Within ‘Our European Family’? The Role of the Local EU Delegation as an Intermediary in EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Relations

The paper examines communication and visibility (C&V) aspect in the operations of the EU Delegation in Saudi Arabia and the GFA Consulting Group. The author assumes that properly designed communication using adequate contents may significantly affect the EU external relations. To verify this statement, the twofold approach was used. First, through the lens of Soft Power and EU actorness, it looks into the theoretical dimension of the international relations and its possible links with communication process. Second, drawing on existing internal EU documents (Communication and Visibility in EU-financed External Actions – Requirements for Implementing Partners 2018 by the EU Delegation in Saudi Arabia, and Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in the Third Countries and International Organizations, published in 20122) the paper offers analytical framework to explore the qualitative and quantitative nature of the online communication undertaken in social media platform both by the EU Delegation in Saudi Arabia and the GFA.

After its inception the European External Action Service (EEAS) was subject to close scrutiny, with analyses focused primarily on the performance of its top official, Baroness Catherine Ashton, and her efforts to combine her duties as Vice-President of the European Commission and Presidency of the EU Councils of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence (Helwig, Chapter 4 of this volume). Much attention was also paid to the many challenges faced by all those involved in creating the new service (Onestini, Chapter 3, of this volume). Yet, relatively little focus has been brought to bear on how the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the EEAS have influenced EU performance in relation to individual partner countries. Likewise, the manner in which EU delegations have taken on the mediation and coordination role between member-state embassies in the field has been little explored. Austermann’s case study of coordination between member-state embassies and the European Union Delegation (EUDEL) in Beijing fills the gap to some extent, (Chapter 15 of this volume), but this chapter focuses on the smaller EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where longstanding policy can be described as part of the EU’s structural diplomacy (Keukeleire, 2014; Keukeleire et al., 2009, 2015).

The Lisbon Treaty aimed to make EU foreign policy-making more coherent, more efficient and more unitary. As with most previous EU foreign policy upgrades, the focus was on institutional and procedural adaptations in Brussels, with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the upgrading of the High Representative (HR) as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and Vice-President of the Commission. But the Lisbon Treaty also had far-reaching impact on European foreign policy-making on the ground: it upgraded former Commission delegations to comprehensive EU delegations, adjusted modes of diplomatic representation towards third countries and international organisations and put an end to the rotating presidency in external affairs (Vanhoonacker et al., 2011). EU delegations now officially represent the Union abroad and ‘shall act in close cooperation with member states’ diplomatic and consular missions’ (Article 221 TFEU, see also Council, 2010, Article 5).

ABSTRACTThe European Union’s (EU) Delegations and Offices that represent the Union in 144 countries have evolved into important satellites, implementing EU external relations. Their activities are manifold and are implemented in various ways. Building on substantive interview data, this article provides the first expansive mapping of EU climate diplomacy practices of EU Delegations and explains the surprising variance therein. It shows that the intensity and quality of contacts between individual Delegations and individual (parts of the) Brussels-based institutions – most importantly DG Climate Action – in combination with individual Delegation staff members’ expertise and host country characteristics can explain the observed variation among EU Delegation activities. These factors can contribute to better understanding the nature of the EU as an international actor.

Governance Territoriale Comunitaria e Sistemi di Pianificazione. Riflessioni sull'Allargamento ad Est dell'Unione Europea

This chapter details the transformation of the worldwide bilateral and multilateral diplomatic network under Article 221 TFEU, which ensures a more effective and coherent external action of the EU. It covers the Union’s international legal personality that reflects its capability to enter into diplomatic relations with third states and international organisations (Ios). It also recounts how the Union maintained 140 EU delegations and offices around the world 2023, most of which are bilateral delegations responsible for maintaining EU relations with a specific third country where they are established. The chapter describes regional delegations that are responsible for a third country other than the one where they are established. It talks about the decision of Article 221(1) TFEU and Article 5(8) EEAS for granting the EU Delegation with the power to represent the Union in the country of the IO where it is accredited.

Summary One of the Lisbon Treaty’s most significant innovations was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which changed the EU’s functioning not only in Brussels, but also around the world. Zooming in on the multilateral context of the UN in New York, this article examines the new EU delegations and highlights the main challenges that are inherent in their establishment. These delegations could be engrafted upon a wide network of European Commission delegations, yet the literature gives little indication of success in integrating the functions and actors. Adding to the literature and building upon interviews with policy officials in both Brussels and New York, this article indicates an additional external challenge in implementing Lisbon’s provisions, with the context of the UN General Assembly raising more fundamental questions on status and membership — questions that have also shaped the role of the EU delegation to the UN during its first year of operation.

The withdrawal of the UK may weaken the EU diplomatic network, since few Member States have a diplomatic network comparable to the UK. Brexit might also complicate the provision of consular protection to unrepresented EU citizens in third countries and increase the workload of other Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions. To address these problems, the Member States may strengthen diplomatic coordination and increase the responsibilities of EU delegations in the sensitive area of consular protection. An important precedent in this respect might be set by the new EU delegation in the UK, which should ensure the implementation of the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement and, consequently, the protection of EU nationals in the UK. Though it constitutes a challenge for EU diplomacy, Brexit offers the opportunity to strengthen the EU’s ‘equality with states’ in the diplomatic arena.

Abstract. The study tries to discover to what extent knowledge of the local language of a diplomat’s host country, and language skills generally, are considered while selecting candidates for EU delegation heads in the European External Action Service. With this aim, the study examines possible correlations between languages spoken by the EU delegation heads and the official languages in their respective host countries. It is concluded that a correlation often exists between the language(s), and especially mother tongues, spoken by the EU delegation heads and the official language(s) in the countries to which they are posted and, thus, a candidate’s knowledge of the host country’s official language is usually taken into account in the selection of candidates for EU delegation heads, although this criterion seems to carry different weight for candidates from various EU member countries. Keywords: EEAS, heads of EU delegations, EEAS staffing policy, EU diplomacy, languages in diplomacy

This paper analyses the processes of Europeanisation of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries and focuses on their comparison through the Greek and Turkish examples. It firstly presents a theoretical framework on the concept of Europeanisation with respect to the foreign policy realm in the EU. The paper, secondly, differentiates between the Europeanisation processes of foreign policy in EU member and candidate countries, and argues that these two processes can be compared by analysing Greek and Turkish foreign policies towards each other since 1999, when Turkey was declared as a candidate country to the EU. The Turkish and Greek cases are, thus, taken as mirror examples of the Europeanisation processes in EU member and candidate country foreign policies. The paper concludes the result of such a comparison is that these processes in member and candidate countries bear more similarities than differences.

Who Is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate Countries' Referenda

The article examines China’s policy in Eastern Europe within the framework of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’. The level of Ukraine’s involvement in the cooperation within the framework of this initiative and China’s policy in general is analyzed. It is stressed that in recent years, the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is not only economic but also political and security project of China. The main purpose of the initiative is to consolidate the role of Beijing as one of the leaders in the modern world. It is noted that Europe is becoming increasingly important in China’s foreign policy. How-ever, in this region, it cannot use the usual strategy of wielding its influence, worked out in Asia and Africa. Therefore, Central and Eastern Europe, new EU members and candidate countries are considered as objects for spreading Chinese influence in the Old World. The article identifies the principal reasons for Beijing’s particular attention to Central and Eastern Europe. The main one is the relative weakness of state and political institutions and their vulnerability to financial and political instruments of the spread of Chinese influence. Also, the importance of the European Union as a market for Chinese goods continues to grow, therefore making the transit through the territory of the Eastern European countries increasingly important for Beijing. The significance of the ‘16+1’ format on the formation of a specific role of China in the region is considered. It is argued that the formal ground of the absence of Ukraine in the Chinese strategy in Central and Eastern Europe is that our state is not involved in the ‘16+1’ format. However, bilateral relations with Ukraine do not differ from those with Central and Eastern European countries. An important factor is the lack of Ukraine’s influence on political decisions of the EU, which is the main criterion for China. This accounts for the insufficient level of Ukraine’s involvement in the cooperation within the framework of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative. Keywords: ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, the People’s Republic of China, Eastern Europe, European Union, Ukraine, politics.

Turkey has long been characterized as “too big, too poor, too Muslim” to be a European country. This assertion permeated the political debates regarding Turkey’s accession to the Union in the early 2000s, leading to a Turkey versus the rest dichotomy: Other candidate countries are European, Turkey is not. A central dimension of this dichotomy was the juxtaposition of public attitudes toward EU membership in Turkey and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). A frequently evoked claim during the fifth enlargement of the Union was that the Turkish public supports EU membership due to its expected economic benefits while citizens in CEECs desire membership because they identify as European. In this article, I show that this claim was empirically false. Using data from the Eurobarometer survey for candidate countries, I statistically demonstrate that both Turks and citizens of CEECs supported EU membership for economic reasons. European identity played a negligible role in shaping mass support for EU membership in Turkey and other candidate countries alike. This study makes a central contribution to the existing literature by analyzing the relative impact of European identity and economic considerations on public support for EU membership in Turkey and CEECs. The results fill an important void in the existing scholarship and contribute to ongoing political debates on Turkey’s EU membership

Summary This article focuses on institutionalized forms of diplomatic cooperation among European Union (eu) members in southern Mediterranean capitals. It argues that European diplomatic cooperation represents a thin form of multilateralization of member states’ bilateral relations with southern Mediterranean countries. By analysing diplomatic presence on the ground, it shows that the European Union delegations in the area are not only big, but also politically strong, and they interact with a large number of national diplomats. The article examines how eu delegations in the southern Mediterranean represent a diplomatic ‘site’, in which diplomacy occurs in the shape of information-gathering, representation and negotiation, including among eu member states. This does not amount to a single European diplomatic system, however, as coordination remains thin to date and the agenda-setting mechanisms for eu delegations’ work and for European diplomatic cooperation have not (yet?) been fully developed.

For conditionality to be credible, it must be clearly benchmarked and be applied with consistency. Similarly, commitment to conformity and compliance with conditionality must be fairly evaluated. Regular monitoring was chosen by the EU as the means to communicate the criteria of accession and assess progress and to highlight shortcomings in adaptation by the CEECs. The Opinions of 1997 and the five sets of annual Regular Reports from 1998 to 2002 were the main outlets for the Commission’s monitoring process. These documents are the only official and transparent public statements of the Commission’s assessments of the progress of the candidate countries over time. The Reports fell within the remit of DG Enlargement where the monitoring process was overseen by the Horizontal Co-Ordination Unit that also produced a manual for the country desks highlighting the issues to be covered. On the basis of reports from the EU delegations in the candidate countries, complemented by information supplied by other international institutions, NGOs and some member states’ governments, the country desks produced the drafts of the annual Reports.KeywordsRegional DevelopmentRegional PolicyStructural FundLegislative FrameworkCandidate CountryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.