Winning the right to work through solidarity: The Argentine workers’ self-management movement

Ratner, Steven R. <i>The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations</i>.New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 496. $85.00 (cloth).

Legal norms are an invention. In this chapter, I advance an account of the kind of invention that they are and how they are similar to and different from other sorts of norms, and specifically other social norms and moral norms. The idea is to place legal norms in a larger framework for analyzing institutional structure derived from work on institutional agency and to see them as having the same fundamental ontological and normative significance as other norms grounded in the description of organizational structure—adjusting only for their place in relation to other social norms of that type. In a nutshell, I will argue that legal norms are special variety of norms deriving from (i) the adoption of a basic set of institutional roles for a group that (ii) make provision for roles in which authority is invested to make policy within the framework of the institution. The norms governing the roles in the institution derive from the functions associated with the roles in its formation and the additional constraints and duties assigned by way of the institution’s mechanisms for issuing policies. The roles are status roles. Status roles are a specific variety of status function. Status functions are functions that items have in social transactions which they can serve only in virtue of having been collective accepted as having those functions—like being a royal seal or a five pound note. Membership in an institutional group is a status role defined by the nature of the group. Status roles within an institutional group are typically further differentiated into an organized pattern of inter-defined roles. The roles are inter-defined in the sense that the function of each is defined in relation to interactions with others functioning in their roles. The persistence of a stable institution over time consists in the successive occupation of the organized pattern of roles that define it by successive waves of agents. The function of status roles in social transactions requires their possessor to intentionally exercise her agency in the role as appropriate. The concepts of rights and duties associated with a role, and hence norms relating to it, derive from their design functions. The point of calling them rights and duties arises from the recognition that human agents in the roles will not always successfully executed the functions associated with them. The design function is then a regulative ideal. This aspect of our understanding of them is captured in the language of rights and duties. The design function provides a norm with respect to which to evaluate the agent with the role and rules directing and constraining action in the role. The authority of these rights and duties over individuals in these roles derives from their being party to the collective acceptance by which they are maintained. The policies may be enforced by mechanisms that involves forms of coercion in the interest of maintaining a stable and well-functioning institution, but these mechanisms provide external reasons for adherence to the norms, and are not a source of authority (cf. POWs). There may be moral reasons for adherence to the norms as well, but if so these are external to the concept of the rights and duties associated with the role in virtue of its definition. Legal norms are special case in that they are derived from the basic institutional framework in a society as a whole within which all other agential activity takes place and the rules promulgated by its policy making bodies (roughly those who contribute to making law and fixing its interpretation), which by design are to take priority over other social or group policies. This is compatible with making provision for a hierarchy of relevant policy making bodies recognized by the highest level as having authority with respect to more limited geographical regions or subpopulations in the society that have a function of providing a framework of social life and which take priority over other social policies and practices, though still constrained by laws promulgated at higher levels (city, county, state, nation—and similar hierarchies of government). Thus, legal norms are socially constructed, the authority they have derives from the acceptance by those they govern of the roles thereby defined, and the coincidence of legal and moral norms or the generation of moral norms from legal norms is a matter external to the status of those norms as legal.

The concepts of 'liability age' and 'capacity responsibility' have been widely dissected by researchers in various fields. However, their application to both criminal and tort liability of children remains inconsistent. Furthermore, rarely has an interdisciplinary approach adequately dealt with these concepts and their impact on legal norms. This text investigates the notion of criminal and tort liability age in connection with the notion of capacity responsibility, in relation to children, and further questions the adequacy of the relevant legal norms. This endeavour to improve the applicable legal norms is supported by an analysis of the pertinent findings in the field of psychology, particularly in respect of the moral development of children. Informed by an excursion through the ideas of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan, among others, regarding the moral development of children, the text also serves to assess the impact of concepts of moral responsibility and maturity, in relation to the development of the legal norms, which determine the age of liability of children. The text concludes with a proposal for a criminal and tort liability age framework, based upon indicative/presumptive age milestones, and an integrated approach to all relevant circumstances in casu.

Urban struggles and theorising from Eastern European cities

Among the values conceptualising and measuring planning processes and outcomes, two play a prominent role in liberal democracies: legal and economic. Current conceptions and practices framing these values face substantial challenges: civil law systems do not account for the variety of land use situations, increases in wealth inequalities, and human activities which threaten planetary boundaries. A way to tackle these challenges is to analyse the current theoretical discourse and legal norms framing values in planning, study alternative conceptions, and outline new responses. The present article investigates how a paradigm shift in planning theory may open new avenues for conceptualising legal and economic values. To do so, it first compares the episteme of land ownership defined by two theories applied to planning: law-and-economics and land master theory. Second, drawing upon the comparison, the article discusses how the strengths of each theory may contribute to filling the gaps of the others. Identified gaps are: the integration of political aspects into the analysis, the conceptualization of collective and use-specific forms of ownership, and methodological issues. These gaps mirror the western legal conception of land ownership, defined as individual and absolute. Fourth, based on collective and use-specific land management practices that develop within the western legal framework, and theoretical inputs from land master theory, the article puts forward a transduction of legal norms that foster a more sustainable conception of land ownership, known as land stewardship.

(1992). Editorial: Collective Social Work Practices: Group and Community Work. Australian Social Work: Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 2-2.

The cyclical nature of capitalism reflected in the current economic crises encourages a review of the economic downturn of the 1970s and 1980s in Europe where workers engaged in sit-ins, work-ins and worker buyouts to save their jobs. Hundreds were successful and thousands of jobs were saved. Spain was at the forefront of this strategy and introduced legislation in 1986 to enshrine the worker self-managed company, Sociedades Laborales, as a policy for corporate restructuring. This article reports on the research in Spain conducted into company failure due to insolvency and the subsequent rescue by an employee-centred equity buyout. Seven firms in the metals industry are examined where workers rescued insolvent factories using the Sociedades Laborales democratic model. The research shows that sustainable democratic corporate governance was possible based on worker self-management and this was achieved by the workers making choices to overcome the conundrum of balancing democratic governance and market efficiency.

This chapter locates legal normativity in social normative practice. Gardner’s jurisprudence points to the ‘Euthyphro’ gap between legal and moral points of view. This insight suggests that if one accepts both (1) law’s moral potential and (2) its social foundations, then our account of legal normativity ought to allow for the possibility of making the ‘leap’ from one point of view to the other—moving from a non-ideal case to one in which law fulfils its moral potential. Gardner suggests that the leap of faith enabling this lies in law’s source of validity. Whereas Gardner envisions that source in a presupposition, this chapter focuses on social normative practice. This requires that norms be transmitted socially. Social normative practice involves the transfer of the internal point of view itself from one person to another, and is possible because of the affective and associational ties people have to one another.

Law is an important component in a community. Development of society of course also be influential for the development of the law, thus the development of society would require a legal development that is in tune with the needs and development of the times. One of the components that play an important role in the development of the law is a legal researcher. The role of legal research in building the national legal system is very important to reveal the scientific data concerning aspects of philosophical, juridical, sociological, economic, and political, which can affect the development of the necessary legal Government of Indonesia as a development policy in the legal field. Researcher as implementers of development, especially in the field of law, in order to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and optimize the necessary coordination at all levels both internal and external level ministry / agency. Researchers law, not only the need to coordinate with other researchers in the field of law only, but also need to coordinate with researchers in other fields as well as coordinate with other functional associated, in particular functional designer of law, because the creation of a legislation can not be monodicipliner done alone. The study, conducted by researchers aimed to formulate new legal norms that have been suggested by the study, and also formulate alternatives. The materials obtained from these studies can be used as input in the preparation of Academic Legislation of the bill to be drafted.Keyword: researcher, legal research, law making

Contents: Introduction: consumption as a gendered social practice, Beth Fowkes Tobin Consuming Desires: 'The things I so indispensably needed': material objects as a reflection of Mary Shelley's life, Pamela Siska Material women: the department-store fashion poster in Paris, 1880-1900, Ruth E. Iskin Nostalgic appetites: female desire and wartime rationing in Virginia Woolf's Between the Acts and Noel Streatfield's Saplings, Andrea Adolph. Home and Consumption: A touch of distinction: furnishing French aristocratic homes in the 19th and 20th centuries, Elizabeth C. Macknight 'Novel and ingenious': innovative graphic arts in the women's magazines of the 1840s and the construction of middle-class taste, Cynthia Patterson The woman's paradise: the American fantasy, home appliances, and consumer demand in liberation France, Rebecca J. Pulju Talking points: advertising female telephone identity, Emily Bills. Dress: Gendered and Political Identities: Trans-coding nationalism: subjectivity and military themes in Regency women's dress, Ellen Kennedy Johnson 'The beauty of her hands': the glove and the making of middle-class body, Ariel Beaujot Made for maharanis: aesthetics of courtly women in colonial princely India, Angma D. Jhala Harmony and concealment: how Chinese women fashioned the qipao in 1930s China, Wessie Ling Women, clothing and politics in Senegal in the 1940s-1950s, Dior Konate. Collecting, Displaying, and Creating Value: The duchess's shells: natural history collecting, gender, and scientific practice, Beth Fowkes Tobin Woman of letters: Elizabeth Gaskell's autograph collection and Victorian celebrity, Pamela Corpron Parker The women of Liulichang: female collectors and bibliophiles in the late Qing, Shana J. Brown Japanese objects in Impressionist women's art: collecting culture and creating identity, Jennifer T. Criss The female past and modernity: displaying women and things in New Zealand department stores, expositions, and museums, 192

&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;At a time when healthcare is experiencing a global shortage of nurses, and safety culture permeates hospitals compounding the challenges in caring for patients, nurses are responding using nursing leadership practices to influence and lead each other, to protect nurses and nursing identity and respond to safety culture expectations.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Leadership is a social practice of influence. Nursing leadership has long been associated with the formal nursing roles within the profession. Through survey, interviews and case studies, leader-centric research has focused on nursing leaders, their styles, qualities, traits, and functions and has been associated with positive patient outcomes, reduced errors and nursing satisfaction and retention. Little is known about how nursing leadership practices occur in the hospital ward nursing team and the situations and context in which this happens. The purpose of this research was to describe and explore how nursing leadership practices were occurring in contemporary hospital wards in Aotearoa New Zealand. Through the lens of leadership-as-practice, this focused ethnography utilised 18 months of episodic fieldwork observations in four wards of a hospital, individual discussions with nurses, and a collection of artefacts. Qualitative analysis revealed the setting that was simultaneously complex and mundane and that nurses engaged in leadership practices in various moments. What nurses said about leadership varied from the activity and performance of leadership practices. Crucially leadership was not the sole practice of those named in formal roles. Informal leaders or those nurses without formal leadership titles led others.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;This thesis describes distinct new understanding about collective nursing leadership practices at all levels of the nursing team. Being present, being alongside, being apart, and role-modelling and enabling followership were patterns of leading that emerged within the data. Safeguarding practices of leadership occurred in response to the safety conscious context which exposed nurses to vulnerabilities and perpetuated the leadership practices. These safeguarding practices anticipated, shielded, and protected patients and nurses. In turn, nurses adapted and developed resilient leadership practices to maintain wellbeing, and the identity of nurses and the nursing team so that both nurses and patients would be safe. Nursing leadership practices are visible at all levels of the nursing team in response to the hospital ward. These collective practices have implications for healthcare practice, for nursing education and the profession of nursing.&lt;/p&gt;

This volume presents the proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Design of Cooperative Systems (COOP 2016). The conference is a venue for multidisciplinary research contributing to the design, assessment and analysis of cooperative systems and their integration in organizations, public venues, and everyday life. COOP emerged from the European tradition of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and Cognitive Ergonomics. A collection of 22 papers and 4 workshop overviews are presented, reflecting the variety of research activities in the field of the design of cooperative systems with a special emphasis on Making Together This collection offers a broad vision of collective working practices and cooperative design, embracing the idea that design requires a deep understanding of collective activities, involving both artefacts and social practices within a context. The result is a rich and articulated debate that widens the design space towards the exploration of a variety of forms of participation and engagement in collaborative system design. Experienced researchers, academics, designers and practitioners who are interested in collaborative design theory and methods would be interested in the state of the art research and case studies this collection provides.

Some social practices and institutions can be described as epistemic because they are aimed in significant part at the acquisition and proliferation of true belief, knowledge, justification, understanding, and other epistemic goods. If they involve sufficient levels of integration and complexity, it can make sense to refer to them as epistemic systems. Whether consciously designed or emerging gradually over time, when they are working well these complex human creations help us learn about and accurately track what is going on in some domain or with some part of the world. This chapter suggests that systems of legal procedure—including the rules and institutions relating to legal investigation and fact-finding, rules and practices regarding the role and responsibilities of lawyers and judges, pretrial discovery processes, trial processes including rules regarding relevance and admissibility of evidence, and post-trial appeals, among others—are carefully refined, integrated, holistic epistemic systems. One aim in this chapter is to draw attention to the importance of the holistic nature of an epistemic system, such as a system of legal procedure. A secondary aim is to draw attention to the complex interaction between what might be valuable epistemically and what is permissible morally when it comes to social norms, practices, institutions, and systems—including, but not limited to, legal norms, practices, institutions, and systems. Systems of legal procedure are holistic epistemic systems, but they are also suffused with moral limitations and considerations; they are not purely epistemic systems.

This article critically examines the methodology of defining the essence of law, revealing a fundamental flaw in many legal theories that equate the general concept of law with its specific form — juridical law. Legal scholars typically view law as a civilizational phenomenon, largely disregarding its historical development and the existence of other forms of law, such as primitive customary law (preceding juridical law) and humanistic law (which follows it). Only dialectical legal theory, developed in recent decades, has proposed this broader perspective, challenging the traditional focus on juridical law as the sole manifestation of legal reality. A significant limitation of mainstream legal theories is their failure to address the species-level essence of law, often reducing it to class-based and state-sanctioned norms. While some theorists, such as S. S. Alekseev, recognize the idea of “humanistic law,” they frame it as an advanced stage of juridical law rather than a distinct form of law. Conversely, early societies are either considered devoid of legal structures or are assumed to operate under an ambiguous notion of “natural law,” which does not align with their actual social practices. The article highlights a fundamental issue in legal categorization: legal scholars frequently classify law using arbitrary criteria without adhering to logical principles of taxonomic division. As a result, numerous subcategories of law—such as objective and subjective law, private and public law, national and international law—are defined inconsistently, lacking a systematic approach to distinguishing general and specific legal concepts. This methodological oversight obscures the deeper essence of law and prevents a coherent understanding of its true nature. Even scholars closest to the dialectical approach, such as L. S. Yavich, failed to establish a clear methodology for determining the essence of law. Yavich attempted to explain law through its class-based nature and economic determination, arguing that juridical norms represent the institutionalized will of the ruling class. However, his analysis remains incomplete, as it does not clarify how this “deep essence” of law emerges or how it fundamentally structures legal relations. Yavich identifies juridical law’s normative properties, arguing that objective and subjective law are interdependent and function as a unified whole within legal systems. Nevertheless, he does not resolve key contradictions inherent in his framework, particularly regarding the relationship between legal norms and individual legal rights. The article argues that a truly scientific understanding of law requires a dialectical approach that situates law within a broader historical and logical framework. Instead of viewing juridical law as the universal form of law, legal scholars must recognize the plurality of legal forms and analyze their evolution from primitive customary norms to class-based legal structures and beyond. Furthermore, legal norms should not be limited to legislative prescriptions, as many traditional theories assume. Rather, they must be understood as actual behavioral norms that materialize in real legal relationships, thereby moving beyond the abstract “objective-subjective” dichotomy. A comparison is also made with A. F. Zakomlistov’s “normological approach,” which claims to offer a universal legal theory free from class-based constraints. However, Zakomlistov reduces the essence of law to its juridical form, defining it through anthropological and ethical abstractions rather than historical material conditions. His view of law as an “anthropological norm” that defines human existence detaches law from its concrete social and economic basis, ultimately leading to an abstract and non-historical legal conception. Legal understanding will remain trapped within the confines of juridical essence unless scholars adopt a dialectical methodology that fully accounts for law’s historical transformations. While juridical law remains the dominant legal form in class-based societies, it does not exhaust the full spectrum of legal reality. A comprehensive legal theory must integrate insights from dialectical logic and materialist history to accurately define the nature of law as a social phenomenon. Without such a methodology, legal scholars risk conflating law with state-sanctioned norms, thereby obscuring its deeper ontological and historical foundations. Key words: essence of law, juridical essence, dialectical legal theory, legal normativity, class-based law, types of law, primitive law, humanistic law.

Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide