Abstract
We study a simple general equilibrium model in which wages are set by collective bargaining as a mark-up over benefits. The inclusion of taxation and the government budget complicates the relationship between employment and hours worked; hence, we present numerical simulations of employment in terms of hours. There is a range of initial hours from which employment can be increased, or unemployment reduced, by cutting standard working time. Welfare conflicts are explained, but our examples show relatively small profit reductions when hours are diminished below the employers' (collective) optimum, and substantial employment gains.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
