Zagorin's Interpretation of Becker: Some Observations

Abstract

IN his introductory pages on the clash of rival philosophies of history, Mr. Zagorin notes with some relevance that they both edify and embarrass the average work-a-day historian. The remainder of his article is a critique of Carl Becker's presidential address, Everyman His Own Historian. He contends that once the majority of American historians became cognizant of the inadequacies of the claims advanced by scientific history, they lapsed into skepticism, bereft of a reasoned justification for the validity of their work. Unable now to believe any longer in the solidity of the historical fact but reluctant to accept the alternative view propounded by the historians of the idealist persuasion, they shun philosophy and carry on with doctrines unanalyzed and implicitly accepted. They are lacking in self-consciousness about the nature and presuppositions of their work and get on with it only by an act of faith. To be simultaneously skeptical and wanting in critical self-consciousness is to be in a deplorable state indeed. If Mr. Zagorin's evaluation is sound, a situation exists which justifies his endeavor to rescue them from their plight, and to do so by exposing the negativism of Becker's essay. For Becker's persuasive phrases, he is convinced, demolish the conception of history as a science without leaving anything constructive in its place. To be sure, the great majority of American historians may not be so deficient in self-consciousness as Mr. Zagorin fears, for a spate of books and articles concerning the nature and the processes of history would seem to belie his concern. One could not prove, naturally, that these are read and digested by the ordinary unphilosophical historian, but on the other hand Mr. Zagorin would also be hard put to sustain his contention. Even the least philosophically minded of historians would not readily avow his indifference to all speculative thought. The possibility also exists that to the degree to which they are skeptical, their skepticism is as much grounded in over-selfconsciousness, after the manner of Becker-if not entirely so-as in a willful refusal to examine the notions they have of their inquiry. Mr. Zagorin's primary concern, at least in this article, is with demolishing Becker's own skeptical fallacy rather than with rescuing its victimized readers; and one turns accordingly to his critique. Becker, he writes, rein-