Woman: Concept, Prototype and Stereotype

Abstract

ABSTRACT Drawing on previous work, I argue that a family resemblance account of the concept woman has several beneficial consequences. Namely, it promotes hermeneutical justice, and, in time, it may serve to change the prototypes and stereotypes people tend unreflectively to associate with woman. I claim that only at that point will full hermeneutical justice be achieved. To this end, I propose a reconceptualization of the notion of hermeneutical injustice, first presented by Fricker (2007). First, I present the family resemblance account of woman. Accordingly, that concept isn’t identified by a set of necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions, but, roughly, by different criteria. Second, I show how concepts, prototypes and stereotypes relate to one another and how they may contribute to hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I show how the proposed account of woman may in time foster a change in the associated prototype and stereotypes, which will ameliorate societies by doing more justice to the lived experience of trans women – that is, by promoting full hermeneutical justice.