Zeitenwende in the Indo-Pacific? Assessing Germany’s Regional Security Engagement

From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.

In its aim to become a global security actor, the EU is increasingly undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over the world. These missions are based on the European security and defence policy (ESDP) which forms an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The Treaty of Lisbon seems to mirror the Union’s global security ambitions as it addresses the European security and defence policy in a whole new treaty section. However, European missions still depend on willing Member States to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of its security and defence policy. The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between the European Union and the Member States in the fi eld of the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy and whether the Treaty of Lisbon manages to clarify the situation. What constraints, if any, do the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy impose on the Member States regarding the conduct of their national foreign policy? The article argues that the relationship between the EU and the Member States can only be determined after an examination of the binding nature of primary and secondary CFSP law as well as of international agreements concluded by the Union.

This research aims at analysing the nature and transformation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy since 2014. Having been founded in the post-Cold War peace environment, the Common Security and Defence Policy had an expeditionary characteristic compatible with the European Union’s soft/normative power. However, this peaceful security environment changed after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. With new security parameters, the transformation of the Common Security and Defence Policy needs to be analysed in an academic context. In this regard, the research question of the article has been conceptualized as “To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected Common Security and Defence Policy transformation?”. There are two main findings of this research. First, the characteristics of the Common Security and Defence Policy have evolved from being expeditionary to being territorial/collective defence in nature. Second, the fragmentation in the European Union is deepening in terms of defence and security policies. This research suggests that the likely outcome is that the European Union will choose to conform to the United States’ NATO policies in order to deter the Russian Federation

Against the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this chapter shows that EU foreign and security policy-related responses were eventually not exclusively decided upon in the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In fact, a number of areas of Union action and respective rules which increasingly became concerned with security and defence policies were to come into the picture and form what today constitutes what one may call the EU’s security policy. Taking this into account, and in order to grasp the EU’s rule-making in response to the crisis in Ukraine, this chapter explores a web of rules which span across, and touch upon, different Treaty provisions in and outside the confines of CFSP/CSDP. Eventually, it asks how rule-making can best be understood in the wake of the EU’s response to the war on Ukraine. More specifically, how could the EU, under the condition of compartmentalization, be expected to act upon being confronted with the war on Ukraine, and how has decision- and rule-making evolved accordingly in the time of the crisis? Contextualizing the compartmentalization of EU foreign and security policy from a historical perspective, the chapter builds on liberal intergovernmental and neofunctionalist conceptual accounts to grasp how the EU has acted and may render different sets of rules in times of geopolitics and geopoliticization. Eventually, the analysis of procedural and substantive rules in view of the geopolitical crisis speaks to each of these theoretical explanations.

The Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union has recently come to the forefront as a potential force of integration. This study explores the consequences (if any) of such a move, investigating how likely it is for Common Security and Defense Policy to be politicized and become a new area of dissent. The article explores conditions of politicization at three different levels of analysis: (a) the systemic level, where Common Security and Defense Policy position in a bi-dimensional political space (left–right and anti-pro EU) is discussed; (b) the party level, where potentially successful issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are identified; (c) the individual voter level, where the probabilities of being mobilized by issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are assessed. Our analysis suggests that although Common Security and Defense Policy is prone to be politicized and right-wing parties are the most likely group to do so, this move may backfire as right-wing voters are less likely to be mobilized on Common Security and Defense Policy compared to their left-wing counterpart. We discuss the implications of these results for the conceptualization of politicization and European integration.

In May this year, a process called the Conference on the Future of Europe was launched, which serves as a platform in which the citizens of the European Union can take part. In this context, we all have the possibility to make suggestions and give opinions. We can participate as individuals or in groups; with a professional, scientific or purely personal contribution we have the possibility to participate in discussions and events or organize an event in our community on one of the priority topics. All this takes place on special common websites of the EU and the Member States. At the same time the Strategic Compass is being developed at the institutional level of the European Union. It is a document that is designed to unite, harmonize and unify all proposals, discussions and starting points on the future of the Union so that they can be implemented to the greatest extent possible. The above-mentioned facts served as the starting point for this thematic issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, which, in the context of the debate on the future of the European Union, specifically focuses on its area of Common Security and Defence Policy. It was designed in cooperation with the Nova univerza-New University as part of the project entitled Integral Theory of the Future of the European Union (J5-1791), led by Matej Avbelj and financed by the Slovenian Research Agency. Much has been written on European security and defence policy. What can be summed up on this occasion is the fact that as early as 1998, the then French President and the British Prime Minister met in Saint-Malo and signed a statement on the creation of a European security and defence policy, including a European autonomous military force capable of operating in cases where NATO would not opt for military participation. A year later, as a direct result of the Saint-Mal summit in Helsinki, the "main goal" was set, setting the year of 2003 as the target date for the establishment of the European armed forces with up to 60,000 troops. However, the European Union has still not reached this main goal. It was again revived by the EU Global Strategy in 2016 with some new approaches to old challenges. Consequently, some of the better known activities that were formed as its result include the European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and others. The debate on the future of the Union's common security and defence policy is mostly determined by the changes in the international security environment that affect the European Union and the events in and around it. The analysis of security threats and the risks associated with them represent the first step in creating a future strategic framework, to be defined by the debaters at national levels and coordinated at the European level. The key achievements will include coordinated agreements in the field of achieving the "main goal" of 2003, namely the European Union as an independent actor in the field of security and defence. It is expected to have more geopolitical power, which, as Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, put it in 2019, will "also know how to use the language of power". The path to this goal will by no means be easy. Coordination between the 27 members in the field of security and defence is a demanding process. In addition, it needs to be properly positioned in relation to NATO's strategic security partner. However, its placement in the defence planning process of the Member States will be the most demanding and important. The Republic of Slovenia is chairing the Council of the European Union at a time of important changes for the Union, which may be decisive in the future. With this thematic issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we want to add to Slovenia's contribution in this process. Igor Senčar writes about the importance of the European Union's resilience in a cognitive sense. In the article The cognitive aspects of Europe’s security and defence challenges he uses the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea to describe the development of a phenomenon that was collectively perceived, understood and learnt from. Modern European society, with its prosperity and high democratic standards, also has shortcomings that need to be acknowledged in order to increase societal resilience in the future. One of the ways in which we could achieve greater power of the Union is the greater role of its community or its institutions. This is proposed by Katarina Vatovec in the article The Communitarization of the European Union's defence policy. Changes have to be applied also in the way the decisions are made, including the voting method, which should be a majority one in order to increase the effectiveness of this policy. In the article European security and defence: a breakthrough or simply muddling through, Dick Zandee notes that changes should be made in the EU security and defence. The long-standing agreement and coordination in this area, which is reflected primarily in its documents and not in its actions, must end. To this end, the author proposes the concrete changes needed to achieve this goal. Twenty years of the European Union’s activities in the field of international operations and missions is a proof that the EU is an important international player. The details of its activities are presented by Aleksandra Koziol in her article Missions and operations as a tool for shaping EU’s global engagement. She notes that the Covid 19 epidemic has shifted the Union’s focus from the global to more internal affairs of the Union itself, which calls to a reflection on the future in this area as well. As part of Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Jelena Juvan discusses The future of the common security and defence policy and small member states. She writes about what a small country can achieve in this process given the fact that the Union as a whole has failed to implement its decisions from the past. However, it is crucial whether the area of the common security and defence policy is designed in such a way that it could represent a response to modern security threats.

This chapter analyses the variations in foreign, security, and defence policy as well as the consequences of a possible fragmentation on the positioning of the Union as a united global force. Since ‘security and defence policy’ is separated from ‘foreign and security policy’, one of the key questions concerns the dividing line between the two areas. Is it possible for Member States not to participate in the security and defence integration or does the single legal order of the Union prevents this variation? A second question concerns the more general possibilities for closer or enhanced cooperation. And, finally, a third question is to what extent the proposed new EU Constitutional Treaty further consolidates the somewhat fragmented legal regime on differentiation in the area of foreign, security, and defence policy.

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.

This chapter examines what the international literature tells us about French security and defense policy, but also what the French case teaches us about this literature. French scholarship on security and defense policy has demonstrated three main trends: the legacy of Charles de Gaulle’s vision and policies, a strongly policy-oriented production, and the influence of sociological approaches in French political science more generally. These trends have given the impression that the Fifth Republic’s security and defense was unique among Western democracies. The chapter tries to bring together the main elements of a research agenda that can connect the French case to the international literature, including: expanding the sociology of security and defense policy actors and institutions; analyzing the changing articulation between defense policy and war; and tracking the reaction of the French “strong state” to the the privatization of defense functions, the civilianization of the military, and growing international cooperation.

This article traces the evolution of attitudes and policies of Irish political parties towards Irish neutrality and the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) across four decades. The article provides conceptual snapshots of the position of parties' policies along two policy dimensions. The first dimension captures policies of limited ‘military’ neutrality and ‘positive’/‘active’ neutrality. The second dimension captures minimalist EU foreign and security policy, defined as ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ security policy, to a maximalist EU CFSP/ESDP ‘hard security’ policy amounting to a ‘militarized’ EU. The positioning starts with the campaign for Irish membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), focusing on the accession negotiations and the 1972 referendum campaign and finishes with an analysis of parties' positions on the Security and Defence Policy aspects of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. Evidence shows the positions of the larger parties of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party shifted away from fundamental neutrality to embrace treaty‐based progress towards a maximalist EU ESDP. Over the same time period, the smaller parties of Sinn Féin and the Green Party were more consistent in their adherence to positive neutrality and in their opposition to the development of a maximalist EU ESDP. The forces of Europeanization have been evident in influencing evolving party discourses in Ireland. Much of this influence has been occasioned by the impact of participation in government on parties and the sporadic requirement to engage with referendum campaigns. The process of Europeanization has thus been subtle and muted and has interacted in intricate ways with domestic party agendas and objectives.

CFSP is one of the policies of the EU based on intergovernmental cooperation in foreign relations and defense policy, including the common security and defence policy (hereinafter CSDP). This research chapter provides an overview of the common foreign and security policy (hereinafter CFSP) within the European Union (hereinafter EU). The chapter discusses the historical development of CFSP, starting from its establishment in the 1970s and its subsequent incorporation into the Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter TEU) in 1992. It outlines the instruments, institutions, and voting procedures associated with CFSP, including the common commercial policy and cooperation with third states. The chapter also explores the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and EU military and civil missions. It highlights the changes the Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon Treaties brought about, such as establishing the position of high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy (FASP) and creating the European external action service (hereinafter EEAS).

The last two decades have witnessed a tectonic upheaval in the international political milieu. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the sudden emergence of newly independent states and required a quick and proper reaction to the changing geopolitical context. Such is the challenge confronting Russia and the European Union (EU), the two major players in the region. In times of economic crisis and political uncertainty, both parties seek to achieve their goals and protect their interests in the shared vicinity by expanding cooperation with their neighbors. However, each side is conducting its actions in a different fashion, according to its own strategic plans. The pressing issue coming out of this situation is whether it is possible to label this dual struggle for broader political clout a new strategic competition. Or it is just an inevitable process of restructuring the regional political environment - a process that is still incomplete after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Thus, this essay examines the practical nature and the ideological background of both the EU and Russian approaches and policies towards the common proximity of the former Soviet republics.The growing importance of the EU as a strong center of gravity in the European postCold War milieu, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, has sparked the development of a wide range of cooperative mechanisms between the Union and its Eastern European neighbors. The EU's increasing geopolitical weight has taken concrete form through the development of its enlargement strategy and the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), followed by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, most recently, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) have been envisaged in the case of Eastern Europe as alternatives to the enlargement strategy, albeit this equivalency has not been officially stated. They were policies meant to enhance political dialogue and cooperation in many areas, ranging from security issues to trade, migration, visa facilitation, energy, and environment. A number of relevant projects have been set up, such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (part of the Association Agreements), institutional appropriation, common negotiation and cooperation platforms (cross-border links, Euro-regions, civil society and business forums, biennial summits, annual ministerial meetings, etc.). This article holds that the Union's paramount goals in Eastern Europe have been first and foremost regional stability and security. However, Brussels has realized that the EU could best promote stability and security indirectly through measures aimed at encouraging the spread of democracy, human rights, good governance, and market economy. Moreover, in order to attain the aforementioned objectives, the EU should further engage in the wider European security environment (through its CFSP/CSDP instruments) and seek to strike a balanced stance towards Russia. Amid sensitive issues, EU policy makers and heads of state need also to work to arrive at a consensus with Moscow that might involve common approaches for facilitating regional cooperation.The strategy centered on the integration-security spectrum has been the main rationale that stood behind the EU's approach towards Eastern Europe. The ideas under which the European integration process has been conceived dealt with threats and risks in a rather politicized way, rather than using hard power (best reflected in the concentric circles model). This is because Brussels perceives regional stability from a liberal security perspective of normative transformation based on the EU's core values: democratization, rule of law, human rights, and market economy. This perception stands in contrast to the more traditional realist understandings of international relations, premised on material interests and balance of power. However, in the Eastern neighborhood of the EU, this article argues that an interplay of liberal/realist perceptions of security exists, and that it stems from the persistence of a geostrategic competition between the EU and Russia over the post-Soviet Newly Independent States (NIS). …

The European Union (EU) decided in the late 1990s to become involved in security and defence maters. Many see this as a logical accomplishment of European integration and as a fundamental simplification of the European security architecture where two organizations will play a major role – the EU and NATO. The project of a European security and defence policy as an instrument of the EU to manage crises in its close neighbourhood has become significant thanks to the evaluation of European participation in the Kosovo crisis and, above all, as a result of its performance during the air strike campaign against Yugoslavia. The support rendered by two major European powers – France and Great Britain – was also decisive; on this issue their positions became closer than ever before. At its meeting in Helsinki the European Council reached agreement on concrete objectives – the establishment of military capabilities which would be prepared for operations by 2003. What is important is not only the reinforcement of European capacities but also their relationship with NATO as well as the exploitation of their existing procedures and structures. Apart from the degree of the interlinking and autonomy of the two organizations in the event of such operations, the question of drawing in NATO allies standing outside the EU is also a sensitive matter. The new dimension of the EU foreign and security policy will have a fundamental long-term influence on the shape of NATO and consequently on Trans-Atlantic relations. The way the US sees the European security and defence policy project is definitely not negligible. For the moment there is a predominant slightly “vigilante” approach, with emphasis on the limits of acceptability for the American side and possible dangers. The question of financial resources which the improvement of European military capabilities and a certain degree of EU strategic autonomy will require remains a controversial point for the moment. Pressure on increasing defence expenditure, on establishing certain criteria and, at least, on changing the structure of defence expenditure will clash with a policy of budget restrictions. The manner in which major European procurement projects will he interlinked with the restructuring of the European armaments industry will also be a factor that cannot he overlooked. The danger of unrealistic expectations placed in the European security and defence policy and the need of creating a security awareness among the European public will remain a long-term challenge. Without a definition of European interests and objectives, understandable to the public at large, a backing for EU military operations will be questionable and, in the last resort, the EU cannot avoid it.

In the post-cold war era, with the creation of the European Union(EU) that included the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) as "second pillar", the European security order furnished the basis that led to the development its own foundation. Based on this, the EU started striving for independent military capability, while establishing cooperative relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), establishing a political role in addition to a military role.<BR> With these points in mind, this paper researches the development of the CFSP that the EU executed, and analyzes the external relations and defense capabilities that the EU seeks to strengthen through the Treaty of Lisbon which came into effect recently.<BR> For this purpose, this paper examines the background and refinement process of the EU"s developing the CFSP in the new European security environment, and discusses aspects of promoting cooperation with NATO and striving to establish European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) and independent military capability.<BR> Also, because the EU switched from ESDP to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty of Lisbon to strengthen the European security strategy and established the European External Action Service(EEAS), this paper treats the contents of the CSDP that the EU strengthened within the category of CFSP through the Treaty of Lisbon, and makes a close inquiry into the main role of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affaires and Security Policy(HR/VP)” in describing the structure of EEAS.

Turkey’s current role as international mediator tempers the year 2020 with repeated crises, and the multiplication of misapprehensions with France and Greece. Therefore, as tensions gradually erupted between Turkey and the European Union (EU), this article through the retrospective of partnerships in the African space, highlights evidence of the advantages that the integration of Turkey in its area or more targeted and consensual policies could confer to the EU. The paper expounds on the new model of cooperation within the discipline of security studies; it merges the institutional approach and the triangular cooperation framework in illustrating Turkey and EU foreign policy towards Africa. The work fundamentally explains the transformation of Ankara and European Union’s security policies within Africa. It notes that the change from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and later on to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) provides a new synergy for cooperation among the three actors. Therefore without being an EU member, this model legitimately provided Turkey with a kind of de facto membership and consequently grants them with the latitude to engage in EU’s security policy.