



Wylie, P. (2018). Exclusionary and Extractive Campus Management: The University of British Columbia, Okanagan. *Workplace*, 31, 22-30.

PETER WYLIE

## **EXCLUSIONARY AND EXTRACTIVE CAMPUS MANAGEMENT: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, OKANAGAN**

### **Introduction**

The Government of British Columbia (BC) established many new public universities in the province, 2005-10, largely out of existing colleges and university colleges. In the case of University of British Columbia, Okanagan (UBCO) an existing institution, Okanagan University College (OUC), was in 2005 split into two new entities, UBCO and Okanagan College (OC), with The University of British Columbia (UBC) taking over the university campus and functions of the former OUC, to form UBCO. The two new institutions (or rather one new institution, OC, and one new campus of an existing institution, UBCO) were to henceforth to exist separately; UBCO with a research-intensive academic discipline mandate, and national/international focus, and the new college, OC, with a largely vocational and trades applied college mandate, and a local/regional focus. The *University Act* (latest revision, 2017) was amended to allow for UBCO as a new provincial research-oriented university campus.

This paper analyzes the evolution of this “new” public university campus, UBCO, in the Interior of BC, situated in the city of Kelowna, with a focus on issues at with respect to shared academic governance and university management models. The paper is informed by the analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), applying the analysis in the context of the question of why universities might fail, rather than nations. The paper is divided into five sections. The first discusses the insights of Acemoglu and Robinson and how they can be applied to this case study. The second discusses incidents around total enrolment management that demonstrate the exclusionary nature of the campus management model. Issues of internationalization and indigenization strategy form the discussion of the third section. In a fourth section, issues of labour relations with respect to faculty are analyzed, and a final section discusses the workplace experience of faculty and staff. The paper ends with some concluding comments.

### **Theoretical Perspective**

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 68), in a book about long-term economic development, argue that to understand why nation states are rich or poor, that is, succeed or fail, we need to study politics, history and political processes, that is “how decisions actually get made, who gets to make them, and why those people decide to do what they do.” The same analysis can be applied to universities. To understand why universities might succeed or fail, we also need to study how decisions actually get made, who gets to make them, and why those people decide to do what they do.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument with respect to nation states is that achieving national success depends on solving some basic political problems of the rules and institutions that influence how the nation and its economy works, and the incentives that motivate people politically and economically. These rules and institutions can be either inclusive or extractive. Inclusive institutions include strong centralized governance, but egalitarian and pluralistic involvement of all people regardless of class or race, with no cronyism or favoritism, in this governance. Such institutions create and foster social cohesion, technological change and innovation and the economy flourishes with long-run sustainable growth (such as say in the Scandinavian countries, the United States, or the United Kingdom). Extractive, exclusionary institutions extract income, wealth and power from one subset of society and the

economy to benefit another subset, the subset that has a say in decision-making. Such institutions can produce growth for a time but no social cohesion, technological change or innovation, hence growth is unsustainable in the long-run (such as say Imperial China, the former Soviet Union, or North Korea).

If strong central governance breaks down we get decentralized chaos with no establishment of law and order which will also undermine growth (e.g. the Soviet Union relative to China since 1980 perhaps, or Somalia), and if pluralism breaks down, we get absolutism and extraction, which can produce high economic growth for a time, and high incomes for the rulers over the ruled, but it is unsustainable in the long-run (e.g. the Roman Empire or North Korea). So why do nation states not always choose pluralistic, inclusive, non-exclusionary and non-extractive economic and political institutions, and hence sustainable prosperity in the long run? Because such institutions might not favour the currently privileged and might reduce their incomes and power e.g. why France had to have a Revolution in 1789 to unseat the aristocracy. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 84) state; “fear of creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to inclusive...institutions.” Creative destruction produces winners and losers, and is unpredictable and uncontrolled, so will be resisted in authoritarian regimes characterized by the “iron law of oligarchy” (e.g. China for many centuries until recently).

How can these arguments be applied to a university setting? Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument implies that achieving success as a university depends on solving some basic managerial organization problems of the rules and institutions influencing how the university works, and the incentives that motivate faculty, staff and students in the university. These rules and institutions can be either pluralistic and inclusive, or extractive and exclusionary. Inclusive institutions include egalitarianism, pluralism, and involvement of all stakeholders regardless of position, broad shared governance, and no cronyism or favoritism. Such institutions will create and foster innovation and creativity and the university will flourish and be sustainable in the long-run. Extractive and exclusionary institutions at the university level extract power from one subset of the university e.g. the students and faculty, to benefit another subset e.g. the crony managerial class, and reserve decision-making and identification as the “University” for only the senior administrative class. Such institutions can produce success for a time but limited cohesion, innovation or creativity, so this model is unsustainable and will foster conflict in the long-run.


An inclusive and non-exclusionary university includes strong shared governance with pluralism, meritocracy, no favoritism, and openness to all viewpoints and debate. This will foster creativity and the university will flourish in a long-run sustainable and cohesive way. If strong central governance breaks down we get decentralized chaos, and if governance is not shared with faculty, staff and students, and management culture is not pluralistic or merit-based, we get absolutism and oligarchy, both of which can produce good results for a time (especially for those making the decisions and extracting the benefits) but is unsustainable in the long-run due to the resentment of those left outside in the cold. So why do universities not always choose inclusive, non-exclusionary and non-extractive institutions and hence long-run cohesion and sustainability? Again, because it might not favour the currently privileged, e.g. the exclusive and extractive crony managerial class. Creative destruction would produce winners and losers, and shared governance is unpredictable and uncontrolled, and cannot guarantee the privileged their current positions, power and incomes.

### **Total Enrolment Management**

With Acemoglu and Robinson’s simple but persuasive theoretical framework in mind, incidents involving total enrolment management at UBCO have arguably been good examples of the extractive, non-inclusive and exclusionary university campus and is the first area of campus management we examine here. The enrolment targets for the new UBCO in 2005-06 included 900 new student spaces over the existing approximately 3,000 already enrolled in the replaced institution’s degree programs in 2004-05. These targets were set to grow by an approximately 900 additional students per year, to reach a final target of 7,500 by 2009-10 (MoU, 2004, p. 6). Once at that level and as stated in UBC promotional material in 2011: “The planners of UBC’s Okanagan campus made a key decision; the student body will never exceed 7,500” (UBC Viewbook 2011, p. 20). The plan was for a small, intimate campus with the focus on quality over quantity – “a liberal arts education in the finest tradition.” However in 2013 the campus Principal was quoted in the student newspaper (*The Phoenix*, 2013) predicting a student body of around 9,000 within four to five years, and the *UBC Okanagan Campus Master Plan* of September 2015 (developed fall 2013 to summer 2015, but with no consultation with Senate or with faculty, staff or students, noted (p. 15): “The Campus Plan provides for a potential doubling of the 2012 campus population” so that would be 15,000 or so students within twenty-five years or so. There had been no deliberation at Senate about this, and this emphasis on

extensive size and revenue over intensive quality is indicative of an extractive managerial ethos, moreover with no inclusionary input from faculty, staff or students in such decision-making.

Figure 1 depicts UBCO’s actual record in meeting its enrolment targets since 2005. In order to expand enrolment quickly competitive admissions standards for UBCO were set much lower (about 65-70 percent secondary school grade average) than the main campus of UBC in Vancouver (about 80-90 percent), but above the standards of the prior OUC (which had open access at about a 60 percent secondary school grade average). There was a major shortfall in the first year of UBCO, enrolment reaching only approximately 3,000 FTE domestic students (about the same as in the university degree programs of the OUC campus in 2004-05), approximately 25 percent below the targeted and funded amount of 3,900. This was due to a severe shortfall in newly admitted domestic students in September 2005. In 2004-05, UBC Okanagan had been unable to get its publicity machine working. Only approximately 650 new-to-UBC domestic students arrived in 2005-06, not enough to increase overall enrolment past the 3,000 mark. It was difficult to recover quickly from this rather poor start, but new-to-UBC domestic students admitted did rise substantially in 2006-07, especially from outside of the Okanagan region, once publicity and communications had been appropriately ramped up, and continued to rise to 2011-12. However, subsequent growth in total enrolment was slower than growth in Government targets so the campus fell increasingly below its targets up to 2009-10 (see Figure 1). The campus finally caught up to the targets by the 2012-13 academic year (see Figure 1), as the targets did not grow 2009-10 to 2012-13, and after admitting very large numbers of new-to-UBC domestic students in 2011-12. The key to why the campus did not meet its targets until as late as 2012-13 was the poor initial enrolment of 2005-06. The campus has fallen, since 2012-13, five percent or so below targets in subsequent years. A severe and somewhat inexplicable decline in new-to-UBC domestic students set in under a new campus Principal and Provost after 2011-12 until 2014-15, a decline the campus has slowly recovered from.



**Figure 1: Target and Actual FTE Domestic Student Enrolment UBCO, 2005-06 to 2017-18.** Source: UBC Report of Enrolment, various years. Note: In 2004-05, OUC enrolled 2,969 FTE students in its degree programs at the campus taken over by UBCO, about the same as UBCO in 2005-06. (KPMG, OUC 2004-05 Audited FTEs by Campus, May 2005).

An interesting non-inclusive and exclusionary university affair involving total enrolment transpired in the fall of 2014. As noted above, target enrolment had been met in 2012-13 by admitting very large numbers of first-year domestic students in 2011-12 and 2012-13, especially into the Bachelor of Arts (BA) program, which had been the largest program by far at the former OUC, and which was the easiest for UBCO to expand quickly. Since these large

numbers of admissions into the BA in 2011-12 and 2012-13 students would be filtering into second, third and fourth year in 2013-14 to 2015-16, it was noted in the UBCO Enrolment Report for 2013 that the campus was now following a “deliberate plan to decrease the size of the incoming first year class to ensure overall enrolment stays in line with ministry funding levels” (Annual Report on Enrolment: Okanagan Campus, 2013, ps. 3, 5). However in early September 2014 UBCO put out a press release entitled “New President welcomes largest ever first-year class” and the press release was picked up in a newspaper article entitled “UBC boasts biggest first-year class at Vancouver, Okanagan campuses” (UBC News, 2014: Vancouver Sun, 2014). The press release noted: “The University continues to completely fill all of its provincially-funded spaces for domestic students” (UNC News, 2014) However, this turned out to be an administrative fabrication designed to hide a dramatic decline in first-year domestic student enrolment at UBCO in 2014-15.

In mid-September myself acting as an elected Senator representing the joint Faculties alerted Senate to the actual fact that overall enrolment of domestic students was in fact down five percent in 2014-15 over the previous year, with the campus now falling six percent below its provincially-funded target for domestic students, explaining that the main reason for the shortfall was a surprisingly large thirteen percent shortfall in domestic new-to UBCO students below target. The campus had reduced its first-year intake by far too much. So I wrote an article for the student newspaper, which was published in late September under the headline “UBCO’s enrolment fell short this year” (*The Phoenix*, 2014a). In very early October 2014 my Acting Dean sent me a very curt email demanding that I attend a meeting with her with Department of Human Resources staff present and advising me to come with union representation, to discuss the article, but without specifying exactly what about the article she wished to discuss. I found out via enquiry that the Acting Dean’s concern was that I had inappropriately made information public that in the view of the “University” (i.e., the senior administration) was proprietary to the University and not in my authority as a faculty member or Senator to make public. Of course I hadn’t, the information was freely and publicly available.

In early October 2014 the student newspaper printed a rebuttal to my article in the form of a letter from the UBC Registrar in Vancouver (*The Phoenix*, 2014b), stating that enrolment at UBCO was not down by as much as I was stating. At no time did the Registrar contact me to discuss this. I rebutted this rebuttal in mid-October 2014 (*The Phoenix*, 2014c), saying that in fact it was down by the amount I was stating (since these were the official University figures). In the meantime, the University, via my Head, Acting Dean and the UBCO campus Registrar, had my access to the University’s student information system data cut off, access I had as a faculty member since the founding of the campus in 2005. The student newspaper published a further article in late November 2014 under the heading: “Why is administration taking action against a prof... for just writing about publicly available info?” (*The Phoenix*, 2014d). The same day the official Enrolment Report for UBCO for 2014-15 was published, demonstrating that the enrolment numbers I had cited were entirely accurate, and those of the UBC Registrar in her letter to the student newspaper entirely inaccurate, but of course much more favourable to the University’s public image.

I was then subsequently subjected to further administrative harassment and charges. Such is the toxic work environment in an extractive and exclusionary, rather than inclusive, university campus.

### **Internationalization and Indigenization**

This section undertakes analysis of the campus’s internationalization and indigenization strategies, or rather the lack of both, bringing out additional aspects of the extraction and exclusion practiced by the University senior management. International students are free to be enrolled by UBCO on top of the domestic student targets, entirely at the discretion of the University, but are unfunded by the Government. International students at UBCO (and UBC Vancouver alike) pay approximately seven times the domestic student tuition fees to cover this fact, by far the highest tuition rate for international students in the province, and are hence a profit centre for the University. Prior to quite recently, UBC claimed the international student fees it charged were set to simply cover the cost of providing education per student as a public, non-profit institution. The then provost of UBCO stated in 2012 in a letter to the editor of the local newspaper: “International tuition fees are set at a cost-recovery level – no more, no less” (Daily Courier, 2012b) UBC has most recently however switched to a strategy of a profit-seeking monopolist with the tuition fees it charges (price) set by demand (what the market will bear) rather than cost of supply (cost of production). The Vice-Principal of Students at UBCO was quoted as saying in the UBC Okanagan student newspaper in late 2014: “If the market is willing to pay that much, why wouldn’t we charge it?” (*The Phoenix*, 2014e).

UBC (and UBCO) hence now engages in the monopolist profit-maximizing behavior of setting price to international students and quantity of international students admitted to maximize profit from international students. But unlike

most monopolists, constrained by a downward-sloping demand curve for their product, who can choose price or quantity but not both, UBC (and UBCO) can choose both, by adjusting admissions standards for international students. So it can choose both a high price and a high quantity. International students are hence a massive profit centre for the University, as their cost of education is much less than the tuition fees they pay.

UBCO then of course has a drive to increase the number of its international students. The enrolment of international students is significant in four programs: the BA, BSc, BMGT and BASC (Engineering). There is an absence of international students in education and health and social fields such as nursing, human kinetics, or social work, or, of course, in the UBCO offshoot of the UBC Vancouver Faculty of Medicine. The UBCO campus is planning to continue to increase the number of international undergraduate students from the current 1,000 or so (12 percent of total students) to around 1,750 (20 percent of total students). 1750 would be 20 percent of 8750 (7000 domestic undergraduates and 1750 international), well above the 7,500 that it was previously stated that the campus would never exceed. Attracting more international students to UBCO has of course large financial, cultural, intellectual, and societal payoffs to the University and region. In 2013, the then Provost of UBCO is quoted as saying: “In Kelowna and the Okanagan Valley, it is widely acknowledged that the presence of people from around the world is a good thing for the culture and economy of the region” (UBC Reports, 2013).

UBCO claims that the high fees that international students pay, and the growing number of them paying them, allows it to hire more faculty and put on a greater selection and number of courses for all students, including domestic students, presumably so that class sizes can go down and class choice and diversity can go up, to the benefit of domestic students. A win-win situation, if it was true. Have average undergraduate class sizes at UBCO gone down, and have there been more faculty hired as international students as a percent of total enrolment in direct entry undergraduate programs has gone from an average of six percent in 2010-11 to an average of 14 percent in 2016-17, generating about \$20 million more in additional revenue to the campus? According to data released by the Research Universities’ Council of BC and published as the BC Higher Education Accountability Dataset (bcheadset.ca), “created to demonstrate accountability on the part of BC’s higher education institutions, and contain[ing] data on key measures of public interest”, the answer is, quite emphatically, no.

Table 1 shows the headcount of undergraduate international students at UBCO, the number of full-time, permanent faculty, and the average undergraduate class sizes at the lower level (first and second year courses) and upper level (third and fourth year courses), in 2010, 2013 and 2016. International undergraduate students have more than doubled between 2010 and 2016, but the number of faculty has increased little and average class sizes have increased quite dramatically. In fact, UBCO now has the largest average class sizes at the lower level of any BC post-secondary campus, even larger than UBC Vancouver, and the second largest (after UBC Vancouver) at the upper level. International students increased by almost 350 in number between 2013 and 2016, generating \$10 million in more revenue to the campus, but faculty numbers only increased by 2 in number, at a cost of around \$200,000. Such are the spending priorities of the extractive, rather than inclusive, campus. Where did the additional money go?

	2010	2013	2016
UBC Okanagan			
International undergraduates	415	659	1,002
Number of faculty	304	353	355
Average class size lower-level	79	83	86
Average class size upper-level	33	38	40

**Table 1: Undergraduate International Students, Number of Faculty and Average Class Sizes, UBC Okanagan 2010-2016.** \*Between 2010 and 2013, UBC Okanagan was increasing its faculty members due to increasing numbers of domestic students admitted. See Figure 1. Source BCHeadset.ca.

In late 2012 the local newspaper published a letter to the editor written by myself where I stated that in order for domestic students not to be displaced by the increasing number of international students at UBCO “the University needs to do a better job of identifying which classes international students are taking and adjusting the number and/or capacities of these classes accordingly” (*Daily Courier*, 2012a). In response, the then Provost of the UBCO campus did not engage me in a dialogue but wrote in a rebuttal letter: “Though it is natural for any faculty member to believe resources should go to his or her unit, universities and our students have many other needs” (*Daily Courier*, 2012b). The Provost listed what he thought these needs were, but none of them were more classes, more seats in classes, or

more professors. Instead, they were “libraries, residences, educational and research infrastructure, student advising, and university administration.” Such as it is in the exclusive and extractive rather than inclusive, university campus. So I presume that is where the money went! International student fees have gone to building residences, hiring more student advisors, and hiring more senior administrators at higher and higher salaries, but not to hiring more faculty or putting on more classes?

Moreover, despite the drive to attract more international students paying well-above cost-recovery fees, there is no strategy at UBCO to internationalize the curriculum or to increase international opportunities for domestic students. Few UBCO students study abroad, and of those that do, the vast majority choose the tried and trusted United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Ireland. There is also no thought that UBCO might need to expand the study of international relations for instance. The 2011 development review called for the campus to develop an internationalization strategy, but no such inclusive strategy has ever been developed.

Regarding an indigenization strategy, well, there has been none either, with no attempt to date at the indigenization of the curriculum. A small committee was set up in 2017 to begin to look into this matter. About 250 new professors have been hired by UBCO since 2005 but there was no attempt to prioritize the hiring of professors of First Nations background, a massive opportunity missed to do something different of an inclusive nature. There was no mention of indigeneity in any of the UBCO planning documents. The University has been advised at different points over the last number of years that it would be ideal if every discipline at the campus had at least one indigenous scholar, but this advice has fallen on deaf ears and persistently been ignored. However, there might be a glimmer of hope on the horizon. The UBC Annual Report 2016-17 states that: “UBC is working to ensure that...a full and accurate understanding of Canada’s history is...part of the education of all students, whatever their field of study” (UBC, 2017, p. 66). Presumably this would be an indigenous (de)colonial and inclusive perspective history.

### **Labour Relations**

Whereas the two campuses of UBCV and UBCO are in theory based on the University of California model, with each campus largely autonomous with respect to academic governance (separate Senates and administrations) a major problem with the campus development has been the unfortunate fact that union representation for the faculty has not been based on the University of California or University of Quebec system, where each campus has its own Collective Agreement and bargaining agent, but based on a unitary model of one Collective Agreement and one union representing faculty on both campuses. This has left the faculty at UBCO with no local representation, no local shop stewards, no empowered local union officers, and all matters have to be dealt with via the UBC Faculty Association (UBCFA) headquarters in Vancouver. In effect, UBCO faculty have been entirely marginalized and stripped of union representation and entirely exposed to exploitation by extractive, exclusionary and authoritarian local management and administration. This comes from a June 2005 Consent Order where the local union of the previous OUC continued its local representation at the new OC but gave up all local representation at UBCO, giving in to the University’s desire for a single bargaining agent for all faculty at UBC, and not a separate Collective Agreement and local bargaining agent for the UBCO campus and faculty.

The UBCFA has largely been a disaster for the UBCO campus. It does not enforce the Collective Agreement on the campus, allowing the local administration to pay just lip-service to it. The number of grievances that emanate from UBCO are vastly disproportionate to the overall membership because the administration feels it can get away with anything because UBCFA is far away in Vancouver, and it lets the UBCO administration get away with everything by not prosecuting grievances or enforcing the Collective Agreement. UBCFA in representing UBCO faculty members are very quick to take and argue management’s side, to parrot identically the management positions down to even the same punchlines, to argue against the individual faculty member, and to drag grievances out *ad infinitum*, hoping to wear down the members by attrition. UBCFA, for all intents and purposes, might just as well be management itself; UBCFA member service officers advocate for UBCO management, not faculty members. They also fail to acknowledge the collegial nature of decision-making in a university setting, and appear to think of all management-faculty interactions within the context of a corporate world of management (senior administration) versus employees (faculty) where the employees (faculty) have no say in managerial decision-making and just have to take orders and just be eternally thankful whatever they are ordered to do for their pay packet at the end of the week. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction on the UBCO campus with the UBCFA, especially in the area of handling of complaints and grievances. Most faculty on the campus are used from its OUC days to have a union that is a strong and timely advocate for individual members’ interests, concerns, complaints and grievances, with a proactive shop steward system; there is perhaps less of an expectation and history of this at UBC Vancouver, given

its different history and weak union; but the faculty at UBCO expected better from the UBCFA. So effectively, the lack of faculty union representation at UBCO has allowed the exclusionary, extractive campus to run amok, unchecked.

A good example of this is the UBCFA compliance with UBCO management in allowing heads and directors of “departmentless” Faculties to be appointed without input from faculty; that the persons who determine their workload, recommend their pay rises, chair their reappointment, tenure and promotion processes, and recommend their tenure, promotion or otherwise, can be appointed without their input and without any consultative and open application and nomination process, and these persons can even come from outside of their Faculty, with no expertise in their own discipline. Another good example is the failure of the union to enforce the Collective Agreement with respect to workload polices. Rather than enforce the language of the Collective Agreement that standard and general departmental workload polices must be established transparently and in full consultation with the faculty members of the department or Faculty, the union has allowed the UBCO administration to turn the process into what amounts to an annual post-tenure performance review of each individual faculty member, using the members’ annual reports submitted for purposes of pay rise consideration, to be instead used for performance appraisal in what the University has decided unilaterally are compulsory annual meetings with the head/director. This has allowed the assignment of differential teaching workloads based on what the administration sees as the performance of each individual faculty member in terms of primarily research, but also service. Such annual performance reviews for workload purposes do not exist at the UBC Vancouver campus, hence serve to further differentiate UBCO as a particularly good example of the extractive university campus, as the administration seeks to extract more and more work out of faculty members, especially ones it deems not up to scratch with respect to research, not in a collegial manner, but in an authoritarian manner.

My own experience with the UBCFA in the last year illustrates these problems. In 2017 I was elected as a member of the UBCFA Executive, as First Vice-Chair of the Okanagan Faculty Committee. I began my role in July 2017, and began to meet with faculty members on the UBCO campus who contacted me in this executive capacity to discuss their problems and propose solutions. Because I was being seen to be helping members too much perhaps, in September I was denied the usual place of the First Vice-Chair on the UBCFA Member Services and Grievances Committee. In August the President of the UBCFA had told me that I could not help members, and then in September 2017 I received a letter from my Provost (of all people) stating that I must “cease and desist from any further involvement in the workplace affairs of faculty members” as I “do not have the authority to act on behalf of the Faculty Association” and my statement that I was the elected First Vice-Chair of the OFC executive representative of UBCO faculty members was a “willful misrepresentation of my status” and that I has no authority to be “involved in labour relations matters concerning members of the Faculty Association” and I was “inappropriately engaging with Faculty Association members.” I received a similar letter a month later from the UBCO campus Principal. Was I perhaps upsetting the “sweetheart unionism’ deal between the UBCO senior administration and the UBCFA in Vancouver?

### **Workplace Experience**

At UBCO there has been an autocratic, top-down, hierarchical, non-inclusive, exclusionary and extractive management culture of command and control from the senior administration which has led to a disengaged faculty, poor labour relations and poor morale on the campus especially for regular faculty members, who in general feel a lack of pride in the university and lack of inclusive involvement in decision-making. Such has been the findings of the *de-rigour* surveys of faculty, staff and student satisfaction that UBCO administration has of course undertaken, in particular the findings for staff and faculty via a series of *Workplace Experience Surveys*, undertaken by an outside consultant. Surveys were carried out in 2008, 2011, and 2014, and one more is currently underway as of late 2017. Very little was heard about the 2014 survey, suggesting the results probably did not put management in a very good light. More comprehensive analysis was undertaken and published of the 2011 survey, hence I focus here on this survey.

The University administration’s interpretation of the results of the 2011 survey was that the “results are generally positive, indicating a generally satisfied workplace. But we can make our campus an even better place.” (UBC Okanagan, 2013b). Specific things the administration suggested to make things “even better” were to develop a mental health strategy for the campus, have some science of happiness presentations for staff and faculty, and maybe look into having a leadership blog. Results were especially positive for senior management and administration, who almost to a woman and man found UBCO to be a wonderful place to work. Results were less much positive for

support staff, but still positive, but once one went to the faculty member level of analysis, results began to look very negative.

The negative results for faculty at UBCO of the prior 2008 survey were put down to the usual grumpy and ungrateful nature of faculty members (the then Principal at the time remarked something to the effect, that since they got a raise in their salary coming from OUC, what do they have to complain about?) but the results in 2011 were too negative to be so easily dismissed. One Faculty through its Faculty Council was so concerned that it decided to look in detail into the faculty results of the 2011 survey for its own faculty members; the Faculty of Arts and Sciences (aka the Barber School of Arts and Sciences). It formed an ad hoc committee of the Faculty Council to report its findings and suggest remedies. The findings turned out to be quite shocking, revealing a generally dissatisfied and disengaged faculty. What was found to be the opinion of faculty was poor morale, poor workplace atmosphere and lack of pride in the campus, a very negative view of senior leadership communications, and absolutely no faith in senior leadership to follow through on addressing problems. Reported was a sense of poor Faculty and campus governance and leadership, lack of inclusive and collegial decision-making, and inadequate faculty involvement or consultation on major decisions at the Faculty and campus level. Also a lack of articulated academic or strategic plans or articulated organizational vision, a lack of confidence in senior management, a low level of morale and engagement, and faculty feeling excluded in decision-making regarding the affairs and business of the Faculty, including space planning, classrooms, new buildings etc. A remarkable only 6 of a responding 47 faculty members thought that “UBC’s senior leaders communicate a clear, strategic vision of the future direction of the University” and an even more remarkable two (2) of the 47 respondents could say in the affirmative that “I believe that UBC’s senior leaders will take meaningful action on the issues identified in this survey” (and subsequent events proved the other 45 to be entirely justified in their skepticism).

Also found was a poor overall state of physical and mental health and wellbeing among the faculty members, the need for more workload flexibility, and the need for better physical workspace. Lamented also by the faculty members were inadequate investment in professional development programs for regular faculty, and few opportunities for professional advancement. The one area where there was general satisfaction was with the heads of the academic units/departments, who, being recruited from the regular faculty ranks, were seen as collegial colleagues and not managers. The recommendations of the ad hoc committee were that faculty members through Faculty Council be given a larger voice in the management of the affairs and business of the Faculty under the collegial and shared governance norms of university management. The specific recommendations were the formation of a standing committee of Faculty Council on academic and strategic planning including space planning, size and role of programs and departments, enrolment policies, and the formation of a budget advisory standing committee of Faculty Council. Also recommended was the devolution of budgetary authority to the level of the academic units and departments, in order to include, engage and empower the departments and their faculty members, as budgetary authority is so devolved to the departments at UBC Vancouver. The ad hoc committee also recommended that the agenda and minutes of the executive management team (the so-and self-called “Leadership Team”) meetings be made available to the faculty members, in order that they could know what decisions were being made when and by whom, and how and why they were being made. Also that there be as soon as possible an external review of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, one that had yet to have been carried out after 9 years of the Faculty’s existence, and in violation of expressed campus policy that such reviews at UBCO be carried out every five to six years. (UBC Okanagan, 2013a, p. 19).

What was the response of the UBCO senior administration to the ad hoc committee and its recommendations? The Acting Dean and Provost refused to meet with the committee to assist it in its research and deliberations. Given the satisfaction expressed by the faculty members with their heads of the academic units/departments, the administration decided to hire all new heads, external to the campus, so that faculty members would be able to kick their habit of thinking of their heads more as colleagues than as management. Both the Acting Dean and the Provost gave no response to the report of the ad hoc committee, or to the overall results of the 2011 survey. A new Dean of the Faculty was hired in 2015, and a year later in 2016 he admitted no knowledge of the existence of the ad hoc report. Once made aware of its existence, he also gave no response. The report’s recommendation for an external review of the Faculty to be undertaken was endorsed by the passing of a motion to that effect in Faculty Council in 2014. The Provost was then requested by Faculty Council through the Acting Dean to initiate the review, and the request was refused. So now 13 years after the founding of the Faculty, an external review of it is still to be carried out, in spite of its quite unusual and experimental structure and nature, and in spite of UBCO senior administration stating publicly that such reviews of Faculties at UBCO are carried out every five to six years.



## Conclusion

The analysis of this paper tends to support the conclusion that the UBCO campus conforms to the characteristics described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) of an exclusionary and extractive rather than an inclusive institution. What are the most egregious examples, from this broad but far from exhaustive and comprehensive survey, of the exclusionary and extractive rather than inclusive nature of the campus? Certainly, the weak-to-ineffective-non-existent faculty association, and the ignoring of faculty calls for external reviews. Moreover, the general ostracism of faculty, staff and students from administrative decision-making, right down to telling faculty that they have no right to act of behalf of the university or discuss data that the senior administration see as proprietary to it, rather than in the public domain, as befits a taxpayer-funded public institution, or even to purport to be members of the university community. Add to this the growing diversion of grant and tuition fee funding to administrative bloat. Time will tell if these states of affairs either worsen or improve over the coming years.

## REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Annual Report on Enrolment: Okanagan Campus. (2013). University of British Columbia. Kelowna, BC: Author.
- Daily Courier*. (2012a). Peter Wylie, letter to the Editor, "Extra tuition money can go to hiring professors." November 23.
- Daily Courier*. (2012b). Wesley Pue, Provost, letter to the editor "International students don't displace locals" November 29, 2012.
- MoU. (2004). *Memorandum of Understanding on a Major New University Campus for the Okanagan* Government of BC, Ministry of Advanced Education and University of British Columbia.
- The Phoenix*. (2013). "DVC Deborah Buszard speaks on UBCO's successes and the shaping of its future" March 25, 2013.
- The Phoenix*. (2014a). "UBCO's enrolment fell short this year" September 22, 2014.
- The Phoenix*. (2014b). "Enrolment numbers inaccurate" October 6, 2014.
- The Phoenix*. (2014c). "Ross's enrolment rebuttal mistaken" October 20, 2014.
- The Phoenix*. (2014d). "Why is administration taking action against a prof...just for writing about publicly available info?" November 24, 2014.
- The Phoenix*. (2014e). "International tuition fees explained." November 3, 2014, p.4.
- UBC Viewbook. (2008). University of British Columbia. Vancouver, BC: Author.
- UBC Viewbook. (2011). University of British Columbia. Vancouver, BC: Author.
- UBC Okanagan Campus Master Plan. (2015). University of British Columbia. Kelowna, BC: Author.
- UBC Okanagan. (2005). *A Community of Excellence, Academic Plan*. Kelowna, BC: Author.
- UBC Okanagan. (2010). *UBC's Okanagan Campus: Strategic Action Plan*. Kelowna, BC: Author.
- UBC Okanagan. (2013a). *UBC's Okanagan Campus*. Kelowna, BC: Author.
- UBC Okanagan. (2013b). *Workplace Experience Survey Update*, Okanagan Executive Team, March 14. UBC.
- UBC News. (2014). "New President welcome largest ever first-year class", September 2, 2014.
- UBC Reports. (2013). "Giving BC students a global edge", February.
- UBC. (2014). *2014 Annual Report on Enrolment Okanagan Campus*. Vancouver, BC: Author.
- UBC. (2017). *UBC 2016-17 Annual Report*. Vancouver, BC: Author.
- University Act. (2017). R.S.B.C, 1996, c. 468 *Consolidation of the University Act*, University of British Columbia, Office of the University Counsel.
- Vancouver Sun*. (2014). "UBC boasts biggest first-year class at Vancouver, Okanagan campuses". September 2, 2014.

## AFFILIATIONS

**Peter Wylie** is an Associate Professor of Economics in the Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan.