role. However, his writings supply evidence for what might be inferred as his preliminary considerations of artistic research. In 1923, Picasso provided the following statement to artist and gallery owner Marius de Zayas:

> When you begin a picture, you often make some pretty discoveries. You must be on guard against these. Destroy the thing, do it over several times. In each destroying of a beautiful discovery, the artist does not really suppress it, but rather transforms it, condenses it, makes it more substantial. What comes out in the end is the result of discarded finds. (Picasso, 1988, p. 9)

Although Picasso's statement is moderately imprecise, he seems to say that his painting process involves more than straightforward progress from the start to the finish of a painting. He writes of creating and then transforming pretty discoveries, and through this revision, he reaches a more substantial result. Picasso does not say what he means by "more substantial," but the phrase could be taken to mean that he considers the revised work of art to be more emotive, or closer to an intended goal, or more formally organized than earlier versions.

It is now of interest to consider whether Picasso undertook research. In order to do so, a definition of research is needed. A distinctive and exemplary definition was proposed in 1988 by

Gillian Hatch, Principal Lecturer in mathematics education at Manchester Polytechnic and Christine Shiu, Senior Lecturer in mathematics education at the Open University. They wrote that research was: "*The intentionally controlled examination of issues [within and related to the domain]…through a process of inquiry that leads to the production of (provisional) knowledge both about the objects of the inquiry and the means of carrying out that inquiry*" [italics in original] (Hatch & Shiu, p. 313). Their definition of research does not unnecessarily limit the activities or entities of research, it does not presuppose scientism, and it recognizes that the process of inquiry leads to provisional knowledge. If their definition of research is accepted, then Picasso's creative practice, as he described it, may be considered to be research. Picasso intentionally controlled an examination of issues by locating inquiry within his artistic practice, the result of which was knowledge.

Picasso's quote of 1923 may now be compared with a later reflection upon his art. He wrote in 1956 that "Paintings are but research and experiment…I never do a painting as a work of art. All of them are research. I search incessantly and there is a logical sequence in all this" (Cohen, 2006, p. 252). Here, Picasso explicitly stated that his painting practice was research. I take the phrase "logical sequence in all this" (p. 252) to mean that knowledge gained in creating one painting logically provided a foundation for investigation in the next. The two quotes by Picasso expose the compound nature of his artistic process. In using the terms "picture" and "painting," although downplayed in these quotes, Picasso indicated that he was creating art, or at least creating artifacts that were taken by others to be art. Simultaneously, Picasso emphasized that his painting practice was research and experimentation.

In his 1962 book, *The Genesis of a Painting: Picasso's Guernica*, art theorist and Gestalt psychologist, Rudolf Arnheim seems to have agreed that Picasso's process was one of creating art and doing research, although he described these practices with the term "visual thinking" (p. 10). Arnheim presented 61 preliminary drawings and seven stages of Picasso's painting *Guernica* that showed the visual transformation and revision of Picasso's ideas throughout the spring of 1937. Arnheim, in contrast to Picasso's 1956 view, saw growth in art not as the successive elaboration of fragments or sections but somewhat more broadly, as partial entities acting upon each other dialectically. He wrote, that the artistic practice demonstrated "An interplay of interferences, modifications, restrictions, and compensation" (p. 131). This did not unfold straightforwardly but grew "in what looks like erratic leaps, forward and backward, from the whole to the part and vice versa" (p. 132).

The creative process of an artist according to Arnheim may not be explicitly visible in the surviving few preparatory studies or final works of art by an artist. Yet, even with the few works that remain, as with Picasso's *Guernica*, there is found evidence of an amalgam of activities commonly classed as art and activities commonly classed as research. It is this amalgam of activities that for approximately 30 years, mostly in North America and Europe, has provided a rationale for the domain known as "artistic research."

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

2.1 The Historical Context of Artistic Research

In contrast to many millennia of artistic creation, only about 30 years have elapsed since "artistic research" was conceptualized as a *sui generis* domain. A look back over the short history of this domain shows that neither art nor research associated with art changed once the domain came into being or was generally accepted in the literature. In fact, the conceptualization of artistic research as a new sort of endeavor contrasted the view that artistic practices throughout history normally demonstrated the intertwining of artistic creation and research.

An example of this intertwining is found in the artistic practice of Eugène Delacroix. Delacroix was a major figure in the history of painting known for the quote, "If you are not skillful enough to sketch a man falling out of a window during the time it takes him to get from the fifth story to the ground, then you will never be able to produce monumental work" (Strickland, 2007, p. 78). In order to translate his imaginative conception to paint on canvas for a large work, Delacroix frequently created thousands of drawings and hundreds of studies (Rich, 1930, p. 8). Art historian John Gage (1993) wrote that Delacroix considered, pre-thought, and recorded his color palettes, in which he contrasted hues and complementary colors, and grouped colors by value (darkness and lightness). Gage cited Piot (1931) as having noted that Delacroix spent weeks combining tonal relationships on his palette that he then transferred to canvas scraps and pinned to his studio wall. According to the painter Paul Signac (Ratliff, 1992), Delacroix copied works of Titian, Veronese, Velázquez, and Rubens to study their color. As well, Delacroix studied the scientific theory of color including successive contrast,

simultaneous contrast, and the optical mixtures of colors. Gage (1993) also reported on Delacroix's study of color theory: He adapted the color triangle of 1830 by Mérimée for his own use, he acquired a set of notes taken in 1848 at lectures by the renowned scientist and color researcher Michel Eugène Chevreul, and he knew Charles Blanc whose *Grammaire des Arts du Dessin* (1867) was widely influential. Here we find a good deal of correlated evidence as to specific research that Delacroix undertook in relation to the creation of a finished work of art.

Upon examination, a similar level of focus and depth artistic research is revealed in the practices of most artists. Filmmaker and visual artist Hito Steyerl (2010) seems to have arrived at this conclusion when he said that it simply does not make sense to continue discussions regarding artistic research as though it has not occurred throughout the history of art.

The first conceptualization of artistic research as a purposefully designated domain distinguished from either art or research is unclear. An early example is found with the Bureau for Surrealist Research, which according to Durozoi (2002) opened an office in Paris on October 11, 1924. Durozoi cited a commentary from the magazine *Les Nouvelles littéraires* in which the Bureau's intent was as follows: "No domain has been specified, a priori, for this undertaking, and surrealism proposes a gathering of the greatest possible number of experimental elements, for a purpose that cannot yet be perceived" (Durozoi, 2002, p. 63). Bureau co-founder and artist André Breton had studied medicine and psychiatry and he considered Surrealism to be a quasi-scientific activity in which art was evidence of explorations into the unconscious (Chilvers & Glaves-Smith, 2009). He seems to have supported the blurring of the line between art and research both in regard to the Bureau and in regard to his art. In an interview with *View* magazine editor Charles Henri-Ford in 1941, Breton said regarding the labyrinth of activities of Surrealism, "Les

circonstances présentes leur enlèvent tout aspect utopique et leur font présenter un intérêt vital au même titre que les recherches de laboratoire" [The presented factors erase any idealism from these and elevate them to the same importance as laboratory research.] (Ford, 1969, p. 232. E. Charron-Willard, trans.) It seems that at this point in his career, Breton continued to see surrealist activities as research on par with research done in laboratories.

A similar intertwining of art and research took place with Fluxus artist and filmmaker Robert Filliou, who is known for stating in 1963 that art began on January 17, one million years ago when someone dropped a sponge into a bucket of water. In 1971, Filliou undertook a project at the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam titled *Research at the Stedelijk* designed to intertwine knowledge production and research. During a period of four weeks, visitors to the museum could participate in the creation of art and research with Filliou. According to the website *Artist's books from the Netherlands and Belgium part 1: the 70s and 80s*, Filliou wrote in documentation for the exhibition, "Research is not the privilege of people who know—on the contrary, it is the domain of people who do not know. Every time we are turning our attention to something we don't know we are doing research" (later published in Filliou, 1996, p. 82).

An early citing of the artist as researcher is found in an article that appeared in *Leonardo* magazine from 1968, which quotes an unidentified museum catalog that includes the sentence, "X was very much the twentieth-century artist, a kind of artistic research worker, utilizing the latest scientific discoveries, looking always to the future" (Rowell, 1968, p. 291).

The genealogy of the domain of artistic research may also be found in the longstanding discussions regarding the differentiation of the sciences and the humanities that reached a sort of flash point with British novelist and scientist C.P. Snow's (1959/1990) Rede Lecture at

Cambridge titled *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution.* Snow called for an end to the cultural divide between the sciences and humanities that he saw as only getting more unbridgeable. Reasons for the divide included what Snow described as a fanatical belief in educational specialization. In his opinion the remedy was to rethink the entire educational enterprise. The discussions continued throughout the 1960s with a main critique of Snow's position offered by literary critic F. R. Leavis in his *Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow* of 1962 and in his *Luddites? Or, There is Only One Culture* of 1966. Leavis' opinion was that Snow was neither a novelist nor a scientist of any standing and therefore he came across as a philistine merely spouting opinions in a sort of meaningless gesturing. Discussions focused upon the relationship of art and science continued into the 1980s (e.g. Winchester, 1985; Lather, 1986) and and it was articles such as these that helped to set the stage for the designation of the domain of artistic research.

The binary attitude that had systematically pried apart art and research began with the ancient Greeks and had maintained a persistent influence, according to Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén (2005). Their view was that experience could not naturally be divided into compartments of art and research. Many authors agreed. Artists and researchers were seen to hold shared interests (e.g. Finley & Knowles, 1995) and artistic research was seen as facilitating a denser research culture through cross-disciplinary practices (Margolin, 2000). According to Massaert (2004), researchers who accepted the class overlap of art and science were aligning with common sense. He wrote, "all we do is research, art is by definition research" (p. 156). He characterized positions that differentiated art and research as based upon an epistemological slant toward experimental research that characterized art as somewhat monstrous. For Massaert, artists

both constructed proper arguments and undertook rigorous research. If an epistemology or methodology did not encompass what he described as the chaotic, nonlinear, uncertain, and hybrid nature of art, then the qualifiers associated with the epistemology or methodology contributed little to the artist's research and therefore did not need to be respected.

In surveying the interdisciplinarity of art, it might be surmised that the divide between the arts and sciences is less a topic of debate today. However, a presupposed dichotomy is often revealed when research is said to be reliant upon scientific method, as though the method somehow offers validity to the artistic research. Sá Cavalcante Schuback (2008) saw this dichotomy as a continuing and valid topic of discussion regarding artistic research. Engels-Schwarzpaul (2008) pointed out, so long as we continue to operate without confronting the binary, we are likely to end up with confusion, inconsistent arguments, and with mistaken attempts to differentiate the disciplines. She wrote,

Emerging disciplines have to prove themselves and will often not only outline, but fabricate, their disciplinary field and establish its identity by elaborating differences with peers or adversaries. Thus, it is no surprise that much rhetorical energy is still spent critiquing the research paradigms and methods of the natural sciences or the humanities. However, the debate about practice-based research sometimes feels a-historic, as if Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift had never been debated.…Arguments are still relentlessly pitched against the worst excesses of logical positivism, rationalism, positivist empiricism, etc., as though they were endemic. (Separation, para. 1)

In her view, many discourses retained the flavor of the dichotomy described by C.P. Snow in which the significant class overlap of the humanities with other disciplines was denied

in favor of caricatures of discrete domains and activities. To present and then critique such caricatures for being narrow frameworks was a weak and outdated strategy in support of contemporary artistic research. Refsum (2000) said that "theory and scientific methodology in the making fields are in its earliest development and there is uncertainty about how scientific research and artistic practice can or should meet" (p. 181). Such a view denies the many ways in which artistic practice and research have been intertwined throughout the history of art. Indeed, upon a consideration of the works of Renaissance artists such as Da Vinci and Michelangelo, the separation between art and the sciences seems to be a more recently constructed problem.

Artistic research as a domain differentiated from singly art or research was, according to Nelson (2013), emergent in Finland and the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s and typically situated within academia. The reason that artistic research suddenly became a focus of interest in the early 1990s and 2000s appears to be due to a number of concurrent factors. An interest in the relationship of art, education, and research began to appear in the literature following similar and prior considerations in the field of design (e.g. Gray, Pirie, Malins, Douglas & Leake, 1995). The European League of Institutes of the Arts (ELIA), founded in 1990, held a meeting at the Utrecht School of the Arts in 1991, one theme of which was the development of appropriate methodologies for use by researchers in art and design (Gray & Malins, 1993).

European formal institutions of higher education in particular began to recognize pressures from standards generating bodies such as the Bologna Process. According to the report to the Ministers of Education of the signatory countries, the goal of the Bologna Process was not only to study structures, qualifications, and governance but to strengthen and develop appropriate tools for research within institutions (Bologna Process, 2003). The final report stated that the

systemic integration of the Bologna reforms process "becomes blatantly obvious in the establishment of the new Bachelor and Master degrees, in which the role of research may have to be redefined" (p. 99). Similarly, a panel of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) of the United Kingdom (2001) tasked themselves to write a statement regarding research strategy. Research in that document was understood as original investigation undertaken in order to gain knowledge, which included fundamental research, applied research, practice-based research, and interdisciplinary research that as a group were meant to recognize the distinctive differences in which research was conducted and published across various disciplines. In the strategy document of the same Research Assessment Exercise, a panel was tasked to consider research objectives and activities over the following five years and it was explicitly stated that, "The Panel's attention should be drawn to ongoing research work that will not produce immediate visible outcomes" (Research Assessment Exercise, RAE, Research Strategy RA5, 4.30).

One response to these initiatives was that artists saw the possibility of research being defined in deference to a scientistic agenda, which could potentially exclude forms and outcomes of creative practices. In stressing the research component of creative practices with the use of the phrase "artistic research," artists strove to resist being shut out of both research discussions and research funding. The adoption of the term, and variations, however, seems to have made little inroads on general understandings of research used within academia and by quality assessment and outcomes measurement bodies. So, by the time artistic research was more widely accepted as a domain of study in the 2000s, Slager (2009) expressed concern that artistic research might be absorbed intellectually by academic discourse focused on institutional results. Maharaj (2009) also worried about the normative, verbal-discursive legibility required for validity in academia,

which did not readily accept the non-discursive modality of art as devoted to problems within the framework of an advanced artistic practice.

Authors who reflected upon the first two decades of artistic research as a designated domain characterized it in various ways. Apparent to Boomgaard (2008) was the recognition that artistic research would likely exhibit no set of fixed, shared methods. The artistic research community would continue to reinvent itself (Öberg, 2009). The discourse presented persistent ontological and existential tensions (O'Donoghue, 2009) often between practitioners of artistic research and those who were skeptical about artistic research as a meta-discourse (Lesage, 2009). Topics such as methods seemed to linger in a continual cycle of advocacy and critique, and in the opinion of Andersson (2009) discussions were disorderly as ontological questions were confused with questions of method, practice, and epistemology. Biggs and Karlsson (2012) noted what they considered a lack of progress on the fundamental nature of research in the arts.

A change revealed by looking at the literature chronologically is that over time authors became more assertive. Where at first the domain was tentatively conceptualized, authors later advocated their conceptualizations more strongly. They advocated for resisting frameworks of academia and criteria generating and assessment bodies (Newbury, 2012) or they advocated for situating artistic research within academia and adopting the norms of traditional research (Biggs & Karlsson, 2012; Nowotny, 2012; Schwartz, 2012). Borgdorff (2012a) provided one of the more international and contemporary surveys of artistic research, which he characterized as "boundary work" (p. 132), or research that was undertaken on the borderland between the art world and the academic world, even as he perceived these boundaries as unstable and subject to

constant debate. Artistic research was the articulation of unfinished thinking that reinforced contingent perspectives. For Borgdorff, the importance of artistic research lay in,

> the realisation that we do not yet know what we don't know. Art invites us and allows us to linger at the frontier of what there is, and it gives us an outlook on what might be. Artistic research is the deliberate articulation of these contingent perspectives. (p. 173)

Thus, Borgdorff did not see artistic research as involving theory building or knowledge production in the usual sense of the terms.

In part, due to the fact that the domain "artistic research" is still relatively new, it is reasonable to expect a plurality of emphatic proposals and equally emphatic challenges to the proposals. This may be seen as an indication of the vitality of the domain. In this we can find precedents in the discourses of art and philosophy, for example, the dialogues of Plato.

2.2 Early Attempts to Disentangle and Arrange the Relationships of Art and Research

Sir Christopher Frayling provided one of the first significant attempts to disentangle and arrange the relationships of art and research. Frayling, while a student at Churchill College, Cambridge, received a PhD for his dissertation on philosopher and writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French Revolution. He later worked as Rector and Vice-Provost at the Royal College of Art in London where he founded the department of Cultural History, and he held the position of Chairman of the Arts Council England. In 2001 he was awarded a knighthood for Services to Art and Design Education. Frayling's publications are eclectic and consider semiotics, vampires, Tutankhamen, and Sergio Leone's spaghetti westerns.

In 1993, Frayling wrote a paper titled *Research in Art and Design* that went on to become highly influential in the discourse of artistic research. Frayling focused upon the confusion regarding understandings of research in relation to art. His stated goal was to unpack the stereotypes regarding research and in doing so to refuse accepting stereotypes that the scientist worked only cognitively and that the artist worked only expressively. Artists who challenged the stereotype, for Frayling, were George Stubbs with his anatomical drawings and John Constable with his painted studies of clouds. Each artist had produced art that could be seen as deliberate and systematic, as well as intuitive.

A brief overview of the magnum opus of George Stubbs will demonstrate the sort of class overlap between art and research that Frayling considered as breaking the stereotype. Stubbs (1724-1806) published in 1766 a book of 24 engravings titled *The Anatomy of the Horse*, in which he meticulously drew the musculature and skeletal structures of the horse from a variety of angles. The book reflected the style of illustrated books on human anatomy such as those previously produced by Dutch anatomist Bernhard Siegfried Albinus and Brabantian (Belgian) anatomist and physician Andreas Vesalius. According to Fountain (1968), Stubbs worked for eight years studying the anatomy of horses during which time "The horses were bled to death by cutting the jugular vein and the blood vessels were injected with tallow" (p. 641). This method allowed Stubbs to arrange and dissect the carcass layer by layer. Fountain portrayed Stubbs as a researcher and compared him to natural scientists such as Joseph Banks, who in 1768 was to sail with Captain Cook to the Great South Land. Fountain wrote of Stubbs, "His approach to art was rational and similar to that of Charles Darwin or Linnaeus to biology" (p. 645). Fountain's use of the word *rational* suggests that he saw Stubbs' research as somehow differing from solely an

intuitive, artistic approach. It is evident that Stubbs undertook his anatomical studies for *The Anatomy of the Horse* with a somewhat methodological intent, relying upon perception, and applying analysis during the drawing process. These activities in the view of Frayling counted as research.

Frayling next conceptualized types of relationships between art and research, and in doing so he was influenced by the work of art historian and art critic Herbert Read (1958) who differentiated between:

a) education through art, or education that had no object but the cultivation of an awareness of art's intrinsic value, and

b) education to art, such as art history and art appreciation.

Frayling conceived the relationship of research to art as taking three distinct forms. These were:

i) research into art and design

ii) research through art and design

iii) research for art and design.

Research into art and design described historical, aesthetic, theoretical, and sociopolitical research and involved theses and dissertations in academia. *Research through art and design* included materials research, developmental work such as refining a technical artifact, and action research in which the step-by-step process documented, contextualized, and communicated studio experiments. These two categories were considered by Frayling to be big R research in the sense that the activities involved developmental and professional practice. Somewhat different was *research for art and design* that took place when an artifact was the goal and research materials were gathered to support that goal. Picasso's gathering of images of works by

Velázquez would be this sort of research. Frayling's categories also reflect an Aristotelian approach in differentiating intellectual knowledge (epistêmê) and practical knowledge (technê) (Aristotle, 1999).

Frayling's suggestion that artistic research took differing forms was influential according to Scrivener (2012), who considered the categories to have transformed the practices of some artists. Belcher (2014) noted that Frayling's categories and viewpoints were evident in the United Kingdom Council for Graduate Education (UKCGE) report (1997), that Frayling co-authored. Belcher also saw Frayling's influences in the writings of artist and educator Ken Friedman (2008) who wrote, "while we learn the art and craft of research practising research, we do not undertake research simply by practising the art or craft to which the research field is linked" (p. 156). Certainly Frayling's paper has been one of the most known and cited documents in the literature surrounding artistic research.

Although Frayling demonstrated that artists worked both cognitively and intuitively, he positioned research as differing from creative practice alone. Opportunities for research might occur in art but Frayling opined that certain combinations of art and research throughout history counted as research while other combinations did not. He concluded, "There must be some differentiation" (p. 5). For research to occur "there must be an institutional, or pedagogical, or academic, or technical, or some reason for wanting to do research. Not just status, promotion and fund-raising" (p. 4). Frayling accepted one or both of two justifications for art as research: a) that the intention of the artist plus an additional reason(s) determined whether the undertaking was research, in a context in which one apparently knew beforehand what research was; and/or b) the

reason(s) for doing research determined that an undertaking was research. The first type of reasoning is often considered circular reasoning. The second privileges intention as justification.

Two principal critiques of Frayling's categories were that they did not exhaustively describe all forms of artistic research and that they did not allow for artistic creation by itself to be research. According to Borgdorff (2007, 2012a, 2012b), art was often not only a motivating factor for, or the subject of research but the practice of creating could be central to the research process itself and this fact was not captured by any one category. Further, Borgddorff said that to assume that artists researched only in support of an artifactual goal was a mistaken view by Frayling. An example of an artist for whom the artistic artifact in the typical sense is not the goal is Kiel Gilleade who throughout a year streamed his heart rate, twenty-four hours a day, to Twitter (Carmichael, 2012). Gilleade's art was less about the creation of an artifact than it was about the ongoing conveyance of information.

Scrivener (2012) also critiqued Frayling's categories as excluding the possibility that art alone could contribute to knowledge and in turn could contribute to research. Likewise, Belcher considered the categories flawed in that the creation of an artifact was not positioned as commensurate with the creation of new knowledge. According to Macleod and Holdridge (2006), Frayling's categories pointed out differences that could allow one to categorize his or her undertakings, but the categories begged the question of how one was to judge art as research.

The critiques are merited. Frayling's categories exclude certain types of artistic activities, and especially those in which art is created without institutional context, without particular reason, or without technical need. Given the significant class overlap of art and research activities as demonstrated by contemporary art, there is perhaps no longer much sense in

attempting to differentiate types of art and research. Support for my view may be found in Collingwood's *An Essay on Philosophical Method* in which he said much the same upon examining philosophical inquiry:

> A person who begins a philosophical inquiry with the assumption that the object of which he is in search has the structure either of a classificatory system or of an aggregate of parts, is committing himself to the assumption that this apparent overlap of classes is an illusion. (p. 53)

To agree with Frayling is to accept that the subject of the researcher is differentiated from the researcher, that research has an institutional, pedagogic, academic, or technical goal, and that the validity of research is linked to intention. Also embedded in Frayling's conceptualization of art and research was his view that the artist's thinking may be tacitly embodied in the artifact and that the finished work of art may convey this tacit, unspoken knowledge.

Although Frayling's categories may not withstand scrutiny regarding class overlap, and although his categories seem to both exclude forms of art as research and suggest unstated necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be research, his outline of differing relationships between art and research was an initial step toward untangling the confusions within the discourse of artistic research.

2.3 Artistic Research as a Domain

Rather than survey the literature and automatically agree to the view that artistic research

should be a domain, I prefer to begin with artistic research as a question and attempt to identify the peculiarities that justify the need for a domain.

An illustration is useful here, and so I will return briefly to the creative practice of Pablo Picasso. In the latter half of 1957, Picasso spent four and a half months creating 44 paintings based upon the Diego Velázquez masterwork of 1656 titled *Las Meninas*, that I will refer to as the *Las Meninas* series. The single textual document that describes Picasso's undertaking was a letter he wrote to his friend Jaume Sabartés a few years prior to the creation of the series. In it, Picasso wrote, "If someone set out to copy *Las Meninas*…and if the person doing the copying were me….I would try to do it my way, forgetting Velázquez" (Museu Picasso, 1998, p. 94). It appears, in light of this letter, that Picasso's goal was not to make an exact copy of *Las Meninas* but to interpret the original painting in his own style.

Let it be agreed that the entirety of Picasso's creative output related to *Las Meninas* consists of the 44 visual artifacts and the one prior letter in which he indicated that he might consider copying the Velázquez painting in his own way at some point in the future. Now let us consider the question as to whether, based on this evidence alone, Picasso's *Las Meninas* series constitutes artistic research. Arguments for the *Las Meninas* series being artistic research might suggest that all artistic inquiry is artistic research because the creation of art is the creation of knowledge. In arguing this position, one would align with the definition of research in the Frascati Manual (2002). This is an internationally recognized document that outlines proposed standard practice for research and development that defines research as "creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including the knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this knowledge to devise new

applications" (Frascati, 2.1, 63, p. 30). It might be argued that Picasso embraced norms often associated with a systematic investigation: he indicated intention, he posed a research question as indicated in the letter, and he utilized a system and method in the creation of a series of paintings. It could also be argued that the object of his study was identifiable—a single work of art by Velázquez, and that his outputs were of a similar sort that allowed for comparisons.

Arguments against Picasso's *Las Meninas* series being artistic research might grant that Picasso created art, that aspects of his series mimicked research, and that interesting things occurred in the making of the paintings, however, something more was required to make his artistic undertaking artistic research. To argue that Picasso did not undertake both art and research in this series invites questions related to distinguishing the disciplines, such as which aspects of his practice are clearly art or why aspects such as his systematic search or the inquiry are not considered to be research. Further, one might ask when and how an inquiry shifts to research from art, or just how systematic an investigation must be to become research.

The attempt to distinctly classify the activities undertaken by Picasso as either artistic creation or as research will reveal a significant amount of "class overlap" to use the phrase of Collingwood in his *Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933). In his opinion, classes within any philosophical classificatory system normally overlapped, and such overlap could reach formidable dimensions. Therefore Collingwood wrote, "No method can be used in philosophy which depends on its validity the mutual exclusion of classes. Certain actions cannot be assigned to any one class" (p. 47). In artistic practices, classes of activities often considered to be art and classes of activities often considered to be research normally intertwine in a similar fashion.

This has not stopped authors in the literature from attempting to separate the classes of activities, or from attempting to articulate possible boundaries of the classes of art and research. Borgdorff (2012b) regarded such an approach dubiously when he wrote, “The entanglement of artistic research with art practice and with artistic development is so close that a conceptual distinction often appears contrived” (p. 45). He continued, “Such distinctions are usually made by people who first create a caricature of the one activity, believing they are protecting the other activity by doing so” (note 3. p. 62). Conceptualizations in which art is intuitive and science is rational do not reflect the reality of the blurring of any possible boundaries of the classes of activities. Collingwood (1933) suggested the boundaries of any one philosophical class cannot be exactly drawn nor should we look to discover a method for doing so.

In 2004, philosopher James McAllister of Leiden University stated at the international symposium titled *Artistic Research at the Rijksakademie van Beeldende Kunsten*, “I think artistic research exists” (p. 22). What exists as artistic research for McAllister are normal studio activities, but he also seems to indicate the appropriateness of using the term for a domain, which in turn sets up a class of activities differentiated from those exclusively of art or exclusively of research.

Collingwood suggested, convincingly to my mind, in *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, that any special science must have something special to study and that whatever peculiarities it presents in its aim and method must be due to the peculiarities in its object. Following his maxim, for artistic research to be a domain, there must be something special to study that is not already contained within the individual concepts of art or research. Likewise, according to Paul Feyerabend in his book *Against Method* there is no need to change a theory unless there is a

compelling reason. He wrote, “The only pressing reason for changing a theory is disagreement with facts” (1975/2010, p. 19). To continue Feyerabend’s line of thinking, reasonable theories of art and research are currently in use.

To agree that artistic research as a domain is necessary is to say that neither art nor research singly accounts for all the facts. Schwab (2014), considered this question as follows. First, artistic research radicalized epistemology by the various forms of artistic activities within it. It opens the field of relevant practices to the extreme as anything that might make artistic sense may be considered, however marginal or bad it may look. As such, it opens up the processes of knowledge making and academic discourse. The possibility was that in a “world governed by ontology safeguarding disciplines and territories, artistic research may look weaker when compared to other approaches to research” (para. 4). One could accept artistic research as a domain comprised of the totality of entities and activities taking place within it, for better or worse when contrasted with other domains. Schwab then questioned whether the radicalization of the epistemology was good for or merely an added complication for artistic research. This raised the question as to whether there were actually categorical limits to artistic research. He wrote, “We are interested in finding out if artistic research really requires particular notions of ‘art’” (para. 5). It seems that underlying Schwab’s question is whether the conceptualization of artistic research as a domain may accept the totality of the entities and activities within it without radicalizing research. The answer is not to delimit forms or notions of art. Art in all forms, without limits, may function as a component of artistic research, and that this appears to be a radical position only in contrast to narrower conceptualizations of research, for example such as those that presuppose scientism.

An even more fundamental approach may be taken to justify the domain of artistic research by considering the classes of activities of art and research. It is arguably impossible to delineate the boundaries of each, however, some ground is gained by looking at their pragmatic extremes. It is possible that research may be undertaken in which no art takes place, no art is involved, and the research itself is neither considered to be nor designated art. It is also possible that art may be created without research. Finally it is possible to undertake activities that involve both art and research. The compound term "artistic research" specifically identifies or designates the domain in which the classes of activities of art and of research conjoin, in various ways, often with significant class overlap. If it is agreed that research may be undertaken in which no art takes place, and if it is agreed that art may be undertaken in which no research takes place, then the object of artistic research, the particular amalgam of art and research, demonstrates a peculiarity that justifies its being a domain.

Normally, significant class overlap is found in artistic practices wherein it is impossible to delineate elements of art and research. An example is the project by Beatriz da Costa and Claire Pentecost from the group Critical Art Ensemble who worked with students from the Corcoran College of Art and Design on a project called *Molecular Invasion* (2001-2003). Their goal was to engage in what they called "fuzzy biological sabotage" (Critical Art Ensemble, 2013) against genetically modified organisms. Specifically, they hoped to develop a biochemical intervention that would inhibit the resistance of plants developed to be immune to the herbicide Roundup by the agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology company Monsanto. Critical Art Ensemble's art was undertaken as an action of civil resistance designed to highlight the view that public interest

must be a part of a corporation's testing and distribution procedures. It is in such instances where the class overlap of art and research is perhaps most explicitly seen.

The concept of class overlap is supported by some of the literature surrounding artistic research. For example, Caduff (2010) wrote, "Whether and how the observer of a finished project perceives it as 'artistic research' or simply as 'art' remains correspondingly open; and it is unclear whether identifiability of that kind would be desirable in the first place" (p. 45). To accept my claim that artistic creation is in most instances i*pso facto* artistic research is to recognize the significant class overlap and the near-complete dissolution of class boundaries of art and research in creative practice; only in rare instances will art without research exist.

Feyerabend in *Against Method* pointed out that frequently the response he received regarding his suggestion to dissolve the separation of the history of science, its philosophy, and science itself was not a counter argument but the posing of rhetorical questions. It is much the same in the literature surrounding artistic research. For example, responding to suggestions that the boundaries between artistic creation and research be dissolved, authors Frayling (1993) and Büchler (2006) both rhetorically asked whether we go back through history and award every great artist an *ex post facto* PhD for their artistic creations. Clearly, the recognition of an outcome in which artistic creation in most instances is *ipso facto* artistic research causes apprehension for some authors, as demonstrated by such rhetoric.

A further difficulty in examining the domain of artistic research is that the components, art and research, are without universally fixed definitions and instead are subject to differing but workable conceptualizations. Consequently, artistic research is best considered much as Wittgenstein describes games in *Philosophical Investigations*. Games take many forms and they

exhibit similarities and differences. Wittgenstein suggested, however, that the activities one calls games will not show something in common to all, but instead will show similarities and affinities that he characterized as "family resemblances" (§66, p. 36). One cannot tell others exactly what a game is and so one describes games and perhaps says, "This *and similar things* are called 'games'" (§69, p. 37). Yet, although lacking the ability to state exactly what a game is, one may still continue to use the concept "game" in a general sense to convey meaning, and one may draw boundaries around the concept for a special purpose. My suggestion is that in a similar manner artistic research may not exhibit something common to all forms and artistic research activities may reveal differing and even contradictory entities. Yet, this does not prevent us from using the term "artistic research" to convey meaning.

Both Feyerabend and Collingwood recognized that in setting up a special area of study a finished form may never be reached. Likewise, I have no goal in my examination of artistic research to propose a set of criteria that describes a conclusive form of artistic research. Feyerabend wrote in *Against Method* that one might never be content for "nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account" (p. 14) as we develop an ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives. A lack of universal agreement upon a single conceptualization of artistic research is not problematic, because much like art it will continue to be open-ended, and without universally shared definitions or boundaries. Collingwood wrote in *An Essay on Philosophical Method* that "Philosophy never with any of us reaches its ultimate goal; and with its temporary gains it never rests content" (1933, p. 3). Likewise, Wittgenstein cautioned in *Culture and Value* that if there were a 'solution' to the problems of philosophy, we only need to remind ourselves that there was a time when the problems had not been solved, and

yet people must have known how to live and think. The designation of the domain of artistic research does not suddenly provide a language or framework that solves the problems inherent to activities in the domain because in part, the questions and problems inherent to artistic research are much the same as the problems inherent in artistic creation, which in turn never have been solved sufficiently.

Throughout my disentangling of the issues of artistic research, I also have been aware that Collingwood (1933) wrote, “To reject one account of a philosophical matter is to accept the responsibility of giving a better account of it” (p. 106). I have taken up the challenge of providing what I consider to be a better account of artistic research, at least regarding the substantiation that artistic creation is normally artistic research and regarding the justification of artistic research as a useful domain. Before initiating my main argument, however, it is important to refute the opposing viewpoint that no need exists for the separate domain of artistic research.

Two of the most incisive critiques of artistic research as a domain have come from educator and philosopher, D.C. Phillips and from scholar of postcolonial Feminism, historian, and cultural analyst, Griselda Pollock. Both deserve a detailed examination.

In 1993, Elliot Eisner, an initial proponent of arts-based educational research [ABER] and who was seen as a progenitor of discussions regarding art and educational research, gave the presidential address at the American Educational Research Association Conference. Eisner suggested that there were different ways to understand the world, and that acknowledging this could lead to a pluralistic rather than a monolithic approach to research in education. Phillips (1995) supported Eisner’s suggestion that the arts should be reflected more than they currently

are in the display of research but he criticized Eisner's call for educational methods to expand to include methods of the arts.

Phillips began by critiquing Eisner's view that the primary aim of research was to advance understanding, which was seen as so broad a mandate as to be insufficient to distinguish research from other activities that historically generated understanding, such as fasting. Phillips suggested that Eisner set out the criteria by which one might distinguish a work of art that was research from a work of art that was not research. Phillips also allowed that a work of art might offer viewers a type of meaning, but Eisner had not explained why artistic meaning had relevance for the sorts of questions social scientists or other educational researchers conducted research upon.

For Phillips, research was always directed toward a specific problem that had been clearly formulated and managed, and which was warranted by evidence and the ability to withstand skeptical scrutiny and criticism. A competent researcher would design the research so as to guard against alternative explanations and would use data-gathering methods and designs to insulate against threats to validity. In this way, the research would be sensitive to the constraints (in the guise of the phenomena being studied) that nature imposed upon the researcher's hypotheses. A researcher would ask what the data was trying to tell him or her. As a result, a researcher could claim that previous work of research was incorrect, as based upon evidence found in nature.

Contrarily, in Phillips' opinion, artists did the reverse. They considered their views as more important than the story waiting to be told by nature, and as they were not bound by the constraints of nature, they were free to express whatever they wanted. Artists could undertake

any inquiry and propose any artistic solution and call it artistic research, which would reduce artistic research to solipsism. Therefore, it was more appropriate to call their endeavors art, and as so, the arts needed no artificial shoring-up. They could stand on their own as non-research. Artistic creation was undoubtedly a complex and demanding cognitive activity, but it was not research and nothing was to be gained by pretending it was.

Following, a researcher could claim previous work and meanings were wrong, but it did not make much sense to claim that the meanings found in a painting by Jackson Pollock, for example, were incorrect. Moreover, a work of art might express meanings but Phillips saw these as having quite a different sense than those expressed in language, and in his view it did not help the discourse to blur this difference. He wrote,

> It is a philosophical truism—if I can be permitted the use of the term in this context—that in the literal or technical sense, the predicates "true" and "false" only apply to propositions, not to things or states of affairs. (p. 76)

While Eisner had stated that truth should not be restricted to what one could claim, Phillips took a different stance. He agreed a work of visual art could express meanings, however these meanings were not expressed in a translatable language. By this, Phillips meant that if the concerns of painter Jackson Pollock could not be translated into English or some other natural language, then his concerns could not be graphed onto the concerns of other educators or researchers. Works of art were states of affairs; they were not propositions. He said that as states of affairs, whatever meaning works of art expressed was not propositional meaning. To formulate what a painting was expressing was to create a message or proposition, which could then be

deemed true or false. In other words, the form of research was propositional. On this point, I agree with Phillips.

It seems however that Phillips and I hold differing presuppositions regarding research and knowledge. He subscribes to the view that knowledge is justified true belief, with nature often providing sufficient justification, and he sees propositional belief as requiring such justification. Without justification for one's propositional belief, the person stating the propositions might be deluded, as not everything a person believes turns out to be true. I adopt the definition of knowledge put forth by philosopher Lorenzo Peña (1988) who wrote, "as it is ordinarily understood in most contexts and as it concerns the epistemological enterprise, knowledge is nothing else but true belief" (section 3, para. 1) and so Peña detaches belief from the justification of the belief. He is not alone in this view (e.g. Sartwell 1991, 2011). Peña continued, "A mental act is one of knowledge to the extent that it (i) is a belief and (ii) it is true" (p. 10). To accept Peña's definition of knowledge means that one may believe the truth of a belief, at times even when the belief is not justified. For Phillips, the justification of a belief so as to guarantee its truth is required.

I have accepted the definition of research by Hatch and Shiu (1998) that states research is an intentionally controlled examination through a process of inquiry that leads to provisional knowledge. In contrast to Phillips, I suggest that research is often undertaken with a large degree of unknowing and chaotic investigation, as provided in examples by Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and by Paul Feyerabend in *Against Method*. Phillips attempts to offer himself an out by saying that some good research has not always resulted in conclusions that were true, as nature is complex and we do not know everything. He does not expand on this

thought and it is unclear whether he means to say that good research may result in false conclusions, or whether if good research is built on a foundation of mistaken premises it is not good research, or whether he suggests a continuum running from good research to some form of similar but not-good research, which would set up a sorites paradox.

Thus, while Phillips and I are in agreement regarding a work of art as a state of affairs and knowledge as being carried by propositional beliefs about the state of affairs, we differ regarding our conceptions of research and whether knowledge requires justification. His conceptions resultantly limit artistic research in the sense that only some artistic undertakings may be research.

Griselda Pollock (2008) questioned whether a clear difference existed between the "so-called scientific model which is unambiguous and collectively endorsed" (para. 2) and the pluralistic and interpretive model prevailing in the arts. In her opinion, such a distinction misrepresented the historic creativity and conjectural riskiness of science. She characterized research as beginning with a purposively posed question and then utilizing methods by which new and useful questions could be posed and explored. To do research meant that one referenced and evaluated the state of thinking and research in the field in which one was working. She did not see that artistic practice situated itself in such a context, nor was it generally seen as necessary that the outcomes of artistic research be contextually validated as a contribution to knowledge and understanding. As a result, Griselda Pollock distinguished between practice as practice and practice as research. One might want to investigate a thing, and that desire might enable a practice, but the practice alone was not research. Private and self-defined pursuits often produced interesting and even cultural transformational results, but such products were not

research. Entering into the formal world of research was also to submit to tests of validity and significance, which fundamentally articulated a relationship with a community of thinkers and creators. It was only within the field that the researcher could both perform and have their research adjudged by members of the community for making a significant contribution in relation to the current field and the field's histories. For these reasons, artistic undertakings were either art or research and Pollock saw no need for another sub-discipline called artistic research.

Griselda Pollock's argument seems reasonable until the breadth of artistic undertakings is considered in relation to her criteria that makes an undertaking research. She presupposes that scientific method is linked to research and that a goal of research is an original result judged as significant by members of an established community. Instances exist where artistic research conforms to scientistic views or norms of the community, other instances where art interrogates such structures, and still other instances where art purposely denies them. Griselda Pollock also generally articulates a difference between creative practice that is not research and creative practice that is research, yet she does not explicitly articulate the necessary and sufficient criteria by which this determination may be made. Griselda Pollock, much like Phillips, also presupposes that in doing research one first generates a question or problem and then undertakes actions designed to generate an answer or solution, which does not fit for many artistic practices. As I see it, many who undertake artistic research often pursue no identifiable question or problem nor does their process exhibit a linear progression toward an answer and solution.

One of the most substantial arguments that may be applied against the criticisms offered by Griselda Pollock and Phillips is Paul Feyerabend's book *Against Method* in which he

challenged, theoretically and with examples, most of their presuppositions about research. Feyerabend wrote,

> It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, 'objectivity,' 'truth,' it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under *all* circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: *anything goes*. (1975/2010, p. 11-12)

Phillips and Griselda Pollock seem to have predetermined the acceptable manner in which knowledge is acquired and they view scientific method as a sort of touchstone to which questions of validity or truth may be appealed. Feyerabend said that to simply accept traditional scientific method was to dismiss that fact that "interests, forces, propaganda, and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge" (p. 10). Science exhibits greater conceptual risk than its caricature, as Griselda Pollock noted. On the other hand, art is often more systematic and contextualized than she seems to admit. This fact alone does not mean that undertakings must be either art or research. Pollock seems to dismisses the view that class overlap between art and research would indicate a domain of artistic research.

An artistic network that does not conform to the conditions proposed by Phillips and Griselda Pollock, and which denies a scientistic approach is that of Fluxus. From the Latin word to flow, Fluxus is a changeable international network of artists in which the emphases that may

be historically identified are: Anti-art, anti-style, fun, simplicity, the viewpoint that Fluxus is a state of mind or attitude rather than a movement, and the fact that anyone can be a Fluxus artist. That said, artists who participated in Fluxus activities never agreed upon one goal or any set of methods. An example of Fluxus art is the Michigan vanity license plate that Allen Bukoff, Acting Director of Fluxus Midwest, applied for and put on his car in the 1990s that read "FLUXUS." Fluxus art diminishes neither art nor research but it does interrogate the adoption of traditional criteria and structures of art and research.

The critiques by Griselda Pollock and Phillips raise interesting challenges to artistic research, but to accept their arguments is to agree with various presuppositions they hold that include knowledge as justified true belief, scientistic definitions of research, and the necessity of the community for the adjudging and validating art as research. All of these prove problematic or untenable when compared to the breadth of artistic research.

CHAPTER 3: DEFINITIONS

3.1 Presuppositions

Throughout this dissertation, I will be using the term "presupposition" in considering authors' viewpoints. A presupposition may be defined as a background assumption, which is often not the result of a conscious choice and I am guided by Collingwood's in-depth discussion of presuppositions as found in *An Essay on Metaphysics* (1940/1972). Collingwood writes that whenever anybody states a thought, other related thoughts called presuppositions influence the stated thought. In his view, presuppositions are often deeply held, unverifiable, and logically prior to current thoughts.

Collingwood identifies two types of presuppositions: Absolute presuppositions and relative presuppositions. He writes, "An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer" (Def. 6, p. 31). An absolute presupposition generally remains unquestioned and is not verifiable. For example, the pronouncement that a thing is art only when it is aesthetically pleasing may be an absolute presupposition. When the person stating the presupposition is pressed for reasons that make it true, the person may say that it is known fact or the person may become somewhat defensive. As Collingwood points out, "people are apt to be ticklish in their absolute presuppositions" (p. 31). Wittgenstein appears to have come to a similar conclusion when he wrote in *Culture and Value*, "Don't play with what lies deep in another person!" (1977, p. 23).

A relative presupposition discussed by Collingwood is, "one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer" (Def. 5, p.

29). Collingwood provides an example of a relative presupposition in regard to measuring length with a tape-measure. In answering a question of the distance between two points, the user of the tape-measure presupposes that the answer given by the tape-measure is correct because he or she accepts, or presupposes, that the tape-measure is accurate. However, the presupposition of the tape-measure's accuracy may also be raised as a question. One might ask whether the tape-measure was made accurately or whether it might have stretched with use. In doing so, the accuracy of the tape-measure that was originally presupposed as an answer to the question of the distance between two points is now raised as a question. An interesting work of art by Robert Morris titled *Three Rulers* (1962) displays three yardsticks of visibly differing lengths, however each is marked with regular inch to eighth of an inch dark lines, and each apparently accurately presents thirty-six inches. A viewer is unable to know which, if any, of the yardsticks are in point of fact thirty-six inches long. The work of art shifts that which viewers may have presupposed as accurate, the length of the yardstick, to the position of a question.

Collingwood also suggests that thinking in an orderly and systematic fashion requires untangling a knot of thoughts and arranging them into a series of thoughts so that the connections between them are seen. Presuppositions should not be simply accepted but likewise disentangled, arranged, and examined. He writes in *An Essay on Metaphysics*, "If a man while pursuing or expounding a science makes a mistake as to its nature or the nature of its subject-matter, it is quite possible that this mistake will infect all his work with a certain amount of error" (p. 17). I take this to mean that if one presupposes a mistaken conception of one's subject matter, all work based upon this mistaken presupposition resultantly may be somewhat erroneous.

It is rare that authors in the literature surrounding artistic research articulate their presuppositions regarding art and research. Bekalu (2006) wrote that "speakers/writers unconsciously or consciously make pragmatic presuppositions based on assumed shared knowledge between them and their addressees" (p. 152). Indeed, many authors in the literature seem to assume that their presuppositions regarding art, research, or knowledge are shared and therefore not requiring definition. My approach in analyzing authors' conceptions of artistic research was to attempt to identify the underlying presuppositions the authors held that would precipitate their conceptions.

Collingwood stated an important point: A questionable presupposition is not disproven by the fact that the person stating the presupposition fails to see that it is questionable. The logical efficacy of a presupposition does not depend upon its truth or falsity, only upon its being supposed. A presupposition regarding art or research may be questionable, for example a conceptualization of art may exclude various things of the world that are normally accepted as art, but nonetheless the conception may be utilized.

In *An Essay on Metaphysics,* Collingwood wrote that the scientist's business (and I would say that normally this applies to the artist too) is not to propound presuppositions but only to presuppose them. On the other hand, my business in this analytic dissertation is closer to that of Collingwood's characterization of the metaphysician whose job is to propound the proposition that this or that presupposition was presupposed. Collingwood seems also to have been developing this idea in *An Essay on Philosophical Method* when he wrote:

what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know better something which in some sense we knew already; not to know

it better in the sense of coming to know more about it, but to know it better in the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way—actually instead of potentially, or explicitly instead of implicitly. (1933, p. 11)

The goal as Collingwood saw it was to expose the implicit content, or to unearth the presuppositions, as the means for better knowing. It is this identification of and critical interrogation of the presuppositions underlying authors' conceptions of art, research, and artistic research that assists in the obtaining of clarity regarding artistic research.

Clarity, however, is not intended to extinguish disagreements that exist when presuppositions are exposed and when authors indeed talk about the same thing but hold radically differing viewpoints; this is a hallmark of a thriving domain. As Wittgenstein wrote in *Philosophical Investigations* "It is not the business of philosophy to resolve a contradiction...but to render surveyable...the state of affairs *before* the contradiction is resolved" (§125, p. 55). His use of "state of affairs" here is one that I take to mean the state of the field or domain. Artistic research is characterized by a plurality of ideas that generates contradictions and proposals. Attempts to resolve contradictions may reflect an author's view of what artistic research ought to be rather than what it is. Neither is my intent to advocate for a specific set of conditions to be universally applied to artistic research. Conditions or rules will most likely delimit artistic research and result in the exclusion of potential or existing forms of artistic research. Once this occurs, as Wittgenstein wrote in *Philosophical Investigations*, we become "entangled in our own rules" (§125, p. 55).

3.2 "Artistic Research" and Related Nomenclature

Artistic research has been characterized as a concept searching for a definition (Frieling, 2008; Hannula, Suoranta & Vadén, 2005) and therefore, a clarification of terms, meanings, and concepts of knowledge regarding artistic research has been seen as necessary (Niedderer, 2008). According to the Working Group on Practice-based Research in the Arts (2010) the fact that artistic research is an emergent field of inquiry means that points of definition should continue to be tested.

I advocate for a conceptualization of artistic research that embodies concept pluralism in the sense of Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances. Michael Lynch, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, wrote in his book *Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity* (2001) that concept pluralism seems to best frame any definition. Lynch agreed that Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances was correct and he further believed that concepts were learned by extrapolating from paradigmatic examples and placing similar objects under the same concept. But, Lynch said, accepting this view did not mean that one should infer that any two paradigmatic examples possess characteristics that overlap. Compare the painting *Mont Sainte-Victoire and the Viaduct of the Arc River Valley* (1882-1885) by Paul Cezanne, which represents hours that the artist spent translating his visual sensations into oil paint on canvas, with *Cat* (1965) by Fluxus artist Milan Knizak which consisted of the three word typed directive, "Get a cat" (Fluxus debris archive, n.d.). The difficulty in finding characteristics that overlap in order to generate a definition of visual art is obvious.

Lynch suggested that two people could disagree about whether a thing was a particular concept and both be correct, but they were not required to say that they were using distinct concepts. Lynch explained, “we are speaking of a nonabsolute, shifting target that can be applied in inconsistent ways, relative to different paradigms” (p. 65-66). There could exist incompatibility or “opposite truth-values” (p. 72) in multiple concepts. Lynch demonstrated this with the following example. He asked that we suppose two people are presented with a crudely drawn sketch and told to add lines to create a more complete picture. No doubt two very different pictures would result. A true definition of a picture could not be determined from the various results except as an index to each person’s conceptual scheme as the concept of sketch was extended in incompatible directions. Concepts for Lynch did not admit fixed, determinate uses but were extended as new circumstances were encountered. I consider “artistic research” similarly.

I have chosen to use the term “artistic research” consistently throughout this dissertation so as to avoid continual digressions into terminological comparisons (quoted passages will retain their original terms). I find that the term captures the range of meanings and artistic activities found in the literature and in art.

According to Malterud (2012) the term artistic research is preferable because it is an established term in the literature of art education and the philosophy of science. Yet, to say that any consensus exists for this term would be a mischaracterization. Numerous terms are found in the literature since the early 1990s signaling differing conceptualizations and emphases. A preliminary cataloguing of terms and understandings in the literature was done by Finley (2003) who focused upon articles about arts-based inquiry that appeared in the first seven years of the

journal *Qualitative Inquiry* and who found that terms were emergent and often displayed authors' contextual grounds for argumentation. However, I found that the authors generally did not articulate their presuppositions driving their use of particular terms. According to Mäkelä, Nimkulrat, Dash, and Nsenga, (2011) and Nimkulrat (2011), terms varied among countries, institutions, disciplines, and researchers and at times terms were used interchangeably. Commonly used are the terms "artistic research" (e.g. Varto, 2009; Borgdorff, 2012a, 2012b; Biggs & Karlsson, 2012; Slager, 2009) "arts-based research," "arts-informed research," "arts-based inquiry" (e.g. Scrivener, 2012; Nowotny, 2012; Hannula Suoranta & Vadén, 2005), and "arts-informed inquiry" (Butler-Kisber, 2010). The term "practice-led research" is also frequently found in the literature (e.g., Mäkelä, Nimkulrat, Dash, & Nsenga, 2011; Hoffert, 2010; Hamilton & Jaaniste, 2009). The subject researching in a manner that necessarily includes the creation of an art object is most commonly called "research through art," "research for art," or "practice-based research" (e.g. Biggs & Büchler, 2012; Öberg, 2009; Sullivan, 2010). Research supporting an art practice, such as the study of paint polymers or human anatomy would also be included in these terms. The subject creating an art object is most commonly called "art *as* research" (Borgdorff, 2012a, p. 207) or "research in the arts" (Boomgaard, 2008); both authors stated that the creation of art is research, as with a painting without supporting text. Terms such as "research on art" generally speak to the domains of art history and art criticism (Borgdorff, 2012a).

While the above terms may be situated within or outside of academia, two forms of artistic research are situated specifically within academia. Most known is "arts-based educational research" (ABER) (Barone & Eisner, 1997, 2006; Eisner, 2008) that focuses on inquiry and

research approaches that involve interpretations and practice within the formal higher learning environment (Sinner, Leggo, Irwin, Gouzouasis, & Grauer, 2006). Whereas artistic research might be used in conjunction with other forms of research such as ethnography, ABER is recognized as contributing specifically to education (Sinner et al., 2006, p. 12) or comprised of purposeful research that is educational in character and defined by the presence of certain aesthetic qualities (Barone & Eisner, 2006). In ABER, educational researchers are not required to become artists. It is enough that they are exposed to the craft and practice of artists, which might allow them to question the limits of formal educational tradition (Cahnmann, 2003; Cahnmann-Taylor, & Siegesmund, 2008). More sectarian terms include "the creative practice PhD" (Macleod & Holdridge, 2005), "scholARTistry" (Knowles, Promislow, & Cole, 2004) that is used to describe art generated by researchers with professional training in the arts, "a/r/tography" (Sinner et al. 2006) that is focused on art making in relation to a written dissertation, and "art-based research" and "art-based inquiry" in relation to psychology (McNiff, 1998). In light of the above, it is no wonder that the entities and activities of the domain known as artistic research are continually contested.

3.3 A Designation Definition of Art

I have suggested that artistic research designates a domain involving an intertwining of art and research, the facts of which are not always fully captured individually by art or research. I now wish to begin my primary argument to substantiate that artistic creation is most often *ipso facto* artistic research. To start, a clarification of the term "art" is necessary. In this way I hope to prevent a range of reader presuppositions related to the definition of art from entering into the

compound concept of artistic research as this seems to at times to be the reason for confusions found in the literature.

My claim regarding art is this: Anything that is designated to be art is art, if only for the person designating the thing as art. This may be called a designation definition of art.

An articulation of a designation definition of art is found with philosopher and aesthetician Morris Weitz in his article *The Role of Theory in Aesthetics* (1956). Weitz's central theme was that there could be no necessary and sufficient conditions that would guarantee a thing was art versus non-art. As I will frequently use the phrase "necessary and sufficient conditions," an explication of the phrase is due. One is provided by Fox (2004) who wrote,

We'll call the event in which we are interested in *E.* This event *E* could be anything: a car starting, a match lighting, a team winning a game,....If something (let's call it *N*) *must* happen in order for *E* to occur, then whatever that is (*N*) is a **necessary condition** of *E*'s happening. Another way of saying this is that if *N* does not occur, then *E* cannot either.

The second type of condition is known as a **sufficient condition**. If something (let's call it *S*) always leads *E* to occur, then *S* is a sufficient condition for *E*'s ocurring [sic]. Another way of saying this is that whenever *S* occurs, then so does *E*. (p. 1)

The necessary and sufficient conditions describe a relationship between the two conditions and the event. If statements are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, they are both simultaneously true in regard to the event.

In the history of art, a typical viewpoint was that a necessary condition of art was that a thing existed, such as a created object. Once the thing existed, another condition or other conditions were stated to guarantee that the thing was a work of art.

Weitz investigated historic aesthetic theories that he called "empirically-descriptive and normative" (p. 31) and attempted to identify the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that each presupposed for a thing to be art. These theories and their conditions were:

a) Formalist — focused upon plastic elements in relation to each other. Formalist conditions could be characterized by concepts related to composition, contrast, line, color, and shape;

b) Emotionalist — the affective aspects or the viewer's sense of an artifact's expression of emotion;

c) Intuitionist — art was a creative, cognitive, or spiritual act that arose beyond the artist's consciousness;

d) Organicist — art was a class in which various elements combined to an organic whole, often said to be greater than the simple accumulation of the individual parts; and

e) Voluntarist — art was the embodiment of wishes and desires imaginatively satisfied, unified by harmony, and disseminated by way of the public medium of language.

Weitz concluded that no aesthetic theory of the past had provided the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to distinguish works of art from non-art things.

In his opinion, such conditions would not be found. Art would change, the criteria of art would change, and therefore no one could imagine all future sorts of art. Those who accepted certain necessary and sufficient conditions were eventually likely to encounter a work of art that did not fit the conditions. In such an instance, they were put into the awkward position of either extending their particular concept of art to include the new art conditions, or closing their original concept of art and devising a new set of conditions to cover the new art. Weitz's definition of art was one in which there might not be properties common to all works of art but

only strands of similarities, a concept that he traced back to Wittgenstein's discussion of family resemblance concepts illustrated by games in *Philosophical Investigations*.

In the world of contemporary art, the fact that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee that a thing is art and the fact that art can be designated should be beyond debate. In the literature surrounding artistic research, various authors have taken this position. For example, Vickery (2002) wrote,

if a work of art is no longer visual [sic] distinct from a non-art object then our contemporary concept of 'art' no longer bears any direct or necessary relation to any objective characteristics, any aesthetic qualities, artistic techniques or any kind of object per se. Art can only be described in terms of *an activity.* (pp. 2-3)

Vickery recognized that art as detached from any system of values-embedded constraints could appear to the uninitiated as arbitrary and self-indulgent. But recognizing this view did not mean that it was necessary to settle upon some set of necessary and sufficient conditions as an answer. Kamber (1998) wrote that if necessary and sufficient conditions were to be found, they would have to demonstrate a deep and unchanging structure, but as of yet nobody had succeeded in making a convincing case for any invariable condition. Tillinghast (2003) imagined two categories of objects, art and non-art and said that there was most likely no way to identify the conditions by which any single thing should be in one or the other category.

Regarding the designation of things of the world as art, art historian Esther Pasztory wrote: "Art is whatever people designate as art, regardless of form and content" (Pasztory, 2005, p. 8-9). The statement seems to reflect the content of an earlier interview that she had conducted with art historian Thomas McEvilley in which he had voiced a similar opinion:

It seems pretty clear by now that more or less anything can be designated as art. The question is, has it been called art by the so-called "art system"? In our century, that's all that makes it art. As this century draws to a close, it looks ever more Duchampian. (Wallach, 1997, p. 36)

In his use of the word Duchampian, McEvilley suggested that a designation definition of art could be traced back to artist Marcel Duchamp, and he is right to do so.

Two particular events stand out in Duchamp's art practice. In 1915, Duchamp, who had recently moved from Paris to New York City, bought a snow shovel and wrote upon the reinforcement plate as a title, *In Advance of the Broken Arm/(from) Marcel Duchamp 1915*. Duchamp stated that the shovel was just a plain snow shovel that he bought at the hardware shop (Hamilton, 1966). This was the third object that Duchamp would call a readymade, a term that he explained in a lecture at the Museum of Modern Art was perfect for already fabricated objects that were not originally works of art (Cabanne, 1987). Duchamp, in 1913, had previously considered the question, "Can one make works which are not works of art?" (Kuenzli & Naumann, 1996, p. 33). The readymades were his answer. The snow shovel was simultaneously both art and non-art. The designation of the object alone shifted the class of object it belonged to. When asked if there was a way in which one could think of a readymade as art, Duchamp answered:

That is a very difficult point, because art first has to be defined....We have tried, everybody has tried, and every century there is a new definition of art. I mean that there is no one essential that is good for all centuries. So if we accept the idea that trying not to define art is a legitimate conception, then the readymade can be seen as a sort of irony, or an attempt at showing the futility of trying to define art, because here it is, a thing that I call

art….The actual intention in choosing and selecting, in setting them aside from everything else in the world, does that not give them some kind of possibly intellectual value?…It has a conceptual value. (Perloff, 2012, p. 30)

Duchamp's *In Advance of the Broken Arm* and the questions around the work of art radically challenged beliefs that only some things of the world could be art as determined by necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Duchamp had shown that a thing could become art by intention and designation alone, or as philosopher George Dickie said in his book *Art and the Aesthetic* (1974), one could solely by his or her thought confer the status of art upon a thing. Duchamp had re-designated a pre-existing object for the production of a new value in a purely semiotic operation (Lütticken, 2010). He had challenged value empiricism, or the view that artworks have a unique or experiential value, which had often been promoted as a necessary and sufficient condition of art. In his critique of value empiricism, Shelley (2010) pointed out the following paradox: If the experience of viewing art provided a particular value, then anything other than art that afforded the same experience would have that same value. But he said, nothing other than the artwork, as an original work of art, was allowed to have the same value. Duchamp had done exactly this. He took an art-valueless object, designated it as art, and then suggested it offered a similar unique art-value experience.

The second event, for which Duchamp and a designation argument are more widely known, occurred in 1917. According to Dyson (1979) and Hubregtse (2009), in February of that year, the Society of Independent Artists, Inc. announced an exhibition at the Grand Central Gallery in New York City and advertised that any artist who paid the five-dollar annual membership fee and the one-dollar initiation fee would have their work exhibited. Duchamp submitted a manufactured porcelain urinal that he bought at a hardware store. He said the idea

had come to him during a conversation with artist Joseph Stella and collector Walter Arensberg, the latter who would eventually amass the most extensive collection of works by Duchamp in the world. Duchamp placed the urinal on its back, painted the name R. Mutt on the side, and titled it *Fountain*. Hubregste (2009) wrote that soon after the urinal had been submitted to the exhibition, the Society's directors held an impromptu meeting and voted to dismiss *Fountain* from the exhibition. Once again, Duchamp had taken a thing considered to be an ordinary object and elevated it to the status of art by designation alone.

Later in his career when Duchamp was questioned about what he thought could be art, he replied "anything can be art and anyone can do art" (d'Harnoncourt & McShine, 1973, p. 171). Lubow (2010) in the *New York Times Magazine* stated that nearly 100 years has elapsed since Duchamp had attached titles to everyday objects and had thus demonstrated that anything could be art if the artist said it was.

The question as to whether a designation should be accepted by everyone was taken up by McEvilley (1988) at a colloquium at the Center for African Art in New York City. He said that the fact one could designate a thing as art meant that something was art for that person, but this alone said nothing about what other people considered the thing to be. He demonstrated that anthropological readings of artifacts, such as tribal objects, had allowed items that were never intended as art to be exhibited as art in museums. He added that once the archaic quest for essences common to all art was given up, there was no reason why a thing could not be art for one person or culture and non-art for another. Accepting this view is often a particular problem for those who believe art has necessary and sufficient conditions that span cultures, contexts, and time periods.

Definitions of art based upon necessary and sufficient conditions quickly demonstrate fundamental problems and inherent contradictions. For example, Woodruff (2001) proposed a "virtue theory" in which an artist recognized aesthetic properties and used them in creating art so that others would recognize those properties. A work of art was produced for the purpose of appreciation, and if the work was appreciated with some degree of success, then that was a sufficient condition for a work to be art. Woodruff therefore did not see everything produced by an artist, or everything thought of by someone, as rightfully art. He wrote, "It is not enough to have production of a work as a goal; you must have a certain degree of success to warrant the title 'artist'" (p. 30). And he added, "Art can make a statement about the world, but when the statement and not appreciation is motivationally central to a work, what is produced is not art" (p. 30). Woodruff's somewhat vague conditions are refuted by works found in the history of art. For example, when artist, architect, and writer Giorgio Vasari wrote in *Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects* (1568/1988) about Michelangelo's finished ceiling frescoes in the Sistine Chapel, Vasari commented on the biblical events such as the creation, the flood, the drunkenness of Noah, and the ancestors of Christ and then discussed Michelangelo's visual depictions of these events. It appears that the statements were motivationally central to the work in the view of Vasari. For a public of which a large percentage could not read, and who most likely had no art training, the iconic depiction of scenes from the Bible could arguably have functioned primarily to relate biblical events, as statements, rather than to have functioned primarily aesthetically. Under Woodruff's logic, the Sistine Chapel ceiling arguably would not be art as the relating of biblical statements was motivationally central to the work.

Woodruff's proposals regarding the recognition of aesthetic properties and the necessity of the artist having a certain degree of success with their work's appreciation likewise are problematic. After seeing Michelangelo's fresco *The Last Judgment* on the wall behind the altar of the Sistine Chapel, artist El Greco approached Pope Pius V and offered to repaint the work so that it more accurately conformed to Catholic doctrine. El Greco apparently disregarded the aesthetic properties of Michelangelo's fresco in favor of a moral judgment. Guinard (1956) related the anecdote:

> At that time the figures of Michelangelo's Last Judgment which the pope held to be indecent were being covered over. He [El Greco] ventured to say that, should the work be destroyed, he would take it upon himself to do all of it over again with propriety and seemliness. (p. 120)

In 1564, the Congregation of the Council of Trent demanded that parts of the fresco they considered indecent be painted over, which was done by artist Daniele da Volterra. Once again, it would seem that by Woodruff's criteria, Michelangelo's *The Last Judgment* could arguably not be a work of art because an expert with a recognized degree of success, in this instance El Greco, did not sufficiently recognize the aesthetic properties or virtues of the work. These two examples demonstrate the problems that quickly arise with attempts to apply necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be art.

Similarly, attempts to distinguish classes of art, such as art and craft, are also problematic. Collingwood attempted to do this in *The Principles of Art* (1938). He suggested that a craftsperson could focus on the means used to reach the end, such as perfecting a technical skill, which could be separated from the end product. On the other hand, an artist might possess

technical skill, but this was not sufficient because, “a technician is made, but an artist is born” (p. 26). Collingwood also suggested that the craftsperson would know precisely what he or she wanted to make before making it. The end was thought out before starting work and likewise materials were pre-chosen. In his attempt to distinguish the two disciplines of art and craft, Collingwood presupposed that the great artist possessed a mysterious power, presumably from birth, to know when a work of art was finished. Secondly, he presupposed that artists often played with their materials, revised their art, and struggled for the expression of emotion in tangible form, often not recognizing the expression until it was expressed. Craftspersons did not do this as they knew the outcome in advance.

Collingwood appears to have presumed necessary and sufficient conditions related to craft and art. He also seems to have accepted historic rhetoric that disenfranchised craft from the rights given to art. An example of this rhetoric is found with the debates between English architect and archeologist C.R. Cockerell and artist Richard Redgrave in 1846. Cockerell stated that while the painter’s art may be called a poetical art, the art of the architect, designer, or craftsperson was prosaic. Peter Dormer stated in his book *The Culture of Craft* (1997) that the views of Cockerell revealed the continuing sense that high art was identified with poetry and non-functional objects. For a work of art to be a truly disinterested vehicle carrying artistic ideas, it had to be separated from perceivable use-value. It is odd, given Collingwood’s advocacy for class overlap that he seems to have accepted such rhetoric and strived to articulate discrete classes of art and craft.

Further to the point of necessary and sufficient conditions, contemporary art demonstrates a breadth and diversity that arguably would make it impossible for any one person to know

whether his or her proposed necessary and sufficient conditions would universally apply. Wittgenstein seems to have foreshadowed a similar state of affairs when he considered games in *Culture and Value*:

> Everything has become so intricate that mastering it would require an exceptional intellect. Because skill at playing a game is no longer enough; the question that keeps coming up is: can this game be played at all now and what would be the right game to play? (p. 27).

Undoubtedly, the skill sets that were once considered necessary to the creation of some art are no longer sufficient. More broadly, and under a designation definition in which anything may be designated as art, there appears to be no right way to do art; instead all possible ways are valid, without limits.

In considering the issue of art and non-art, philosopher Christy Mag Uidhir (2012) speculated that nominalism, or the naming of a thing, might ultimately win out in the battle of art ontologies. He wrote, "On a purely speculative front, I think that should aesthetics experience anything approximating a philosophical upheaval in the near future, it most likely will be in the form of nominalism establishing itself as the dominant art-ontological position." (p. 21, note). Mag Uidhir added that this might result in a full confusion of art and non-art:

> Perhaps we'll simply find artworks to be no more special an ontic sort than the relevant works of any putatively more mundane sort (e.g. poems no more ontologically special a thing than office memos, novels no stranger sort of object than stereo-instruction manuals, and symphonies no more metaphysically complex than advertising jingles) and thereby accordingly expect the ontology of art and the ontology of ordinary objects to be similarly populated. (p. 22)

Mag Uidhir may have suggested this ironically, however in my view we are now experiencing it. Resultantly, artistic research accepts a plurality of activities, practices, approaches, methods, and philosophies as noted by Yee and Bremner (2011). Artistic research may incorporate a broad spectrum of activities (Mäkelä, Nimkulrat, Dash, & Nsenga, 2011) and it can be characterized by a mix of heterogeneous forms and diverging goals (Busch, 2009).

3.4 Intention

The final point that requires consideration is that a designation of a thing as art presupposes the intention to designate the thing as art. In considering intention, it is relevant to start with philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe and her book *Intention* (1957) in which she pointed out that one can differentiate between "thinking of doing" and "doing." Anscombe said that it was absurd to think that an intended action took place only by describing the objective. Something had to happen; intention was related to the process of doing. The measure of the intention was the action.

Following her line of thinking, the statement "I intend to create art," is not enough for art to have been made because no action in relation to the "thinking of doing" takes place. It is intention without action. The statement, "This is art" is an action of designation which most likely presupposes the intention of designating. This view aligns with that of Anscombe. Whether one creates art or designates art, the intention to do an action is followed by the action.

Mag Uidhir in his book *Art & Art-Attempts* (2013) took a somewhat different view regarding intention. Intention alone, or designation alone, was insufficient for a thing to be art. For Mag Uidhir, intention-dependence was a necessary condition for art in the following manner:

A thing *W* was art if and only if *W* was the product of a successful art-attempt in which art was the intended goal of that attempt and the resulting thing possessed the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being art. The mere fact of being designated art would tell one nothing interesting about what it was to be the thing of art. In contrast to G.E.M. Anscombe, the result of the intention and action also had to fulfill necessary and sufficient conditions for being art.

To make a painting, within the parameters proposed by Mag Uidhir, one must intend to make a painting, and one must do an activity that is the right sort of attempt for making a painting, and upon completion of the painting, the painting must demonstrate the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a painting.

One of my first questions in reading Mag Uidhir was whether and how he considered Duchamp's readymade art. The single example discussed by Mag Uidhir is a note written by Duchamp in 1916 in which the artist said he was thinking of signing the Woolworth Building in New York City and thereby converting it into one of his readymades. Mag Uidhir was willing to grant that Duchamp's other readymades had been accepted as art and so the intention and art-attempt had been the right sort of action necessary for the creation of art. However, Mag Uidhir was not willing to grant that the intention to sign the building was the right sort of art-attempt to result in the building being art. The failure for the building to be art, even when designated by Duchamp, rested on the building's lacking the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being art. In other words, a building would be recognized presumably by the general public or by other artists as belonging to the class of objects called architecture, but not to the class of objects called art.

Mag Uidhir provided an example of what he meant by the right sort of art-attempt as follows: He said he could attempt to build a doghouse, but if he created something that would not be classed a doghouse as it would fail to house a dog, then it would not be a doghouse. In Mag Uidhir's argument, the result of an art-attempt could fail to be art for a number of reasons:

a) the artifact was non-standard (did not fit what art is/has been considered to be art by some group),
b) the result failed to fulfill the right art actions or art properties even though the actions seemed right. In attempting to paint a portrait, one could end up with a blob of paint, which would not be art even though it had aesthetic properties,
c) the result could fail to be art if it was the product of a failed art-attempt, for example a thing like a mask made with no intention to be art, and
d) the resulting thing was not an artifact—the goal to make a chair required that a chair be made, the chair could not be made only by intention or thinking about a chair.

The conditions that Mag Uidhir required are problematic in relation to the past hundred years of art, but more fundamentally, they rely upon unstated necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be art. He grants that Duchamp exhibited the right sort of intention and art-attempt because the readymades were previously accepted as art. However, when first exhibited and rejected from the Armory show, Duchamp's *Fountain* was not considered by some people to be art, it was non-standard, and it had been created to be something other than art. Yet, at some point in time, without any further artistic intervention by the artist, the non-standard, rejected work somehow obtained and satisfied the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to allow Mag Uidhir to consider it art.

Mag Uidhir wrote, “something is an artwork only if the way in which that thing comes to satisfy the conditions for being art (whatever those may be)” (p. 23) in addition to being the product of intentional action. He further stressed in a footnote that those who do not possess the concept of art can undertake art-attempts and if they succeed they produce art and if they fail they produce failed-art. So it seems the argument as to whether a thing can be art for Mag Uidhir relies upon the work of art being the product of a correct intentional action and that it conforms to unarticulated necessary and sufficient condition inherent in works of art from history, not all but some that satisfy the conditions for being art “whatever those may be” (2013, p. 23).

I take a substantially different point of view in offering a designation definition of art. In the designation definition, intention cannot fail. One intends to designate with no action, which is intention. Or, one intends to designate and then designates, which is an action of designating. Once a thing is designated as art, the result is always art. Further, the refusal to designate a thing as art does not preclude another person designating the thing as art. Art can come about simply by the action of designation, which is merely assigning the thing to a particular class of objects. Designation says nothing more about the object so designated.

CHAPTER 4: CLAIM AND SUBSTANTIATION

4.1 A Work of Art is a State of Affairs

A work of art exists when a thing is created as or designated as a work of art. I now claim that the work of art is a "state of affairs," following the definition of Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein wrote, "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)" (2.01, p. 5). A work of art is generally a combination of things, or is at least a thing in space, and is therefore a state of affairs. This definition puts no limitations upon the form, context, or duration of the art.

In Wittgenstein's conception, the work of art, which he called a picture, was a state of affairs that most often referenced reality, or what was perceived in the world. For example, a field, haystacks, and sky in a painting by Monet, would reference a field, haystacks, and sky in the real world. Wittgenstein spent a good deal of time considering the relationship between the picture and reality in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. He wrote, "what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way" (2.14, p. 9). The way these elements were related "represents that things are related to one another in the same way" (2.15, p. 9). Again, in the Monet painting, the color, size, and position of the element one would call the sky would hold a relationship to the color, size, and position of the element one would call a haystack. This in turn would relate to the relationship of the color, size, and position of the sky and haystack of the world.

Wittgenstein did not extend his analyses of pictures to abstract, or non-iconic art in which reality, to use his word, was intended or depicted. However, he did attempt to articulate the ways

in which the specific elements in a picture could be related to one another in a determinate but non-referential manner in various sections of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations* as follows. If we take proposition 2.14 of the *Tractatus* as standing on its own, which I think we can as it is a separate proposition, Wittgenstein says the elements in a picture are related. This constitutes a fact, as next stated in proposition 2.141. In my view, had Wittgenstein intended to say that a fact of a picture occurs if and only if it correlates to reality, he would have allowed proposition 2.15 to stand alone without proposition 2.14. In proposition 2.172 he writes, "A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it" (p. 9). Here Wittgenstein uses the German *Form der Abbildung* for pictorial form, translated by Ogden and Ramsey (2014) as "form of representation" (p. 18). In Europe and North America, the term "pictorial form" is commonly used to describe the arrangement of elements in a work of art, often called the formal properties of a work of art or the manner in which the elements of a work of art, such as the colors or forms, relate. Wittgenstein in proposition 4.122 says that we can talk about formal properties "formelen Eigenschaften" (2014, p. 42) of a state of affairs. Later in his *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein considers understanding a picture. He writes regarding a still-life, "I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour on the canvas" (§526, p. 151). In these remarks, Wittgenstein begins to conceptualize a picture as a combination of non-iconic elements in relation to each other. It is an idea that remains relatively unarticulated, which may be due in part to his conception of a picture as iconic and correlated with reality.

The first person to clarify this subject was, in my opinion, British aesthetician and founder of the British Society of Aesthetics, Harold Osborne in his book *Abstraction and Artifice*

in Twentieth-Century Art (1979). In considering works of art and drawing upon his knowledge of Information Theory, Osborne noted that when a work of art was representational, it carried information about things in the world outside itself, such as the colors and shapes of those things. Osborne called this sort of information "semantic information" (p. 181). This was a view that Osborne traced back to Plato: "Hence such remarks as that of Plato, who said in the *Laws* that you cannot judge the success of a work of representation unless you are independently familiar with the thing it represents" (p. 181). The success of a work of art was judged as correlated with the reality the work depicted and this is a position much like that taken by Wittgenstein in his picture theory. Osborne next described a continuum of representation that at one end was populated by works that were highly representational and that moved to works of art in which the representational information was deliberately reduced. He called this latter sort of work "aspect realism" in which the artist's aspect or viewpoint predominated over accurate representation. An example is the difference between a representational, realistic looking interior painted by Johannes Vermeer and a Cubist painting by Picasso in which the objects are fragmented and rendered as geometric shapes.

Osborne also wrote that art works imparted information about "their own sensory properties and structure. He called this sort of information "*syntactical information*" (p. 182). The general sense of his intended meaning most closely resembles the usage found in semiotics in which syntax is the relation of signs in formal structures. Osborne noted that as the 20th century progressed, art increasingly emphasized the presentation of syntactical information as artists became interested in making an "artefact expressly to be seen in its own right for what it in itself is" (p. 182). Syntax, as Osborne used the term, is a part of all works of art. A Monet

painting of haystacks, in addition to depicting a field, haystacks and sky, also presents syntactic information, which would be information about its materials, colors, size, structure, shape, marks, brushstrokes, and so forth.

It is this recognition that a work of art presented both semantic information and syntactical information that I think Wittgenstein grappled with, in *Philosophical Investigations* in particular. He seems to state the difference in §522 and §523 in response to the question about what a picture might tell him. He wrote, "'A picture tells me itself' is what I'd like to say. That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in *its* own forms and colours" (p. 150). In *Philosophical Grammar* he wrote, "That a picture tells me something consists in its own form and colours" (p. 27). Both of these statements indicate syntactical information. Wittgenstein's use of the word *tells* (he uses the German word "sagt") could be subject to misreading and so I wish to clarify using his words: "A picture's telling me something will consist in my recognizing in it objects in some sort of characteristic arrangement" (p. 26). So he means not so much that the picture "tells" as he means the picture provides the stimulus for perception. Wittgenstein also notes the duality of objects when he writes, "the shape I see is not simply a shape, but is one of the shapes I know" (p. 26). In these instances, Wittgenstein directs attention to both the semantic and the syntactical content.

In building on Wittgenstein's thoughts, I am claiming that art is a state of affairs of the artistic kind. The state of affairs presents a combination of things, which if considered to be a combination of syntactical elements, is equally applicable to iconic and non-iconic art.

4.2 States of Affairs of the Artistic Kind and Propositional Belief Formulated About a State of Affairs.

A state of affairs of the artistic kind, or art, may be created or designated. This state of affairs, however, in and of itself is not a proposition or propositional belief. This is not to deny that at times a state of affairs, such as a painting, may include further states of affairs that appear propositional such as a sentence painted upon a canvas. Following the creation or designation of the state of affairs of the artistic kind, propositional belief about it may be formulated. A proposition is whatever can be true or false, according to Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* (§136, p. 58). The general form of a proposition, according to Wittgenstein was to state, "This is how things are" (§134, p. 57), which he considered to be the same as the explanation. Furthermore, he wrote that "a proposition is whatever can be true or false" (§136, p. 58). Upon seeing a square one can express the proposition, "This is a square," which may be proven true or false. The square itself is not true or false, it is simply a square. Wittgenstein seems to have considered this idea when in his *Notebooks* (1961/1998) when he wondered if one could negate a picture. His answer was that one could not. He wrote,

> And in this lies the difference between picture and proposition. The picture can serve as a proposition. But in that case something gets added to it which brings it about that now it *says* something. In short: I can only deny that the picture is right, but the *picture* I cannot deny. (26.11.14, p. 33)

I suggest that the expression of propositional belief is not strictly limited to propositions as described by Wittgenstein, but that the expression may also take other forms of thought and speech acts, such as questions, that arguably rely upon propositional belief. I therefore use

"propositional beliefs" rather than "propositions" to assist with clarity and to slightly broaden the conception to account for forms of expression such as questions that may be formulated regarding a state of affairs.

A similar conceptualization is found in the work of philosopher Robert Audi (2011), although he used terminology more common to the field of epistemology. He wrote, "objectual belief is *de re*—of the thing—whereas propositional belief is *de dicto*—of the proposition" (p. 32). Audi added that objectual cases required no particular concept of the thing perceived. One could hear that a piano was out of tune (objectual belief). One could also hear the tuner say that the piano needed tuning (propositional belief). Audi continued that in objectual belief, "some perceptions may also be plausibly conceived as simply attributions of a perceptible property to the thing perceived" (p. 21). An objectual belief might be true of the object rather than simply true. He provided the example of a pre-lingual child who is offered a liquid that the child sees to be milk, and yet who does not believe, or disbelieve, the proposition that the liquid is milk. Thus, the child has objectual belief, and has not yet formed an opinion regarding a propositional belief. He wrote, "objectual perceiving seems possible without propositional perceiving" (p. 24-25). Once more there is a distinguishing between a state of affairs and the propositional belief about the state of affairs.

Audi also took the view that the existence of a state of affairs did not demand nor guarantee the formulation of propositional belief about the state of affairs. He wrote, "objectual perceiving seems possible without propositional perceiving, but not conversely, the former seems relative to the latter" (p. 24-25). The formulation of propositional belief about a state of affairs depends upon the existence of a state of affairs. The state of affairs does not depend upon the

formulation of propositional belief about the state of affairs. This, for Audi, was a perceptual hierarchy in which "propositional perceiving depends upon objectual perceiving" (p. 25). He concluded, "seeing an object (always) gives one *prima facie justification* for believing something or other about it" (p. 28). Wittgenstein seems to have reached a similar conclusion regarding the differentiation and hierarchical arrangement of a state of affairs in relation to propositions in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. A state of affairs was prior to the consideration of the state of affairs. He wrote, "Logic is *prior* to every experience—that something *is so*. It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to the question 'What?'" (5.552, p. 55). The thing that is precedes experiences about the thing that is.

According to Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the simplest kind of proposition was an elementary proposition. An elementary proposition "asserts the existence of a state of affairs" (4.21 p. 30). However, because one could formulate many propositions about a state of affairs, Wittgenstein added the caveat, "A proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation, but it is always a complete picture of *something*" (5.156, p. 41). An example of an elementary proposition is the phrase "This is a painting by Monet." The proposition asserts that there is a painting by Monet; however, the proposition tells us nothing about the semantic or syntactical content of the painting. Wittgenstein wrote in *Culture and Value* about elementary propositions, "the work of art does not aim to convey *something else*, just itself" (1977, p. 58).

There have been late-modernist and contemporary artists who have created art that was intended to do little more than present this sort of self-referential elementary proposition. For example, between 1966-1968, artist John Baldessari created a work of art titled *A Painting That*

Is Its Own Documentation. This painting presented, with painted text, the initial idea and completion date of the painting. As the painting was exhibited, each exhibition date and venue were added. More canvases were added to the first to include the documentation of subsequent exhibitions of the painting. One way to consider this work of art is that elementary propositions, in this case elementary propositions about the creation and exhibition history of the work of art, are the principal content of the work of art.

Art theorist Thierry de Duve also wrote about the manner in which an elementary proposition could be the content of a work of art in his book *Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp's Passage from Painting to the Readymade* (1991) For de Duve, a work of art was "a signifier with no other signification than its own quality of being a signifier, or a nomination that names no more than its naming function" (p. 65). To translate his statement into the language that I have been using so far, a state of affairs of the artistic kind could function primarily to assert propositionally the state of affairs that it presented. Another appropriate example to illustrate this idea is Walter De Maria's *The New York Earth Room* (1977). This work, still on exhibit, consists of 197 cubic meters of earth filling a 3,600 square foot gallery to a height of 22 inches (Dia Art Foundation, n.d.). The state of affairs, the earth in the room in New York, is echoed by the elementary proposition of the artwork's title that simply asserts the state of affairs, *The New York Earth Room.* No further function of either the art or title is intended, as far as I am aware.

The sorts of propositional beliefs one might formulate in looking at a state of affairs of the artistic kind, are not entirely without boundaries. In creating, artists frequently make choices that direct the possible propositional beliefs formed. Thus, a viewer, upon seeing a red square in

a painting may be more likely to formulate a propositional belief about the red square and be less likely to formulate a propositional belief about a silhouetted sailboat off of Antarctica.

Young (2001) wrote in his book *Art and Knowledge* that "Artworks cannot provide rational demonstrations of perspectives, but they can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of a perspective. That is, artworks can put audiences in a position to recognize the rightness of a perspective" (p. 69). Perspectives were not true or false, rather only a way of looking at things. Choices made in the creation of a work of art would thus support the artist's perspective. Wittgenstein held a comparable viewpoint in *Culture and Value* when he wrote that "A work of art forces us—as one might say—to see it in the right perspective" (1977, p. 4). He suggested that a state of affairs could be created or designated to force, or perhaps help a viewer see it in the right perspective. He then wondered if one might be justified in forming a certain propositional beliefs about a state of affairs, and his answer was that different propositional beliefs could be formed with different justifications.

Wittgenstein in the *Notebooks* suggested that for a picture to be a proposition, something else had to be added (26.11.14) and later considerations of the matter by other philosophers seem to uphold his view. In discussing whether a picture could be a proposition, Shier (1997) said that our reading of a picture is a use of a picture in accordance to our conventions regarding its use. The picture, qua picture, neither affirmed nor denied the pictured state of affairs, although it would be taken as an affirmation as standing inside the conventions governing the use of such pictures. Shier's argument was that a proposition is the result of a certain kind of mental act. It required that the viewer project in thought the possible state of affairs or something about the possible state of affairs.

Shier looked at Wittgenstein's picture theory and at Anscombe's (1959) analysis of the same, and he concluded that Anscombe had made an important point that she then seemed to overlook, which he extended as follows: "it is in some sense our *use* of the picture that must be 'added to the picture' to produce a definite proposition" (Shier, 1997, p. 70). Shier's point was that there was nothing that could be done internal to the picture that would make the picture a proposition. Adding or subtracting picture elements only altered the relationship between the elements; it only transformed the state of affairs into a different state of affairs. Shier was clear, a picture by itself was not a proposition. He wrote that a picture "is not yet a proposition since it can still be used to make either the positive or negative claim" (p. 73). It was one's use of the picture allowed the formulation and expression of a proposition. In Shier's opinion, Wittgenstein was forced into this sort of position too. Shier considered the proposition to be the result of a certain kind of mental act, of thinking in a relationship with the physically sensible picture. One could project, or express, a thought in relation to the picture, or state of affairs.

4.3 Tacit Knowledge is Not Propositional Knowledge

I agree with Shier (1997) that a picture is not a proposition and that something must be added to it to produce the proposition. In contrast, a belief exists in which a work of art seemingly functions as a proposition because a form of knowledge called tacit knowledge, which is not conveyed discursively, is said to be embodied in and transmitted by the work of art. This deserves scrutiny.

The two authors most frequently cited in support of tacit knowledge are scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi in his book *The Tacit Dimension* (1966/1996) and educator Donald

Schön in his book *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action* (1983). Polanyi wrote, "*we can know more than we can tell*" [author's emphasis] (p. 4), which seems to exemplify the position most usually taken with tacit knowledge.

Some authors writing on artistic research have accepted the idea that art carries or transmits tacit knowledge. Newbury (1996) wrote, "A well-designed object or piece of sculpture embodies the knowledge and research employed in its production as does the scientists [sic] formulae or the sociologist's written text" (p. 9). According to Nielsen (2002), such knowledge was virtually impossible to articulate. Niedderer (2007) considered tacit knowledge to be experiential knowledge, and she drew upon Schön's "knowing-in-action"(1983, p. 49) in characterizing it. Experiential knowledge was intuitive or automatic, which contrasted knowledge generated by research that was propositional, cognitive, and explicit. Neuweg (2004) saw knowledge as more coachable than teachable. As an example, compare the firing temperature of a kiln that may be conveyed with words with the teaching of the forming a clay pot on the potter's wheel lay that might be seen as best demonstrated demonstrated or guided.

A common presupposition regarding tacit knowledge is that it may be successfully retrieved or transmitted from the object to the viewer. Borgdorff (2007) suggested that tacit knowledge could be retrieved by viewers using experimental and hermeneutic methods. The difficulty in holding this position is that artifacts are states of affairs, and as such cannot express propositional belief, therefore the artifact is unable to transmit knowledge. Knowledge held by an artist may impact the making of a work of art, and certainly there are actions that once learned become internalized and require less than a conscious awareness for their use. Viewers can formulate propositional beliefs about the work of art, they may be directed to formulate certain

propositional beliefs rather than others by the choices of the artist, viewers may bring their own knowledge bases to bear on the propositional beliefs they formulate, and they can perhaps express propositional beliefs that speculate about the knowledge base of the art's creator, but there is no transmission of knowledge by the work of art. A cup cannot convey its history or the creative process behind it, nor does it convey information about the artist or artists who made the cup.

James Elkins, art historian and art critic, shares my view in dismissing the conveyance of tacit knowledge by an artifact in his article *What Do Artist's Know?* (2010). He wrote, "What exactly do you learn, for example, from the Sistine Ceiling? (Other than Christian doctrine, which Michelangelo would assume you already knew.) What knowledge do you get from a Mondrian painting?" (p. 29). For Elkins, tacit knowledge depended on unreliable and idiosyncratic concepts such as the intuition of the viewer and resultantly there could be no consistency in the knowledge supposedly transmitted.

In writing up a guide for practice-based research at the PhD level at the University of Technology, Sydney, Linda Candy (2006) advised against tacit knowledge. She wrote, "That we have achieved new implicit or tacit knowledge is clearly not relevant because, by definition, it is not shared" (p. 5). Any argument that relied upon the unshared, private knowing of an individual was not knowledge appropriate for PhD research. A similar argument was used by Scrivener (2002) as a compelling reason to deny the transmission of tacit knowledge by works of art. If knowledge could be shared tacitly, the tacit knowledge gained from looking at an object by many different viewers would exhibit a consistency. However, such consistency was not to be found. The tacit knowledge supposedly conveyed was wildly varied and individual. He concluded,

"Since this [consistency] is a proposed prerequisite of shared knowing, it is unlikely that artworks function as a means of sharing knowledge" (Recapitulating, para. 3). As Scrivener pointed out, the problem with tacit knowledge is that shared knowledge is presupposed, which upon closer analysis is often not shared nor even readily identifiable. For Diamond (2004) the belief in tacit knowledge arose from an outdated conception of art in which one was asked to accept some mysterious element in art that on the one hand defied linguistic articulation and on the other hand was transmittable or discoverable and clearly received by viewers. Nielsen (2002) suggested that the main purpose of unclear, unidentifiable tacit knowledge was to help solidify communities of practitioners, to provide a means for new professions to legitimize themselves, and to help artists distinguish themselves by way of artistic intuition from the community of scientific rationality. Better, Nielsen thought, was to describe concretely the various activities that took place within a practice.

There may indeed be forms of knowledge that are difficult to transfer with words or for which a demonstration without words is an efficacious means, but it should not be inferred, either by the lack of desire or inability to articulate such forms of knowledge, that it is solely tacit and therefore discursively inexpressible.

4.4 Locating the Site of Research in Artistic Research

Artistic practices normally demonstrate an intertwining of the creation of states of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional knowledge about those states of affairs, during and after their creation as in the following scenario.

Scenario a: Subject *S* intends to make art, places a mark of paint on a canvas and after doing so, reflects upon the mark on the canvas and says or thinks, "There is one mark on the canvas." Both the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs has occurred.

My claim is that two conditions must be met for artistic research to occur. These are, a) that a state of affairs of the artistic kind is created or designated and jointly, b) that propositional belief is formulated about that state of affairs. I will now present a series of scenarios that further demonstrate and then test this claim.

It might be presupposed that a state of affairs of the artistic kind and propositional beliefs formulated about that state of affairs are always conjoined. The claim that artistic creation is artistic research in most instances rests upon this claim. However, it would be a mistake to believe that the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and propositional belief formulated about that state of affairs are in every case intertwined. A scenario will illustrate the possibility of decoupling them. If this separation is possible, which I suggest it is, the site in which research is initiated in artistic research may be located.

Scenario b: Subject *S* is asked to sit beside an opaque screen. Her arm is numbed and she is directed to thrust it through a hole in the screen, without being informed of the reason. She is asked to focus her attention and thoughts toward a television, which is easy for her to do because it broadcasts her favorite show. Once her arm is through the screen, a robot places an unseen implement, which happens to be a paint brush, into her hand. A robot behind the screen at times moves a palette of paint in contact with the brush that *S* holds and at other times moves a stretched canvas in contact with the brush. At the end of an allotted time, the brush is removed

from *S*'s hand and *S* leaves with no further knowledge about the event. The most that *S* might know is that an activity may have taken place behind the screen although she was unaware of the nature of that activity.

According to both Shier (1997) and Wittgenstein in the *Notebooks*, the state of affairs, or picture, is not *ipso facto* a proposition—something must be added. I suggest this added component is the formulation of a propositional belief about the state of affairs. In *Scenario b* above, a state of affairs was created, yet subject *S*, if we accept that she had no knowledge of the existence of that state of affairs, was unable to formulate propositional belief about that state of affairs. Normally, the creation of art involves an intertwining of the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind, and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs as it would be nearly impossible for artists not to formulate propositional belief about the state of affairs throughout the process of creating the state of affairs. In *Scenario b*, the formulation of propositional belief about the state of affairs did not occur. The creation of a state of affairs took place, which might be accepted as a state of affairs of the artistic kind. However, propositional belief was not formulated by *S* about that state of affairs and therefore, both conditions for artistic research were not met.

The decoupling of the activities as shown in *Scenario b* suggests other scenarios which in turn raise further questions for artistic research. A few of these are now presented.

Scenario c: Subject *S* creates a state of affairs without her knowledge, as detailed in *Scenario b*. Is it possible to say that subject *S* created a state of affairs of the artistic kind? To answer affirmatively would seem to indicate that subject *S* created a work of art without any intention of or knowledge about creating a work of art.

Scenario d: Subject *S* creates a state of affairs without her knowledge, as detailed in *Scenario b*. Later, *S* walks into a gallery where the canvas now hangs. *S* sees it, either designates it as art or accepts it as art, and then formulates propositional belief about that art. Have both conditions regarding art and research been met for artistic research to occur?

Scenario e: Subject S creates a state of affairs without her knowledge, as detailed in *Scenario b*. Later, another person, viewer *W*, walks into a gallery where the canvas now hangs.Viewer *W* designates the canvas to be a state of affairs of the artistic kind, or viewer *W* simply accepts the canvas as art based on its correspondence to other similar things that are considered art. Here it seems that a third person can designate a thing as a work of art without any knowledge about the manner in which the state of affairs came into existence, and without the knowledge or consent by the artist. A rationale for this may be backed up by McEvilley (1998) who said that the fact one could designate a thing as art meant that it was art for the person designating, but this alone said nothing about what other people considered the thing to be. Accepting things as works of art in the way that viewer *W* did is common, as when people walk into a gallery or museum. In doing so, people likewise may have no knowledge of the artist or events around the artifact's creation.

Scenario f: The events of *Scenario e* occur. In addition, the viewer *W* who has designated or accepted the state of affairs of the artistic kind formulates propositional belief about that state of affairs without any knowledge of the manner in which the state of affairs came into being. Does artistic research occur now? In other words, if an artist creates art, but someone else then formulates propositional belief about that art, does artistic research occur? This sort of formulation of propositional belief about states of affairs of the artistic kind is precisely what

critics and art historians do. A critic may stand in front of the Monet painting and formulate propositional belief about the painting, and so the critic appears to be undertaking artistic research. It is not artistic research undertaken by Monet, but it is artistic research in relation to a work of art by Monet. If activities taking the form of *Scenario f* are to be accepted as artistic research, it seems that current conceptions of artistic research would need to change significantly. In a recent editorial for the *Journal for Artistic Research* (2014), Michael Schwab saw this as one of the unresolved questions in the discourse (e.g. Schwab, 2014).

Similarly, one may view a painting by Monet in a museum and suggest that Monet undertook artistic research. The acceptance of the state of affairs of the artistic kind is easy because the painting is before the viewer. But, the research component is apparently designated without any further knowledge about the manner in which the artifact came into being. In holding this position, one most likely presupposes that normally the creation of works of art involves the intertwining of the creation of states of affairs and the formulation of propositional belief about those states of affairs. While my claim supports this presupposition, there is no absolute guarantee for this view. The Monet before the viewer might be the sole painting that Monet painted sitting before an opaque screen as in *Scenario b*, and thus without any knowledge that he painted it.

Scenario g: Artist *A* creates a state of affairs of the artistic kind and formulates propositional belief about that state of affairs, and so artistic research occurs. Years later, artist *B* revises the work of art done by artist *A*. This was the situation with Leonardo da Vinci's *The Last Supper*, which is said to have been completely repainted by Michelangelo Bellotti, the first of a total of eight "restorations" (Palmer, 2012). How does this scenario affect artistic research?

Scenario h: Artist *A* creates a state of affairs of the artistic kind, and formulates propositional belief about that state of affairs. Years later artist *A* revises the work of art. This is the case with artist Pierre Bonnard who is said to have snuck into a museum to revise one of his paintings that he had not seen in years (Graham-Dixon, 1998). How does this scenario affect artistic research?

Scenario i: Artist *A* intends to create art but much or all of the artist's oeuvre is painted by others. For example, assistants painted a good deal of the paintings by Peter Paul Rubens. Artist Mark Kostabi hires teams of people to conceptualize, design, select designs to be painted, and paint the final paintings, without necessarily any input from the artist. Richard Prince has at times designated another person's art as his own. Again, these scenarios raise questions about artistic research.

4.5 The Formulation of Propositional Belief About a State of Affairs of the Artistic Kind is Research in Artistic Research

I claim then that artistic research as a compound concept requires that two activities be identified as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions:

1) The creation or designation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind, and

2) the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs.

As a reminder, research, according to Hatch and Shiu (1998) is "*the intentionally controlled examination of issues [within and related to the domain]…through a process of inquiry that leads to the production of (provisional) knowledge both about the objects of the inquiry and the means of carrying out that inquiry*" [italics in original] (p. 313). A state of affairs

cannot examine nor can it inquire; it cannot undertake an action of research. The actions of examining and the process of inquiring may only be undertaken by a person. The component of research is the formulation of propositional belief, which may be characterized as an intentionally controlled examination. Propositional belief formulated in response to a state of affairs of the artistic kind, without further qualification, indicate an intention to examine the issue, in a controlled manner within the domain, as part of a process of inquiry, that leads to knowledge, which may be provisional.

In his book *Art and Knowledge* (2001), James Young wrote, "I believe that every item properly classified as a work of art can contribute to human knowledge. I maintain that all artworks possess cognitive value" (p. 1). Works of art, in his opinion had the capacity to cause new mental states, which then were cognitive states. These presumably would be formulated as true belief, taking the form of a proposition. Similarly, Robert Audi (2011) suggested, "knowledge that *p* (propositional knowledge) must be grounded in some appropriate connection to the fact that *p* (or whatever it is in virtue of which *p* is true)" (p. 109). He added that a basic source of knowledge is roughly one that grounds it without epistemic dependence on any other source. He saw sensory experience as a basic ground for knowledge. And so he wrote, "'standard' cases of knowledge are instances of belief" (p. 111). Respectively, this formulation of a propositional belief is the component of research in artistic research in which the basic ground for knowledge, to use Audi's phrase, is the state of affairs of the artistic kind.

In *Scenario b* presented in chapter *4.4 Locating the Site of Research in Artistic Research*, it might be accepted that subject *S*, created art. Yet, because subject *S* had no knowledge of the creation of the art, subject *S* was unable to formulate propositional belief about the art. Thus, no

research was initiated. There appears to be two ways to consider this. To say that the art conveys or transmits research confuses a state of affairs with the formulation of propositional belief about the state of affairs. Upon seeing the artifact alone, viewers may not have explicit access to the research that went into the making of the art, if any. On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to rely upon our knowledge that in the vast majority of creative practices that both components are not decoupled; the creation of a changing state of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs are normally ongoing, sequential, and simultaneous. Therefore, upon seeing the work of art, one may reasonably presuppose that research was a part of the creative process. An artist may forefront the creative practice, as did Picasso, or an artist may forefront the research as did Alfredo Jaar in considering his practice when he wrote: "My work is 99% thinking and 1% making" (Shtromberg, 2013, para. 12). Consequently, the following may be provisionally asserted: For artistic research to occur, a state of affairs of the artistic kind must be created or designated by a person (or artistic collective) and the same person (or artistic collective) must also formulate propositional belief about that state of affairs. It is a provisional assertion because there are instances as detailed in chapter 4.4 *Locating the Site of Research in Artistic Research* in which this assertion is put to the test. It is yet unclear if and how conceptions of artistic research might change due in answering those scenarios.

Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén (2005) wrote, "It is not very productive to carry out artistic research in such a way that a person is first the artist who does the art and then becomes the researcher in order to study that artist" (p. 58). In their view, the separation of the artist and the researcher was unlikely, and it would lead to a "methodological failure: there is no conscious thematization of the relationship between the artistic and scientific research" (p. 58). In their

opinion, the artist would be asked to continually stop being an artist and to switch into the role of a researcher. In actuality, artists normally create and reflect upon their actions and outcomes throughout the creative process. Often they deliberately stop working to analyze and critique their work and process, or in instances of self-quantification art, the artist may purposely take a position of auto-ethnographer. This indicates less a methodological failure and more of an expansion of our understanding of the sorts of activities done by artistic researchers. Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén said the fact that the artist and the researcher were most often the same person had meaning that would have to be accounted for in conceptions of artistic research. Primarily, it meant that there would be an interweaving of facts and values, which they said would be impossible for naïve research methods to handle.

One way to conceptualize the various roles of artists is to draw parallels with the manner in which Hatch and Shiu (1998) saw research generated by those working in the field of medicine: Dedicated researchers and practitioners, generalists and specialists all contributed their unique understandings to the body of knowledge. This suggests that there may be varying types of artistic researchers with differing emphases and agendas and that it may not be particularly productive to assume that all artistic researchers hold the same beliefs and goals.

CHAPTER 5: MODES OF ARTISTIC RESEARCH

5.1 Mode One of Artistic Research: Artistic Creation is Artistic Research

In mode one artistic research, the conditions for artistic research are met by the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind, and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs. No further epistemic justification is required for true belief or knowledge that is generated and transmitted by the expression of a propositional belief. In the example of the subject *S* who thrust an arm through an opaque screen in *Scenario b* of chapter *4.4 Locating the Site of Research in Artistic Research,* the uncoupling of the activities of creating a state of affairs of the artistic kind and propositional belief made about that state of affairs is not normally found in artistic practices. More usual is that the formulation of propositional belief in relation to the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind takes place throughout the process of creating and the two activities may be nearly impossible to distinguish. These combined activities indicate that knowledge is generated and transmitted.

In the literature surrounding artistic research, it is normally the indistinguishability of actions that are seen to be artistic and actions that are seen to be research that appear to provide a foundation for views that artistic creation is artistic research (e.g. Finley, 2005; Balkema 2004; Sheikh, 2009). Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén (2005) suggested that the accumulation of knowledge in the artistic field was the result of a form of research in which artists carried out research about the work, the network of art, their instruments, and themselves. Serig (2012) wrote, “Broadly stated, all artists do research when they do art” (p. 121). According to Malterud

(2009), one might do types of research without art but one could not make art without research. Day (2012) noted that art often inhabited the exact space that artistic research aspired to inhabit:

> 'Artistic research' must be judged by the same terms as art in general. If we disconnect from the traditions and capacities established in the last hundred years, we will throw out the baby with the bathwater, and cut off the legs upon which we stand. The risk is not just instrumentalizing art but abolishing it altogether in favor of some new form of design. This new field would turn out not to be an oasis, but only a mirage. (p. 20)

For Day, the domain of artistic research was not valid unless it accounted for the work of artists throughout history. For Hoffert (2010), "research in art and the visual contributes to knowledge in the same way as all disciplines do—research results in new knowledge" (p. 5). The manner in which contemporary art was intertwined with theoretical knowledge meant that it was a research practice in itself (Busch, 2009). Maharaj (2004) wrote, "Many of us must feel we've been doing 'artistic research' for years–without quite calling it that" (p. 39).

As Steyerl (2010) wrote, "It simply does not make any sense to continue the discussion as if practices of artistic research do not have a long and extensive history well beyond conceptual art practices" (p. 34). The discussion regarding this aspect of artistic research and art could end here. The creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and jointly the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs indicate the initiation of an intentionally controlled examination of issues that leads to provisional knowledge, and is the research component of artistic research.

5.2 Propositional Beliefs About a State of Affairs May Not Be Seen as Having the Same Value

It should not be inferred that all propositional beliefs about a state of affairs of the artistic kind have the same value. Propositional beliefs may demonstrate varying degrees of insight, depth, or understanding. Propositional beliefs may be true and well-framed, or false, poorly framed, and ill-chosen. On one hand, this fact is of little importance. Collingwood suggested in *An Essay on Metaphysics*, proposition 3, that the logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon its truth but upon its being supposed. While a proposition, according to Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* takes a form that can be proven to be true or false, the efficacy of a proposition is not dependent upon its being true. Wittgenstein took much the same viewpoint when he wrote in his *Notebooks*, "The proposition constructs a world by means of logical scaffolding....we can draw conclusions from a false proposition" (p. 16). For example, many propositional beliefs were asserted throughout the history of art about paintings that were later proven to have been misattributed, that were in actuality training copies done by apprentices, or were proven to be outright forgeries. The fact that the propositional beliefs were in part baseless did not necessarily invalidate the fact that conclusions could be drawn from them.

Propositional belief about states of affairs are also contingent upon the individual knowledge bases of those formulating the propositional belief. Upon seeing the Bridget Riley's optical painting *Current* (1966) with its wavy high contrast lines that create illusory colors, a viewer with little or no background in art may formulate a set of propositional beliefs that differ

significantly from those formed by a viewer with extensive knowledge regarding the history and functioning of optical art and the human eye/brain system. Robert Audi (2011) wrote, “Thus, in the very same situation, one person’s inference may be another’s perception” (p. 179). The educated viewer may just see things in the work that the less educated viewer can only draw inferences about.

The recognition that propositional beliefs may have different values may prompt a question such as: Is there a difference in the sort of knowledge acquired by George Stubbs in his anatomical studies of the horse and knowledge acquired by doodling, or absent-minded drawing? As a reminder, my claim is that knowledge in artistic research occurs as propositional belief is formulated about a state of affairs of the artistic kind. Therefore, firstly, the type or form of state of affairs of the artistic kind does not alter this occurrence. So the answer would be no. As the number of the propositional beliefs about a particular state of affairs increases, a body of knowledge may be constructed. To inquire whether the sort of knowledge acquired from a work by Stubbs versus a doodle is different may also essentially ask for judgmental determinations centered upon the complexity, quality, fecundity, or applicability of the body of constructed knowledge, which may not be able to be known in advance. In turn, any judgment will involve presuppositions about art and research as well as the contexts and purposes of that art. To suggest that the formulation of propositional belief is fundamentally different based upon different states of affairs of the artistic kind is mistaken. Such a view would raise a sorites paradox, class overlap problems, and problems around the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions.

5.3 Objections to Mode One Artistic Research

In the literature, some authors do not agree that knowledge is generated and transmitted through the formulation of propositional belief about a state of affairs. Instead, they suggest that further justification is needed. The reasons for such are most often not articulated by the authors but they seem to arise because authors presuppose that knowledge is justified true belief instead of true belief. It is worth looking at some of the objections to mode one artistic research that such authors hold.

In the opinion of Büchler (2006), allowing that the creation of art could generate and contribute to original knowledge in the community was problematic. She wrote, "Without the clear definition of indisputable criteria, the question of PbR [practice based research] is circular" (p. 10). If art was seen to generate knowledge, she worried that artists could obtain academic validation for their work with or without community acceptance or further justification. She wrote that, "the design of Brasília would have awarded Lúcio Costa a PhD and Picasso could have equally received the doctoral title for his 'Demoiselles D'Avignon' [sic]" (p. 8). It seems that her argument is now immaterial because many such precedents exist. Music composer and conductor Leonard Bernstein received twenty-two honorary doctorates over the course of his career (Bernstein, n.d.); visual artist Gerald McMaster received an honorary doctorate from the Emily Carr University of Art and Design in 2014, and painter, mixed media sculptor, and performance artist Faith Ringgold received an honorary doctorate from the Royal College of Art in London in 2013, to name but a few. It may be only a matter of time before conventional doctorates with questionable or implied scholarship are awarded.

One of the more usual recommendations by those who do not see artistic creation and the formulation of propositional belief about the art as generating valid knowledge is that artistic creation be situated within or parasitic upon academia (Newbury, 1996; Biggs & Karlsson, 2012). Doing so might allow for the creation of a canon of exemplars to be created (Kjørup, 2012) or academic norms and standards regarding research processes and assessment criteria that could be applied (Schwartz, 2012). These views are not uncommon and some authors in the more recent literature propose that the artistic research community has already decided that artistic research is best located within academia (e.g. Biggs & Karlsson, 2012). There is, in fact, no consensus on this issue. Bangma (2005) at the symposium on artistic research titled *Research Questions* at the National College of Art and Design, Dublin stated that the sticky problems of artistic research would be solved if it were located within formal learning institutions. She wrote,

> Rather than taking research as a way of understanding or defining artistic practice, as a redefinition or reevaluation of artistic practice, I would propose considering research as a particular institutional structure, or framework, in terms of a basis, setting, context or platform (institutional, physical, social, intellectual) which delineates [as] well as limits and excludes certain possibilities for artistic practices. (Bangma, 2005, p. 128)

She added that she was not fearful of the research model, because she found it no less enabling or limiting than the autonomous art paradigm—any paradigm that artistic research might exist within would enable and limit art in its own way. Suggestions that artistic research is universally best situated within or parasitic upon formal learning institutions seems unnecessarily limiting. On this point, I side with authors who believe that artistic research does not require institutional justification (Mäkelä, Nimkulrat, Dash, & Nsenga, 2011; Sevaldson, 2010), that it can withstand

academic pressures (Thun-Hohenstein, 2009), and that it can resist aping methods of scientific research (O'Riley, 2011; Busch, 2009).

Sullivan (2008a) investigated assumptions about artistic research and concluded that research was often mistakenly assumed to be a logical and linear process of intervention and inquiry. The main characteristic of artistic research, in his perspective, was reflexivity. A reflexive methodology was the subject of a book by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) in which reflexivity was defined as the mutual and continual manner in which the object of study is influenced by the researcher and the researcher is affected by the object. This appears to have been Sullivan's primary influence. The reflexive artistic practice was for Sullivan one in which knowledge creation was recursive and undergoing continual change as new experiences that arose from the process and progress of making art were considered. Artists reflected on information gathered from their practices and engaged in dialogues with the content and context of the larger field of information related to their individual inquiries. Sullivan suggested that the methodological implications of a reflexive process were: a) considering the observer and the observed as legitimate sources of knowledge, and b) the need to hold up knowledge, no matter how it was obtained, to critical scrutiny. Sullivan later expanded his views into a proto-theory of artistic research in his book *Art Practice as Research: Inquiry in the Visual Arts* (2010). Sullivan's reflexivity may be a part of normal art practices, however research in artistic research does not require community contextualization, justification, or scrutiny, even if the construction of a body of knowledge would benefit from such practices.

For some authors, the debate about whether artistic creation can be knowledge without further justification has been seen as requiring clarification (e.g. Dally, Holbrook, Lawry, &

Graham, 2004; Piantanida, McMahon, & Garman, 2003). As mentioned at the start of this section, authors who do not accept that the artistic practice alone can create valid knowledge appear mainly to disagree that true belief is knowledge. Philosopher Lorenzo Peña (1988) warned that many epistemologists were not intent on finding the best ways to acquire knowledge, but instead were interested in finding ways conducive to discovering truth, with "strongly justified true belief and nothing less as the only desirable goal of any epistemic enterprise" (p. 10). The main objection to the acceptance that true belief could be separated from its justification, according to Peña, was that such a position would leave one stranded on irrationalism and irresponsible wantonness, with knowledge reduced to "an idle and futile logomachy" (p. 9). The criticism was that without any justification, it would be impossible to distinguish true knowledge from false knowledge, and justification would be reduced to a rhetorical game. Peña challenged this objection. He presented guessing as an example in which little if any justification for knowledge is found. However, in his opinion, no guess was ever advanced without there being ever so faint or flimsy evidence supporting the guess, of which the guesser may have more or less knowledge. Peña then considered the justification of a belief and suggested that "no warrant lies on rocky, absolutely steadfast ground; or, more to the point that *being warranted* is no property of a belief: what instead exists is the relation of *being warranted by*" (1991, p. 4). Peña in his response suggests two things: first, any decision may be seen as having some form of justification, no matter how minimal, and second that there is no unconditional ground to which anyone can appeal for justification of any belief, in other words justification may be not be as stable as it is often assumed to be.

For states of affairs of the artistic kind, there is a distinct problem regarding justified true belief in that artists frequently break norms of truthful research. Mollin (2010) noted: “lying is good. It works. Falsification of documents is okay” (para. 31). Similarly, Andersson (2009) said “artists have used lying, cheating and copying as techniques” (para. 11). This inherent unreliability is similar to Picasso’s statement, “We all know that Art is not truth. Art is a lie that makes us realize truth” (Barr, 1946, p. 270). When an artist may be unreliable regarding truth, the art resultantly becomes problematic in terms of truth, and as a result, propositional beliefs about the work of art might be unjustified, or propositional beliefs might simply contain, a certain amount of error. Wittgenstein wrote about this sort of condition in *On Certainty*:

When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (1969/1998, p. 2)

Wittgenstein suggested that one could make certain assertions about reality that would have different degrees of assurance. Whether a proposition turned out to be true or false depended upon one’s determinants for that proposition.

In relation to a work of art, propositional belief may be formulated, but attempts to provide further justification may fail. Two examples of art will help make this point clear. Artist Tom Friedman claimed that he stared at a blank piece of white paper for one-thousand hours between the years of 1992 and 1997. The art work titled *1,000 Hours of Staring*, (1992-1997) now resides in the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art. Rugoff (2000) wrote that Friedman’s art “reminds us that our decision to invest something with meaning always involves an act of belief, even at times an irrational leap of faith” (para. 7). The fact that we have no

justification for the truth of Friedman's claim, beyond his claim, does not render the work of art invalid. Surety as to whether he was truthful in his claim about the hours spent staring in the form of further justification will not be found.

The second example is found in much of the art by Joseph Beuys. Beuys claimed to have survived a World War II airplane crash and subsequent rescue that was the impetus for many of his works. The events were accepted as fact for many years, but then their accuracy began to be doubted as new evidence and contradictions in his account emerged (e.g. Buchloh, Krauss, & Michelson, 1980; Knöfel, 2013). The artist died in 1986 having never cleared up the debate. Today there is a good deal of skepticism regarding his account. However, this is not necessarily seen as a problem, as Borer (1996) wrote:

> the legend of Beuys must be held for the truth, not because the facts at its source may be true (they have never been completely substantiated) but because a legend is neither 'true' nor 'untrue' […] but Joseph Beuys' legend must here be taken for the effect of truth, indispensable to any analysis of his work, and as such should be sung: in this way it is truthful. (p. 12-13)

Borer stated that facts provided by the artist were without reliable justification but that at times one was required to suspend justification in order to read the work in the manner that the artist intended, in this instance within the realm of myth. To engage with, discuss, and accept the art of Beuys is to operate on the basis of true belief, and to accept that the work has no further, independent justification.

Peña (1988) wrote that accepting true belief rather than justified true belief was probably a good thing,

Each time an established standard or canon of rational acceptance or justification can be dispensed with, or sidestepped—or overridden, or superseded—with true belief being enhanced as a result thereof, I think the sidestepping would all in all be a good thing, since thus an epistemic net gain would be secured. (p. 9)

Support for the suggestion that knowledge occurs without justification is also found with Wittgenstein's proposal that an assertoric sentence, one stating a fact such as a proposition, could be used as the basis for research and action. In *On Certainty* he wrote that the statement 'I know' expressed a relationship between "me and a fact" (p. 13). One could act with complete certainty but this certainty was one's own. Wittgenstein continued, "'I know it' I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief....What I know, I believe" (175 and 177, p. 25). Here, knowledge is seen as existing without justification beyond the fact that one believes it. Knowledge and the justification of that knowledge may be separated. Wittgenstein wrote, "'Knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories" (308, p. 39). Perhaps this understanding of true belief as opposed to justified true belief helps to provide more clarity regarding Wittgenstein's statement, "Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement" (378, p. 49).

Once knowledge is separated from justification, then the formulations of propositional belief about a state of affairs of the artistic kind, may be accepted as knowledge, and in turn artistic research. This is the basis of mode one artistic research.

5.4 Mode Two of Artistic Research: Delimited Forms of Artistic Research

It is logical to ask what form artistic research takes when the conditions of mode one are not considered as sufficient for artistic research to occur. Mode two artistic research indicates the employment of additional epistemic justification, or criteria, in order to provide sufficiency to artistic research. Mode two artistic research recognizes the view of authors in the literature who see additional justification as a requirement for artistic research; however, because mode two artistic research is inherently delimited in various manners, mode two forms are neither normative nor universally applicable.

Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén (2005) wrote, "One can only wonder why it is that when talking about artistic research the first questions to arise concern the demarcation or restriction of the field of study" (p. 153). Wittgenstein may be seen to have provided a possible answer in *The Blue Book* (1958/1998) in regard to thinking and philosophy. He wrote that there was, "the tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term" (p. 17). In his opinion, the root for wanting to find a common property came from reliance upon usual forms of expression. For example, if one has seen paintings created with paint on canvas, he or she may be inclined think, wrongly so, that paint and canvas are common to all paintings. Or, having seen that scientific method has been variously or effectively used, one might think, wrongly so, that all research utilizes scientific method. The delimitations are seen to provide justification. Wittgenstein continued to address this issue in *The Blue Book*:

Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the

treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer

questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive'. (Think of such questions as "Are there sense data?" and ask: What method is there of determining this? Introspection?) Instead of "craving for generality" I could also have said "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case". If, e.g., someone tries to explain the concept of number and tells us that such and such a definition will not do

or is clumsy because it only applies to, say, finite cardinals I should answer that the mere fact that he could have given such a limited definition makes this definition extremely important to us. (p. 18-19)

I am continually impressed by the similarities of Wittgenstein's views to those of Collingwood. Regarding this issue of looking to the past for methods, Collingwood (1933) discussed philosophical method and said that while we want to recall methods used in the past, we also want to avoid replacing a philosophical question by an historical one. Methods of the past, he wrote, must be treated as preliminaries with the final appeal to our experience of philosophical work.

Mode two of artistic research allows for delimitations, but as both Wittgenstein and Collingwood warned, examples and methods used at times in the past should not be generalized and adopted as universals. Instead, the delimitations put upon artistic research by further justification are more profitably seen as context and purpose driven. They are, according to artist

and Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal for Artistic Research* Michael Schwab, "drawn for a special purpose" (2007). Wittgenstein used the same phrase in *Philosophical Investigations* when he wrote, "we can draw a boundary—for a special purpose" (§69, p. 37).

The literature surrounding artistic research often shows authors confusing the issue in suggesting that further justification or delimitations define, provide legitimacy for, or validate artistic research. In doing so they often presuppose a) that knowledge is justified true belief rather than true belief and b) that scientism is a primary authority to which questions regarding the justification of the belief may be appealed. In using the word scientism I look to Sorell (1994) who characterized scientism as:

> The belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning—much the most valuable part because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial. Other beliefs related to this one may also be regarded as scientistic, e.g. the belief that science is the *only* valuable part of human learning, or the view that it is always good for subjects that do not belong to science to be placed on a scientific footing. (p. 1)

The scientistic view is seen in proposals for the adoption of scientific methods, approaches, or norms for artistic research activities. According to philosopher Lynne Rudder Baker (2003a, 2003b) scientism is an inductive argument in which it is believed that because science has explained more and more, it will eventually explain everything. She cast doubt on such a view, but in doing so noted that scientism was assumed by much of the educated world. Indeed, presuppositions of scientism are deeply embedded throughout the literature of artistic research. Consequences of the adoption of scientistic views include the need for an articulated research

question, the adoption of scientific method, the locating of artistic research within academia, or the requirement that results be discursively presented. These all potentially close down the possibilities of artistic research. As Baker pointed out, not everything that is both known and important is visible to science. She wrote, “The entities and properties recognized by the commonsense conception cannot be systematized into anything like a domain for scientific understanding” (2003a, p. 166). The view that all knowable reality was understandable or revealed by science was wrong.

Baker suggested that those who accept scientism often accept the premise that scientific knowledge is third-person knowledge. Those who advocate that forms of mode two artistic research be universally accepted likewise seem to presuppose a relationship between first-person and third-person knowledge, in which the valid knowable world is third-person knowledge, and resultantly best discoverable by scientific methods.

Upon the issue of first-person knowledge, I concur with Baker in that first-person knowledge may exist and that it is valid. Baker wrote that one may know a thing that is not known by others. Thus, this first-person knowledge cannot be replaced by third-person knowledge. By way of a syllogism, she concluded the following:

“All scientific knowledge is third-person knowledge.

Some genuine knowledge (i.e., first-person knowledge) is not third-person knowledge.

∴ Some genuine knowledge is not scientific knowledge” (2003a, p. 181).

When propositional belief is formulated about the state of affairs, both first-person and/or third-person knowledge can occur. First-person knowledge occurs when the formulation of a

propositional belief is known only to the person formulating the propositional belief. Third-person knowledge occurs when the propositional belief is received by another person.

A third-person view of knowledge often goes hand in hand with presuppositions that first-person knowledge makes the most sense when it is considered to be inherently linked knowledge within community contexts where shared knowledge may be tested, generalized, validated, accepted and rejected. As a result of this view, the requirement of disseminating knowledge to the community is seen to be a next natural step following individual inquiry.

By far the most prevalent delimitation proposed for artistic research is that the undertaking involve particular methods, usually those of science. This delimitation exists, in my view, because the research component of artistic research is mistakenly presupposed to be logical, systematic, and procedural. The second common delimitation attempts to position artistic research against some standard of validity or quality. This is most often revealed to be an absolute presupposition related to aesthetic ideals. The final common delimitation is that a discursive dissemination of results of artistic research is required. To the discussion of these three delimitations I now turn.

CHAPTER 6: DELIMITATIONS OF MODE TWO ARTISTIC RESEARCH

6.1 Delimiting by Methods

According to Lee Shulman, educational psychologist and past president of both the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the American Educational Research Association, few subjects have generated as many arguments among scholars as methods. Method, in his view, was the attribute which distinguished research from mere observation and speculation. He wrote,

> Scholars who agree on matters of method can pursue research questions in a parallel fashion and then argue over the results of their respective investigations. However, if they do not agree even on some matters of research method, then their findings are likely to be incommensurable. There will be no way to properly compare one inquiry with another. (1981, p. 5)

Shulman's stance was that artistic research ought to accept the framework of scientism. This position of aligning studio practices with the research paradigm of scientific method is one that Sullivan (2008a) saw as having begun in the later 1980s.

Methods proposed for artistic research are most often regulatory, procedural, or generalizable functions or steps (e.g. Gray & Malins, 2004; Law, 2004; Tormey & Sawdon, 2008). Methodological norms found in contemporary academia are often privileged (Serig, 2012) and are at times uncritically accepted as impartial and non-arbitrary criteria (Longino, 1990). For those who accept scientism, particular sets of scientific methods might be questioned, but the overall need for rules and procedures is not (Law, 2004).

Authors who presuppose scientism also seem to presuppose a dichotomy between art and science in which science has method and art subverts or avoids method (Boomgaard, 2008), research is seen as organized and systematic (Ernest, 1998) while inquiry is less rigorous (Phillips, 1995; de Vries, 2004), and the replicability of research is deemed important (Schippers & Flenady, 2009; Ochsner, Hug, & Daniel, 2012).

The development of beginner skills in art is often presented as requiring methods in a view that only later admits more chaotic and nonlinear processes of learning (Massaert, 2004; Cazeaux, 2008). Those determining art school curricula often accept that art should be taught much as it was at times in the past, in which particular skill sets are seen as foundational, for example as with learning perspective drawing, as though the creative practice can be reduced to sequential steps that mimic scientific method. This step by step approach subtly introduces a scientistic agenda, and it is probably the wrong way in which artistic creation and research should meet. Unfortunately, this type of view is widely supported by standards generating and quality assessment bodies. For example, the National Association of Schools of Art and Design (NASAD) states a second aim and objective as the need to "establish reasonable standards centered on the knowledge and skill sets" (p. 2) for academic and professional competence. The skill sets are considered as progressive as students move toward greater freedom in creating. This view regarding knowledge acquisition in art is antiquated and the skills that are often privileged in such frameworks have for many years been criticized as not particularly relevant for today's artists. Yet, the cachet and benefits of accreditation are often seen as necessary, and so curricula planners in art schools often both design and alter content in deference to such standards.

One response to the call for methods might be to do what those advocating for skill sets have normally done, to draw upon methods used in the past successfully by internationally known artists. A few of these methods are now described, which in turn will more clearly show that such a plan of action is productive only in a limited sense, which in turn will emphasize the caveat of Collingwood (1933) about replacing a philosophical question with an historical one, or in other words accepting and generalizing methods of the past for current use.

Artist Hans Haacke, in 1970, created a work of art titled *MOMA Poll* for the exhibition *Information* at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Museum-goers over the course of twelve-weeks were asked to respond with a yes or no to the question "Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President Nixon's Indochina policy be a reason for you not to vote for him in November?" (Haacke, 2009, para. 20). Ballots were dropped into clear Plexiglas boxes so that results were immediately visible. At that time, the Guggenheim museum had planned a one-person show of Haacke's art although after seeing *MOMA Poll*, the Director of the Guggenheim Museum, Thomas Messer, cancelled the planned exhibition. Messer stated that the museum was "non-political, is apolitical, and not concerned with political and social issues" (para. 24) and therefore the show, based on *MOMA Poll*, would be "out of bounds" (para. 24). In other shows from the same period, Haacke employed methods commonly associated with the social sciences. Those attending his exhibitions were asked to complete questionnaires concerning demographic, topical, political, and social issues. Cumulative polling tallies were regularly updated and posted, and statistical profiles of the audiences were generated, either manually or by machine, in the form of printouts, graphs, and charts (Deutsche, 2011). Haacke then analyzed the findings to generate conclusions. The methods Haacke employed were

appropriate for *MOMA Poll* and a select few other projects; such methods did not define Haacke's larger practice nor were his methods generally useful for other research. Haacke's methods may mimic those of the social sciences but they may be criticized as being problematic regarding reliability and validity. Such a criticism may be answered by agreeing with Sullivan (2008a) who said, "The source of dilemmas about definitions and methods facing practice-based researchers is relatively simple: *artists are not social scientists*" (Definitions and Dilemmas, para. 4). However, in a sense Haacke was both an artist and social scientist, and the blending of methods associated with both domains was appropriate to his artistic research, and so it might be a mistaken approach to critique his methods using the criteria common to social science alone.

The following examples will push to an extreme the problem found in accepting methods of successful art practices of the past for universal use in the present. Yoko Ono in *PAINTING FOR THE SKIES (1961)*, a work of text art that functioned as a directive, specified methods to be used: "Drill a hole in the sky. Cut out a paper the same size as the hole. Burn the paper. The sky should be pure blue" (a-i-u, Instruction Pieces, n.d.). Claire Fontaine, who considered herself a readymade collective artist when she appropriated her name from a paper making company, advocated for the method, "Whatever you do, do something else" (Claire Fontaine, 2012, p. 133). Ayşe Erkmen in 2012 said to make art one should follow the methods as follow:

> Buy or rent one red Ferrari. Let one friend drive a grey Palio in front of you. Make him/her stop. Continue driving at a moderate speed towards the Palio going under it. This can be done in an art institution or as art in public space. (p. 156)

Each set of methods was efficacious in facilitating art that gained international status, and yet each set also demonstrates the absurdity in attempting to apply methods universally for all art. It

would be to nonsensical to force any one of these sets of methods onto the artistic practices of Monet or Rembrandt. In a similar manner, the call for the universal application of scientific method for all types of artistic research is equally, if less visibly nonsensical.

These examples of art and their individual methods are evidence of the characterization of artistic research by Slager (2012) as producing "novel connections, accelerations and mutations in temporary, flexible, and open systems. These systems run up against problems, but rather than creating solutions, novel methodological lines are created" (p. 338). Therefore, artistic research utilizes "operational strategies which cannot be legitimized beforehand" (p. 338). Research questions are frequently not known in advance and artistic research often proceeds in a non-linear manner, without steps, and without a specific goal or answer. The legitimacy of methods for any particular artistic research undertaking may not be fully known in advance and they may develop and change throughout the creative process.

6.2 Advocating for Method Pluralism

The answer regarding methods in relation to artistic research is method pluralism. Method pluralism allows for the validity of all methods, including those that are instrumental to the particular creative practice. Kjørup (2012) suggested that artistic research was fruitful when it was plural. He wrote:

Once you let go of the ideal of a small set of formal criteria for what may count as 'real research', you open the doors for a serious and much more interesting discussion about what should be considered *good* research, research that gives us interesting, eye-opening,

inspiring, enlightening, fascinating, edifying, uplifting contributions to knowledge and insights that are also well-founded, justified, persuasive. (p. 41-42)

Gray, Pirie, Malins, Douglas, and Leake (1995) asserted, "We must be brave enough to propose, use and validate our own procedures, or else our research will never be released from the grip of the 'scientific method', and will never be a powerful mode of disciplined inquiry" (p. 18).

One of the most influential advocates for method pluralism is Paul Feyerabend. In his book *Against Method*, Feyerabend said that in considering the field of discourse, researchers must not try to get a better hold on current ideas by likening them to what they already know or find more comprehensive or precise because to do so would accept the same terms, conditions, and presuppositions. He continued, we do not want to provide a "little bit of 'reconstruction'" (p. 198) which changes the theory so that it conforms to some preconceived principles of modern logic and readily provides an answer. Instead, Feyerabend suggested research be approached with an acceptance of method pluralism and that in doing so one be prepared for discoveries that are "wildly illogical (when judged from the point of view of a particular system of formal logic) and [has] *to be* wildly illogical in order to function as they do" (p. 198). In accepting Feyerabend's position, I suggest that artistic research has no need to rely upon any set of historical methods that hold the potential to diminish possibilities of discovery.

Feyerabend also reminded readers that throughout history scientists proceeded heterogeneously and if rules of method were mentioned explicitly, they were often either not obeyed or they functioned at most like rules of thumb. Achievements were frequently produced by separate and often conflicting trends and so, even granting successes in science, previous methods were not to be used as arguments for treating yet unsolved problems. Instead, research

was best conducted without advance restrictions, as reflected in his famous dictum, “The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes” (p. 7). In other words, knowledge was not a series of self-consistent theories that converged toward an ideal view, it was an ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives in competition, without the possibility or need of being settled. From this standpoint, Feyerabend critiqued the suggestion of Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962/1970) that method pluralism was a characteristic of pre-science. For Feyerabend it was quite the opposite, method pluralism was a hallmark of advanced science. As Feyerabend showed with many examples, ideas and practices do not often develop from problems but arise from a multiplicity of activities, often from activities extraneous to the intended research, and often only later are the side effects and developments interpreted as solutions to problems. In his opinion, science was sloppier than its methodological image portrayed.

Authors in the literature surrounding artistic research who advocate that scientific method is necessary for artistic research uncritically accept presuppositions regarding research that Feyerabend successfully argued are neither practical nor consistently supported by historical examples.

Fortunately numerous authors in the literature surrounding artistic research have also recognized the importance of method pluralism that supports the different ontologies and vantage points held by artists. According to Biggs (2004), Cahnmann-Taylor and Siegesmund (2008), and Lesage (2007), it would be impossible to preference any one set of methods. Artists made up rules as they worked (Pakes, 2010) and methods were not so much “readymade and received as ‘knocked together for the nonce’” (Maharaj, 2009, p. 2). Maharaj also observed in the literature

what he described as a trend toward the institutionalization of art research and practice, which brought a heightened "academicization not in the sense of enhanced rigour but of regulation and routine" (p. 14). In his view, a sort of method fever had overtaken discussions of artistic research in relation to academia in particular as demonstrated in the United Kingdom by the Research Assessment Exercise (2008) which he described as demonstrating the "emergence of a full-blown art practice-research system with a corpus of methods and procedures" (p. 6). Plurality, openness, and uncertainly were a necessity of artistic research (Hannula, 2009), and generally artistic research defied one singular approach or paradigm (Kjørup, 2012; Newbury, 2012; Serig, 2012).

Artistic research frequently generated its own criteria of validity and quality (Borgdorff, 2012a) and it exceeded the parameters of traditional knowledge management (Balkema and Slager, 2004). Hannula (2004) saw artistic research as an umbrella term covering many activities, and Hannula, Suoranta, and Vadén (2005) advocated for methodological anarchy. The granting of equal validity to both method and non-method approaches to artistic research seems correct in light of what those undertaking artistic research actually do; method pluralism allows artists the authority in "implementing what works if what works, works" (Eisner, 2008, p. 23).

Collingwood in *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933) wrote, "this only is clear, that the old methods are no longer followed, and every one is free to invent a new one of his own" (p. 6). Each person inventing his or her own method was natural and proper when new philosophical movements were in the making. However, Collingwood worried that in the long term this could lead to discouragement and indifference. Here, Collingwood demonstrated his view that metaphysics as an historical science would benefit if philosophers became more conscious of

adopting principles and methods that were common among historians, but these too were not fixed. As he wrote in 1933, the principle of method was necessarily provisional:

> To commit oneself to it at the beginning of one's inquiries, as a cast-iron rule to be followed, come what may, in every possible variety of problem and subject-matter, would be foreign to the whole spirit of philosophical thinking. (p. 52)

Artistic research may challenge notions of method and discipline and it can embody the characteristic that artist Daniel Mafé (2009) called epistemological uncertainty, or the unknowing that often accompanies artistic practice. Often artistic research does not aim for any singular or objective truth but asks for an analysis of meaning construction, as pointed out by Turpeinen (2006). Biggs (2004) wrote that artistic research had peculiarities—it was experiential, multiple solutions were an asset, and one could choose one's target audience.

Schwab (2013) looked at methods with a degree of skepticism in his editorial for the *Journal for Artistic Research* (JAR) as follows:

> JAR attempts to challenge any one meaning of 'artistic research' by moving the emphasis from the narrow definitions of 'discipline', which regulate what is and is not possible at any given time, to epistemic engagements in artistic practice in their widest and most diverse form. (para. 7)

At its core, the question regarding methods asks, according to Bordgorff (2007), whether there is "a characteristic, privileged way of obtaining access to the research domain of art practice and the knowledge embodied in it, a route that could be denoted by the term 'artistic research'?" (p. 12). There is not. To accept this claim allows for epistemological pluralism, namely that there is not one way of knowing about our world, nor is there one best way to go about obtaining

knowledge in the artistic context. Artistic research is best served when it is allowed to embrace a multitude of equivalent approaches, including those that hold antagonistic relationships. This supports epistemological pluralism. The manner in which knowledge is generated and transmitted by the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind and the formulation and expression of propositional belief about the state of affairs in artistic research is not reliant upon methods, and therefore, method pluralism is of no threat to artistic research.

6.3 Quality and Quality as Validity in Regard to Artistic Research

In this section I will challenge the second major presupposition found in the literature that suggests a necessary relationship exists between artistic research and the quality of that research, and as well the view that the quality of the research provides validity to the research. For the purposes of this discussion, I will begin with an example that demonstrates that quality regarding works of art may be a confused matter, and in fact can be manipulated.

In late 1993, the artists Vitaly Komar and Alexander Melamid, with financial support of the Nation Institute, hired the opinion research firm of Marttila and Kiley, Inc. to conduct a sampling of 1001 adults in America (Meyer, Navasky, vanden Heuvel, & Wypijewski, 1994; Govan, 1995). A random sampling was used, the sample was stratified according to state, and gender quotas were observed. The survey contained 103 questions that covered a wide range of subjects from income and education to recreational habits and to aesthetic preferences. The artists used the resultant findings to create a work of art titled *America's Most Wanted Painting* (1994), a painting representative of peoples' preferences as determined by the survey. The preferences included: realism, simple rather than busy, an outdoor scene, a predominance of blue

and green, a historical figure, a group of people (preferred over single figures), fully clothed people, wild animals, soft curves, blended colors, and visible brushstrokes. This “dishwasher size” (Dia Art Foundation, 1995) painting depicted a group of clothed figures walking, with George Washington standing behind them, under a half-cloudy blue sky, along the edge of a greenish-blue lake where two wading deer appear to have been startled by the approach of the humans.

In creating the art, the artists relied upon majority justification for the validity and quality of the work using accepted data collection techniques. Ross (1995) characterized the artists as “Evincing deadpan respect for the pollsters’ democratic science, they appeared as enthusiastic participants in a national exercise of statistical quality control” (para. 5, p. 72). Ross further suggested that the artists’ goal was not an attempt to produce populist art, but to show how using the correct tools, data might be used to create the appearance of a public dialogue. Their work, said Ross, fed off a familiarity with the modern state and “its procedures for manufacturing consent” (para. 5, p. 72). This example demonstrates that potential exists to view criteria of quality and validity as somehow having attained an objective status, when in fact as Melamid (1994) noted, a referendum on the quality of art had been manufactured. In his opinion, the work of artists could at times in the past be judged as good or bad, but now, “this criterion just collapsed, so then what? Why this artist, not that artist? Why Schnabel is a good artist? [sic] Who can tell? I don't know. Can be good, can be bad, [sic] but there is no objective truth” (Meyer, Navasky, vanden Heuvel, & Wypijewski, 1994, pp. 336-337). No longer was there any normative standard by which the quality of a work of art could be judged. In point of fact, one could manipulate quality.

If there were a single rule of quality to which artists could appeal to, it could be identified and then deemed a necessary and sufficient condition for excellent art. However, as pointed out by Weitz (1956) the necessary and sufficient conditions that allowed a thing to be art versus a thing of non-art had been articulated throughout the history of art, and yet each had proved to be neither necessary nor sufficient given the breadth of art. The same sort of obstacle exists in attempting to articulate just what should be the definition and measure of quality in art. Given this, it is strange that some authors who advocate for artistic research also promote the idea that quality is a necessary condition for artistic research. For example, artistic research was deemed of acceptable quality if it fit existing norms of outcomes or accorded with a particular understanding of quality in the field (Hannula, Suoranta, & Vadén, 2005; Schwab, 2008; Öberg, 2009; Serig, 2012) or if it was seen as demonstrating rigor (Biggs and Büchler, 2007; Leavy, 2009). The outcome of research was seen as having quality if it was original in relation to prior work done within the particular community (Holert, 2009; Schippers & Flenady, 2009; Pakes, 2010; Ochsner, Hug, & Daniel, 2012). For artistic research to succeed, it required criteria, which for Biggs and Büchler (2007) included incisiveness, concision, coherence, fecundity, social significance, evocation, and illumination. Holding artistic research to such criteria would allow it to be of sufficient "high quality" (Barone & Eisner, 2012, p. 145). Any of these criteria would most likely be impossible to apply to all forms of artistic research.

A widely known historical example regarding aesthetic quality is found with the impressionist painters who attempted to introduce their paintings into the mainstream Paris Salon shows of the late 1800s and found their work summarily rejected. According to Boime (1969), the Academicians connected with the Salon exhibitions saw the impressionist works as sketches

with incomplete surfaces instead of as finished paintings. Here a further question is raised regarding necessary and sufficient conditions: Who would be granted the authority to determine the means by which quality is recognized? Both Schenker (2003) and Leavy (2009) pointed out that the acceptance of quality as a necessary or sufficient condition presupposes an identified or often unidentified qualified practitioner, network, or expert who is provided with the authority to adjudicate (e.g.).

One of the problems in applying criteria of quality was pointed out by Schippers and Flenady (2009):

> Two very similar sculptures or opera performances may have very dissimilar research components: one may constitute a major innovation in terms of form or format or (re)interpretation, while the other may conform to well-established conventions. Either or both may represent high-level and critically acclaimed art, and it is even possible that the work that represents more successful research represents a less successful work of art. (p. 8)

There may be contexts in which judgments of quality are considered appropriate but there cannot be any universal application that fits for all forms of artistic research in all contexts, cultures, or time periods.

A related consideration is that quality or validity in artistic research is linked to the originality of the artistic research. Particular pressures regarding originality are put upon research by criteria generating and quality assessment bodies such at the United Kingdom's Arts and Humanities Research Council (2014) or the Campus Alberta Quality Council (2013). Academic

programs are often beholden to generate curriculum that is said to generate and justify original contributions to knowledge by students.

The attribution of validity based upon the originality of artistic research is problematic for a number of fundamental reasons. New creations are often linked in a multiplicity of ways to existing art. Artists reference works of art by other artists, or they sample, collage, and blend works of art by other artists into their own. Artists copy the works of other artists as a means of learning, which is a well-supported tradition accepted by many museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art that has a program whereby artists may set up easels in the museum to copy old works. Artists arrange existing artifacts, assemble information, or reorganize existing information, rather than create new artifacts. Artists exhibit found objects, as with Duchamp's readymades. Artists appropriated the art of others as a legitimate if not often a litigious artistic practice (Gilbert, 2012). For example, artist Sherrie Levine rephotographed photographs by Walker Evans which, without any alteration to the photographs, which she then exhibited as her own works.

Additionally, given the breadth and diversity of art on a global scale, it would appear that no one artist could be able to obtain the extensive knowledge base required to determine if any individual work was original. According to the Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies at Princeton University (n.d.) in 2001 there were 1,337,000 artists (painters, sculptors, craft artists, designers, and photographers) in the United States. According to the Executive Summary of the International Art Materials Association (2009), there are in the range of 4.4 million visual artists worldwide. The vast majority if not all of these artists presumably would be creating original works of art.

It would also arguably be impossible to determine the extent of difference between a new work of art and one previously done in order to prove originality. Pakes (2010) noted that universities have accepted normative definitions and models of research that "invariably turn on the idea of research as an *original* contribution to knowledge within the particular subject domain" (p. 127). Originality for Pakes (2010) was a continuum that ran from marginally original work to highly original work. Even noting this continuum, she wondered, "How far must a researcher's dance depart from existing work in order to be considered new?" (p. 133). To sufficiently judge a work of art or artistic research as original would require that these concerns be answered, which would likely be impossible. To accept the criterion of originality as fundamental to artistic research could support an argument that Rembrandt van Rijn's paintings are unoriginal and therefore invalid because Frans Hals previously painted portraits in a similar style and with similar colors. Such an argument makes little practical sense. Both Niedderer (2008) and Holert (2009), in looking at calls for originality, expressed concern over the formal adoption of originality as a criterion because it was obvious that certain artistic practices were excluded.

Biggs (2006) recognized that the condition of originality had caused confusion. In his opinion,

all production from the studio is by this token new and apparently making a new contribution to the world. But that which is new in such cases is an experience, whereas what is required in research is new knowledge. (Artefacts and Theories, para. 9)

He is somewhat mistaken here. New contributions are new knowledge. A work of art may not rate as original but it may still contribute to bodies of knowledge and to an individual's knowledge.

One route forward is found with language in the United Kingdom's Higher Education Funding Council's Review of Research (2000). Research was said to be an activity that pushed forward the frontiers of knowledge and which "may involve new discoveries and/or reinterpreting and developing fresh insights from existing knowledge" (Higher Education Funding Council, p. 47). In this definition, research may include original discoveries but is not dependent upon some vague notion of what originality means. In relation to artistic research, this seems to be a sound approach.

6.4 The Dissemination of Artistic Research

A final major presupposition held by some authors in the literature is that the results of an undertaking require dissemination or publication in order to qualify as research. The reason given is frequently that individual research is part of the larger collective creative search and as such requires the dissemination of findings within the community (Borgdorff, 2012a; Biggs & Büchler, 2007). The duty of the artist was not necessarily to explain his or her practice according to Kurki (2001, as cited in Hannula, Suoranta, & Vadén, 2005), however, the duty of the researcher was to do just that:

In art 'how' we reach the goal is not important from the receiver's point of view. The artist has the right to preserve her secrets, and even to mislead. In research the author must

subject to scrutiny not only her research results but also what road she took to her goal, the basis for presenting what she presents. (p. 161)

Calls for dissemination usually ask that artistic research results are presented in discursive form or that the results are appropriately documented and disseminated to the research community and to the wider public. A case of this point is the statement of de Vries (2004) made during a symposium on artistic research at the Rijksakademie van Beeldende Kunsten (State Academy of Visual Arts): “In order to enter into the system of research, I think that you have to publish” (p. 30). Balkema (2004) took a more polarizing view when she said that not only was an endeavor without dissemination not research, it was not art. This is simply illogical. Van Gogh did not exhibit his work or publish his writings to the larger community during his lifetime. He did not suddenly and only posthumously become an artistic researcher as a result of three or four years of diligent promotion of his art by his sister-in-law Johanna Van Gogh (Van de Veen, 2010). Once Van Gogh’s letters were published, we find discursive evidence that all along he was investigating through the creation of paintings and drawings, and he was formulating propositional beliefs about those works of art, in other words confirming that he was doing artistic research.

Niedderer (2008) wondered what might go missing in the process of eliciting and disseminating knowledge in art through discursive forms. An ironic example is presented by Strand (1998) who described how researchers in Australia rejected the use of Thomson Institute for Scientific Information journal citation impact rankings because of the narrow view of evaluating publications. For example, in applying evaluative rankings to works by visual artists, an artist’s exhibition did not count as a publication while a paper written by the artist about his or

her own exhibition counted as a publication. In Strand's opinion, the publication of a work of art should also entail hearing it, reading it, or experiencing it in other ways such as through a performance or other public forum. Dissemination also did not prescribe specifically linguistic access for an exchange of information according to Tormey and Sawdon (2008). By re-presenting artistic research in a variety of ways, particular insights might reach diverse audiences.

The relationship of artistic research to PhD programs, and their requirement for a discursive component, such as an exegesis or dissertation, is an interesting example that highlights the tensions between knowledge acquisition through artistic practices and the conventions of academia around the dissemination of results of an undertaking. Candlin (2000) noted that a 1997 survey by the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) implied that to validate practice-based doctorates without the written component would undermine and devalue conventional doctorate degrees in that the scholarly worth of the art would be impossible to judge. This viewpoint seems to presuppose that works of art are mainly understood by way of a discursive exegesis. It also suggests that a work of art is to be understood by the general population in the sense that anyone can read about a work of art but that understanding or assessing a work of visual art visually may take specialized knowledge. Doing away with a discursive component of a PhD, for example, might make the assessment, understanding, context, and so forth nearly impossible for generalist assessment bodies but arguably specialists would be able to assess with relative ease. The fields of advanced mathematics or medicine operate in this manner, in that a generalist assessment committee of a PhD dissertation for either field would not be appropriate. Krauth (2011) considered what appeared to be a double standard

when PhD programs that used a visual language were required to produce an exegesis separate to the works of art, but programs that utilized other languages such as creative writing or mathematics often did not have this requirement.

I have not found PhD programs in visual art for which a written component such as a discursive dissertation has been completely abolished, although some programs have drastically reduced the length and structure of such a required document. The Slade School of Fine Art allows the PhD student in its practice-led option to submit a thesis of studio practice results and a written report of 15,000-40,000 words. The Doctoral School of the Estonian Academy of Arts allows PhD students to choose either a dissertation, a series of publications and summarizing article, a published monograph, or internationally recognized creative work displayed in an exhibition with an accompanying research paper. If what appears trends toward increasing the number of PhD programs in visual art and shortening the discursive component required by these programs continue, it seems only a matter of time before conventional doctorates are awarded for a body of creative work alone.

The dissemination of results of artistic research, and especially a dissemination of results discursively, may be appropriate in particular contexts or for particular purposes, yet, such a condition should not universally define or be seen as providing validity to artistic research.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have considered the conjoining of activities commonly associated with art and research that indicates and rationalizes a domain of study called artistic research. I next attempted to disentangle and arrange a number of concepts surrounding its conceptualizations.

I have suggested that artistic research is bimodal. In mode one artistic research, two activities may be seen as necessary and jointly sufficient for artistic research to occur. These are a) that a state of affairs of the artistic kind comes into existence and b) that propositional belief is formulated about that state of affairs. These two activities are normally intertwined in creative practices and therefore substantiate the fact that the vast majority of artistic creation is *ipso facto* artistic research. I have also suggested that the creation of a state of affairs of the artistic kind may be decoupled from the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs. In separating the two activities, the point at which research is initiated is located with the formulation of propositional belief about the state of affairs.

Mode two artistic research accepts that works are designated or created and propositional belief is then formulated about that art, but these conditions alone are not considered sufficient for artistic research to occur. For artistic research to occur in mode two, further justification, or criteria are required. Mode two artistic research is usually proposed in specific contexts for specific purposes.

Disagreements regarding conceptions of aspects of artistic research are to be expected, but the discourse does not progress productively when confusion in the discourse occurs as a result of authors who have conceptualized artistic research differently based upon their competing and unarticulated individual presuppositions regarding art, knowledge, and research. Clarity is promoted when tacit presuppositions are made explicit. The bimodal framework asks that the tacit presuppositions in a conception of artistic research be identified. The proposed bimodality of artistic research does not limit the possibilities of artistic research but merely points out the fact that differing modes of artistic research may exist in parallel.

7.2 Implications Arising from this Research

_____The fact that knowledge is generated and transmitted in mode one of artistic research through the formulation of propositional belief, which describes nearly all art practices, holds particularly significant implications regarding art. Nearly 30 years of discourse exists in which artistic research has been positioned as a separate domain, for which authors have attempted to define the parameters. Accepting mode one artistic research suggests that the many millennia of artistic practice rightly should also be considered to be artistic research. The acceptance of the claim that in most instances artistic creation is *ipso facto* artistic research will offer opportunities for a reassessment of artistic practices and outcomes throughout history as well as the presentation of those practices in documents and discourses.

The acceptance of the claim also holds the potential to expand the definitions of research. Academia, outcomes measurements bodies, quality assessment bodies, and funding bodies will be challenged to reconsider their currently assumed definition and current norms of research as

they are asked to either accept the fact that artistic creation is research, and as such generates and transmits knowledge without further justification, or to be clearer on the sets of limitations they impose, along with their particular reasons for potentially excluding forms of research and knowledge.

Currently, artistic research sits in what may be described as a catch-22 position. In order to gain access to credentials, publications, and funding, and to meet outcomes and quality assessment requirements, artistic researchers may be pressured to adopt norms related to scientific methods and norms related to community-based knowledge transfer in the sciences. In doing so, they risk delimiting artistic research in a way that excludes forms of artistic research. On the other hand, if artistic researchers resist scientistic norms, they risk losing academic legitimacy. In a best case scenario, academia, outcomes measurement, quality assessment, and funding bodies would broaden their understandings of research to accept mode one artistic research as research and begin to consider changes in curricula or criteria that reflect this acceptance. It is also suggested that accepting the view of artistic research expounded in this dissertation has educational importance for learners and facilitators of learning at every level of engagement, both inside and outside of formal learning environments, for the fact that as individuals undertake artistic creation they also undertake artistic research.

7.3 Further Research

Nearly every topic touched upon in this dissertation may be productively investigated because artistic research is a relatively new domain. That said, three topics raised in this dissertation are particularly compelling.

All too frequently, artistic research has been conceptualized through the lens of scientism. Artistic research does not universally fare well in such scenarios. One result of the acceptance of scientistic norms is the promotion of a delimited form, mode two, of artistic research for general use. Rather than link artistic research to science, as it often has been done in the past, it is more accurate to consider the discourse and problems surrounding artistic research as a philosophical undertaking. Research and the further development of the discourse around an alignment with philosophy may provide many useful contributions to the discourse.

The second area for research centers upon questions related to the creation of a state affairs, the designation of that state of affairs as art, and the formulation of propositional belief about that state of affairs. It is generally assumed that the three are done by the same person, however, artistic research might significantly change if it is allowed that these components may be done by different people with or without knowledge of the other. This holds particular implications for undertakings such as art criticism and art history. Stemming from this is the similar question as to whether a temporal relationship exists between the creation of a state of affairs, the designation of that state of affairs as art, and the propositional belief formulated about the art, for artistic research to occur.

Finally, the challenge to develop articulated theories of artistic research remains. A domain may be defined as the sum of entities and activities that take place within that domain. As such, it is expected that artistic research as a domain will demonstrate a continual re-mapping as the forms of contemporary artistic research are expanded and challenged within a context of method pluralism. While a mapping of the activities that comprise artistic research is expected to be ongoing, a theory asks for the conceptualization of the larger picture of interconnections of

constructs and variables, entities and activities within the domain. Theories provide frameworks for analyses and they facilitate the further development of the domain as competing theories are compared.

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Appendix

I produced a brief presentation designed to frame and introduce the dissertation. This was presented at my defense and is shown here in figures 1-23.

Figure 1.

Figure 2.



Figure 3.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Figure 13.

Figure 14.



Figure 15.

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

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

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

Figure 19.

Figure 20.

Figure 21. Published Fiction.



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

Figure 23.

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