Wonders of Creation: Art, Science, and Innovation in the Islamic World, San Diego Museum of Art, San Diego, September 27, 2024–January 5, 2025

With so many existing and emerging issues affecting mental health globally, this work is a timely review of issues faced specifically in Muslim (majority) countries. The editors advise there has been no serious attempt to study suicidal behaviors in Muslim-majority countries previously and the book covers epidemiology, risk factors of suicidal behavior, and the challenges of suicide prevention. The book will serve as a useful resource for family doctors who may be the first point of contact of potential suicides, as well as policymakers, public health specialists, mental health professionals and non-governmental and voluntary organizations interested in suicide prevention in Muslim-majority countries and in Muslim populations in non-Islamic countries. The book was compiled by S. M. Yasir Arafat, Mohsen Rezaeian and Murad M. Khan who have a deep, ongoing interest in the topic. Previous articles include: Arafat SMY, Baminiwatta A, Menon V, Singh R, Varadharajan N, Guhathakurta S, Mahesar RA, Rezaeian M. Prevalence of suicidal behaviour among students living in Muslim-majority countries: systematic review and meta-analysis. BJPsych Open. 2023 Apr 14;9(3):e67. doi: 10.1192/bjo.2023.48. Arafat S M Y, Menon V, Hussain F, Rezaeian M. Suicidal Behavior and Suicide Research during COVID-19 Pandemic in Muslim-Majority Countries: A Rapid Review. JSP. 2022; 4 (1) :3-23. Arafat SMY, Marthoenis M, Khan MM, Rezaeian M. Association between Suicide Rate and Human Development Index, Income, and the Political System in 46 Muslim-Majority Countries: An Ecological Study. Eur J Investig Health Psychol Educ. 2022 Jul 9;12(7):754-764. doi: 10.3390/ejihpe12070055. PMID: 35877455; PMCID: PMC9318836. Arafat SMY, Khan MM, Menon V, Ali SA, Rezaeian M, Shoib S. Psychological autopsy study and risk factors for suicide in Muslim countries. Health Sci Rep. 2021 Oct 1;4(4):e414. doi: 10.1002/hsr2.414. PMID: 34622034; PMCID: PMC8485607. Features: Available as EPUB and PDF Read on any device Instant download Own it forever (book format) Contact: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-97-2519-9

This article is intended to discuss the issue of corruption in Muslim countries as compared to western countries. As well as bribery, corruption also covers nepotism and favouritism. Despite Islamic teachings that forbid corruption it is widespread in countries such as Iraq and Yemen. There are Muslim countries that have anti-corruption legislation, but there are still some that do not. The aim is to examine the factors of corruption in Muslim countries. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is the main indicator for global corruption. Out of 198 countries, many Muslim countries are found in the bottom 20. Malaysia is ranked 51, which is reasonably good. The issue of corruption with reference to the Quran is examined. The example of corruption in the Ottoman Empire is looked at. The issue of why many Muslim countries are very corrupt is taken note of. There are political, cultural and legal factors at play. The type of political system practiced in various countries may be a factor. Many Muslim countries do not actually practice Islamic norms in relation to corruption. Compared to Muslim countries, many ‘Western’ countries rank well in the CPI. It may be the case that the more democratic the country the less likely it is to be highly corrupt as corrupt officials have more chances of being caught. Democratic ‘Western’ countries often have strict laws regarding funding for political parties. Democratic Muslim countries often do not, such as Malaysia. It must be pointed out that American companies operating in Iraq after the 2003 invasion also engaged in highly corrupt practices. The perception that ‘Western’ countries are less corrupt than Muslim countries often boils down to the fact that they have tougher laws and better enforcement. Muslim countries need to strengthen their governance and update and enforce anti-corruption laws.

Terrorism is becoming threatening and fear-provoking phenomenon for the present globe. The occurrence of terrorists’ activities is carried on without discrimination of Muslim and Non- Muslim countries. Present study investigates the trends and severity of terrorism in both Muslim and Non-Muslim countries. Forty five Muslim and one hundred thirty Non-Muslim countries are considered. Strong economic performance may reduce terrorism. The relationship of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita with terrorism is also calculated. In both types of countries, terrorist activities are evaluated through number of attacks, killings and injured persons. Besides this, the correlation is also applied to examine the association among number of attacks, killings and injured persons. Descriptive statistics evidently shows the huge losses in the form of Number of attacks, Killings and Injured persons. From 1980s to 2015, total terrorist attacks, killed persons and injured persons are 67518, 188775 and 272683 respectively in Muslim countries. In the sameway, in Non-Muslims countries, from 1980s to 2015, total terrorist attacks, killed persons and injured persons are 86914, 159386 and 167828 respectively. Number of injuries and killings are comparatively higher in Muslim countries whereas Non-Muslim countries have higher number of attacks. Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique is used to examine the relationship among these variables and Per Capita GDP. Elevated correlation is found among number of attacks, killings and injured persons. However, thecorrelation among per capita GDP and the other variables found negative. OLS findings as well show negative relationship among per capita GDP and number of attacks, killings and injured persons. With the increase in per capita GDP, terrorism will be minimized. Improvement in economic activity can reduceterrorism outcomes particularly in developing countries.

“Why are Muslim-majority countries less peaceful, less democratic, less developed?” This is the question Ahmet Kuru poses and seeks to answer in his Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment. Kuru's quite elaborate and complex causal explanation can be summarized as follows:The Muslim world was once unlike what it is today: specifically, between the eighth and twelfth centuries, it accommodated an ethnically and religiously pluralistic society, nurtured a vibrant intellectual-philosophical life, and made great advances in sciences, agriculture, urban development, theology, and commerce. The Muslim world enjoyed such a long period ofintellectual-scientific and economic progress thanks to the financial strength of merchants based on the vibrant role they played in international trade; the financial and institutional independence of ʿulama (religious scholars); the rulers and their reliance on merchants instead of the ʿulama; and the patronage extended by the rulers to scientists/philosophers. Yet, starting in the tenth century, a complex web of developments, such as the rise of the Shiʿi states, the formation of Sunni orthodoxy, declining agricultural productivity, and the spread of the iqta system, undermined the very conditions that made the Muslim “Golden Ages” possible. The political and economic upheavals that hit the Muslim world eventually pushed the rulers and the ʿulama to forge an alliance by the twelfth century (chapter 4).From the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries the Muslim world endured a series of foreign invasions unleashed successively by the Crusades, the Mongols, and the Timurids. These invasions aggravated the security situation in the Muslim world, pushed the masses into the arms of the military elites, and thus strengthened the militaristic-orientation of the state and further consolidated the ʿulama-state alliance. The same context also facilitated the spread of Sufism and Sasanid political thought. Ostracized by the ʿulama and bereft of state patronage, philosophers were gradually and systematically distanced from the Muslim body politic. Merchants also lost their former financial strength and social status as the economy became more militarized. European merchants became more competitive in the international trade and Sufism and Sasanid political thought spread. The latter ideational forces also added to the strengthening of the ʿulama-state alliance and the weakening of philosophers and merchants. Sasanid political thought legitimized the ʿulama-state alliance by promoting the idea that the state and religion are inseparable. Sasanid political thought also idealized a particular social hierarchy that envisioned a lower social status for merchants and thus discouraged commerce. As a parallel development, Sufism undermined philosophy and displaced the latter's rationalism with mysticism (chapter 5).As of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Muslims could still establish major world empires, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire, and the Mughal Empire. Yet these empires could not, and in fact did not, even intend to revitalize the intellectual and commercial life the Muslim world once had. With the continued support of the state, ʿulama dominated the educational system and prevented the reflourishing of philosophy. The ʿulama even prevented the adoption of the new printing technology and stemmed the spread of literacy among the masses. Already weakened in the previous centuries, the merchants could neither challenge the ʿulama-state alliance nor recover their former vibrancy and political influence. In fact, by capitulating to foreign powers and granting trade concessions the ruling elites even further weakened the merchants in the Muslim world. In addition to actively opposing any step that might revitalize intellectual and commercial life, the ʿulama also crafted the economic institutions and laws that hindered the long-term economic development of the Muslim world (chapter 6).The Muslim world eventually fell under the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of Europe, with only a few regions escaping direct European colonization. Even though Muslim statesmen introduced extensive modernization reforms—for example, in the Ottoman Empire—they failed to stop the balance of power from shifting in favor of Europe. The failure of modernization reforms was in large part due to the top-down nature of reforms, which, even though they weakened the ʿulama-state class and created a new literate class, they focused solely on strengthening the state, not on social forces, such as free and critical thinkers/intellectuals and merchants, who could have generated economic development in the Muslim world. In other words, the reforms failed to address the root causes of why the Muslim world fell behind the West and continued to keep the agents that could have worked to revitalize Muslim intellectual and economic life weak (chapter 7).To reiterate the causal explanation Kuru proposes, the long-term consequence of the ʿulama-state alliance, forged by the twelfth century, and the consequent marginalization of intellectuals and merchants largely explains the economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world. This failure, in turn, hindered the development of democracy and contributed to the continued resilience of authoritarianism in the Muslim world. Authoritarianism has taken a peculiar form in the Muslim world, embracing an inward-looking developmental model with heavy state involvement in economy. This peculiar form of authoritarianism subsequently generated violence expressed in various forms, and including not only the interstate, but also intrastate, conflicts in the Muslim world. In a more concise formulation, Kuru suggests the ʿulama-state alliance built by the twelfth century brought economic underdevelopment, which served only to sustain authoritarianism, and authoritarianism generated violence (chapters 1–3).Kuru's causal explanation is in large part path-dependent. That is, he claims, it was precisely the ʿulama-state alliance forged by the twelfth century that had put the Muslim world on a historical path toward economic underdevelopment in the subsequent centuries. To explain how the Muslim world remained stuck on that historical path, Kuru relies on neo-institutional economic theory. Timur Kuran's The Long Divergence, in particular, prefigures critically in Kuru's causal explanation.1Yet Kuru also goes beyond neo-institutional economic theory in two critical ways. First, Kuru suggests, economically inefficient laws and institutions cannot survive themselves, but have to rely on the existence of a powerful social coalition for sustenance and implementation. Therefore, Kuru painstakingly shows that the ʿulama-state alliance was not just a one-time event, but rather a persistent development that continues to survive and flourish in the Muslim world. Second, and relatedly, Kuru seems to believe that economic underdevelopment was not predetermined as neo-institutional economic theory implies. At any moment in time, powerful actors—the rulers and the ʿulama—could have changed the historical course and put the Muslim world onto a different historical path. But, alas, they did not.The links, first between economic underdevelopment and authoritarianism and then between authoritarianism and violence, are heavilytheory-based. In suggesting these links Kuru relies on rich and relevant political science literatures. Yet, he also claims that the rulers and the ʿulama made their own contributions to the sustenance of economic underdevelopment, authoritarianism, and violence in the Muslim world all along. By remaining thoroughly scholastic and medieval even to the present day and opposing original and critical thinking, the ʿulama, for example, could not effectively counter Salafi-Jihadism and thus indirectly contributed to religiously sanctioned violence in the Muslim world (chapter 1).In substantiating his causal explanations Kuru marshals not only theories, but also empirical materials, contemporary as well as historical. Kuru's empirical materials come from a wide variety of sources and hence are of wildly different kinds. Yet, all of them, be it a major historical event, like the Crusades, or an individual biography, like that of al-Ghazali, are fit together to illustrate one grand narrative. And that grand narrative is multilayered. To use Marx's terminology, Kuru's account not only takes into account structural (economic base) and superstructural (ideas, theologies, regimes, and laws) factors, but it also remembers the agent.Throughout the text Kuru engages in various theoretical debates. Consistently, though, he dismisses two major explanations for the backwardness of the Muslim world: colonialism and Islam. In dismissing colonialism Kuru emphasizes the role of agency. Kuru points to the experiences of East Asian countries and claims that the colonial past did not pre-ordain East Asia to economic underdevelopment. In dismissing Islam, Kuru advances two arguments: first, Islam is open to multiple interpretations and hence has no one single essence. Second, Islam did not prevent the Muslim world from experiencing scientific and economic flourishing during the eighth to twelfth centuries.Three fundamental issues come to mind with regard to the book. First, Kuru too easily dismisses the colonialism argument. The book disregards two other major cases that confirm the argument: Latin America and Africa. Furthermore, the book ignores the fact that the two most successful casesfrom East Asia—Japan and China—had never been under any colonial administration, and the third most successful case, South Korea, had never been under any Western one. The case of South Korea, when compared to the case of North Korea, and, of course, Taiwan, merits closer inspection, especially the role the United States played in its economic development, if it is to be used to dismiss the colonialism argument. Other cases from East Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Vietnam do not discredit but rather confirm the colonialism argument.Second, Kuru's causal explanation rests on a particular reading of the rise of Europe, which gives primacy to the role played by merchant-bourgeoisie and philosophers-scientists. Once these two groups emerge and begin to play their historical roles, the rest is simply history. This reading oversimplifies the rise of Europe and totally dismisses a host of factors, such as extreme political fragmentation and a competitive state-system, geographical location, and climate. It is fair to say that merchants and philosophers played their historical roles in bringing about the rise of Europe at the expense of other regions of the world within a special and unusual constellation of factors.The rise of Europe was more like a one-time unique event, which was, as Immanuel Wallerstein would say, something like the agricultural revolution or the coming into being of the universe. That is to say, the absence or suppression of some factors, thought to be the engine of the rise of Europe, in some other part of the world might not sufficiently explain the contemporary backwardness of that part vis-a-vis Europe. To put it more plainly, even if merchants and philosophers were not suppressed, the Muslim world could eventually have ended up in the same global status vis-a-vis Europe today.The rise of Europe has not only changed the balance of power between Europe and the rest, but also transformed the latter into a position, out of which, as Kuru is well-aware, the latter could have escaped with a strong state-building and economic development program. That is how Germany and Italy, which were not short in merchants and philosophers/scientists, yet still fell behind Britain, France, or the Dutch Republic, recovered in the late nineteenth century. Japan pursued a similar path during the same period. In the second half of the twentieth century, South Korea and Taiwan were able to replicate the same achievement. Now China seems to be doing it. Then why did the Muslim world fail to do the same? This question is obviously rather central to the book's argument. Yet it is not addressed.This leads to the third and last issue with the book. According to Kuru, the Muslim world has developed “an inward-looking model of governance” and therefore failed to replicate what East Asia achieved in economic development. The obviously critical question is why the Muslim world could not develop a better version of authoritarianism, which could have been conducive to economic development? Kuru does not specifically address this question. This is, in large part, because Kuru provides a rather superficial account of the last 200 years: Chapter 4 (seventh to eleventh centuries) comprises a total of forty-eight pages; chapter 5 (twelfth to fourteenth centuries),forty-four pages; chapter 6 (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries) thirty-eight pages; and chapter 7, which covers the critical centuries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during which the Muslim world could have potentially developed economically successful authoritarianism, comprises just twenty-one pages. Moreover, Kuru devotes only six pages in chapter 7 to his discussion of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century state-building reforms. The book could have been better balanced by devoting more space to how the Muslim world failed to meet the European challenge and thus made an even more critical contribution to our understanding of the contemporary backwardness of the Muslim world.Despite these issues, Ahmet Kuru must be applauded for his audacity. The book is ambitious in every imaginable way. Kuru poses a really momentous question, covers an expansive geographical space, traces a long historical period, and yet manages to propose a neat answer, provide an incredible array of empirical materials to back up his claims, and goes beyond the restrictionsof his scholarly specialty and thereby transcends the academically well-established borders and walls. Scholars of particular fields, periods, regions, and countries will certainly find something to disagree with in this book. Yet, all in all, Kuru's Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment is an admirable work of scholarship.

BackgroundEarly detection of breast cancer can improve survival rates and decrease mortality rates. This study investigates whether there are significant differences in participation in breast screening among women born in Muslim countries compared to women born in Non-Muslim countries and Australia.MethodsScreening data from January 1st, 2000 to December 31st, 2013 from the Breast Screen Victoria Registry (BSV) was linked with hospital records from the Victorian Admitted Episodes Dataset (VAED). Countries having more than 50% of their population as Muslim were categorised as Muslim countries. Age adjusted rates were calculated for women born in Muslim and Non-Muslim countries and compared with the Australian age adjusted rates. Logistic regression assessed the association between screening status and other factors which include country of birth, marital status, age and socio-economic status.ResultsWomen born in Muslim countries (Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.70, 95%CI = 0.68–0.72) and in other Non-Muslim countries (OR = 0.87, 95%CI = 0.86–0.88) had lower odds of participation in breast screening than Australian born women. Women aged 60–64 years (OR = 1.42, 95%CI = 1.40–1.44) had higher odds of participation in the BreastScreen program than 50–54 age group.ConclusionThis study provides valuable insights to understanding breast screening participation among women born in Muslim countries residing in Victoria. This population level study contributes to the broader knowledge of screening participation of women born in Muslim countries, an understudied population group in Australia and across the world. This study has implications for breast screening programs as it highlights the need for culturally sensitive approaches to support breast screening participation among women born in Muslim countries.

Status and drivers of maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health in the Islamic world: a comparative analysis

This article is a study of the views of Muhammad Asad (1900-1992) regarding relationship between Muslim and western worlds. It makes a comparison of Asad’s view with some other distinguished scholars like Dr. Mahmood Ahmad Ghāzī, Marmaduke Pikthal etc. Quoting Asad and other scholars it concludes that West had been picking & choosing the beneficial particles from Muslim Civilization in the field of science and civilization. But in modern age when West has become in the position to give its science and technology to the Muslim world, it ruins political liberty of the Muslim world and destroy it spiritually and culturally. The West demanded from Muslim world to give up its cultural heritage and adopt western ideologies and ways of life with the claim that it is the only way of progress for the Muslims. Asad emphasizes on reconciliation between Muslim and Western worlds for better future of the human race. He says that despite their differences Muslims and the West may make friendly relation with each other. However he states that fundamental barrier between good relations of both the worlds is overwhelmed enmity and phobia of the West against Islam and Prophet of Islam. So it is mandatory for reconciliation and good relation amongst both the worlds that such irrational and unethical hostility, hatred and phobia of the West against Islam be deleted first. He says that in the prejudiced and hostile atmosphere they could never attain the goal of reconciliation. Asad expresses his distinctive opinion that West has the most powerful and dominant position in political, economic and technological spheres of life, hence it must take first step for the purpose of reconciliation between Islamic world and western worlds. He further emphasizes that for the better relation between both the worlds, the west should also give up the dual standard to deal with Muslim world. He also advises Muslims that they should explain and interpret Islam in such a way that may be easily understandable for the western world.

Purpose– The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the Muslim religion on firm capital structure.Design/methodology/approach– The authors compare financing patterns in Muslim versus non-Muslim countries using 658 firms in 16 countries covering a period of seven years.Findings– No significant differences between Muslim and non-Muslim countries were found in terms of total debt ratios. However, significant differences were found in the choice of short-term versus long-term debt, with firms in Muslim countries showing a strong preference for short-term debt.Research limitations/implications– The findings confirm existing theories on the impact of the Islamic religion on short-term versus long-term debt preferences. However, the findings concerning the lack of an impact of the Islamic religion on total debt preferences are surprising and contrary to existing theories.Practical implications– Firms in Muslim countries appear to have the flexibility to adopt overall leverage ratios comparable to those in non-Muslim countries. However, firms in Muslim countries may be disadvantaged in that there appear to be impediments to the use of long-term debt.Originality/value– This paper presents one of the first empirical studies of the impact of the Muslim religion on corporate financing choices across a large cross-section of firms in Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

We analyze spatial spillover effects in international tourism as a consequence of transnational terrorist attacks. Specifically, we hypothesize that attacks executed in Islamic countries on citizens from Western countries will generate spatial spillovers of three kinds. Firstly, tourism from the victims’ countries to Islamic destination countries other than the location of the attacks will decline. Secondly, tourism from other Western countries to the country in which the attacks took place will decline. Thirdly, tourism from other Western countries to other Islamic destination countries also will decline. These spatial spillover effects occur because the terror message is strategically addressed at Western citizens in general rather than the tourists’ countries of origin per se. Tourists update their priors after such attacks, rationally expecting a greater chance of becoming victimized in other Islamic countries as well, given the transnational character of Islamist terror groups and the limited capacity of governments in Islamic countries to prevent such attacks.

Concatenate Buying Behavior of Working Women: Empirical Evidence from Islamic Verses Non-Islamic Perspective

Understanding the participation in cervical screening of Muslim women in Victoria, Australia from record-linkage data

Saving and investment are two of the most important tools for economic growth. The interest rate has always been considered an important determinant of saving and investment. However, according to Islamic teachings, riba or earning interest on saving or investment is forbidden, and thus, many Muslims try to avoid earning income from the interest rate. Therefore, the aim of this study is to assess the effects of this religious guideline on the financial decisions of an Islamic country’s population and its impact on saving and investment. We applied the random effect and system generalized method of moments (GMM) model separately to data of 17 non-Islamic and 17 Islamic countries from 2005 to 2013. The results suggest that people in Islamic countries are not concerned about the interest rate on saving, but in non-Islamic countries, the interest rate, per capita income, and inflation have significant positive impacts, and national expenditure has a significant negative impact on saving. However, in Islamic countries, remittances received and national expenditure have negative significant impacts, and per capita income has a positive significant impact on saving. In the case of investment, interest rate and inflation show a negative effect on investment while trade affects investment positively in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Furthermore, domestic credit provided by banks has a negative significant effect on investment in non-Islamic countries, while in Islamic countries, remittances show a positive significant impact on investment. The governments and policy makers of Islamic countries should not imitate the economic policies of non-Islamic countries because religious factors play an important role in the interest rate–saving relationship. Instead, they should increase per capita income by improving employment conditions and by reducing remittances received and national expenditure. Policies on saving should not allow earning interest. Furthermore, in order to increase investment, efforts should be made to lower the interest rate and inflation, and to enhance remittances received and trade. These policies will increase saving and investment in Islamic countries, ultimately resulting in improved economic growth.

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have been growing in number and size over the years, in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Their importance in terms of potential impact on the economic, social and political fronts of both the home countries (managing the SWFs) and the host countries (receiving the investments of SWFs) has drawn increasing attention to the operations of these funds. The basic concerns about these funds are the issues of governance, transparency and accountability at a global level. This paper aims to highlight these issues with a specific focus on SWFs sponsored by the members of the Organisation of Islāmic Cooperation (OIC), or Muslim countries in short. It discusses the gaps arising in the governance, transparency and accountability of SWFs in Muslim Countries (SWF-MC) and proposes some recommendations to improve their practices with a view to enhance their impact on social and economic developments in Muslim countries. It also discusses the Santiago Principles which have been developed as a comprehensive set of voluntary codes to serve as a framework of international best practices in the area of governance for SWFs. It is found that SWF-MC such as Libya, Qatar, Sudan, Nigeria, Oman, Brunei and others are the least compliant funds with regard to the Santiago Principles based on the Truman scoreboard. Moreover, the overall level of transparency of SWF-MC, based on the Linaburg–Maduell Transparency Index (LMTI) is also very low. Based on these findings, it is deemed crucial that SWF-MC should be properly set up and governed by international best practices.

Secularism in Islamic countries is a hotly-debated topic which produces dramatic sociopolitical consequences on the one hand, and wide-ranging academic controversy on the other. The real social potential of secularism among Muslim populations is an issue that is not always estimated properly. The present paper first reviews some historical examples of secular cultural policy in Islamic countries. This review covers the secular reforms in four political, social, legal, and educational spheres. Subsequently, using data from the World Values Survey, it compares empirically the desirability of a public role for religion in 18 Islamic and Western countries. Furthermore, it examines the acceptability of Western secular culture in six countries in the Muslim world. Bearing in mind Casanova’s analytical approach to the theory of secularization, it comes to the conclusion that a democratic application of a secular cultural policy in Islamic countries is neither desirable nor feasible.

This study examines whether and how Islam has bearings on corporate liquidity (cash holdings). A review of 34,895 non-financial firms from 68 countries (12 Islamic countries and 56 non-Islamic countries) for the period 1996 -2011 reveals that cash is lower in Islamic countries than in non-Islamic countries. The positive effect of growth opportunities on cash is also weaker in Islamic countries than in non-Islamic countries, thereby indicating lower propensity to hoard cash for upcoming growth opportunities in the former than in the latter likely because corporate governance is stakeholder-based such that shareholder wealth maximization is not the corporate objective in Islamic countries. Furthermore, the negative effect of debt issuance on cash is stronger in Islamic countries than in non-Islamic countries, thereby signifying higher effectiveness of debt in reducing agency cost in the former than in the latter.